I. Introduction

1. The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 provides for measures to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) monitors the Governments’ control over those precursor chemicals and assists Governments in preventing the diversion of such chemicals into the illicit traffic.

2. The present report on precursors has been prepared by the Board pursuant to article 23 of the 1988 Convention. Substantive reporting begins in chapter II, which provides statistical data and other information on action taken by Governments and the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Those data are drawn from a number of sources, including the following: form D; the Pre-Export Notification Online (PEN Online) system; the Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS); the results of task force operational support under Project Prism and Project Cohesion; and official national reports on the situation with regard to drug and precursor control.

3. Chapter III provides information on the extent of legitimate trade in precursor chemicals; on the latest major trends in trafficking in and the illicit use of those chemicals; on relevant cases involving suspicious and stopped shipments; on diversions or attempted diversions of those chemicals from international trade; and on seizures of those chemicals.

4. Chapter IV, entitled “Action to enhance international precursor control”, builds on the thematic chapters in the Board’s 2011 and 2012 reports on precursors. The chapter outlines regional priorities to be addressed by Governments in response to the rapidly changing situation with regard to precursor trafficking at the national and international levels.

5. Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations for Governments on effective precursor control at the national and international levels, including on ways to address the challenges posed by the use of non-scheduled substances in illicit drug manufacture.

6. Annexes I-XI provide updated, practical information to assist competent national authorities in carrying out their functions, including information on estimated annual legitimate requirements for the import of selected substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), a list of Governments that require pre-export notifications, information on the use of scheduled substances in illicit drug manufacture and a summary of applicable treaty provisions. Annexes can be found in the CD-ROM version of the present report and in the online version or the Board’s website (www.incb.org). Governments may obtain a printed copy of the annexes by contacting the secretariat of the Board by e-mail (secretariat@incb.org).

7. The present report, together with the thematic chapters in the Board’s 2011 and 2012 reports on precursors, provides an assessment of the effectiveness of precursor control, pursuant to the high-level segment on progress of precursor control as outlined in the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem and is to be part of the input for the high-level review of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action to be conducted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its fifty-seventh session, in 2014, and by the General Assembly at its special session to be held in 2016.

II. Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board

A. Scope of control

8. In response to significant detections and seizures of alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), an immediate precursor of 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P) and hence a “pre-precursor” of both amphetamine and

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3 The annexes are not included in the printed copies of the present report but are available in the CD-ROM version of the report and in the version on the website of the International Narcotics Control Board (www.incb.org).
methamphetamine, the Board has sent a communication to the Secretary-General to formally initiate the procedures for the scheduling of APAAN in March 2013. The Secretary-General invited Governments to express their opinion regarding the proposed scheduling through a questionnaire distributed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

9. A total of 42 Governments responded to the questionnaire, providing information on the licit manufacture and use of, and trade in, APAAN on their territories, its use in the illicit manufacture of drugs and any implications that the scheduling of the substance might have on legitimate industry and trade. On the basis of the responses received, the Board has submitted to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs a recommendation to include the substance in Table I of the 1988 Convention. That recommendation is to be considered by the Commission at its fifty-seventh session, in March 2014.

B. Adherence to the 1988 Convention

10. As at 1 November 2013, the 1988 Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by 187 States and formally confirmed by the European Union (extent of competence: article 12). Of the nine States that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention, five are in Oceania (see annex I). The Board urges the nine States that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention to implement the provisions of article 12 and accede to the Convention without further delay.

C. Reporting to the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention

11. Governments are obliged to report to the Board annually information on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The information, which is submitted on form D, is used to identify regional and global patterns and trends. The Board requested Governments to submit form D by 30 April 2013, in order to provide it with adequate time to assess the submitted information. As at 1 November 2013, a total of 123 States and territories had submitted form D for the year 2012 (see annex VII). Some Governments continue to miss the reporting deadline, fail to report altogether, submit blank forms or provide only partial information on precursor chemicals. The Governments that failed to report to the Board for the year 2012 as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention are listed in table 1. The Board wishes to remind all States parties that reporting pursuant to the 1988 Convention is not an option but an obligation. All States parties are requested to complete the latest version of form D and submit it in a timely manner.

