I. Introduction

1. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) monitors Governments’ control over precursor chemicals and assists Governments in preventing the diversion of such chemicals from licit into illicit channels, pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The present report has been prepared pursuant to the provisions of that Convention.

2. Substantive reporting begins in chapter II, which provides statistical data and other information on action taken by Governments and the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Those data are drawn from a number of sources, including the following: form D; the Pre-Export Notification (PEN Online) system; the Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS); the operational results achieved under Project Prism and Project Cohesion, which are the international initiatives addressing chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of, respectively, amphetamine-type stimulants, and cocaine and heroin; and official national reports on the drug and precursor control situation.

3. Chapter III provides information on the extent of legitimate trade in individual precursor chemicals; on major trends in trafficking in and illicit use of those chemicals; on relevant cases of suspicious and stopped shipments; on diversions or attempted diversions of those chemicals from legitimate trade; and on seizures of those chemicals, including clandestine laboratories.

4. As has been the practice since 2011, one precursor-related theme is addressed in greater depth in the report. In this year’s report, chapter IV explores the role of precursor law enforcement in preventing diversions, including the diversion of non-scheduled substitute chemicals.

5. Specific recommendations and conclusions are highlighted throughout the report to facilitate concrete actions to be taken by Governments to prevent diversion. Overall conclusions are presented in chapter V.

6. Annexes I-X to the report provide updated statistics and practical information to assist competent national authorities in carrying out their functions. The annexes are not included in the printed copies of the present report but are available in the electronic version (CD-ROM) and on the INCB website.

II. Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board

7. The present chapter provides information on action taken by Governments and the Board since its 2015 report on precursors.

A. Scope of control

Initiation of procedures for the inclusion of two precursors of fentanyl in Table I of the 1988 Convention

8. In October 2016, the Government of the United States of America notified the Secretary-General of a proposal to place N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP) and 4-anilino-N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (ANPP), two precursors of fentanyl and of a few “designer” fentanyl, in Table I of the 1988 Convention. Pursuant to the procedure set out in article 12, paragraph 3, of that Convention, the Secretary-General invited Governments’ comments concerning the notification and supplementary information which might assist the Board in establishing an assessment and assist the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in reaching a decision.

B. Adherence to the 1988 Convention

9. As at 1 November 2016, the 1988 Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by 189 States and formally confirmed by the European Union (extent of competence: article 12). As there have been no changes since the publication of the Board’s 2015 report on precursors (see annex I), there continue to be nine States — five in Oceania, three in Africa and one in West Asia — that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention. The Board urges the nine States that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention to implement the provisions of article 12 and accede to the Convention without further delay.

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2 Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, State of Palestine and Tuvalu.
C. Reporting to the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention

10. Article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention requires States parties to submit annually to INCB aggregated information pertaining to the previous year, on: seizures of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and, when known, their origin; any substance not included in Table I or II which is identified as having been used in illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; and methods of diversion and manufacture. Such information is to be submitted in form D at the latest by 30 June of the following year, although INCB encourages an earlier submission (30 April) to facilitate its analysis and ensure sufficient time for any necessary clarification of information provided.

11. As at 1 November 2016, 120 States parties had submitted form D for 2015 (see annex VII for details); of those, 71 States parties submitted form D on time, by 30 June 2016, the highest rate in five years. In past form D reporting cycles, a number of countries submitted their forms after the final cut-off date, with the result that those forms could not be considered in the annual report for the respective year (see figure I). Similar to last year, 6 per cent of form D submissions were made using older versions of form D, thus providing an incomplete set of information. Governments are reminded to use the latest version of form D, which is available, in the six official languages of the United Nations, on the INCB website, and submit it within the requested timeline to facilitate the Board’s analysis of the world precursor situation.

Figure I. Timeline of form D submissions by States parties to the 1988 Convention, 2011-2015

![Timeline of form D submissions by States parties to the 1988 Convention, 2011-2015](image)

12. Sixty-four States parties to the 1988 Convention failed to report to the Board the information for 2015. Of those, two States parties have never submitted form D, and 23 States parties have not done so in the past five years (see table). Kenya resumed submission after failing to submit form D for four years; Burundi submitted form D for the first time. The Board thanks those Governments that have provided a complete form D and wishes to remind all other Governments that the submission of form D is mandatory under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention and that submission of blank forms or of partial information continues to impact the Board’s analysis of regional and global precursor patterns and trends.

