

COMPILATION OF PRECURSOR-RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD RELEVANT TO IMPLEMENTATION BY GOVERNMENTS

INTRODUCTION

This document is a compilation of the recommendations relating to international precursor control produced by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The recommendations have been compiled utilising the Board's annual reports on precursors from 2016-2000 and the Annual Reports from 2016-2004. As such, the document is an all-encompassing reflection of every single recommendation made by the Board in these published reports.

The document is structured thematically and includes sections on legislation and control measures, pre-export notifications (PENs), multilateral mechanisms, investigations, seizures and other reporting to the Board, industry cooperation, training and capacity-building, and substance and country specific contexts.

The document is also linked to the INCB Information Package, which is available to officials of competent national authorities on the Board's restricted web page (<https://www.incb.org/incb/en/precursors/cna.html>) and has a section (Part D) entitled "Summary of Recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board Relevant to Implementation by Governments of Article 12 of the 1988 Convention". This section of the Information Package provides a practice oriented means of implementing systems, mechanisms and processes related to international precursor control. By comparison this document contains INCB recommendations in their original and unedited form. Hyperlinks have been added to Part D of the Information Package where appropriate to direct one to specific sections within this compilation of recommendations.

The referencing (sourcing) on this document appears in the following format: publication type/year of publication/paragraph or recommendation number. The initialism 'AR' means 'Annual Report' and 'PR' means 'Precursors Report'; 'P' refers to the paragraph in which the recommendation can be found, and 'R' refers to the recommendation in the Annual Report. For example, the reference 'PRE/2016/P9' can be found in the INCB Precursors Technical Report 2016, in paragraph 9. The reference 'AR/2008/R30' translates to INCB Annual Report 2008, recommendation 30.

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Part 1. Legislation and Control Measures

Recommendation	Reference (source)
The Board urges the [...] States that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention to implement the provisions of article 12 and accede to the Convention without further delay.	(PRE/2016/P9) (PRE/2015/P5) (PRE/2015/P30) (PRE/2014/P40) (PRE/2013/P10) (PRE/2012/P5) (PRE/2011/P10) (PRE/2010/P6) (PRE/2009/P9) (PRE/2008/P9) (PRE/2008/P87) (PRE/2007/P6) (PRE/2006/P21) (PRE/2004/P15) (PRE/2003/P8) (PRE/2002/P8) (PRE/2001/P7)
It is critical to recognize that the ability to comply with the requirements set out in the 1988 Convention for the monitoring of international trade is very closely intertwined with the existence of the corresponding legal basis at the national level and of an appropriate regulatory framework, procedures and working mechanisms . Without information about the domestic market and its players, including end users, a party may not be in a position to comply with its obligations related to preventing the diversion of precursors.	(PRE/2012/P127)
The Board therefore calls upon all countries concerned to introduce appropriate precursor control legislation in compliance with the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, as necessary, or to enhance existing legislative provisions with a view to strengthening the monitoring and control mechanisms already in place and to inform the Board of such measures in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29 of 30 July 1992.	(PRE/2004/P44)
The Board urges the Governments in question to adopt, as a matter of priority, necessary legislative measures to prevent [the diversion of precursors]. In accordance with the Political Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session (Assembly resolution S-20/2, annex), Governments should report to the Board in a regular and timely manner on the adoption of, or changes to, national regulations to control precursors.	(PRE/2008/P88)
The Board urges Governments to establish and strengthen mechanisms for tracking the domestic and international movement of those precursor chemicals and to provide the relevant data to the Board . The Board expects that, with the further development of cooperation under Project Prism, which monitors both international trade in and domestic distribution of those substances, more comprehensive data on the trade in such precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants will become available.	(PRE/2004/P26)
The Board has noted over the years that different control measures in various countries have created situations such as that observed in connection with Belize and encourages all Governments, including in transit countries, to harmonize, and ensure the adequacy of, their legislation to deal with emerging challenges.	(PRE/2010/P64)

The Board notes that the authorities of China are standardizing procedures relating to the purchase and transport of precursor chemicals. Furthermore, those authorities have also strengthened controls over chemicals being exported to countries forming part of the Golden Triangle. The Board **trusts that those efforts** will be of benefit to **Asia** as a whole.

(PRE/2006/P122)

A) Working mechanisms and operating procedures

The Board urges all States that have not yet done so to take steps to establish the necessary **control mechanisms to adequately monitor the licit trade** in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. Information on licit trade is essential to government efforts to monitor the movement of those substances and for the Board to assist Governments in identifying suspicious transactions. Without such information, it would be difficult to quickly check the legitimacy of individual shipments. Furthermore, monitoring such activities enables the Board to **determine general trends in global trade in scheduled precursor chemicals** in order to assist Governments in identifying unusual transactions and diversion attempts. The availability of such information also **facilitates licit trade, by expediting, for instance, the issuance of import and export authorizations** where required.

(PRE/2006/P52) (AR/2008/R30)
(PRE/2007/P85) (PRE/2003/P20)
(PRE/2002/P20) (PRE/2001/P18)
(PRE/2000/P23)

The Board requests all Governments **to establish or strengthen existing procedures** to allow them to adequately **monitor** the licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and to report relevant data in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution **1995/20**.

(PRE/2004/P22) (PRE/2013/P21)
(PRE/2014/P57) (PRE/2012/P18)

INCB commends those Governments that **provide comprehensive licit trade data** for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and wishes to encourage all other Governments to provide such data, confidentially if so desired, **to help to understand the patterns of regular trade and licit requirements in order to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity** and prevent diversion of those substances.

(PRE/2016/P24) (PRE/2015/P21)
(AR/2005/R12) (PRE/2003/P26)

The Board notes the **introduction of regulations** as an important step in reducing the potential for diversion and **reminds Governments of exporting countries to keep themselves informed of existing import restrictions** and to consult available resources, such as the information package for competent national authorities available on the Board's website.

(PRE/2010/P40)

INCB wishes to encourage all competent national authorities **to remain vigilant** not only regarding the diversion of precursor chemicals from **international trade** but also **regarding their diversion from domestic distribution channels** and to pay **particular attention to the legitimate final use** of key precursor chemicals and the quantity required for that purpose.

(PRE/2015/P68)

The Board urges the Governments of the manufacturing, exporting and trans-shipment countries to ensure that [...] the **entire physical routing of the shipment is known prior** to an export being authorized.

(PRE/2003/P55)

<p>The Board urges Governments to continue to strengthen their control mechanisms with regard to precursors, including the establishment of realistic estimates of legitimate requirements, and thereby reduce the risk of diversion and of being targeted by traffickers.</p>	<p>(PRE/2010/P43) (PRE/2010/P88)</p>
<p>The Board reminds Governments of exporting countries to keep themselves informed of the importing country's existing import restrictions to ensure that their exports do not violate the laws and regulations of the importing country, and to consult available resources, such as the information package for competent national authorities available on the Board's website.</p>	<p>(PRE/2011/P16) (PRE/2011/P161) (AR/2011/R13)</p>
<p>The Board encourages Governments to monitor and report on trade in precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants.</p>	<p>(AR/2005/R6) (PRE/2001/P24)</p>
<p>The Board reiterates its recommendation that all Governments verify that licit requirements exist for all precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants ordered within a country prior to authorizing an import, especially when [...] the "end-product" is another controlled chemical.</p>	<p>(PRE/2003/P95)</p>
<p>Governments are urged to ensure that, when an importing company is identified, the legitimate need of the company for a specific precursor chemical is confirmed before the shipment is authorized. Mechanisms should also be introduced to monitor the activities of brokers, especially when a consignment of precursor chemicals is not shipped to the country where the broker is located.</p>	<p>(PRE/2005/P141)</p>
<p>The Board urges all Governments to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are put in place to allow for controlled deliveries of chemicals, since that investigative technique should be more widely utilized in precursor investigations. Moreover, since commodity brokers play a major role in the international trade of acetic anhydride and other chemicals, Governments should closely monitor the activities of such operators. National legislation should allow for the prosecution of illicit activities even when the chemicals concerned do not enter a national territory.</p>	<p>(PRE/2002/P81)</p>
<p>The Board reminds competent authorities to be aware that the names of legitimate companies may be misused by traffickers to source the substances for the illicit manufacture of drugs.</p>	<p>(PRE/2014/P88)</p>
<p>The Board requests Governments throughout the world to take note of the modus operandi (using the names of bona fide companies with legitimate requirements for potassium permanganate), and ensure that the legitimacy of all shipments for which pre-export notifications are received is verified with the companies concerned and not authorized on face value merely because the company is known.</p>	<p>(PRE/2001/P71)</p>
<p>The Board urges the Governments concerned to strengthen the capacity of their competent authorities to investigate the legitimacy of precursor transactions.</p>	<p>(AR/2008/R13)</p>
<p>With traffickers now increasingly making use of false import certificates in attempted diversions of precursor chemicals, the Board urges Governments using such certificates to supply it with samples of those documents.</p>	<p>(PRE/2002/P102)</p>
<p>The Board wishes to encourage the Governments of all major manufacturing and trading countries of acetic anhydride, such as Mexico and the United States, to remain vigilant and to verify the legitimacy of all shipments of the</p>	<p>(PRE/2008/P77)</p>

substance, in particular those destined for either new markets or new customers.	
The Board advises all countries that manufacture, trade in or export acetic anhydride not to export acetic anhydride to Afghanistan (as there is no legitimate use for the substance in the country).	(PRE/2009/P15)
While existing legal procedures had been followed to import the substance, the Board urges all Governments of countries in Africa to thoroughly check reported end-users and actual licit requirements before authorizing shipments , as traffickers have been known to both set up front companies and use the names of existing companies for diversion attempts.	(PRE/2006/P117)
The Board therefore advises the Governments of African countries (Governments in the Caribbean, and surrounding regions) to be particularly vigilant with regard to shipments of potassium permanganate to their countries and to immediately respond to pre-export notifications and to inform the Board and the Governments of exporting countries of any suspicious transactions.	(PRE/2007/P70) (PRE/2005/P54)
The Board continues to be concerned that the trafficking organizations operating in the country may have continued their illicit activities and diversion attempts involving Iraq or other countries in West Asia . The Board therefore reiterates its request to Governments of countries that export acetic anhydride to unknown companies in Iraq to require authorization before releasing the shipment.	(PRE/2012/P113) (PRE/2011/P123)
The Board urges Governments to take measures, in addition to their controls over international trade, to adequately monitor the licit manufacture and distribution, as well to prevent the accumulation in quantities exceeding their legitimate requirements , of all precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants , in particular the precursors 3,4-MDP-2-P, P-2-P and phenylacetic acid .	(PRE/2007/P87)
The Board wishes to remind all exporting Governments that shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine , regardless of their form, are prohibited in Guatemala , as well as in Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua .	(PRE/2012/P50)
The Board encourages [Canada and China] to furnish their licit trade information as soon as possible.	(PRE/2003/P19)
The Board commends the Government of France for this amendment [a new internal mechanism to enable the competent authority for article 12 to send pre-export notifications for P-2-P despite the fact that the substance is controlled as a narcotic drug and hence under the purview of another authority], which will help to ensure an unbroken chain of monitoring of international trade in P-2-P .	(PRE/2014/P54)
The Board commends the efforts of Indian authorities to require importing countries to actively approve shipments of precursor chemicals in cases in which the company is unknown and calls on other exporting countries to exercise the same level of due diligence.	(PRE/2011/P58)
The Board wishes to encourage Pakistan to collect and furnish the requested data (the importing of large quantities of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention) without further delay.	(PRE/2006/P51) (PRE/2005/P102) (PRE/2004/P21) (PRE/2004/P29)

In the light of the prevailing situation in several countries in West Asia, such as the **Syrian Arab Republic**, INCB encourages all countries to exercise a **heightened level of vigilance regarding large-scale orders for pseudoephedrine placed by companies in conflict areas** and to consider suspending the authorization of such shipments unless there is explicit confirmation regarding the legitimacy of the shipment and the end use of the substance, and secure transportation and handling can be assured. (PRE/2015/P71)

INCB therefore recommends all exporting countries **not to authorize any shipment of P-2-P to the Syrian Arab Republic unless its legitimate final use has been duly confirmed by the relevant competent national authorities**. INCB requests all exporting countries to communicate to it any significant order placed for **P-2-P** to be exported to the **Syrian Arab Republic** or any other country in order to allow for follow-up with the competent national authorities. (PRE/2015/P83)

INCB encourages the authorities of all exporting countries to exercise **vigilance in relation to any planned export of P-2-P or 3,4-MDP-2-P to Zimbabwe or elsewhere**, considering that those substances are traded and used by a relatively small number of countries. (PRE/2015/P25)