12. Of the 123 Governments that submitted form D for 2012, 49 per cent reported having seized substances in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention in that year. (For details on the reported seizures of those substances, by region, see annex VIII.) Thirty per cent of Governments also reported for 2012 seizures of substances not in Table I or II. In several instances, significant seizures of precursor chemicals reported by some Governments in their national reports were never reported on form D. The Board stresses the importance to all Governments of their obligation to provide on form D complete and comprehensive data on seizures of precursor chemicals.

13. Governments submitting information on form D often fail to include details on, for example, methods of diversion, stopped shipments or the illicit manufacture of substances. That hampers the ability of the Board to identify and analyse emerging trends in trafficking in precursors and the illicit manufacture of drugs. The Board wishes to remind Governments to provide details on methods of diversion, stopped shipments and the illicit manufacture of substances wherever possible.

D. Legislation and control measures

14. In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29, the Board collects information on the specific controls applied to the substances in Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention and maintains a directory of those requirements to assist Governments in monitoring trade in controlled chemicals. Since November 2012, several changes in control measures introduced by Governments have been brought to the attention of the Board.

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5 For a list of substances in Table I and Table II, see annex III to the present publication.
7 Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu.
8 The latest version of form D is available in all six official languages of the United Nations on the Board’s website (www.incb.org).
15. In November 2012, Peru issued a new regulation through a legislative decree on control measures for chemicals, equipment and material used for the illicit manufacture of drugs. The decree establishes measures for the registry, control and inspection of goods that can be used directly or indirectly in the illicit manufacture of drugs. It defines the roles of different government agencies in that area.

16. India enacted a narcotic drug and psychotropic substance (regulation of controlled substances) order, which in March 2013 placed 12 more substances under domestic control, namely: ergometrine and its salts; ergotamine and its salts; isosafrole; hysergic acid and its salts; 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P); norephedrine, its salts and preparations thereof; phenylacetic acid and its salts; 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P); piperonal; potassium permanganate; safrole and safrole-rich oils; and methyl ethyl ketone; and preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

17. In Australia, the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 have been amended, adding Ephedra sinica to Schedule 4 and increasing control over its importation. Since April 2013, the plant material may not be imported into Australia unless the importer has been granted a licence to import it.

18. In response to illicit methamphetamine manufacture using ephedrine derived from plants of the genus Ephedra, the Supreme People’s Court of China has strengthened regulations concerning ephedra, the natural source of the drug ephedrine. Since June 2013, any person who harvests or purchases ephedra for the purpose of manufacturing drugs may be charged with a drug-related crime.

19. In September 2013, the Government of Viet Nam classified 41 substances as precursors with strengthened control measures. The Government now requires agencies, organizations or individuals that study, examine, produce, transport, maintain, store, purchase, sell, distribute, use, process, exchange, import, export or transit those precursor chemicals to comply with strict new legal regulations in relation to the handling of those chemicals.

20. Remedial measures have been adopted to control trade in acetic anhydride involving member States of the European Union. The European Commission has proposed new legislative measures for the monitoring of international trade in pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.
E. Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for precursors

21. In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20, parties to the 1988 Convention provide data on their licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Table I and Table II of the Convention. As at 1 November 2013, 112 States and territories had provided information on licit trade in those substances, and 108 had furnished data on licit uses of and requirements for one or more of those substances (see annex IX). The voluntary provision of those confidential data allows the Board to help prevent the diversion of precursors by monitoring legitimate international trade flows and identifying patterns of suspected illicit activity. The Board commends those States parties which provide comprehensive and confidential data on trade in substances in Tables I and II of the Convention and urges all other parties to the 1988 Convention to provide those data in accordance with Council resolution 1995/20.