13. In 2015, while 83 States parties provided information on seizures of substances in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention on form D (for details on the reported seizures of those substances, by region, see annex VIII), only 45 parties provided information of operational relevance with a view to identifying weaknesses and emerging trends and preventing future diversions, such as substances not included in Tables I and II (43 Governments, or 36 per cent of all 120 submitting States parties) and information on methods of diversion and illicit manufacture (24 Governments, or 20 per cent). While such information is often available in media reports, reported in national reports or in official conference presentations and sometimes communicated through PICS, it

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5 The Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino did not furnish form D separately as their data are included in the reports of France, Italy and Switzerland.
is too often not reported on the annual form D. Therefore, INCB wishes to commend Governments that shared operational details and remind all other Governments effecting seizures or encountering alternate substances to provide all relevant details of such seizures on form D, in particular, information on origin, where known, and methods of diversion and illicit manufacture.

Table. States parties failing to report as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention, 2015

| Algeria         | Fiji       | Niger a |
| Angola a        | Gabon b    | Nigeria |
| Antigua and Barbuda a | Gambia     | Niue    |
| Bahamas a       | Grenada a  | Paraguay |
| Barbados        | Guinea a   | Qatar   |
| Belize          | Guinea Bissau | Saint Kitts and Nevis a |
| Botswana a      | Iraq       | Samoa   |
| Burkina Faso    | Kuwait     | Sao Tome and Principe |
| Cambodia        | Lesotho a  | Serbia   |
| Cameroon        | Liberia a  | Seychelles |
| Central African | Libya a    | Sierra Leone a |
| Republic Chad   | Luxembourg | Suriname a |
| Comoros a       | Malawi a   | Swaziland a |
| Congo a         | Maldives   | The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a |
| Cook Islands    | Marshall Islands b | Timor-Leste |
| Côte d’Ivoire   | Mauritania a | Togo |
| Cuba            | Mauritius  | Tonga a |
| Djibouti a      | Micronesia | Vanuatu  |
| Dominica a      | Mozambique | Yemen    |
| Dominican Republic | Namibia   | Zambia   |
| Eritrea         | Nauru      |         |
|                 | Nepal      |         |

Note: See also annex VII.

a Government that failed to submit form D for any year during the period 2011-2015.
b Government that has never submitted form D.

D. Legislation and control measures

14. In accordance with the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Governments are requested to adopt and implement national control measures to effectively monitor the movement of precursor chemicals. In addition, Governments are also requested to further strengthen existing precursor control measures should any weaknesses be identified. The following changes in control measures have been brought to the attention of INCB since the publication of its last report on precursors.

15. In November 2015, Australia passed an amendment to the Criminal Code Act 1995, removing the element of “intent to manufacture” from offences relating to the importation of “border-controlled precursors”. The element required, for the offence to apply, that a person who imported or exported a “border-controlled precursor” had done so either with the intent to use it to illicitly manufacture a controlled drug or had the belief that another person intended to use the substance to illicitly manufacture a controlled drug (“intent to manufacture” element). However, there had been significant difficulties in proving the intention or belief of the persons, especially if they were part of a larger operation and deliberately operated with limited knowledge about how their actions fitted into the broader criminal enterprise.

16. In China, the ninth amendment of the Chinese criminal law became effective on 1 November 2015, adding two new precursor-related offences to the criminal law, namely, illicit
manufacture of precursor chemicals and illicit transportation. The amendment also increased the maximum sentencing for precursor-related crimes, including a provision for the confiscation of property and for punishing as conspiracy the illicit manufacture of drugs.

17. Following the international scheduling of alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAN) effective 6 October 2014, Canada added APAN, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers to part 1 of schedule VI of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to the schedule to the Precursor Control Regulations (PCR) on 24 February 2016; in Norway, APAN was scheduled on 19 March 2016.

