
Part 4. Supporting Domestic and International Investigations

Recommendation	Reference (source)
INCB encourages all Governments to cooperate with each other and thoroughly investigate thefts of precursor consignments , or parts thereof, and share relevant findings, especially about the modi operandi, with INCB for further dissemination. The information will help to improve understanding of recent patterns and methods of diversion of precursor chemicals and will assist INCB and competent national authorities in preventing future diversions.	(PRE/2016/P54) (PRE/2015/P47) (AR/2015/R9) (PRE/2011/P153) (PRE/2010/P82)
Governments should [...] be proactive in their approach to precursor investigations and develop information and/or intelligence related to stopped shipments and/or attempted diversions.	(PRE/2005/P142)
Governments should continue to give the highest priority to investigations into seizures and stopped shipments of precursor chemicals and to follow up information provided on attempted diversions. Intelligence-driven investigations and backtracking investigations have proved particularly useful in the identification of those responsible for trafficking and diversion.	(PRE/2006/P138) (PRE/2004/P84) (PRE/2000/P75)
The Board recommends that Governments enhance their cooperation at all levels and exchange pertinent and timely information with all relevant national, regional and international counterparts to support domestic and international investigations targeting organized criminal networks for trafficking chemicals and drugs and to enhance operational and information-sharing activities to that end .	(AR/2013/R10)
The Board encourages other Governments to organize [operational case] meetings where necessary and stands ready to assist in that regard pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention.	(PRE/2004/P79)
The Board reminds all Governments that, by properly investigating stopped shipments , valuable intelligence can be gathered that may lead to the identification of traffickers as effectively as a controlled delivery or the dismantling of illicit drug manufacturing laboratories would .	(PRE/2004/P84)
The Board encourages those States not yet making use of this important tool (controlled deliveries) to consider doing so when interceptions or seizures are effected, not only of acetic anhydride, but of any substance used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.	(PRE/2002/P57)
Governments are required to report seizures on form D and are requested to provide additional information on the background and circumstances of a seizure in response to INCB inquiries , with a view to supporting follow-up investigations, disseminating relevant information widely and preventing similar diversions in the future and elsewhere.	(PRE/2016/P94)
Successes against trafficking groups can only be achieved when the Governments intercepting smuggled consignments launch backtracking investigations . The authorities need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to launch such investigations so that the source of a seizure can be identified and the trafficking network dismantled .	(PRE/2005/P29)

Governments need to ensure that **mechanisms are in place, and utilized, for sharing real-time information**, which is essential if intelligence-driven investigations are to be launched against those responsible for the diversions and if their prosecution is to be ensured. (PRE/2005/P128) (PRE/2004/P9)

The Board therefore urges all Governments to launch intelligence-driven investigations into diversion attempts and stopped shipments, focusing on **identifying those responsible as well as the sources of the finances utilized**. (PRE/2004/P126)

Thorough investigation into suspicious transactions and other irregularities in legitimate trade, such as the [shipment of 18,500 litres of **acetic anhydride** to the **Islamic Republic of Iran**, about which the Italian authorities sent a notification through PEN Online], is very important. Suspending the delivery of **a suspicious precursor shipment alone, without further law enforcement investigation, is not enough**, as experience has shown that the persons behind the suspicious order may continue looking for acetic anhydride in other source countries. (PRE/2016/P135)

The Board commends the authorities concerned for using a **controlled delivery** and urges all Governments to make more use of that important investigative technique. The above-mentioned cases show the **importance of having scientific support in investigations** into precursor chemicals. (PRE/2005/P38)

The Board **emphasizes that follow-up investigations into such cases** (whether the importing company had simply not complied with applicable legislation or whether the order had been identified as an attempt to divert a substance) are of the utmost importance. If shipments are suspended for solely administrative reasons, that information should be conveyed to the exporting country and to the Board in order to avoid delays in legitimate trade in the future. (PRE/2007/P24)

INCB welcomes the vigilance and close cooperation of Governments to prevent chemical diversion and encourages **the timely exchange of all relevant documentation to enable the authorities of the countries concerned to investigate** suspicious cases, diversions and attempted diversions. INCB wishes to acknowledge specifically the efforts made by the authorities of countries participating in **Operation Missing Links to assist the authorities in countries where conflicts and political instability** affect the ability of those authorities to effectively control the trade in precursors in their entire territory. (PRE/2016/P80)

While the integrity of ongoing investigations must be ensured, INCB encourages the authorities in the countries concerned, as well as relevant European institutions, to **ensure that the details of the investigation are made available to those that need to know in order to prevent similar diversions from happening in the future and elsewhere**. (PRE/2016/P81)

INCB therefore encourages all Governments to **make every effort to identify the modi operandi** of those involved in trafficking in **acetic anhydride** and to **communicate** through established channels **any relevant details** (including information about the sources of that substance). In doing so, Governments should consider communicating possible changes in trafficking routes, concealment methods, modi operandi and trafficking trends, as well as the possible shifting of illicit heroin laboratories to previously unsuspected locations (such laboratories were identified, for example, in Spain in 2013 and 2014). (PRE/2015/P151)
(PRE/2012/P109)
(PRE/2006/P116)

The Board [...] urges the **authorities involved in** activities such as **identifying and dismantling illicit laboratories and dumping sites to exercise** the utmost **caution** and, where possible, to ensure that **specialty trained teams** are available for such activities. (PRE/2003/P126)

As the **substances (3,4-MDP-2-P and P-2-P)** are **not usually diverted from international trade, backtracking investigations remain one of the most effective ways to address such trafficking.** (PRE/2006/P89)

Governments **should develop operating procedures to backtrack** from cocaine laboratory seizures and related cases, to **attempt to trace the chemicals back** to the source and transit countries and company and to **inform the Governments concerned.** (PRE/2005/P121)

The Board urges all countries to **identify and monitor the operators involved in either the manufacture or distribution** of [MDMA precursors], in order to determine how and from where the precursors used in the illicit manufacture of **MDMA** are being obtained. (PRE/2000/P128)

The Board [...] calls upon Governments in the region, supported by the **international community, to launch comprehensive operations to identify and dismantle** the networks responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals into **Afghanistan.** (PRE/2005/P139)

The Board notes that the seizure in **Fujian Province** resulted from the exchange of information between the authorities of **China** and the **Netherlands** and urges the Governments of other countries in Asia to **initiate similar backtracking investigations wherever possible.** (PRE/2006/P93)

The Board has requested the authorities concerned to **launch investigations to determine if any links can be established between three cases** [involving **ergotamine** diversion in **Netherlands, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Russia**]. (PRE/2004/P147)

As both provinces (the **Paktia Province** and the **Nangarhar Province**) border **Pakistan**, the Board urges the Government of that country to **increase precursor interdiction efforts along the border.**