F. Annual legitimate requirements for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants

22. In its resolution 49/3, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs requested Member States to provide the Board with annual estimates of their legitimate requirements for imports of four substances frequently used in the manufacture of ATS—3,4-MDP-2-P, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and P-2-P—and, to the extent possible, estimated requirements for imports of preparations containing those substances.

23. As at 1 November 2013, 153 Governments had provided estimates for at least one of the above-mentioned substances—a total of 749 estimates. After the Board's 2012 report on precursors was published, Armenia and Cameroon provided such information for the first time. The estimated annual legitimate requirements submitted by States and territories as at 1 November 2013 are provided in annex II, which is regularly updated on the Board's website.

24. The Board has identified 42 Governments that provided estimates but did not include their annual legitimate requirements for the import of 3,4-MDP-2-P. As legitimate use of and international trade in that particular substance are virtually non-existent (during the reporting period, PEN Online was used for only one pre-export notification of 0.5 litre of the substance), the Board decided that, for those Governments providing estimates of annual legitimate requirements where estimates for 3,4-MDP-2-P were missing, a default value of 0 kg would be entered on the Government's behalf (see annex II). A footnote to the default entry would indicate that the Board was not aware of any legitimate need for the importation of that substance into the country.

25. The Board continues to be concerned about the relatively high annual legitimate requirements for imports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and the subsequent risk of the diversion of those substances into illicit channels in many countries in West Asia. For example, Pakistan has continued its high-profile investigation into past cases involving the diversion of ephedrine. National regulations in Pakistan impose on individual pharmaceutical companies a maximum quota of 500 kg of ephedrine per year for the manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine. Court filings allege that some companies were allotted quotas far in excess of that amount and were unable to clearly explain what had happened to those precursor allocations. If substantiated, the allegations will raise questions about the accuracy of the country's estimated annual legitimate requirements for ephedrines.

G. Controls over international trade

1. Pre-export notifications

26. By invoking article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, Governments of importing countries may require exporting countries to inform them of exports prior to shipping. As at 1 November 2013, 98 States and 3 territories had formally requested pre-export notifications (see map 1 and annex X). Since the Board published its 2012 report on precursors, 13 more Governments have invoked articles of the 1988 Convention. Armenia, Barbados, Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), for all substances in Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention, including pre-export notification for pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and for safrole-rich oils. Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, the Syrian Arab Republic and Togo also invoked article 12 for all substances in Table I and Table II. Jamaica requested notification for all substances in Table I, including pre-export notification for pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and for safrole-rich oils. Panama requested notification for ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, norephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The Republic of Moldova, which had previously requested notification for all substances in Table I and Table II, requested that notification be extended for pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and for safrole-rich oils. The Board calls upon all remaining Governments to further strengthen the pre-export notification system by invoking the provisions of article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention without further delay.
CHAPTER II. ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

Map 1. Governments invoking article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, requiring pre-export notification for selected substances
(As at 1 November 2013)

2. Pre-Export Notification Online

27. The PEN Online system, launched in March 2006, is a tool that makes it possible for the competent national authorities of exporting and importing countries to securely inform each other about international trade in precursors chemicals. The information shared through PEN Online enables the monitoring of licit global trade at the country and company levels. It also assists the competent national authorities and the Board in identifying and confirming the legitimacy of individual shipments of precursors and enables suspicious shipments to be suspended or stopped in an efficient and timely manner. On average, more than 2,000 pre-export notifications are communicated through the PEN Online system each month. Since the publishing of the Board’s 2012 report on precursors, 11 additional States or territories have registered to use the PEN Online system, bringing the total number to 146. A total of 52 States do not receive automated pre-export notifications and are thus vulnerable to traffickers of precursor chemicals. The Board urges those 52 States to register to use the PEN Online system and encourages all registered Governments to utilize the system.