18. In June 2016, the Canadian senate passed a bill to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to include six chemicals, often key intermediary products, used in the manufacture of fentanyl, namely, NPP, 4-piperidone, norfentanyl, 1-phenethylpiperidin-4-ylidene phenylamine, N-phenyl-4-piperidinamine, as well as the salts of the aforementioned substances, and propionyl chloride; the last-mentioned has been included in the INCB limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled chemicals since 2007.


20. In response to the international scheduling of APAN, the 2017 edition of the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System Nomenclature, which entered into force effective 1 January 2017, includes a new harmonized system code number for the separate identification of APAN. In addition, new code numbers were also introduced to improve the monitoring and control of pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or norephedrine. The amendments were made at the request of INCB.

21. As in the past, updated information about individual national systems of authorizations applied to imports and exports of substances in Tables I or II of the 1988 Convention, as well as to additional substances under national control, is available on the secure website of INCB, for use by competent national authorities. The INCB information package on the control of precursors is updated whenever new information is made available to INCB.

22. In April 2016, the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly on the world drug problem concluded with the adoption of an outcome document in which Member States reconfirmed their joint commitment to addressing and countering the world drug problem. In response, the Government of Thailand, in a letter to INCB, informed INCB of its request for all Governments to pay more attention to the control of precursor chemicals and cooperate in the interdiction of precursors to prevent them from entering areas in which illicit drug manufacture takes place. INCB welcomes the outcome document of the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly and the commitment of Governments to the core principles of international precursor control, including the monitoring of international trade through the PEN Online system, operational cooperation under Project Prism and Project Cohesion and through PICS, and public-private partnerships. In relation to the appeal of the Government of Thailand, INCB invites all countries and territories to further strengthen their cooperation with the Board and with each other on all matters related to the implementation of their treaty obligations under article 12 of the 1988 Convention.

E. Submission of data on licit trade, uses and requirements

23. Knowing the legitimate market and understanding and recognizing the nature and extent of regular trade, uses and requirements is a prerequisite for identifying unusual trade patterns and preventing diversions. To that end, and pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20, INCB requests information on licit trade in, use of, and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention on form D. Provision of those data is on a voluntary and confidential basis and allows INCB to help Governments to prevent diversion by identifying patterns of suspected illicit activity.

24. As at 1 November 2016, the Governments of 115 States parties had provided information on licit trade in substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, and 111 had furnished data on licit uses of and/or requirements for one or more of the substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention (see annex IX). The Governments of Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda submitted licit trade data for the first time in the five-year period. INCB commends those Governments that provide comprehensive licit trade data
for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and wishes to encourage all other Governments to provide such data, confidentially if so desired, to help to understand the patterns of regular trade and licit requirements in order to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity and prevent diversion of those substances.

F. Annual legitimate requirements for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants

25. For more than a decade, Governments have been providing estimates of annual legitimate requirements for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants to the Board, pursuant to Commission on Narcotics Drugs resolution 49/3, entitled "Strengthening systems for the control of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs". That resolution requests Governments to provide voluntarily to the Board annual estimates of their legitimate requirements for imports of the following four precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants: ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P) and 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), and preparations containing those substances that could be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means.

26. Since the first publication of annual legitimate requirements in the Board’s 2006 report on precursors, the number of Governments that have provided at least one estimate to the Board has doubled, and the total number of estimates substantially increased, from 160 (in 2006) to 851 (in 2016). The increase in both the number of Governments providing at least one estimate and the number of the individual estimates confirms that these estimates continue to be a useful tool for Governments to assess the legitimacy of shipments and to identify any excesses in pre-export notifications. First-time submissions of annual legitimate requirements were made by Burundi, Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Oman and Rwanda, which brought the total number of submitting Governments to 162 as at 1 November 2016. The authorities of Ethiopia submitted estimates for ephedrine (1,000 kg) and pseudoephedrine preparations (100 kg).