B) Invoking article 12, paragraph 10(a) of the 1988 Convention

INCB urges the Governments of those countries (yet to invoke article 12, paragraph 10(a), and make proper use of pre-export notifications systems) to **take the necessary steps to invoke the provisions** of article 12, paragraph 10 (a), without further delay. Forms to be used for formally requesting to be notified of all shipments of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention are available from INCB. The Board also wishes to remind the Governments of all countries exporting substances in Tables I and II that it is an **obligation to provide pre-export notifications** to the authorities of importing countries and territories that have requested them. (PRE/2015/P29) (PRE/2014/P62) (PRE/2013/P26) (PRE/2012/P26) (AR/2012/R11) (PRE/2011/P25) (AR/2011/R15) (PRE/2010/P20) (PRE/2001/P33) (PRE/2000/P36)

The Board calls upon all **importing countries** that have not yet done so, to consider **formally requesting the provision of pre-export notifications** through the Secretary-General under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. (PRE/2003/P34) (PRE/2008/P27)

[The Board] encourages the Governments of **exporting countries** to **request pre-export notifications** to enable them to ensure the adequate monitoring of shipments of precursor chemicals entering their territories that may be destined for subsequent re-export. (PRE/2002/P34) (PRE/2001/P33)

The Board therefore urges all Governments to ensure that they are **informed of any proposed export** of precursors and **are able to provide pre-export notifications**, particularly to the importing countries that have officially requested such notifications. (PRE/2012/P25) (PRE/2011/P26)

The countries concerned have to **recognize their responsibility to create the conditions for being notified** of exports of precursor chemicals. Otherwise, they may continue to be regarded as easy targets by organizations trafficking in such chemicals. The provisions of article **12, paragraph 10 (a)**, if used and implemented by all, could **create a robust and practical mechanism** for the control of international trade in scheduled chemicals. (PRE/2012/P138)

The Board wishes to remind Governments that **by registering with PEN Online, they do not automatically invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a)**, of the 1988 Convention. (PRE/2014/P68)

The Board calls on the **45 Governments that have registered to use PEN Online but have not yet invoked the provisions of article 12**, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention to invoke those provisions without further delay. (PRE/2013/P28)

The updated list of specific requests received from Governments are reproduced in annex V to the present (2005) report. The **list should assist Governments of exporting and re-exporting countries in ensuring that the required pre-export notifications** are sent to those importing countries **which have officially requested** them before the export takes place. (PRE/2005/P97)

C) Measures to prevent diversion from domestic distribution channels

The Board calls upon all parties to the 1988 Convention, in particular major trading countries, **to effectively monitor the domestic manufacture, trade, distribution and end-use** of precursor chemicals. (PRE/2010/P85)

The Board draws the attention of all parties to the **need to adequately monitor domestic manufacture and distribution** in order to **identify suspicious orders** and prevent diversion, in accordance with **article 12, paragraph 8**, of the 1988 Convention. (PRE/2009/P102)
(PRE/2015/P135) (PRE/2008/P57)
(PRE/2008/P92) (AR/2007/R16)
(AR/2006/R22)

The Board is concerned that **weaknesses in precursors control are most often the result of a lack of effective implementation of existing legislation**. All Governments are therefore urged to **review the effectiveness of their domestic chemical control systems** and work on closing any gaps in those systems and making them fit for their purpose. (PRE/2014/P32) (AR/2015/R9)
(PRE/2013/P148)
(PRE/2012/P152) (AR/2009/R36)

In order to be effective, they (parties to the Convention) should, pursuant to **paragraph 8 (b) of article 12**: (a) **control all persons and enterprises** engaged in the manufacture and distribution of such substances; (b) **control under licence the establishment and premises in which such manufacture or distribution may take place**; (c) require that **licences obtain a permit** for conducting the aforesaid operations; and (d) **prevent the accumulation of such substances** in the possession of manufacturers and distributors, in excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of business and the prevailing market conditions. In accordance with its mandate under article 12, paragraph 8 (a), the **Board reviews controls in States parties to the Convention to ascertain whether they have taken the measures necessary to implement the provisions of the Convention**. (PRE/2006/P34)

The Board urges Governments to **focus domestic control efforts on the beginning of the chemical supply chain, starting with the verification of the bona fides of all new companies entering business**. (PRE/2011/P151)

Declaration of end-use and an understanding of the legitimate requirements for precursor chemicals by registered companies are among the **key control measures** that can assist Governments in preventing diversions. (AR/2012/R10)

To address the challenges of the future, Governments should **review precursor-related information-sharing and practical working mechanisms between concerned regulatory and law enforcement agencies**. They should ensure that there are neither gaps nor overlaps in responsibility that might be exploited by organizations trafficking in precursors.

(PRE/2012/P133)

States parties are reminded that pursuant to **article 18 of the 1988 Convention**, they are obliged to apply control measures in **free trade zones and free ports** that are no less stringent than those applied in other parts of their territories.

(PRE/2016/P210) (AR/2006/R12)

As in other regions, the scenario of **criminals continually setting up illicit laboratories** is well documented and, within the scope of existing legislation, authorities should **make efforts to prevent such recurring activities**.

(PRE/2005/P35)

The creation of **common internal markets** may present some difficulties regarding control that competent national authorities should be aware of and effectively address.

(PRE/2012/P134)

The Board calls upon all Governments to **evaluate the efficiency of their control measures applied to domestic trade in acetic anhydride** and to adopt further measures as deemed necessary to prevent such diversions.

(AR/2010/R31) (PRE/2009/P79)
(PRE/2009/P92) (PRE/2006/P114)

The Board encourages Governments of all trading countries to **strengthen their efforts to verify**, to the extent possible, **the legitimacy of the end-use of acetic anhydride** in their countries.

(PRE/2009/P90) (PRE/2006/P114)

INCB therefore encourages Governments to consider the **registration of all companies** that are in any way involved in **acetic anhydride** manufacture, trade, distribution or end use. INCB wishes once more to encourage Governments of countries in which **acetic anhydride** and other scheduled substances are manufactured to **report accurate, complete and up-to-date details of such manufacture** in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20.

(PRE/2015/P142)
(PRE/2014/P182)
(PRE/2013/P108)
(PRE/2012/P109)

The Board wishes to remind national competent authorities that in cases of isolated imports of large amounts of **acetic anhydride** by **unknown companies** located in countries that in the past imported minor amounts of the substance, the **claims** of the importer that the substance will be used for **“domestic consumption or distribution” should not be regarded as sufficient proof of their legitimacy** without further investigations into the matter.

(PRE/2010/P80)

The Board notes that the seizures of **acetic anhydride** in the countries bordering **Afghanistan** have been negligible. The Board therefore urges the Governments of countries in **Asia** to **strengthen controls over the movement of the substance within their territory and to assist the Government of Afghanistan** in intercepting consignments of acetic anhydride that are smuggled into its territory. A **concerted effort by all Governments is necessary** to stop the smuggling of acetic anhydride and of other substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin into countries in the region, particularly **Afghanistan**.

(PRE/2007/P78) (PRE/2006/P121)
(PRE/2005/P66) (PRE/2001/P86)

The Board **notes the efforts of the European Union to strengthen the efficiency of precursor-control mechanisms** applied in the region and wishes to encourage the European Commission and member States of the European Union to

(PRE/2010/P76) (PRE/2010/P89)

take further measures to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals from their territories for illicit drug manufacture.

Control measures applied to **internal trade in the European Union** appear to be insufficient to prevent the diversion of the substance (**acetic anhydride**). The Board encourages the European Commission and States members of the European Union to introduce appropriate remedial measures.

(PRE/2009/P95) (PRE/2009/P110)
(PRE/2008/P82)

The Board, in view of continuing diversions and attempted diversions of controlled precursor chemicals in the countries of the European Union, expects the European Commission to introduce as soon as possible an appropriate monitoring and control mechanism over imports and exports of controlled chemicals.

(PRE/2004/P41)

The Board urges Governments to continue to **strengthen their domestic control mechanisms** with regard to precursors of **amphetamine-type stimulants**.

(PRE/2011/P55) (PRE/2010/P15)
(PRE/2010/P55) (PRE/2009/P6)
(PRE/2007/P57)

Governments are urged to **ensure that the distribution and consumption** of those two substances (**acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate**) at the national level are properly controlled, in accordance with **article 12, paragraph 8**, of the 1988 Convention.

(PRE/2006/P137)

As the origin of seized **potassium permanganate** is often not known, the Board encourages all Governments to **undertake backtracking investigations** into such seizures where possible. The Board urges States in [**Central and South America**] to **enhance their controls** over the distribution of **potassium permanganate** at the **national level**.

(PRE/2007/P69) (PRE/2006/P102)

The Board strongly recommends that the Government of **Bangladesh** should review and **strengthen domestic control measures** for precursors without delay.

(PRE/2012/P50)

The Government of **Brazil** is vigilant as regards imports of the substance and during 2004-2005 requested that two shipments of **potassium permanganate** be stopped. **Similar vigilance as regards domestic distribution channels** should ensure that diversions are not occurring from that market.

(PRE/2005/P49)

The Board calls upon [States in South **East Asia**] urgently to review their controls over [**potassium permanganate**] and to **introduce appropriate mechanisms** to ensure that it is not diverted from licit trade within their countries.

(PRE/2001/P42)

D) Annual legitimate requirements (ALRs)

(The Board appreciates the efforts of the 80 countries and territories that have already been submitting on form D information on their licit requirements for, in particular, bulk quantities of 3,4-MDP-2-P, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and P-2-P.) In recognition of their efforts, and in accordance with **Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 49/3**, the Board has decided to **publish those requirements** as submitted (see annex V).

(PRE/2006/P43)

The Board is aware that **preparing estimates of the needs for precursors of ATS is a complex exercise** and that it will be a few years before such estimates become really accurate. The Board nevertheless considers this type of

(PRE/2006/P44) (PRE/2006/P132)

information to be important and encourages all Governments to provide it. The main objective of the system is to **provide the competent authorities of exporting countries with at least an indication of the legitimate requirements of importing countries**. Any such indication should, however, not be taken as a recommendation nor as a restriction on the use of those substances. Finally, Governments are invited to review the published requirements, amend them as necessary and inform the Board of any required change.

The Board calls upon Governments to comply with the request contained in **Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 49/3** and ensure the **timely submission** and continued **accuracy** of their **estimates** for certain precursors. That is necessary to ensure that the estimates can continue to be used to identify suspicious transactions involving those particular precursors.

(AR/2010/R9) (PRE/2011/P152)

The Board commends those Governments that **make active use of the system of annual legitimate requirements** and encourages all other Governments to **make better use of this basic tool** as both exporters and importers of **3,4-MDP-2-P, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and P-2-P** and preparations containing those substances.

(PRE/2015/P23)

The Board encourages Governments to **regularly review their estimates of annual legitimate requirements, utilizing the most recent market data**. The Board also calls upon Governments, especially those with significant trade (including re-export) in the four substances and their preparations (**amphetamine-type stimulant substances, namely, 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P), pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P)**), to **exercise continuing vigilance** to ensure that their estimates of annual legitimate requirements are **commensurate with prevailing market conditions**.

(PRE/2011/P24) (PRE/2012/P21)
(PRE/2010/P19) (AR/2008/R12)
(PRE/2007/P18) (PRE/2007/P49)
(PRE/2007/P83) (AR/2007/R14)
(PRE/2005/P104)
(PRE/2005/P134)

INCB encourages all Governments to **increase their efforts to establish realistic annual legitimate requirements, or review existing ones**, and inform the Board accordingly. In preparing their annual legitimate requirements, Governments may wish to **consider the *Guide on Estimating Requirements for Substances under International Control***, developed by INCB and the World Health Organization, as well as the **document entitled “Issues that Governments may consider when determining annual legitimate requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine”**, available on the Board’s website.

(PRE/2015/P26) (PRE/2012/P132)
(PRE/2010/P88)

INCB commends all Governments that have **established realistic annual legitimate requirements or regularly review existing ones**, thus providing the competent authorities of exporting countries with at least an indication of their needs and **alerting authorities to any potential oversupply**.

(PRE/2016/P29)

The Board encourages Governments to review the estimates they have furnished and to **inform the Board of any changes or updates** to ensure that the estimates published by the Board **remain as accurate** as possible.

(AR/2009/R11) (PRE/2015/P27)
(PRE/2014/P61) (PRE/2009/P29)
(PRE/2008/P26) (PRE/2008/P89)

The Board requests Governments that have not yet done so to **inform it of the methodologies that they use for calculating their legitimate requirements** for precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants.