28. Governments should be aware that by registering for PEN Online they do not invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention. Forty-five Governments that have registered to use PEN Online have not invoked article 12; 11

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9 Algeria; British Virgin Islands; Burkina Faso; Cabo Verde; Côte d’Ivoire; Liberia; Libya; Macao, China; Marshall Islands; Solomon Islands; and Tajikistan.

11 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan and Vanuatu.

Albania, Andorra, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Eritrea, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles,
thus, exporting countries are under no obligation to notify those PEN Online users prior to shipping scheduled precursor chemicals. The Board calls on the 45 Governments that have registered to use PEN Online but have not yet invoked the provisions of article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention to invoke those provisions without further delay.

29. The Board reiterates that the timely submission of notifications, the review of incoming pre-export notifications and the subsequent provision of feedback—fundamental elements of the PEN Online system—should be respected by all Governments. In some cases, however, chemicals are being shipped despite objections raised through the PEN Online system or without providing enough time for the importing country to review the pre-export notification, even after the Government of the exporting country has been repeatedly directed by the Board and other Governments to address the issue. Under national legislation allowing for the concept of “regular customer” status, the United States of America continues to export with little or no advance notification substances listed in Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention. As indicated by the Board in its 2012 report on precursors, that practice is not in accordance with that Government’s obligations under the 1988 Convention. Several Governments have officially objected to the practice of the United States authorities whereby notifications are sent after shipments have already left United States territory. The recommended practice is to allow 5-14 days for the authorities of the importing country to verify the legitimacy of a shipment. Governments of all countries exporting scheduled chemicals to countries whose Governments have invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention are obliged to notify the authorities of the importing country about the export of a shipment of such chemicals prior to its departure for the importing country. Furthermore, the Board recommends that Governments register for, and actively use, the PEN Online system for such notifications.

30. There have been cases in which Governments of importing countries have failed to systematically review incoming pre-export notifications and to respond to pre-export notifications within the usual period of 5-14 days. The authorities of the importing country should inform the authorities of the exporting country if more time is needed for the verification of a particular transaction and should ask them to delay the delivery of the shipment pending the outcome of the verification. Governments of the importing countries are encouraged to respond to pre-export notifications by the verification deadline when denying authorization for a shipment. In cases where there are grounds for suspicion, the Governments of the exporting countries are encouraged to release the shipments only upon receiving official confirmation from the competent authorities of the importing country.

31. During the reporting period, approximately 1.5 per cent of the replies received via the PEN Online system by Governments of importing countries were requests to stop or suspend shipments. In many cases, the importing company was not registered to trade in the substance in question or there was no valid import authorization for the shipment in question. In cases where the objection is sent after the deadline for responses, the Board works with the authorities of both the exporting country and importing country to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to suspend delivery of the shipment at the local level and/or to launch investigations. The Board commends Governments of importing countries for utilizing the PEN Online system and encourages those that have not yet made use of the system to do so.

32. Some countries export chemicals without sending a pre-export notification via the PEN Online system. For example, according to information provided on form D for 2012, the Governments of Brazil, China and the Republic of Korea—each requiring pre-export notification for shipments of acetic anhydride—reported receiving shipments of acetic anhydride from Saudi Arabia in 2012; however, no pre-export notifications relating to shipments originating in Saudi Arabia could be found in the PEN Online system, making it difficult to monitor the supply chain. The Board wishes to remind Governments of exporting countries of their obligation under article 12 of the 1988 Convention to provide notification regarding exports of chemicals before such exports depart from their territory. Using the PEN Online system is the most efficient and effective way to provide such notification.