27. One of the most significant updates includes the reduced estimates for P-2-P and 3,4-MDP-2-P from the Government of Zimbabwe. As stated in previous reports, the Government of Zimbabwe had, for two consecutive years, submitted estimates of 1,000 litres for each of those two substances. Recently, the Government clarified this issue and the estimates were corrected to zero accordingly. INCB is also in the process of clarifying proposed upward revisions of estimates provided by the Indian authorities, in particular with regard to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and their preparations. The Government of Afghanistan confirmed that it will not authorize any imports of pseudoephedrine raw materials into its territory.

28. Hungary has revised significantly upwards its annual legitimate requirement for the import of P-2-P, from 800 to 1,800 litres. The substance is being used in pharmaceutical production in that country. It is of note that worldwide, only 23 countries have indicated a need to import P-2-P.

29. In its 2012 and 2015 reports on precursors, INCB stated that several Governments, when establishing annual legitimate requirements for precursor chemicals, appeared to have built in “safety margins” that are far above the actual amounts required for import into the respective country. INCB commends all Governments that have established realistic annual legitimate requirements or regularly review existing ones, thus providing the competent authorities of exporting countries with at least an indication of their needs and alerting authorities to any potential oversupply.

30. In response to concern expressed by INCB about high estimated annual legitimate requirements for pseudoephedrine, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Board of a series of measures taken to increase control over the substance. Those measures included import quotas for individual companies and a requirement to submit monthly reports about the use of imported quantities and the sales of any further refined products (decision 22/1452 issued on 13 July 2014). Importantly, a moratorium on the approval of pseudoephedrine imports had been imposed from late 2015 until mid-2016. The Government also confirmed the annual legitimate requirement of 50 tons, which had remained unchanged since 2007 although the number of pharmaceutical companies has increased during the same period. Finally, the Government informed the Board that as a result of the current situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, manufacturing contracts between pharmaceutical companies had been drawn up allowing companies in conflict areas, such as Aleppo, to import pseudoephedrine and process it in safer parts of the

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*The latest estimates submitted by Governments are provided in annex II; regular updates are published on the Board’s website.*
country. INCB continues its dialogue with the Syrian authorities to ensure that remaining concerns are addressed and its dialogue with all Governments to ensure that heightened levels of vigilance are maintained, particularly towards large-scale orders of pseudoephedrine by Syrian companies, thus contributing to balancing the need to ensure adequate supplies of the substance with preventing diversion into illicit channels.

G. Pre-export notifications and utilization of the PEN Online system

31. Pre-export notifications are at the core of the system to monitor international trade in substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. In order for the pre-export notification system to be effective, Governments must formally invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), to make it mandatory for the authorities of exporting countries to send pre-export notifications. Although not a treaty-mandated requirement, Governments should also register with the INCB automated online system for the exchange of pre-export notifications, PEN Online, to ensure that they receive information about all relevant planned shipments of chemicals destined for their territory in real time, before those shipments leave the exporting country.

32. Since the publication of the Board’s 2015 report on precursors, Georgia, Myanmar and Uruguay invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), for all substances in Tables I and II, thus bringing the number of Governments that have formally requested to receive pre-export notifications as at 1 November 2016 to 112 (see map 1 and annex X). INCB welcomes the invocations by the three countries but regrets that this important tool for preventing the diversion of precursors from international trade continues to be underutilized, including in some regions, such as Africa and Oceania, as well as parts of Europe.

33. INCB wishes to remind Governments that shipments dispatched without pre-export notifications are at greater risk of being diverted, in particular those shipments destined for countries that do not have in place a control system based on individual import permits. Information on the systems of authorization that Governments apply to the import (and export) of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention is available in the Board’s information package on the control of precursors, accessible to competent national authorities on the Board’s secure website.

Map 1. Governments that have registered with the Pre-Export Notification Online system and those that have invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, requiring pre-export notification for selected substances (As at 1 November 2016)
2. Pre-export Notification Online system

34. PEN Online, the automated online system for the exchange of pre-export notifications, has become the most effective tool for Governments to monitor, and communicate about matters related to, international trade in scheduled precursors worldwide and in real time.

35. With the registration of the Gambia and Tunisia, as at 1 November 2016, 153 countries and territories had access to the PEN Online system (see map 1). From among the 44 countries and territories not yet registered with PEN Online, 22 are in Africa and 10 in Oceania; the authorities of major trading countries are all registered and use the system actively. **INCB welcomes the registration of the Gambia and Tunisia and urges Governments that have not yet done so to register with the PEN Online system without further delay.**

36. INCB would once again like to remind Governments that registration with the PEN Online system does not automatically invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), or vice versa. Currently, there are 50 countries and territories, including the Gambia and Tunisia, that have registered to use the PEN Online system but have not yet invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a); Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Maldives, Togo and Tonga have invoked the article but are not registered with PEN Online (see map 1).

37. The level of active utilization of PEN Online has increased with the release of the upgraded system in October 2015. However, there are a number of registered importing Governments that do not actively utilize the system and thus remain vulnerable to the diversion of precursors. In 2015, this was the case for 22 Governments of which 11 are in Africa, 5 in Central America and the Caribbean, 4 in Europe and 2 in West Asia. **INCB encourages the authorities of all importing countries, as a minimum, to review all incoming pre-export notifications and to respond to them in those cases where a response is explicitly requested by the exporting country’s authorities.**

38. In terms of shipments notified through the PEN Online system, about 70 per cent and 30 per cent of pre-export notifications each year involve substances in, respectively, Table II and Table I; more than 60 per cent of the notifications involve preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, in line with Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 54/8. **INCB commends all exporting Governments that use PEN Online actively and systematically, that is, Governments that notify the authorities of importing countries of every planned export prior to dispatching it, including exports of pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. At the same time, INCB would like to remind the authorities of exporting countries to allow sufficient time, typically between 5 and 10 working days, for the importing country’s authorities to verify the legitimacy of a shipment.**

39. Since 1 November 2015, nearly 30,000 pre-export notifications were sent through PEN Online; more than 2,200 shipments, or about 7.5 per cent of all pre-notified shipments, have been objected to through PEN Online by the authorities of the importing countries. A number of objections were for administrative reasons; cases of suspended and stopped shipments are included in the relevant sections of chapter III.

40. The analysis of licit trade data provided by importing countries on form D and of PEN Online data suggests that there continue to be exports of substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention without pre-export notifications through PEN Online. For the fourth consecutive year, this is the case of exports of acetic anhydride from Saudi Arabia to the Republic of Korea. In addition, Indonesia reported on form D having exported almost 50,000 litres of safrole to China but no pre-export notification was ever sent through PEN Online. **INCB encourages the Government of Indonesia to register all relevant competent authorities under article 12 of the 1988 Convention to PEN Online, or to establish a working mechanism to ensure that pre-export notifications can be sent for all relevant industrial chemicals under international control as well.**

41. The Board’s last report on precursors referred to information provided by the authorities of Pakistan on form D...
for 2014 about imports of phenylacetic acid from China and India. The Pakistani authorities have since then clarified that there were no imports of phenylacetic acid during 2014.

H. Activities and achievements in international precursor control

1. Project Prism and Project Cohesion

42. The two international initiatives led by INCB, Project Prism and Project Cohesion, continue to serve as platforms for international cooperation in matters related to chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of, respectively, amphetamine-type stimulants, and heroin and cocaine. As at 1 November 2016, 134 and 92 countries had nominated focal points for activities under Project Prism and Project Cohesion, respectively. International and regional bodies such as the European Commission, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization also participate in the two projects. Both projects are steered by the INCB Precursors Task Force, which met twice in 2016, inter alia, to coordinate a global survey to identify the sources and modi operandi to obtain fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, other opioid-type new psychoactive substances, and the related precursors, as well as an international operation focusing on international trade in and smuggling of amphetamine and methamphetamine precursors, including chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of the drugs presumed to be present in “captagon” tablets currently trafficked. The results of the survey and the operation, which is known as Operation Missing Links, will be evaluated by the Task Force in an upcoming meeting and disseminated to participating Governments. INCB thanks those Governments that actively participated in the activities and encourages them to continue to provide information about substances that could be used in the illicit manufacture of fentanyl and the drugs found in “captagon” tablets currently trafficked as well as about the modi operandi of traffickers, to allow for a comprehensive analysis of this issue and devise adequate measures to address it.

43. PICS enables ongoing, real-time communication among participants in the two projects (see below). Participants in Project Prism and Project Cohesion are also informed, by means of special alerts, about major precursor trafficking trends, modi operandi of diversions and attempted diversions and newly emerging precursors. Since the last report on precursors, eight alerts were issued that informed Project Prism and Project Cohesion focal points about attempted diversions of ergot alkaloids involving companies in Suriname; a number of non-scheduled chemicals, including a precursor of mephedrone and a substitute chemical for APAAN; the modi operandi for the smuggling of non-scheduled synthetic drug precursors in buckets and for the smuggling of acetic anhydride disguised as glacial acetic acid; and information gaps in relation to the sources of precursors used in illicit methamphetamine manufacture in the Golden Triangle. One alert also provided the results of Operation MMA, a global operation which targeted methamphetamine (monomethylamine), a chemical not under international control that is required in the illicit manufacture of a number of drugs (such as methamphetamine and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)), the precursor ephedrine and several new psychoactive substances (especially synthetic cathinones).

44. The Precursors Task Force has in recent years repeatedly encouraged international operational cooperation in relation to chemicals used in the illicit processing of cocaine and heroin. However, there has been little interest, including in the regions most affected, in a global, targeted activity to shed light on the sources of those required chemicals and their substitutes. INCB encourages all Governments to make use of the existing global cooperation mechanisms under Project Prism and Project Cohesion to gather and exchange information on new trafficking trends, on modi operandi and on the criminal organizations involved and how they operate, and to use that knowledge to develop specific risk profiles and conduct joint operations to prevent future diversions. INCB also reiterates its recommendations to all Governments to ensure that the contact details of their focal points for Project Prism and Project Cohesion are always up-to-date and that those focal points actively participate in the relevant operations under Project Prism and Project Cohesion and follow-up on the action identified.

2. Precursors Incident Communication System

45. Since its launch in March 2012, PICS has become an important component of the toolbox for global operational cooperation in precursor matters. The communication platform allows Government authorities to share information...
in real time about individual precursor incidents such as seizures, shipments stopped in transit and illicit laboratories, involving scheduled and non-scheduled substances. The early communication of such information alerts users to emerging trends in chemicals and, specifically, alerts the authorities of the countries involved in an incident, as a source, transit or destination country, or when a national of that country is involved, and allows the users to contact each other for further details and to launch joint investigations.\(^6\)

46. Utilization of PICS, which is available in English, French, Russian and Spanish, is cost-free. Since the publication of the last report on precursors, 59 users from 41 agencies in 26 countries have newly registered to use PICS (see map 2),\(^7\) bringing the number of users to nearly 450, agencies to 214 and countries to 100. With the 212 incidents communicated since 1 November 2015, the total number of incidents communicated through PICS has reached almost 1,700, involving more than 90 different countries and territories; 30 per cent of those incidents involved chemicals not under international control, including substances on the limited international special surveillance list. An increasing proportion of incidents now also have actionable information, such as routing information (source, transit and destination), company information, relevant documentation and the names used to disguise the identity of the chemicals, which provide a solid starting point for investigations in the countries concerned. **INCB commends all PICS users that share information on individual precursor incidents with sufficient operational detail to allow the users of other countries involved in an incident to initiate requisite follow-up investigations with a view to not only bring to justice those behind the specific incident in question but also to deny traffickers access to chemicals using similar modi operandi in the future.**

**Map 2. Governments registered with and that are using the Precursors Incident Communication System (As at 1 November 2016)**

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\(^6\) For further details about PICS and the minimum action for sharing information about precursor incidents through the system, see box 3 in the INCB report on precursors for 2015 (E/INCB/2015/4).

\(^7\) Governments that have not yet registered PICS focal points for their relevant national authorities involved in precursor control may request an account at the following e-mail address: pics@incb.org.

\[III. \text{Extent of licit trade in precursors and the latest trends in precursor trafficking}\]

47. The following analysis provides an overview of the major trends and developments identified for both the licit trade in precursor chemicals and the trafficking in these substances. The analysis is based on data provided by