(PRE/2008/P25) (PRE/2007/P18)
(AR/2007/R14) (AR/2006/R11)
(PRE/2006/P42)

All Governments are reminded of the need to **share their methodologies for preparing estimates with each other** and the Board so as to gradually improve the methodologies used. (PRE/2012/P132)

The Board encourages all countries that identify the diversion of **precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants** to **re-evaluate** their **requirements** for those substances and to inform the Board without delay about any such changes. (AR/2012/R14)

The Board welcomes [Governments reporting on their **licit requirements** for **ephedrine** and **pseudoephedrine**] and encourages all Governments concerned to continue to **collect and analyse such data**. (PRE/2004/P30)

The Board encourages countries in **West Asia** to **review both their estimates of annual legitimate requirements and their methods for calculating such estimates**. Furthermore, the Board invites all Governments to **inform it of the methodologies** used for preparing their estimates. (PRE/2011/P23) (AR/2010/R32)

The Governments of importing countries in **West Asia** are urged to take appropriate measures to **monitor the manufacture, distribution and export of preparations of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine**, to ensure that the end-users are legitimate and to prevent accumulation of that substance in quantities exceeding their licit requirements. (PRE/2006/P83)

Part 2. Use of pre-export notifications (PEN), PEN Online and Import/Export Details

Recommendation	Reference (source)
A) Practicality of sending / receiving PENs	
The Board reminds Governments of exporting countries of their obligation under article 12 of the 1988 Convention to provide notification regarding exports of chemicals before such exports depart from their territory. Governments are also encouraged to respond by the verification deadline when denying authorization for a shipment.	(PRE/2012/P31)
The Board reminds all countries that it is essential to respond to pre-export notifications in a timely manner if diversions are to be prevented. Should it not be possible to immediately verify the legitimacy of a shipment, the importing country should supply the exporting country with an interim reply requesting more time to complete the necessary inquiries or investigations.	(PRE/2002/P79) (PRE/2001/P49) (PRE/2001/P73)
The Board encourages the competent authorities of importing countries to observe the verification deadlines set by exporting countries on their pre-export notifications. If more time is needed to complete an investigation into a particular shipment, the exporting country and the Board should be informed as a matter of urgency in order to prevent the delivery of unwanted shipments or the possible diversion of shipments.	(PRE/2007/P23) (PRE/2011/P29) (PRE/2010/P24) (PRE/2009/P91) (PRE/2001/P49)
In cases where there are grounds to believe that a shipment is suspicious, the Government of the exporting country should release the shipment only after receiving confirmation from the competent authority of the importing country.	(AR/2011/R14) (PRE/2013/P30)
Exporting countries are encouraged to apprise the Board of those cases where importing countries consistently fail to provide such feedback (such feedback can include confirmation that the importing country has no objection to the shipment in question or a request that the authorities of the exporting countries take appropriate action), so that the Board can request those countries to take remedial action , as appropriate.	(PRE/2004/P36)
It is in the interest of the importing Government to provide feedback to the exporting country if a transaction appears suspicious or requires additional time for checking. Should verification of the legitimacy of a pre-notified precursor consignment require more time than that allocated by the exporting country in their pre-export notification, the exporting country should be informed of this requirement accordingly.	(PRE/2009/P101) (PRE/2009/P32)
The analysis of pre-export notifications resulting in objections and the reasons for the objections, from the perspective of both exporting and importing countries, could help to determine patterns that, in turn, could be used to identify weaknesses at the national level, and that information could subsequently be used to strengthen existing systems. It is therefore important for importing countries that object to shipments of precursors to indicate the reasons for their objections.	(PRE/2012/P141) (PRE/2011/P156)
INCB invites all Governments to work with the Board to devise appropriate ways and means of handling pre-	(PRE/2016/P209)

export notifications in such cases with a view to enabling the trade of chemicals to and from **high-risk areas in a regulated manner**.

The Board once again encourages the Government of **China** to work with it to devise **practical ways and means of addressing pre-export notifications**, suspicious shipments and diversions involving precursors and **Taiwan Province of China**. (PRE/2013/P33) (PRE/2012/P32) (PRE/2011/P31)

The Board appreciates the efforts of the **Government of India**, through which many suspicious transactions of **ephedrine** (and **methaqualone**) have been identified and stopped. Since 1 November 2005, **India** has **sent pre-export notifications for more than 1,100 shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine** and assisted the importing countries in the identification and investigation of the attempted diversion of dozens of tons of the substances. (PRE/2006/P84)

Governments of all exporting countries are urged to **provide pre-export notifications** for all shipments of **potassium permanganate** to, as well as within, **Oceania**. (PRE/2006/P110)

B) PEN Online

INCB urges Governments that have not yet done so to **register with the PEN Online system without further delay**. INCB also urges all registered users of PEN Online to **use the system actively and systematically** and to notify the importing country of every planned shipment prior to dispatching it. Receiving authorities are also advised to **follow up on the information** available in order to ensure that there are no doubts about the legitimacy of the end use of shipments. (PRE/2015/P33) (PRE/2014/P67) (PRE/2013/P27) (PRE/2013/P29) (PRE/2013/P31) (PRE/2013/P32) (PRE/2012/P29) (PRE/2012/P30) (PRE/2011/P27) (PRE/2011/P30) (AR/2015/R8) (AR/2010/R10) (PRE/2009/P32) (AR/2008/R11) (AR/2007/R13) (PRE/2007/P22) (PRE/2007/P84) (AR/2006/R10) (PRE/2006/P48) (PRE/2006/P113) (PRE/2006/P133) (PRE/2005/P99)

INCB wishes to remind all Governments to use the PEN Online system for **the notification of all planned exports** of substances in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention, since that system represents the **most efficient and effective way for the authorities** of exporting and importing countries **worldwide to communicate** with each other. (PRE/2015/P34)

The Board reminds all Governments exporting scheduled chemicals to countries that have invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention of their **obligation to provide notification of such shipments prior to departure**, and recommends using the PEN Online system for such notifications, pursuant to **Security Council resolution 1817 (2008)**. (AR/2012/R12) (AR/2009/R12)

INCB encourages the authorities of all importing countries, as a minimum, to **review all incoming pre-export notifications** and to **respond to them** in those cases where a response is explicitly requested by the exporting (PRE/2016/P37)

country's authorities.

The Board encourages all Governments to **actively review pre-export notifications** sent to their country and to **communicate any objection** to these in a timely manner via the PEN Online system in order to maintain an unbroken chain of monitoring trade in chemicals.

(AR/2012/R13)

The Board also urges all PEN Online users to make sure that, at a minimum, **they review incoming pre-export notifications** through the system in a **timely manner**, thus ensuring that the receipt of the pre-export notifications are **acknowledged to the sending authority**.

(PRE/2014/P64)

The Board continues to remind all importing Governments to use the **reply function** of the PEN Online system to **provide feedback** to the authorities of exporting countries. **This applies particularly in the event that a transaction appears suspicious**, additional time is required for checking its legitimacy, or the exporting authority has specifically **requested such feedback**.

(PRE/2014/P65) (PRE/2012/P30)
(PRE/2011/P30) (AR/2011/R16)
(PRE/2010/P24)

The Board urges all exporting countries to use the PEN Online system **regardless of whether the Government of the importing country has registered to use the system** or has invoked article 12 of the Convention, requiring pre-export notification.

(PRE/2012/P156)
(PRE/2011/P157) (AR/2011/R12)

INCB commends all exporting Governments that use PEN Online actively and systematically, that is, Governments that notify the authorities of importing countries of every planned export prior to dispatching it, **including exports of pharmaceutical preparations** containing **ephedrine** or **pseudoephedrine**. At the same time, INCB would like to remind the authorities of exporting countries to **allow sufficient time**, typically between 5 and 10 working days, for the importing country's authorities to verify the legitimacy of a shipment.

(PRE/2016/P38) (PRE/2015/P32)
(PRE/2014/P66) (PRE/2011/P20)
(AR/2011/R18) (AR/2006/R23)

The Board urges all countries to **utilize the PEN Online system to advise on exports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine** in all forms, whether raw or formulated into preparations.

(PRE/2009/P61) (PRE/2009/P104)

The Board urges the **Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, the Niger and Togo to join the system. Countries in other regions, including Armenia, Belize, Indonesia and Iraq, are also encouraged to use PEN Online.**

(PRE/2010/P23)

The Board urges those Governments that have registered with PEN Online and trade in precursors, such as **Aruba, Bangladesh, Barbados, the Congo, Cyprus, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua and the Republic of Moldova, to make active use of the system.**

(PRE/2010/P22)

INCB welcomes the invocations by the three countries (Georgia, Myanmar and Uruguay) but regrets that this important tool (PEN Online) for preventing the diversion of precursors from international trade **continues to be underutilized**, including in some regions, such as **Africa and Oceania**, as well as **parts of Europe**.

(PRE/2016/P32)

INCB welcomes the registration of the **Gambia and Tunisia** and urges Governments that have not yet done so to **register with the PEN Online system** without further delay.

(PRE/2016/P35)

INCB encourages the Government of **Indonesia** to register all relevant competent authorities under article 12 of the 1988 Convention to **PEN Online, or to establish a working mechanism to ensure that pre-export notifications** can be sent for all relevant industrial chemicals under international control as well. (PRE/2016/P40)

Part 3. Participations in Multilateral Mechanisms: Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS); Projects Prism and Cohesion and related operations

Recommendation	Reference (source)
<p>Because many precursor seizures have an international dimension beyond the country in which the seizure occurred, any piece of information about the seizure is important as it could be the starting point of an investigation into the source of the chemical and the method of diversion. Governments are therefore encouraged to share all potentially actionable information through PICS or bilaterally, in the framework of Project Prism and Project Cohesion.</p>	(PRE/2016/P204)
<p>A) Projects Prism and Cohesion and related operations (including Operations Purple and Topaz which were merged to become Project Cohesion in 2006)</p>	
<p>INCB encourages all Governments to make use of the existing global cooperation mechanisms under Project Prism and Project Cohesion to gather and exchange information on new trafficking trends, on modi operandi and on the criminal organizations involved and how they operate, and to use that knowledge to develop specific risk profiles and conduct joint operations to prevent future diversions. INCB also reiterates its recommendations to all Governments to ensure that the contact details of their focal points for Project Prism and Project Cohesion are always up-to-date and that those focal points actively participate in the relevant operations under Project Prism and Project Cohesion and follow-up on the action identified.</p>	(PRE/2016/P44) (PRE/2015/P41) (AR/2015/R8) (PRE/2014/P73) (AR/2014/R13) (AR/2014/R13) (PRE/2013/P35) (PRE/2013/P150) (PRE/2011/P158) (PRE/2009/P103) (PRE/2008/P95) (AR/2006/R24) (PRE/2006/P126) (PRE/2003/P25)
<p>The Board encourages Governments to conduct controlled deliveries and backtracking investigations of shipments of precursors and to communicate the results of those efforts via the existing mechanisms of Project Prism and Project Cohesion.</p>	(PRE/2012/P80)
<p>INCB commends such efforts and encourages all Governments to improve operational cooperation at all levels. INCB also wishes to call on the Precursors Task Force members that are representatives of relevant international and regional organizations, such INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, to re-engage their members in international precursor control activities under Project Prism and Project Cohesion.</p>	(PRE/2016/P202)
<p>The Board welcomes the participation of Interpol and the World Customs Organization as members of the task forces of Project Prism and Project Cohesion. The Board recommends that those organizations continue to support activities under Project Prism to address the problem of trafficking in precursors of ATS and that they provide backstopping for and actively participate in law enforcement operations under Project Cohesion to address the continuing problem of the smuggling of acetic anhydride into Afghanistan.</p>	(AR/2006/R39)

Noting operational activities undertaken by Interpol and the World Customs Organization , such as Project Novak and Operation Tamerlane , respectively, which target heroin trafficking from South-West Asia and Central Asia , the Board recommends that those organizations, in their function as task force members of Project Cohesion and Project Prism , consider including activities against precursor trafficking in those and similar projects.	(AR/2005/R52)
The Board understands that such seizures [customs authorities in New Zealand seized over 1 million pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, which had been smuggled into the country from Asia] continue to be made during 2004 and urges the authorities concerned to utilize the mechanisms established under Project Prism to initiate backtracking investigations into those cases in order to prevent further diversions from those sources.	(PRE/2004/P91)
The Board supports the emphasis of Project Prism on the need for regional operations to be launched and coordinated in order to counter specific approaches of traffickers. Licit international trade is also a source of the substances used in illicit drug manufacture. Governments need to identify mechanisms to ensure that those substances are not diverted from domestic distribution channels, while ensuring their availability for licit pharmaceutical uses.	(PRE/2005/P14) (PRE/2005/P138)
The Board therefore urges Governments to establish [networks of governmental focal points], which will enable the reporting of real-time operational intelligence and other information on the licit trade and traffic in precursors under the international operations .	(PRE/2004/P9)
Through the operational activities launched under Project Prism , which focuses on the precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants, such as 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P) , 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P) and safrole , the Board trusts that participating Governments will put into place mechanisms to control and monitor the movement of those precursor chemicals and that more information will become available on patterns of licit trade in those substances.	(PRE/2003/P25)
All Governments in the Americas should be vigilant with regard to pseudoephedrine diversion and should support the regional initiatives proposed by the Project Prism Task Force.	(PRE/2005/P21)
Europe still remains a major illicit manufacturer of amphetamine and MDMA , and authorities of countries in the region are urged to make full use of the reporting mechanisms established under Project Prism to ensure that information on seizures is communicated as widely as possible.	(PRE/2006/P94) (PRE/2006/P135)
Traffickers have identified new methods and routes of diversion and Governments of European countries need to make additional efforts to locate and seize the precursors involved. It is expected that the region-specific operations planned under Project Prism will assist in those efforts.	(PRE/2005/P36)
The Board invites all Governments to support the Government of Mexico in its efforts against illicit methamphetamine manufacture, particularly through participation in activities under Project Prism .	(PRE/2009/P58)
The Board recommends to countries and territories in Oceania the launching of appropriate law enforcement activities under Project Prism to further identify smuggling activities.	(PRE/2006/P87)

<p>The Board remains concerned that little or no progress has been made in identifying all sources and routes used to divert acetic anhydride. At the same time, seizures of heroin have not declined, indicating that traffickers are still able to obtain the chemicals they require. Governments are therefore urged to provide their full support to international initiatives designed to address those issues, such as Project Cohesion.</p>	(PRE/2006/P126)
<p>The Board invites the Project Cohesion Task Force to continue to design specific activities to address the continuing problem of acetic anhydride being smuggled into Afghanistan.</p>	(PRE/2006/P136)
<p>The Board urges Governments concerned, in particular the Government of Afghanistan, to improve the information provided to the Board so that it is in accordance with article 12 of the 1988 Convention with regard to seizures, and to actively participate in and contribute to relevant time-limited anti-trafficking operations and activities under Project Cohesion.</p>	(PRE/2010/P90)
<p>The Project Cohesion Task Force is therefore advised to devise specific strategies and activities to counter the diversion of and trafficking in cocaine precursors. The Board requests all members of Project Cohesion, in particular those in the Americas, to actively assist the Task Force in launching such operational activities.</p>	(PRE/2009/P111)
<p>With regard to Project Cohesion, the Board calls on participating Governments to expand their activities under the project by considering the launch of activities targeting drug trafficking in the relevant regions [...]. The Board wishes to encourage the authorities of countries in the Americas to devise similar activities to address trafficking in potassium permanganate. In particular, the authorities of Colombia and its neighbouring countries should urgently launch investigations to identify the sources and routes from, or along which, the substance is being smuggled into areas where the illicit manufacture of cocaine takes place.</p>	(AR/2006/R25) (PRE/2006/P107) (PRE/2006/P136)
<p>The Board therefore recommends that the Task Force devise specific strategies and activities to counter the diversion of and trafficking in cocaine precursors without further delay. The Board requests all members of Project Cohesion, in particular countries of Latin America, to actively assist the Task Force in launching such operational activities.</p>	(PRE/2009/P41)
<p>The Board further calls on Governments of countries in the Americas and the regional members of the Project Cohesion Task Force to devise strategies to address the smuggling of potassium permanganate into cocaine-manufacturing areas of South America.</p>	(PRE/2008/P40) (PRE/2008/P68) (PRE/2007/P90)) (PRE/2006/P64)
<p>The Board urges Governments in South America to strengthen controls over domestic distribution channels. The Board invites the Governments of countries in the Americas to take advantage of the experience acquired during Project Cohesion targeting acetic anhydride and to design similar strategies to combat the diversion of the chemicals used in the manufacture of cocaine.</p>	(AR/2008/R34) (PRE/2008/P99)
<p>The Board welcomes the action plan devised by the Project Cohesion Task Force to tackle the problem of trafficking in chemicals used for the illicit manufacture of cocaine in South America. The Board encourages all Governments concerned to support further initiatives in the implementation of that action plan.</p>	(PRE/2010/P91)
<p>The Board calls upon Governments of countries in South America to design strategies similar to those developed in</p>	(AR/2009/R38)

the framework of **Project Cohesion**, in order to identify gaps in precursor control measures and the sources of precursors used in illicit drug manufacture.

The Board is willing to support initiatives being launched under the **Project Cohesion** by Governments in [**South America**] in cooperation with international organizations and looks forward to being informed of the results of those activities. (PRE/2007/P36)

Aware that the **Project Cohesion** Task Force is undertaking a number of complementary measures, including anti-smuggling activities in **Central Asia**, the Board stands ready to support those activities within the scope of its mandate. (PRE/2007/P35)

INCB welcomes the **vigilance and close cooperation** of Governments to prevent chemical diversion and encourages the timely exchange of all relevant documentation to enable the authorities of the countries concerned to investigate suspicious cases, diversions and attempted diversions. INCB wishes to acknowledge specifically the efforts made by the authorities of countries participating in **Operation Missing Links** to assist the authorities in countries **where conflicts and political instability** affect the ability of those authorities to effectively control the trade in precursors in their entire territory. (PRE/2016/P80)

The Board urges the Governments concerned to make full use of the mechanisms established under **Operation Topaz** (focussing on **precursors for heroin**), including the provision of technical support and training, to enhance existing law enforcement capacity, especially for customs authorities and border guards. (PRE/2004/P77)

As the countries reporting such seizures [in **acetic anhydride**] are participating in **Operation Topaz**, the Board urges the relevant authorities to fully utilize the mechanisms established under the operation to report seizures or interceptions and, where appropriate, to initiate backtracking investigations to identify the source of the seized substance. (PRE/2003/P119)

The Board wishes to remind all Governments, whether participating or not participating in [**Operation Topaz**], that the response to such notifications is of the utmost importance in order to prevent unnecessary delays to licit international trade and also to prevent diversions by traffickers. Every effort should be made to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place for supplying timely responses to notifications while also being able to conduct appropriate background checks. (PRE/2001/P46)

The Board therefore requests the Steering Committee of **Operation Topaz** to work with participating countries to make a comprehensive evaluation of the role brokers are playing in the diversion and subsequent smuggling of **acetic anhydride**. (PRE/2004/P141)

The Board urges all law enforcement authorities effecting seizures or intercepting consignments of [**acetic anhydride**] to provide all available information as soon as possible to the central national authority of the respective country, should the country be participating in **Operation Topaz**. (PRE/2003/P122)

As specific case meetings will now be convened to coordinate investigations similar to the one referred to above (PRE/2003/P113)

(including **Slovakia, Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro**), under **Operation Topaz**, the Board urges the Governments concerned to fully utilize those forums to address the diversion and smuggling of **acetic anhydride**.

The Board urges all Governments to launch intelligence-driven investigations into diversion attempts and stopped shipments, focusing on identifying those responsible as well as the sources of the finances utilized. In particular, the mechanisms and procedures established under **Operation Purple** should be extended to provide guidelines and best practices for those types of investigation and, where required, technical assistance should be provided, as with **Operation Topaz**.

(PRE/2004/P126)

The Board trusts that the revised procedures identified during the combined meeting of the **Operation Purple** and **Operation Topaz** steering committees held in **Mexico City** in October 2005 will assist in identifying the sources of the potassium permanganate seized.

(PRE/2005/P140)

In 2004, the Government of **Turkey** reported 14 individual seizures [of acetic anhydride], 4 with valuable information on the methods and routes being used by traffickers operating between **Europe** and **West Asia**. Other Governments carrying out seizures of acetic anhydride are urged to make use of the information-sharing mechanisms established under **Operation Topaz** to disseminate such information.

(PRE/2005/P68)

In view of the results of **Operation Dice**, the Board again calls on all Governments to strengthen controls over domestic trade in acetic anhydride and to ensure that the substance traded nationally is used only for legitimate purposes.

(PRE/2008/P76)

The Board also wishes to encourage countries in the region (of **Afghanistan**) intercepting consignments or effecting seizures of acetic anhydride to make use of the task force established under **Operation Topaz** by the Governments of **Germany**, the **United Kingdom** and the **United States** to assist with investigations where international assistance may be required.

(PRE/2003/P58)

The Board reiterates the need for Governments to apply fully the standard operating procedures of **Operation Purple** which require the competent authorities not only to ensure the physical tracking of each shipment of **potassium permanganate** from the point of manufacture to its ultimate end-use, but also to ensure that investigations into interceptions, seizures and stopped shipments are carried out.

(PRE/2002/P77)

B) Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS)

The Board encourages all Governments to **register PICS** focal points for their **relevant national authorities** involved in precursor control, such as national regulatory, law enforcement, customs and drug control agencies, and to actively use the system to communicate all incidents involving precursor chemicals with a view to **enhancing intelligence-sharing**.

(AR/2012/R15)

Governments are encouraged to make full use of this secure online system (**PICS**) to **facilitate communication and**

(PRE/2014/P35)

operational cooperation on precursor incidents.

INCB commends all **PICS** users that **share information** on individual precursor incidents with **sufficient operational detail** to allow the users of other countries involved in an **incident to initiate requisite follow-up investigations** with a view to not only bring to justice those behind the specific incident in question but also to deny traffickers access to chemicals using similar modi operandi in the future.

(PRE/2016/P46) (PRE/2015/P47)
(PRE/2014/P79) (PRE/2014/P143)
(PRE/2012/P151) (PRE/2013/P85)

INCB welcomes the measures to address new developments in precursor trafficking taken by Governments at the national level. However, INCB also wishes to highlight once again the **importance of the early sharing of information** about emerging chemicals and new trends in precursor trafficking at the global level and encourages all Governments to make better use of **PICS** and the form D for this purpose.

(PRE/2016/P169) (PRE/2013/P85)

INCB commends those Governments that provided information about non-scheduled substances on form D and encourages them to consider making better use of **PICS** for the early sharing of such information worldwide. This applies in particular to the **Netherlands** (accounting for more than 30 per cent of all incidents in 2015 and 2016) and other **European countries**, which thus **provided a starting point for follow-up and operational cooperation**, and **helped to raise awareness of new developments**.

(PRE/2016/P96) (PRE/2016/P117)
(PRE/2013/P76)

As those countries (**Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia and Zimbabwe**) are currently not registered to use **PICS**, the Board encourages the Governments of those countries to **register their relevant law enforcement and regulatory agencies with PICS** and to provide confirmation of incidents occurring on their territory without delay.

(PRE/2013/P53)

Part 4. Supporting Domestic and International Investigations

Recommendation	Reference (source)
INCB encourages all Governments to cooperate with each other and thoroughly investigate thefts of precursor consignments , or parts thereof, and share relevant findings, especially about the modi operandi, with INCB for further dissemination. The information will help to improve understanding of recent patterns and methods of diversion of precursor chemicals and will assist INCB and competent national authorities in preventing future diversions.	(PRE/2016/P54) (PRE/2015/P47) (AR/2015/R9) (PRE/2011/P153) (PRE/2010/P82)
Governments should [...] be proactive in their approach to precursor investigations and develop information and/or intelligence related to stopped shipments and/or attempted diversions.	(PRE/2005/P142)
Governments should continue to give the highest priority to investigations into seizures and stopped shipments of precursor chemicals and to follow up information provided on attempted diversions. Intelligence-driven investigations and backtracking investigations have proved particularly useful in the identification of those responsible for trafficking and diversion.	(PRE/2006/P138) (PRE/2004/P84) (PRE/2000/P75)
The Board recommends that Governments enhance their cooperation at all levels and exchange pertinent and timely information with all relevant national, regional and international counterparts to support domestic and international investigations targeting organized criminal networks for trafficking chemicals and drugs and to enhance operational and information-sharing activities to that end .	(AR/2013/R10)
The Board encourages other Governments to organize [operational case] meetings where necessary and stands ready to assist in that regard pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention.	(PRE/2004/P79)
The Board reminds all Governments that, by properly investigating stopped shipments , valuable intelligence can be gathered that may lead to the identification of traffickers as effectively as a controlled delivery or the dismantling of illicit drug manufacturing laboratories would .	(PRE/2004/P84)
The Board encourages those States not yet making use of this important tool (controlled deliveries) to consider doing so when interceptions or seizures are effected, not only of acetic anhydride, but of any substance used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.	(PRE/2002/P57)
Governments are required to report seizures on form D and are requested to provide additional information on the background and circumstances of a seizure in response to INCB inquiries , with a view to supporting follow-up investigations, disseminating relevant information widely and preventing similar diversions in the future and elsewhere.	(PRE/2016/P94)
Successes against trafficking groups can only be achieved when the Governments intercepting smuggled consignments launch backtracking investigations . The authorities need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to launch such investigations so that the source of a seizure can be identified and the trafficking network dismantled .	(PRE/2005/P29)

Governments need to ensure that **mechanisms are in place, and utilized, for sharing real-time information**, which is essential if intelligence-driven investigations are to be launched against those responsible for the diversions and if their prosecution is to be ensured. (PRE/2005/P128) (PRE/2004/P9)

The Board therefore urges all Governments to launch intelligence-driven investigations into diversion attempts and stopped shipments, focusing on **identifying those responsible as well as the sources of the finances utilized**. (PRE/2004/P126)

Thorough investigation into suspicious transactions and other irregularities in legitimate trade, such as the [shipment of 18,500 litres of **acetic anhydride** to the **Islamic Republic of Iran**, about which the Italian authorities sent a notification through PEN Online], is very important. Suspending the delivery of **a suspicious precursor shipment alone, without further law enforcement investigation, is not enough**, as experience has shown that the persons behind the suspicious order may continue looking for acetic anhydride in other source countries. (PRE/2016/P135)

The Board commends the authorities concerned for using a **controlled delivery** and urges all Governments to make more use of that important investigative technique. The above-mentioned cases show the **importance of having scientific support in investigations** into precursor chemicals. (PRE/2005/P38)

The Board **emphasizes that follow-up investigations into such cases** (whether the importing company had simply not complied with applicable legislation or whether the order had been identified as an attempt to divert a substance) are of the utmost importance. If shipments are suspended for solely administrative reasons, that information should be conveyed to the exporting country and to the Board in order to avoid delays in legitimate trade in the future. (PRE/2007/P24)

INCB welcomes the vigilance and close cooperation of Governments to prevent chemical diversion and encourages **the timely exchange of all relevant documentation to enable the authorities of the countries concerned to investigate** suspicious cases, diversions and attempted diversions. INCB wishes to acknowledge specifically the efforts made by the authorities of countries participating in **Operation Missing Links to assist the authorities in countries where conflicts and political instability** affect the ability of those authorities to effectively control the trade in precursors in their entire territory. (PRE/2016/P80)

While the integrity of ongoing investigations must be ensured, INCB encourages the authorities in the countries concerned, as well as relevant European institutions, to **ensure that the details of the investigation are made available to those that need to know in order to prevent similar diversions from happening in the future and elsewhere**. (PRE/2016/P81)

INCB therefore encourages all Governments to **make every effort to identify the modi operandi** of those involved in trafficking in **acetic anhydride** and to **communicate** through established channels **any relevant details** (including information about the sources of that substance). In doing so, Governments should consider communicating possible changes in trafficking routes, concealment methods, modi operandi and trafficking trends, as well as the possible shifting of illicit heroin laboratories to previously unsuspected locations (such laboratories were identified, for example, in Spain in 2013 and 2014). (PRE/2015/P151)
(PRE/2012/P109)
(PRE/2006/P116)

The Board [...] urges the **authorities involved in** activities such as **identifying and dismantling illicit laboratories and dumping sites** to **exercise** the utmost **caution** and, where possible, to ensure that **specialty trained teams** are available for such activities. (PRE/2003/P126)

As the **substances (3,4-MDP-2-P and P-2-P)** are **not usually diverted from international trade, backtracking investigations remain one of the most effective ways to address such trafficking.** (PRE/2006/P89)

Governments **should develop operating procedures to backtrack** from cocaine laboratory seizures and related cases, to **attempt to trace the chemicals back** to the source and transit countries and company and to **inform the Governments concerned.** (PRE/2005/P121)

The Board urges all countries to **identify and monitor the operators involved in either the manufacture or distribution** of [MDMA precursors], in order to determine how and from where the precursors used in the illicit manufacture of **MDMA** are being obtained. (PRE/2000/P128)

The Board [...] calls upon Governments in the region, supported by the **international community, to launch comprehensive operations to identify and dismantle** the networks responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals into **Afghanistan.** (PRE/2005/P139)

The Board notes that the seizure in **Fujian Province** resulted from the exchange of information between the authorities of **China** and the **Netherlands** and urges the Governments of other countries in Asia to **initiate similar backtracking investigations wherever possible.** (PRE/2006/P93)

The Board has requested the authorities concerned to **launch investigations to determine if any links can be established between three cases** [involving **ergotamine** diversion in **Netherlands, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Spain** and **Russia**]. (PRE/2004/P147)

As both provinces (the **Paktia Province** and the **Nangarhar Province**) border **Pakistan**, the Board urges the Government of that country to **increase precursor interdiction efforts along the border.**

Part 5. Form D Submission; Sharing of Seizure Details

Recommendation

Reference (source)

The Board wishes to remind all Governments that the **reporting of seizures** is an **obligation under the 1988 Convention**.

(PRE/2004/P117)

The Board urges all States parties to **comply with their reporting obligations under the 1988 Convention**. States are also **reminded to use the latest version of form D**, which is available on the INCB website in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, and **submit it within the requested time frame**.

(PRE/2015/P8) (PRE/2014/P42)
(PRE/2013/P11) (PRE/2011/P11)
(PRE/2010/P8) (PRE/2009/P12)
(PRE/2007/P9) (PRE/2004/P17)
(PRE/2003/P13)

The Board therefore wishes to remind Governments to submit form D each year, using the latest version available, **on time (by 30 June)**. Reports must include relevant information from all appropriate regulatory and **law enforcement agencies, regardless of which is the competent national authority**.

(PRE/2012/P155)

Governments are **reminded to use the latest version of form D**, which is available, in six languages, on the INCB website, and **submit it within the requested timeline to facilitate the Board's analysis of the world precursor situation**.

(PRE/2016/P11)

The Board thanks those Governments that have provided a complete form D and wishes to remind all other Governments that the **submission of form D is mandatory under article 12, paragraph 12**, of the 1988 Convention and that **submission of blank forms** or of partial information **continues to impact** the Board's analysis of regional and global precursor patterns and trends.

(PRE/2016/P12) (PRE/2015/P104)
(PRE/2013/P11) (PRE/2011/P118)

INCB wishes to commend **Governments that shared operational details** and remind all other Governments effecting seizures or encountering alternate substances to **provide all relevant details of such seizures on form D**, in particular, information on **origin**, where known, and **methods of diversion** and **illicit manufacture**.

(PRE/2016/P13) (PRE/2016/P47)
(PRE/2015/P104) (PRE/2014/P43)
(PRE/2013/P12) (PRE/2013/P13)
(PRE/2012/P7) (PRE/2012/P159)
(PRE/2011/P155) (PRE/2010/P9)
(AR/2009/R10) (PRE/2007/P10)
(PRE/2006/P26) (PRE/2005/P81)
(PRE/2004/P18)

INCB wishes to acknowledge the provision of information about substances **not in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention** and encourages all Governments to provide on form D complete and comprehensive information about such substances (in particular, the intended or suspected use of such substances and their sources), with a view to establishing trends and preventing the diversion of those substances worldwide.

(PRE/2015/P153)

The Board [...] wishes to remind Governments effecting seizures to provide on form D **complete and comprehensive data**, including, where known, the **origin of seized substances and data on the use of non-scheduled chemicals** and

(PRE/2015/P9) (PRE/2005/P81)

methods of diversion and illicit manufacture.

The Board calls upon all competent authorities effecting such seizures to **investigate those cases** and to **provide the Board with the results of those investigations.**

(AR/2008/R10) (AR/2007/R12)

The Board urges all Governments that have effected seizures to **adequately collect** and **report that additional information** (additional data required on non-scheduled substances with regard to method of diversion, illicit manufacture and stopped shipments), which is **essential for determining emerging trends** in illicit drug manufacture and in trafficking in precursors.

(PRE/2008/P91) (PRE/2008/P12)
(PRE/2007/P10) (PRE/2004/P18)

To improve knowledge of the chemicals actually being used and their sources, INCB encourages Governments to **use form D to report details of seizures of, and describe links between, the various alternative (scheduled and non-scheduled) substances.**

(PRE/2015/P127)

The Board calls upon Governments to **use form D** to report to the Board incidents involving the **diversion or seizure of non-controlled substances** used in the illicit manufacture of precursors, in order to facilitate the evaluation of those substances by the Board, with a view to possibly including them on the limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances or recommending their inclusion in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention.

(AR/2010/R8)

INCB therefore encourages all Governments to **improve the quality and comprehensiveness** of their annual form D submissions and to make better use of **PICS.**

(PRE/2016/P48)

All Governments are therefore urged to **review their procedures for the collection and provision of the information relating to seizures, diversions and stopped shipments** of all controlled and non-controlled substances, so that a comprehensive analysis of the current trafficking trends for all chemicals can be carried out.

(PRE/2002/P67) (PRE/2001/P60)
(PRE/2000/P73)

The Board reiterates that the timely and comprehensive reporting of such information is **the basis for the effective functioning of the international precursor control system**, while **lack of reporting may indicate** that the **framework and mechanisms for adequate control are not yet in place.**

(PRE/2002/P11) (PRE/2001/P10)
(PRE/2000/P12)

The Board urges Governments to accurately **report on form D the specific type and form of ephedrines** seized on their territory.

(PRE/2013/P43)

The Board urges those Governments to make every effort to **obtain information on the seizures (of potassium permanganate)** in order to initiate appropriate follow-up action.

(PRE/2000/P84)

Part 6. Industry Cooperation

Recommendation

Reference (source)

For detailed section on public-private partnerships and their merits and potentials in preventing the diversion of chemicals, see PRE/2015, Section IV, p. 29-31; PRE/2014, Section IV, p. 29-31.

The Board considers it vital that all Governments increase their efforts to **partner with private industries and relevant sectors** and explore the full potential of such cooperation to effectively counter the diversion of scheduled and non-scheduled chemicals by improving the reporting and investigation of suspicious orders and inquiries. The principles of counter-diversion activities **should become integral components of the concept of corporate industry responsibility, accountability and credibility.**

(PRE/2014/P31) (AR/2015/R9)

Governments, in **cooperation with industry, are encouraged to apply more flexible approaches to identifying suspicious orders and preventing the diversion of new precursor chemicals. Where necessary, legislation should be introduced** to allow for the investigation and prosecution of cases where such new chemicals are used in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

(AR/2011/R18)

The Board encourages all Governments to **partner with relevant industry to closely monitor or control derivatives** of controlled substances that **readily allow for conversion into the controlled substance** in the same way as the controlled substances themselves.

(PRE/2011/P160)

The Board would like to emphasize once again the **importance of close cooperation with the private sector** in order to solicit information **about suspicious orders in a timely manner.** The Board would also like to remind competent national authorities of the limited international **special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances** as a tool for use in cooperation with the industries concerned.

(PRE/2014/P160)

The Board emphasizes that the monitoring measures associated with the **[special surveillance] list** should be applied through **voluntary cooperation with the chemical industry**, with no prescriptive regulatory requirement or sanction, in order to highlight the complementary need for more strict control of the substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. As in the past, the Board will continue to distribute the limited international special surveillance list directly to competent authorities.

(PRE/2006/P18)

The Board calls on all Governments to ensure adequate monitoring of, and exercise vigilance at, all levels of the **continuum encompassing manufacture and domestic distribution of, and international trade in,** controlled precursor chemicals and to **seek cooperation with relevant industries.** The Board reminds Governments to consult its **Guidelines for a Voluntary Code of Practice for the Chemical Industry**, published in 2009.

(PRE/2010/P50) (PRE/2010/P86)

A **voluntary code of conduct for industries** (a code of conduct similar to the one for industries that produce or trade in chemicals) that produce or trade in equipment [used for illicit manufacture of drugs] could be applied.

(PRE/2012/P137)

Governments currently confronted with significant illicit manufacture of **amphetamine or methamphetamine** should

(PRE/2012/P158)

be aware that traffickers may already be attempting to obtain, through additional sources, large amounts of [...] new chemicals and should proactively monitor those chemicals **through partnerships with industry**.

Governments are reminded once again of the possibility of **traffickers approaching legitimate industry** for customized synthesis of non-scheduled intermediaries and of the **need to alert industry** to that possibility.

(PRE/2016/P108)

Part 7. Non-Scheduled Chemicals

Recommendation

Reference (source)

The Board encourages Governments to **ensure that mechanisms are in place to record information** on all chemicals found to be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and **not only those scheduled** under the 1988 Convention.

(PRE/2004/P83)

INCB wishes to remind Governments of the importance of **sharing information about non-scheduled chemicals, their sources, the modi operandi of traffickers and the actual or suspected use of non-scheduled chemicals in illicit drug manufacture**. Such information-sharing should start at the national level, when a company receives a suspicious order and reports it to the competent national authorities; and such information should also be shared at the international level, to prevent traffickers from exploiting weak links elsewhere. PICS provides an opportunity for the early sharing of such information worldwide.

(PRE/2015/P102)

(PRE/2014/P155)

(PRE/2013/P123)

(PRE/2012/P159) (PRE/2006/P26)

When substitute chemicals are identified (stopped or seized) in international trade, it is important to communicate widely the reasons why the shipment was stopped or seized so as to alert the relevant authorities — nationally and globally — so that they can identify future shipments routed through different border crossings, ports or countries. Similarly, **detailed information on seizures of substitute chemicals in illicit laboratories** provides an opportunity for follow-up investigations, identifying those involved and preventing future diversions. The Board therefore urges all Governments to **improve the extent, frequency and level of detail of shared information**, also in relation to **non-scheduled chemicals**.

(PRE/2012/P94) (PRE/2012/P159)

Noting **similarities in current issues related to precursors and to new psychoactive substances**, the Board calls for urgent practical measures to effectively prevent and counter this new and dangerous trend and recommends that Governments **support the development of adequate multilateral mechanisms to communicate to INCB incidents involving new psychoactive substances and products containing them**, with a view to establishing or confirming emerging trends and contributing to devising early countermeasures.

(AR/2013/R12)

The Board encourages Governments to **put in place effective mechanisms for identifying and investigating suspicious transactions involving such non-scheduled substances**.

(AR/2007/R18) (PRE/2008/P94)

(PRE/2007/P32) (PRE/2007/P89)

The Board wishes to remind Governments that **communicating incidents involving new substances that have not previously been encountered in a given jurisdiction may help to establish or confirm new trends** and may contribute to the development of countermeasures. **Early communication of information** about a suspicious shipment or of concerns about a shipment is critical in that it alerts the relevant authorities at the national and international levels so that similar shipments routed through different border crossings, ports or countries can be identified.

(PRE/2013/P151) (AR/2009/R36)

(PRE/2005/P81)

All Governments are encouraged to **make use of the Board's updated international special surveillance list of non-scheduled chemicals**, which is available to competent national authorities.

(PRE/2009/P112) (PRE/2008/P94)

(PRE/2007/P62) (PRE/2007/P89)

(PRE/2003/P89)

INCB wishes to remind Governments of the **possibility of traffickers approaching legitimate industry for customized synthesis of non-scheduled intermediates** and the need to alert industry to that possibility. A list of key substitute chemicals, including the relevant extended definitions covering a range of derivatives and chemically related substances, is available to competent national authorities in the **limited international special surveillance list** of non-scheduled substances, as part of the information package on the control of precursors, on the secure website of INCB.

(PRE/2015/P108)

The Board would like to emphasize once again the **importance of close cooperation with the private sector** in order to solicit information about suspicious orders in a timely manner. The Board would also like to **remind** competent national authorities **of the limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances** as a tool for use in cooperation with the industries concerned.

(PRE/2014/P160)

(PRE/2011/P100) (PRE/2010/P86)

In view of the **continued notifications of non-scheduled substances**, the Board urges all Governments to ensure that **mechanisms are in place for preventing their use in the illicit manufacture of drugs**. In this connection, the Board draws the attention of all Governments to the latest version of the limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances, which is available on request and can be accessed on the Board's restricted web page.

(PRE/2010/P66)

In order to **properly address these developments** (regulations introduced by 48 countries over 150 substances that are not included in Table I or II or on the limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances), it will be necessary for Governments to **share their experiences with each other**. The Board is currently reviewing the various approaches implemented by Governments.

(PRE/2012/P148)

The Board wishes to remind all Governments to **fully investigate suspicious transactions and seizures of non-scheduled substances** and report the results of those investigations to the Board, in order to **improve the understanding of the chemicals actually being used in illicit heroin manufacture and their sources, as a basis for devising adequate responses**.

(PRE/2010/P82) (PRE/2006/P26)

The Board therefore encourages authorities to **be cognizant of the investigative value of information about non-scheduled chemicals**, details such as the specific **type and form of ephedrines** (and other chemicals) seized, details regarding **labels on containers** found in clandestine laboratories or used in intercepted shipments, and details about **methods of diversion**, and to share such details with their counterparts in the countries concerned.

(PRE/2013/P149)

The Board wishes to remind all Governments to **fully investigate suspicious transactions and seizures of non-scheduled substances** and **report the results** of those investigations to the Board, in order to improve the understanding of the substances actually being used in **illicit heroin manufacture and their sources**, which can then be used as a basis for devising adequate responses.

(PRE/2012/P116)

Governments are urged to ensure that mechanisms are in place for **verifying the legitimacy** of transactions involving non-scheduled substances that can be used in the **illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants**.

(PRE/2007/P62)

The Board recommends to Governments that have yet to do so to **consider placing l-phenylacetylcarbinol under national controls**.

(PRE/2009/P78)

As this substance is not subject to international controls, the Board recommends that all **countries collect information on possible misuse of l-phenylacetylcarbinol and advise the Board.** (PRE/2008/P60)

The Board notes that the Government of **China has stopped shipments of non-scheduled substances that were likely to be used for illicit drug manufacture** and encourages other Governments to follow that example. (PRE/2012/P38)

The Board wishes to alert all Governments that the Government of **Mexico has banned any importation of ephedra into the country.** The Board urges Governments to exercise the utmost **vigilance with regard to shipments of ephedra or substances labelled as Ma Huang food additives,** to carry out physical checks of such consignments and to inform the Board of any transactions involving ephedra. The Board appreciates the cooperation of the Government of **China, which now sends pre-export notifications for shipments of ephedra.** (PRE/2006/P75)

The Board is **requesting additional details** on [seizures of a non-controlled chemical, formic acid, which can be used with **P-2-P** to manufacture methamphetamine, in **Ecuador**] to **determine whether** such illicit manufacture is actually taking place. (PRE/2000/P119)

The Board also recommends that the Government of **China** and other Governments that are not already doing so closely monitor **phenylacetic acid** esters and the esters of other scheduled organic acids (i.e. **anthranilic acid** and **N-acetylanthranilic acid**) **in the same way** as they monitor the acids themselves. (PRE/2010/P64) (PRE/2010/P86)

Safrole-rich oils are traded in multi-ton consignments, without control or monitoring. As they do not have a unique customs code under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), controls are not applied uniformly. **Sassafras oil** should be treated the same way as **safrole.** (PRE/2005/P41)

In order to prevent the manufacture of **3,4-MDP-2-P,** the Board urges all Governments to exercise adequate control measures over the **substances from which that key precursor may be produced,** in particular **safrole,** either as refined or in the form of **safrole-rich oils,** as well as **piperonal.** Such measures are especially necessary in regions where plants containing **safrole-rich oils** are grown and harvested. (PRE/2009/P69) (PRE/2009/P106)

The Board **invites Governments** to consider ways to ensure the acceptance of **sassafras oil as safrole** by the competent authorities and the industry. (PRE/2005/P137)

In the light of the variety of **non-scheduled “designer”** precursors that are being encountered by regulatory and law enforcement authorities, INCB wishes once again to **draw attention to the challenges** that some of the new chemical derivatives may pose to forensic laboratories regarding the identification of such precursors. For example, the inadvertent generation of analytical artefacts during laboratory analysis may suggest the presence of a controlled primary precursor such as P-2-P or 3,4-MDP-2-P when in fact the analysed sample was the sodium salt of the glycidic acid derivative. (PRE/2015/P119)

Part 8. Preparations, Mixtures and Natural Products

Recommendation	Reference (source)
The Board again recommends that pharmaceutical preparations containing scheduled substances be controlled in the same way as the substances themselves.	(PRE/2008/P93) (PRE/2007/P43) (PRE/2007/P86) (AR/2007/R17) (PRE/2006/P134) (PRE/2005/P135) (AR/2005/R13)
Since 2003, the Board has recommended that international trade in pharmaceutical preparations should be monitored in the same manner as the precursors that those preparations contain. Maintaining seamless and effective regulatory controls over both precursor chemicals and pharmaceutical preparations containing those chemicals requires close cooperation between different competent authorities.	(PRE/2012/P145)
Concerned about the continuing diversion of pharmaceutical preparations containing internationally controlled substances, the Board reiterates its request to UNODC to assist the Governments concerned in monitoring trends and preventing the diversion and abuse of such preparations.	(AR/2006/R33)
The Board has endorsed the conclusions of its advisory expert group convened during June 1996 that the control measures over substances listed in the tables of the 1988 Convention should be also directly applicable to the following types of mixtures : (a) Combinations where additional (unscheduled) ingredients are present solely as additives such as preservatives, anti-oxidants or stabilizers; (b) Simple solutions of scheduled substances in the form of solutions; (c) Combinations knowingly formulated to circumvent existing controls.	(PRE/2004/P45)
INCB reminds Governments to consider, to the extent possible and in accordance with national legislation, applying control measures for pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine similar to those for the bulk (raw) substances.	(PRE/2016/P72)
The Board urges all Governments to control pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the same way as they control the scheduled substances themselves , ensuring, at the same time, that legitimate trade is not unduly impeded in the process.	(AR/2008/R31) (AR/2010/R30) (PRE/2009/P52) (PRE/2009/P104) (AR/2009/R35) (PRE/2008/P46) (AR/2007/R17)
The Board therefore requests that Governments, in their efforts to scrutinize shipments of preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine , give due regard to the content of such preparations.	(PRE/2010/P87)
All exporting and transit countries are urged not to release shipments of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine until the legitimacy of those shipments has been duly confirmed. Governments are urged to ensure that mechanisms are in place for verifying not only the legitimacy of the raw material when imported but also the intended end-use of the material, especially in the case of pharmaceutical preparations intended for export to another country.	(PRE/2008/P46)
The Board welcomes the increased focus on shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the form of	(AR/2011/R18) (PRE/2011/P20)

pharmaceutical preparations and encourages Governments to implement the measures outlined in Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 54/8 .	(PRE/2011/P159)
The Board again encourages exporting countries to provide pre-export notifications for all requested exports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine preparations .	(PRE/2007/P86) (PRE/2006/P134) (AR/2005/R13)
The Board welcomes the increased focus on shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the form of preparations and encourages Governments to also pay attention to the ephedrine or pseudoephedrine content in these preparations . This can vary significantly; in past years, ephedrine or pseudoephedrine content of between 30 mg and 300 mg in tablets has been notified to the Board.	(PRE/2010/P36)
The Board urges all Governments in the Americas to continue monitoring the licit trade in precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants , including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine traded in the form of pharmaceutical preparations.	(PRE/2008/P50)
The Board encourages exporting countries to send pre-export notifications for shipments of pharmaceutical preparations to the Americas .	(PRE/2006/P81)
All exporting and transit countries are urged not to release shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine destined to Africa , the Americas and West Asia until the legitimacy of those shipments has been duly confirmed . Governments are urged to ensure that mechanisms are in place for verifying not only the legitimacy of the raw material when imported, but also the intended end-use of the material , especially in the case of pharmaceutical preparations intended for export to another country.	(PRE/2007/P43) (PRE/2007/P85) (PRE/2006/P134)
The Board urges the competent authorities of Pakistan to launch investigations into the export of pharmaceutical preparations from their country to ensure that similar diversions (a shipment that had originally been shipped from Pakistan to the United Kingdom , where it was repacked and exported to Guinea) to other countries have not taken place.	(PRE/2003/P78)
The Board urges the Governments of importing countries in the region (West Asia), including within the framework of the Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East , to take appropriate measures to monitor the manufacture, distribution and export of preparations of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine , in order to ensure that the end-users are legitimate and to prevent the accumulation of those substances in quantities exceeding their licit requirements.	(AR/2006/R23)
The Board strongly urges the Governments of countries in West Asia to pay close attention to industrial products whose formulations contain P-2-P to ensure that the substance cannot be readily extracted for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine . The Board recommends that such industrial products should be monitored in the same manner as are pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine . Consideration should be given to identifying alternative chemicals to P-2-P for use in nonregulated industrial and household products.	(PRE/2008/P54)
The Board requests the Governments of all countries in West Asia to ensure that adequate controls over P-2-P are	(AR/2010/R32)

in place and to revise their annual requirements for that substance.

The Board recommends that Governments **monitor all natural product sources** of **ephedrine alkaloids** in the same manner as is done with respect to **Ephedra sp.**

(PRE/2009/P79)

Part 9. Understanding the Market – Contextual Knowledge Regarding Modi Operandi and Specific Substances

Recommendation

Reference (source)

A) Specific methods and modi operandi in the diversion of precursors

There is a need to enhance the **exchange of experiences and lessons learned** by Governments experimenting with different approaches in order to **decrease the likelihood of the Internet becoming a major vehicle** for the **unregulated supply** of precursor chemicals. (PRE/2012/P149)

The Board [...] urges Governments to **exercise vigilance** with regard to the possible **“chemical masking”** of scheduled precursors for illicit purposes. (PRE/2009/P84)

While the smuggling of concealed **ephedrine** and **pseudoephedrine** still appears to be isolated, **authorities should be aware of the possibility of traffickers turning increasingly to such modi operandi** (Australian authorities have discovered **ephedrine** and **pseudoephedrine concealed in underwater breathing apparatus, decorative wall plaques, tiles** and, during 2005, in the bases of statues imported from **Viet Nam**) in reaction to improved controls over licit trade. (PRE/2005/P26)

It can therefore be concluded that diversion of **potassium permanganate** from domestic distribution channels with subsequent **cross-border smuggling is still another source** of the substance for use in the illicit manufacture of **cocaine**. (PRE/2010/P70)

B) Substances

Chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine

Governments currently confronted with significant illicit manufacture of **amphetamine** or **methamphetamine** should be aware that traffickers may already be attempting to obtain, through additional sources, **large amounts of those new chemicals** and should **proactively monitor those chemicals through partnerships with industry**. (PRE/2012/P158)

Governments should be aware that as traditional precursors of **amphetamine-type stimulants** come under closer scrutiny, it **may be more common for trafficking to turn to alternative substances** such as styrene use in the illicit manufacture of amphetamines. (PRE/2012/P92)

The Board encourages all Governments to **remain alert in regard to Ephedra** and other natural sources of **ephedrine** and **pseudoephedrine**, and to consider adopting adequate measures to monitor them in the same way as is done for the (PRE/2010/P53) (PRE/2015/P80) (PRE/2005/P15)

substances themselves, thus reducing the risk of their use in illicit drug manufacture.

The Board commends the Governments of all countries concerned for their promptness in adopting control measures that assisted in preventing the diversion of **ephedra** shipments. Nevertheless, the Board advises Governments to **remain vigilant** with regard to shipments of **ephedra** extracts. (PRE/2007/P44)

While attempts to divert **ephedra extracts** apparently decreased in 2007, the Board encourages all Governments to **remain vigilant** and to **duly investigate any shipments** of that substance going to or **transiting through their territory**. (PRE/2007/P88)

INCB wishes to remind Governments to **remain vigilant regarding the possibility of ephedra**, a natural source of **ephedrine**, or **ephedra-based products** being illicitly used on their territory. (PRE/2015/P80)

The Board urges Governments to **exercise vigilance over substances** such as **norephedrine** that could be **substituted for [ephedrine and pseudoephedrine]** with little modification of the illicit manufacturing process. (PRE/2010/P52)

Because of the risk of diversion to illicit drug manufacture, the Board **advises against the use of P-2-P**, a prime precursor of **amphetamine-type stimulants**, in unregulated industrial and household products. Such diversion can be eliminated by substituting that precursor with one of many alternative chemicals available for the formulation of cleaning and disinfection products. (PRE/2009/P65)

The Board **notes that no seizure of any type [of P-2-P] was reported in or adjacent to the region of West Asia**, where reports of interceptions of very large quantities of **tableted amphetamine** products are increasing. As **amphetamine** is almost invariably manufactured from **P-2-P**, the unrestricted availability in that region of industrial and domestic products containing **P-2-P must be considered as a likely source** of the diversion of the precursor. (PRE/2009/P70) (PRE/2009/P107)

The Board urges competent authorities to **raise awareness among all concerned national authorities** and industries that attempts are being made to **obtain esters of phenylacetic acid** for illicit purposes and to ensure that mechanisms are in place that enable industry to fully cooperate in identifying and investigating suspicious orders. Governments are encouraged to treat the esters of **phenylacetic acid** the same way they treat **phenylacetic acid**. (PRE/2011/P90)

The Board recommends that Governments **analyse the history of patterns of trade in phenylacetic acid** (and its esters) so that attempts at diversion may be identified and thwarted. The Board stands ready to assist Governments where required. (PRE/2012/P69)

Although the frequency of the seizures of esters of **phenylacetic acid** and the amounts seized have decreased since then, the scale of legitimate trade in those substances and the **ease with which they can be converted into phenylacetic acid warrant continued awareness** by the industries concerned and national authorities. In **Mexico**, the substances have been under national control since November 2009. (PRE/2012/P90)

The Board encourages all Governments to **place special emphasis on the identification of chemicals** that can be used to convert **phenylacetic acid** and its esters into **P-2-P**, in particular **acetic anhydride**. (PRE/2011/P94) (PRE/2010/P65)

The Board urges Governments to **closely monitor movements [piperonal and phenylacetic acid] in both international and domestic trade.**

(PRE/2010/P55)

Chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of fake “captagon”

INCB thanks those Governments that actively participated in the activities [under Operation “Missing Links”] and encourages them to **continue to provide information about substances that could be used in the illicit manufacture of fentanyls** and the drugs found in “captagon” tablets currently trafficked as well as about the modi operandi of traffickers, to allow for a comprehensive analysis of this issue and devise adequate measures to address it.

(PRE/2016/P42)

INCB also wishes to encourage all Governments **to be vigilant** with respect to shipments of **amphetamine precursors** under international control, as well as non-scheduled chemicals, to countries in **West Asia**, as a contribution to establishing the missing links, which would **help for understanding and addressing the sources** of chemicals that **feed the illicit production of “captagon”**.

(PRE/2016/P83)

Chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of MDMA and its analogues

The Board [...] urges Governments to ensure that every effort is made to **identify which precursors are actually being used in the illicit manufacture of MDMA**. In particular, techniques such as impurity **profiling of seized samples by forensic laboratories** can yield valuable intelligence which can then be used to guide investigations or policymaking bodies.

(PRE/2006/P100)
(PRE/2006/P135)

Given the prevalence of MDMA abuse throughout the world and the fact that safrole is a key precursor used in the illicit manufacture of that substance, the **lack of seizures indicates that Governments’ responses to trafficking in precursors of MDMA need to be more effective.**

(PRE/2006/P99)

Governments are urged to **exercise vigilance in monitoring** the trade in [piperonal] because the **globally traded tonnage is high** and because, as controls on safrole are strengthened, illicit demand for piperonal **will likely increase.**

(PRE/2008/P58)

The Board encourages the Governments of countries with plant species rich in **safrole** and/or **safrole** production to **remain vigilant to the possibility** of their diversion for illicit drug manufacture.

(PRE/2011/P86) (PRE/2010/P61)
(PRE/2005/P45)

The Board urges the Governments of those countries [in which the diversion or seizure of safrole oils have taken place] to **determine the amounts of such oils produced and traded**, both internationally and domestically, and to examine what controls are, at present, **exercised over those oils**, with a view to standardizing necessary international actions.

(PRE/2002/P115)

Chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin and cocaine

The **lack of reported seizures of acetic anhydride** and other chemicals required to manufacture heroin remains a concern worldwide. (PRE/2016/P137)

Follow-up investigations into some of those cases **revealed weaknesses in the international precursor control regime**, which have since been rectified. Much work still needs to be done to **identify the trafficking routes** used to smuggle the **acetic anhydride** through the countries concerned. (PRE/2005/P62)

Governments of countries in regions where the illicit manufacture of cocaine takes place **should also note that the substance may also be encountered in illicit laboratories**. (PRE/2006/P104)

The fact that fewer attempts to divert the substance from international trade are also being uncovered serves as an indication that **traffickers may have developed new methods** and routes of diversion, **utilizing domestic distribution channels in third countries not normally associated** with the illicit manufacture of **cocaine**. (PRE/2006/P105)

As processing **cocaine** base into **hydrochloride** can occur anywhere along trafficking routes, the Board urges all Governments to **pay particular attention to shipments of chemicals that can be used** in the illicit manufacture of cocaine. (PRE/2012/P104)
(PRE/2011/P108) (PRE/2010/P71)

Governments are recommended to **maintain awareness of “indicator” substances such as L(+)-tartaric acid and dimethylsulfone** that can help to identify suspicious activity related to illicit drug manufacture. (PRE/2008/P63)

Other

The Board invites Governments to **exercise vigilance** as regards shipments of **ergot alkaloids**, including related substitutes not under international control. (PRE/2005/P71)

INCB encourages Governments to consider using information on **cutting agents to trace the laboratories** in which drugs are illicitly manufactured. Governments may also consider taking action **against cutting agents in accordance with article 13** of the 1988 Convention. (PRE/2016/P180)

Part 10. Training, Capacity-Building, Technical Assistance

Recommendation	Reference (source)
The Board [...]strongly encourages interested Governments and organizations to use bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives to help Governments invoke [the provisions of article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention] for all scheduled substances.	(PRE/2012/P27) (PRE/2012/P157)
The Board urges all Governments and relevant international organizations to provide assistance for training and capacity-building for competent authorities of low-income countries to enable them to monitor and communicate the legitimacy of relevant transactions and to prevent diversions.	(PRE/2011/P154)
The Board invites the Governments of the abovementioned countries [that failed to comply with their reporting obligations for 2004] to inform it of difficulties they may be facing in complying with their treaty obligations. Training may pose problems for a number of developing countries.	(PRE/2005/P80)
Noting the persistent need for training of national drug control administrators in the administration of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals in many countries, the Board wishes to draw the attention of UNODC to these needs and requests it to look into ways to facilitate such training activities on an ongoing basis , for instance, by establishing a specific training unit within UNODC.	(AR/2005/R30)
As trafficking groups capable of handling such large consignments would need well-established and well-organized networks to transport, store and utilize such a large amount of a precursor, the Board requests that initiatives be undertaken to strengthen the capability of both law enforcement and regulatory authorities effectively to counter the networks that may already exist within the region.	(PRE/2001/P116)
The Board urges UNODC to allocate the necessary funds to ensure speedy implementation of the overall training programme for Afghanistan on licit activities related to narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors, which was developed by the Board in cooperation with UNODC, to increase the Government's capacity to implement the provisions of the international drug control treaties.	(AR/2005/R32)
The Board urges all Governments and relevant international organizations to provide assistance for training and building the capacity of the competent authorities of countries in Africa to enable them to confirm the legitimacy of relevant transactions and prevent diversions.	(AR/2008/R14) (PRE/2009/P77) (PRE/2009/P105) (PRE/2008/P48) (AR/2007/R15) (AR/2006/R15)
In many countries in Africa , there is a lack of adequate precursor control legislation and monitoring, and mechanisms for the control of precursor chemicals are insufficient. As a consequence, drug traffickers are increasingly targeting countries in Africa in an attempt to divert the chemicals they require for illicit drug manufacture. The Board calls upon UNODC to offer technical assistance , including training, to the African countries at risk of such diversion.	(AR/2005/R42)
The Board urges the Governments concerned to make full use of the mechanisms established under Operation Topaz (now Project Cohesion) , including the provision of technical support and training, to enhance existing law	(PRE/2004/P77)

enforcement capacity, especially for customs authorities and border guards. (PRE/2004/P77)

Part 11. Commitment and Shared Responsibility; Country and Region Recommendations, Communications, and Conduct

Recommendation	Reference (source)
A) Commitment and shared responsibility	
Considering the difficulties in the implementation of the provisions of the 1988 Convention and related resolutions and, in particular, in view of the challenges , outlined in the present report, that have begun to emerge after 20 years of international precursor control, the Board encourages Governments to reinforce their commitment to the shared responsibility of precursor control by cooperating to proactively address those challenges .	(PRE/2012/P160)
INCB commends Governments for uncovering diversion attempts and effecting precursor seizures. However, INCB would like to remind Governments of the importance of thoroughly investigating all diversion attempts and seizures , and communicating relevant findings to INCB and any other countries concerned so that the underlying weaknesses of domestic monitoring systems or shortcomings at the international level can be addressed .	(PRE/2016/P69)
The Board therefore encourages Governments to identify where weaknesses exist and take remedial action to comply with their treaty obligations and responsibility vis-à-vis other members of the international community , in order to prevent substances from reaching illicit markets.	(PRE/2013/P148)
INCB welcomes the outcome document of the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly and the commitment of Governments to the core principles of international precursor control , including the monitoring of international trade through the PEN Online system, operational cooperation under Project Prism and Project Cohesion and through PICS, and public-private partnerships. In relation to the appeal of the Government of Thailand , INCB invites all countries and territories to further strengthen their cooperation with the Board and with each other on all matters related to the implementation of their treaty obligations under article 12 of the 1988 Convention.	(PRE/2016/P22) (AR/2014/R12) (AR/2013/R11)
The Board invites the Governments of all importing countries and territories , in particular those located in areas where illicit manufacture occurs, or that have been used for transit of precursors to those areas, to collect and report relevant information to the Board .	(PRE/2000/P29)
The Board reminds Governments of their shared responsibility to quickly communicate information related to the diversion and attempted diversion of precursors so as to facilitate international efforts to counter trafficking in precursors.	(PRE/2011/P153) (PRE/2012/P154)
Governments that do not apply some system of control over exports of precursors are not in a position to comply with their treaty obligation to contribute to the prevention of diversion, which is a shared responsibility .	(PRE/2012/P139)
The Board therefore wishes to remind all Governments of the need for appropriate sanctions to act as deterrents of	(PRE/2002/P42)

criminal activity, in particular precursor related offences.

The Board calls on the relevant international bodies, including the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Customs Co-operation Council (also called the World Customs Organization) and regional bodies, to **continue to assist in the operations within their areas of responsibility**.

(PRE/2004/P11)

The Board calls upon the **General Assembly** to respond to the strong recommendation of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and **provide the secretariat with the necessary resources to maintain the activities of the Board under the operations**. Those resources would enable the Board to further improve the already productive activities related to the operations.

(PRE/2004/P12)

B) General communications and cooperation with, and between, Governments

The Board invites all **metropolitan Governments** that have not yet done so to **extend the territorial application of the 1988 Convention**, where applicable, **to their non-metropolitan territories**. The Board also encourages **Governments of the non-metropolitan territories to apply the necessary practical measures** to implement the provisions of article 12 of the Convention.

(PRE/2000/P8)

INCB wishes to encourage all Governments to **make every effort to provide details of, and confirm, relevant seizures when so requested by the Board**. It is only through the sharing of such information that weaknesses in control systems can be identified in a timely manner and be successfully addressed.

(PRE/2016/P152) (AR/2007/R15)
(PRE/2005/P17)

The Board wishes to remind **Governments of Security Council resolution 1817 (2008)**, in which the Council invited all Member States, in particular those producing precursor chemicals, Afghanistan, neighbouring countries and all countries on the trafficking routes, to **increase their cooperation** with the Board, notably by fully complying with the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in order to eliminate loopholes utilized by criminal organizations to divert precursor chemicals from licit international trade.

(AR/2008/R32) (PRE/2008/P70)

INCB encourages Governments that have the technical capabilities to **conduct such detailed forensic analyses and offer such support**, to the extent possible, **to other Governments** on request, with a view to improving knowledge of the chemicals actually being used in illicit drug manufacture and the sources of those chemicals, thus **supporting precursor control measures worldwide**.

(PRE/2015/P90)

The Board is therefore seeking the cooperation of Governments in an effort, inter alia, to **identify safe, affordable and environmentally friendly means of storing and disposing of the seized chemicals**. Governments are urged to support the Board in that task by supplying the information sought when so requested.

(PRE/2000/P90)

C) Country and region specific recommendations

The Board calls upon the Governments of all **African countries** to **strengthen their national mechanisms for precursor control** and to **cooperate** with the Governments of other countries in the region and relevant international bodies in that regard. (AR/2009/R37) (AR/2007/R14)

The Board calls on the Governments of all **countries in Africa** to **strengthen their controls over the import of precursors of ATS and the movement of such precursors within their territory.** (AR/2007/R15)

Although **Africa** is not a major destination for **acetic anhydride**, the Board urges all Governments in the region to **prevent any possible threats by trafficking organizations seeking new sources of the substance.** (PRE/2008/P78)

In view of the existing drug abuse and trafficking situation in **Africa**, the Board calls upon the Governments of countries in the region to **remain vigilant** with regard to all shipments of **anthranilic acid and N-acetylanthranilic acid.** (PRE/2007/P81)

As **methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDMA)**, commonly known as “ecstasy”) laboratories have been dismantled in **Egypt** and **South Africa** in the past and traffickers are utilizing countries in **Africa** to divert other precursors of **ATS**, authorities in the region should **remain vigilant.** (PRE/2006/P90)

The Board **is concerned** that **African** countries are being used as **trans-shipment points** for **ephedrine** and **pseudoephedrine** shipments that are organized by international criminal networks and are destined for **North America.** (PRE/2006/P77)

The Board urges the Government of **Afghanistan** to continue to work with the international community to prevent such diversions and smuggling. (AR/2008/R32)

All Governments are encouraged, with a view to **facilitating the appropriate investigations**, to notify the Government of **Afghanistan** and the Board of any orders for the export of **acetic anhydride** to **Afghanistan.** (PRE/2009/P109) (PRE/2007/P77)

The Board urges the Government of **Afghanistan** to take additional measures, including formally prohibiting the importation of **acetic anhydride**, to **control some non-scheduled chemicals** that are used in the illicit manufacture of heroin, to **strengthen cooperation with foreign partners** in enhancing the capacity of the national competent authorities and to **adequately report to the Board detailed information** on seizures of chemicals. (PRE/2008/P98)

The Board reminds all exporting countries of the **need to thoroughly check all shipments of scheduled chemicals to countries neighbouring Afghanistan.** In addition, **further measures to prevent the diversion of acetic anhydride from domestic manufacture and commerce are necessary** in all countries, but particularly in member States of the **European Union** and in countries in **East Asia.** (PRE/2008/P97)

In view of recent developments (between 2008-12 the Government of **Afghanistan** communicated seven incidents (PRE/2013/P115)

involving ammonium chloride, seizing nearly 1.8 tons), the Board encourages the Government of Afghanistan : to assess its legitimate requirements for ammonium chloride and other substances not under international control that can be used in the illicit manufacture of heroin ; and, pursuant to article 24 of the 1988 Convention, to monitor its trade in those substances.	
The Board urges all Governments in the Americas to continue monitoring the licit trade in precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants , including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine traded in the form of pharmaceutical preparations .	(PRE/2008/P50)
The Board calls on the Governments of all countries in the Americas to continue to closely monitor shipments of ergot alkaloids originating in Europe, in order to prevent their diversion for use in the illicit manufacture of LSD .	(PRE/2007/P82)
The Board encourages the Governments of countries in Central and South America to strengthen their mechanisms for monitoring trade in precursor chemicals and work together with the Board in identifying all the precursors and methods used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants .	(AR/2008/R33)
The Board wishes to warn the authorities of countries in Central America and the Caribbean about the increasing number of incidents involving illicit cocaine manufacture in the region and the need to increase efforts to counter the illicit manufacture of that drug before it takes root.	(PRE/2013/P98)
The Board urges all countries in the region (Central and South America) to establish appropriate mechanisms to allow for real-time exchange of information , not only with regard to shipments [of potassium permanganate] in international trade, but also with regard to interceptions and seizures of smuggled consignments.	(PRE/2004/P70)
The Board urges other countries in [South America] to remain on the alert against possible diversions of acetic anhydride for use in the illicit manufacture of heroin .	(PRE/2000/P99)
Asian authorities should remain particularly alert with regard to precursors of methaqualone .	(PRE/2005/P74)
The Board urges the Government of Bangladesh to closely monitor trade in ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, including imports in the form of raw material for formulation into pharmaceutical preparations and subsequent re-export in that form .	(PRE/2010/P37)
The Board encourages the Government of Canada to adopt the measures necessary to prevent the diversion of precursors arranged through broker companies .	(PRE/2007/P49)
The Board notes with appreciation the continuing efforts of the authorities of China to effectively prevent the diversion and trafficking of chemicals, including non-scheduled chemicals , destined for the illicit manufacture of drugs.	(PRE/2014/P51)
The Board calls upon [China and India], and Myanmar , to further expand their operational activities, through cross-border meetings at the working level, as described in its report for 1999 on the implementation of article 12.	(PRE/2000/P105)
The Board also welcomes the concluding in October 2004 of a memorandum of understanding between the	(PRE/2004/P39)

<p>authorities of China and the Netherlands on effective cooperation to prevent the diversion of certain substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention. The Board wishes to encourage other Governments to consider concluding similar agreements, whenever necessary.</p>	
<p>The Board urges the competent authorities of the Netherlands, who have most frequently seized the substance (3,4-MDP-2-P) and conducted investigations, to make every effort to enable such information-sharing with the competent authorities of China.</p>	(PRE/2001/P56)
<p>The Board urges the Chinese and South African authorities to conduct a joint investigation into the cases (4 tons of methaqualone powder and over 100 million methaqualone tablets seized in South Africa during 2003). Such a combined investigation is essential, as methaqualone powder and tablet presses seized during 2004 in South Africa also allegedly originated in China.</p>	(PRE/2004/P150)
<p>Governments in Europe should take note of the existence of such laboratories and introduce appropriate mechanisms to prevent and detect the illicit processing of cocaine.</p>	(PRE/2002/P74)
<p>Governments in the European region should monitor the situation (ephedrine, pseudoephedrine being increasingly being found in illicit laboratories in Europe) carefully in order to avoid the emergence of problems similar to those encountered in North America and South-East Asia.</p>	(PRE/2005/P25)
<p>The Board wishes to urge countries in [Eastern Europe] to be vigilant in identifying diversions that may be taking place and also in taking action to locate and dismantle any laboratories involved in illicit manufacture of drugs.</p>	(PRE/2000/P115)
<p>The authorities of India are encouraged to continue with their efforts to prevent the illicit manufacture of [methaqualone] in their country.</p>	(PRE/2006/P130)
<p>The Board encourages the Governments of India and Myanmar to make full use of cross-border operational meetings to achieve similar successes.</p>	(PRE/2001/P91)
<p>The Board appreciates the contribution by the Government of Iraq towards stopping suspicious shipments. However, the Board also wishes to express its concerns about the lack of follow-up investigations to identify those responsible for placing the suspicious orders in the country.</p>	(PRE/2010/P78)
<p>The Board also calls upon all States to assist the Government of Iraq in ensuring that its territory is not used for the diversion of acetic anhydride.</p>	(PRE/2010/P89)
<p>The Board notes and commends the increasing alertness of competent authorities towards shipments of potassium permanganate to regions other than Latin America, in particular those along cocaine trafficking routes.</p>	(PRE/2010/P68)
<p>While investigations are ongoing, INCB wishes to commend the Lebanese authorities for those seizures (the dismantling of a laboratory in Dar El Wasiaa village in December 2015 and the seizure of chemicals and equipment, which seemed to suggest that some chemical synthesis may have taken place in that laboratory).</p>	(PRE/2016/P83)
<p>As traffickers are apparently experiencing difficulties in obtaining ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, the chemicals of</p>	(PRE/2006/P92)

choice for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine , it is possible that they will turn to phenylacetic acid as a replacement ; the Governments of all countries in the region (Mexico and the United States) should therefore ensure that adequate controls are in place to monitor and control that substance .	
The Board urges the Moroccan authorities to remain vigilant and to ensure that importing companies [of potassium permanganate] have legitimate requirements and that neither shipments nor portions thereof are diverted.	(PRE/2004/P68)
The Board urges the Government [of Myanmar] to initiate appropriate follow-up investigations , in close cooperation with the Governments of the neighbouring countries, to identify the original sources of the acetic anhydride seized , in order to address the ongoing diversions and smuggling in the region.	(PRE/2002/P86)
While commending the Nepalese authorities for the seizure, INCB encourages the authorities to review the annual legitimate requirements for imports of pseudoephedrine into Nepal (currently 5,000 kg) and amend them on the basis of the most recent market data. INCB encourages all other countries to regularly review and update, as required, the annual legitimate requirements for imports of a number of amphetamine-type stimulants precursors as well.	(PRE/2016/P70)
The Board urges the competent authorities of Pakistan to launch investigations into the export of pharmaceutical preparations from their country to ensure that similar diversions to other countries have not taken place.	(PRE/2003/P78)
The Board urges the authorities of [Panama], as well as others in the region, to fully develop intelligence relating to that seizure, in order to detect similar shipments being smuggled through the country.	(PRE/2003/P104)
The Board wishes to reiterate its warning to countries in the region (Panama) about the increasing number of incidents involving illicit cocaine manufacture in the region and the need to increase efforts to counter the illicit manufacture of that drug before it takes root.	(PRE/2014/P173)
With illicit precursor manufacture being identified in the Russian Federation and Ukraine and with such manufacture possibly taking place in Lithuania , the Board urges Governments in Europe to take steps, especially by launching backtracking investigations , to identify and dismantle such operations.	(PRE/2004/P108)
The Board urges the Thai authorities to bear in mind the need for vigilance against the threat of smuggling of [acetic anhydride] such as that encountered in other countries in the region.	(PRE/2001/P56)
INCB regrets that South Africa has effectively stopped providing mandatory seizure information on precursors in 2008, and regrets that the Board has not been able to confirm seizure information available on official government websites . INCB encourages the South African authorities to fulfil their international obligations and their role as an important partner in countering illicit drug manufacture and precursor trafficking.	(PRE/2016/P66)
The Board therefore urges the Governments concerned with [Ephedrine in Yugoslavia] to work together and make every effort to identify the source of the ephedrine seized.	(PRE/2002/P94)