33. Taiwan Province of China is a significant global trader of some scheduled precursors. According to trade statistics cited in the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the United States, in 2011 Taiwan Province of China was the third largest importer of ephedrine and the third largest exporter of pseudoephedrine. Outside the international control system, Taiwan Province of China also trades in a number of other substances under international control, including acetic anhydride. In its previous reports on precursors, the Board has identified significant seizures of precursors originating in Taiwan Province of China. According to data published online by the Food and Drug Administration of Taiwan Province of China, seizures of precursors of domestic origin remain at a high level: more than 6.6 tons of pseudoephedrine and 1.9 tons of ephedrine

Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia.

have been seized since 2004. The Board is not aware of any territory or State that has seized more norephedrine than Taiwan Province of China: 329 kg since 2004. The current situation represents a significant weakness in the international control system, where the diversion of chemicals into illicit channels is known to occur but the results of follow-up investigations—if any—are not known to INCB. The Board once again encourages the Government of China to work with it to devise practical ways and means of addressing pre-export notifications, suspicious shipments and diversions involving precursors and Taiwan Province of China.

H. Activities and achievements in international precursor control

1. Project Prism and Project Cohesion

Two international initiatives of the Board, Project Cohesion (in operation since 2006) and Project Prism (in operation since 2003), serve as international communication platforms for the monitoring of chemical transactions and for launching targeted, time-bound intelligence-gathering operations. Participants in Project Prism and Project Cohesion continued to be alerted to suspicious shipments and actual and attempted diversions of precursors, as well as newly emerging precursors. At a meeting of the INCB Precursor Task Force of Project Prism and Project Cohesion held in Adelboden, Switzerland, in September 2013, the participants discussed the situation with regard to trafficking in acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan and reviewed recent investigative information.

To address the prevailing modi operandi used by traffickers of acetic anhydride in recent years, the INCB Precursor Task Force initiated in 2013 an international operation called Eagle Eye focusing on verification of the legitimacy of domestic trade in and end use of acetic anhydride. The goals of the operation include a review of control measures to identify cross-border trafficking in the substance. Forty countries are participating in the operation. The results of the operation will be evaluated by the members of the Task Force and reflected in the Board’s 2014 report on precursors. The Board encourages Governments to actively participate in such intelligence-gathering operations under Project Prism and Project Cohesion.

2. Other international initiatives focusing on precursor control

The World Customs Organization, in close cooperation with Chinese customs authorities, conducted an operation called SKY-NET from 10 September to 28 October 2012. Participants from 68 member States of the World Customs Organization, its regional intelligence liaison offices and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) stopped more than 940 postal and express mail parcels containing several tons of drugs and 3 tons of precursors, including pseudoephedrine and ephedrine and the non-scheduled precursor APAAN.

In 2012, INTERPOL spearheaded Operation Icebreaker, targeting illicit methamphetamine manufacture and trafficking across the Americas. More than 360 tons of chemicals were seized, four clandestine laboratories were dismantled and 25 suspects were arrested in the participating countries during the multi-agency initiative, which ran from September to December 2012 and involved 11 countries, in partnership with the World Customs Organization and the Board. The key objectives of the operation were to identify and seize shipments of precursor chemicals intended for use in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, to dismantle the organized criminal groups behind the smuggling of those chemicals and to locate and destroy clandestine laboratories involved in such illicit manufacture.

I. Precursors Incident Communication System

PICS was launched by the Board in March 2012. It has quickly become an indispensable tool for Governments, providing a secure communication platform for quickly sharing—among relevant national law enforcement and regulatory authorities—information about suspicious shipments, seizures, diversions and attempted diversions of precursors, shipments of precursors stopped in transit and seizures of clandestine laboratories and equipment. The system effectively facilitates real-time intelligence-sharing and enables bilateral and regional investigations to be launched without delay.

As at 1 November 2013, there were more than 350 registered users of PICS, from 80 Governments and 8 international and regional agencies (see map 2). PICS has been used to communicate more than 850 incidents involving 84 different countries and territories. The Board encourages all Governments to register PICS focal points for their relevant national authorities involved in precursor control, such as national regulatory, law enforcement, customs and drug control agencies, and to actively use the system to communicate all incidents involving precursor chemicals with a view to enhancing intelligence-sharing.

13 Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama.