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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD
Vienna

PRECURSORS

AND CHEMICALS FREQUENTLY USED IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES

**Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for
1994 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988**



UNITED NATIONS

REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD IN 1994

The *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994* (E/INCB/1994/1) is supplemented by the following technical reports:

Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 1995; Statistics for 1993 (E/INCB/1994/2)

Psychotropic Substances: Statistics for 1993; Assessments of Medical and Scientific Requirements for Substances in Schedules II, III and IV; Requirement of Import Authorizations for Substances in Schedules III and IV (E/INCB/1994/3)

Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/INCB/1994/4)

This year, the Board has issued an additional supplement: *Effectiveness of the International Drug Control Treaties: Supplement to the Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994* (E/INCB/1994/1/Supp.1). All of the above-mentioned reports are issued as United Nations sales publications.

The updated lists of substances under international control, comprising narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, are contained in the latest editions of the annexes to the statistical forms ("Yellow List", "Green List" and "Red List"), which are also issued by the Board.

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Preface

Article 12, paragraph 13, of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988¹ provides that the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) "shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this article and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Table I and Table II".

In addition to its annual report and other technical publications (*Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*), the Board has decided to publish its report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in accordance with the following provisions contained in article 23 of that Convention:

"1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the information at its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Parties, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. The Board may make such additional reports as it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission which may make such comments as it sees fit.

2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution."

¹E/CONF.82/15 and Corr.2.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

The following abbreviations have been used in this report:

CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
ICPO/Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
LSD	lysergic acid diethylamide
MDA	methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDEA	methylenedioxyethylamphetamine
MDMA	methylenedioxymethamphetamine
3,4-MDP-2-P	3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
MEK	methyl ethyl ketone
OAS	Organization of American States
P-2-P	1-phenyl-2-propanone
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
WCO	World Customs Organization

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Diversion and smuggling of precursors* used in the illicit manufacture of drugs continue on a large scale. Illicit drug manufacturing activities are spreading. The illicit demand for precursors is likely to increase, and trafficking routes for diverted precursors will probably become more complex and varied.
2. Nevertheless, recent actions taken by some Governments have proven to be effective in monitoring the movement of precursors and identifying suspicious transactions. The first part of the present report highlights a major series of diversions and attempted diversions that have been identified during 1994, and describes how systems of control in place have allowed those cases to be identified or prevented. It describes the actions taken by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the Governments concerned, particularly those related to information exchange and the establishment of working mechanisms and procedures to be followed to prevent future diversions.
3. The diversion cases discovered show a clear need for further efforts by Governments in preventing diversions, as well as a need for continued vigilance in identifying new trends in illicit drug manufacture and for monitoring the movement of the relevant precursors. Methods of diversion used by traffickers repeatedly show common features, and may be applied to any of the substances listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention and, under certain circumstances, also to licitly manufactured narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances themselves.
4. On the basis of such practical experience, the present report proposes specific actions that should be taken. An increasing number of countries will be affected by diversions, attempted diversions or illicit trafficking in precursors. It is to those countries particularly that the Board directs its recommendations for action to prevent diversions and trafficking.
5. The report examines, in particular, what further actions by Governments are required to prevent diversion. It describes those regulatory controls and working mechanisms and procedures that have proven to work when monitoring the movement of precursors, and recommends that Governments should implement such controls and arrangements as a matter of urgency. It also focuses on the need to establish adequate mechanisms for data collection, without which the Board finds it difficult to see how Governments could actually monitor the movement of precursors and discover suspicious transactions.
6. In order to see the current status of control, the report further examines the legislative efforts made by Governments and their cooperation with the Board under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Despite the actions taken by a number of Governments in 1994 and the successes that have followed as a result, the Board remains concerned that only about a half of the Governments requested have reported information as required under article 12. Again, the report emphasizes the importance of establishing systems of control to enable cooperation with the Board in this respect.
7. A chapter of the report is devoted to the expected assessment by the Board of substances for possible modification in the scope of control, as requested by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

*The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances in Table I or II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,¹ except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances" was introduced in the Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, the Board has decided to use it in the present report for the sake of brevity.

The report notes that, until adequate background reference information is made available to the Board, it will not be useful to carry out its assessment. Again because of the lack of adequate reference information, the report notes also that the Board will not be able to consider the feasibility of compiling and making available to Governments information on the global pattern of trade in scheduled chemicals, as requested by the Economic and Social Council.

8. The second part of the report provides an analysis of the data available to the Board on seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors, and on illicit drug manufacturing trends. It provides a general overview of seizure data and trends and a regional analysis of the world situation on the use of precursors in illicit drug manufacture.

9. Annex I contains technical information relevant for control purposes to support the actions recommended by the Board. Annexes II and III reproduce excerpts of the relevant treaty provisions and United Nations resolutions that provide the practical framework for control of precursors. Annex IV provides an outline of the typical uses of precursors in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, together with indications of the approximate quantities required for such manufacture.

10. The recommendations of the Board to assist Governments in developing precursor controls worldwide are summarized in chapter IV. They are based, *inter alia*, on the practical experience gained in the light of the diversions identified during 1994. All Governments should consider the recommendations carefully and take appropriate steps. The Board considers this essential if traffickers are not to exploit the inadequate controls currently existing in some countries.

11. There has been notable progress in the context of precursor control. Much, however, remains to be accomplished. The Board calls upon all Governments to take immediate and concerted action. It stands ready to assist, within the framework of its treaty mandates, competent authorities in doing so.

I. FRAMEWORK FOR PRECURSOR CONTROL AND ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS

A. Major cases of diversion and attempted diversion

12. The following section describes the major cases of diversion and attempted diversion that have recently come to the attention of the Board. Because of their significance, it focuses on ephedrine cases in particular, and outlines the methods that have been used by traffickers to divert that substance. It also focuses on the actions required by Governments to prevent similar diversions in the future.

13. The Board notes, however, that the diversion methods used in the current series of cases are not specific to one substance; they are applied to any of the substances scheduled in the Tables of the 1988 Convention. The information available to the Board concerning diversions and attempted diversions of scheduled substances (other than ephedrine) confirms that fact. Governments should therefore be aware that the lessons learned from the diversion cases involving ephedrine are valid for all 22 scheduled substances, and should bear that in mind when reviewing existing precursor controls and taking action to prevent diversions.

1. Diversion and attempted diversion of ephedrine

14. In 1994 the attention of the Board was drawn to a series of large-scale diversions and attempted diversions of ephedrine, a substance listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention because of its frequent use in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is widely abused in the United States of America and in countries in South-East Asia; abuse has also been reported in a number of European countries. In connection with those diversions, the Board took immediate action, working with the Governments concerned, to uncover the full details of reported cases.

15. The quantity of ephedrine involved in the cases identified recently has amounted in total to over 50 tonnes (1 tonne of ephedrine could be used to manufacture approximately 0.7 tonnes of methamphetamine). Consignments of the substance were ordered from different manufacturing countries in Asia and Europe by brokers based in Switzerland and, after having been routed in many cases through third countries (for example, Germany), were then shipped to Mexico. Follow-up investigations by the Mexican authorities resulted in the detection of trafficking groups and illicit laboratories. It is understood that the ephedrine or the final product, methamphetamine, was to be smuggled into the United States. Further investigations were still continuing in most of the countries concerned at the time of the preparation of the present report.

16. The first attempted diversion in the series was detected through a chance seizure effected by the competent authorities of the United States, which has a strict chemical monitoring system in place, on the grounds that the consignment in question showed a number of irregularities, of the type mentioned in paragraph 18 below.

17. The whole series of diversions and attempted diversions was uncovered because in the Czech Republic, a major ephedrine-manufacturing and -exporting country, an individual export authorization is required by law prior to each and every instance of the export of that substance. In addition, as part of its domestic control system for precursors, the Government of the Czech Republic also provides importing countries with pre-export notifications of all its exports concerning Table I substances, including ephedrine. It is only due to the work done by the Czech Republic that the diversions could be identified and the routes of the consignments in question traced through various transit countries, and that their final destination was eventually found.

18. After an analysis of the methods used by the traffickers, the following common features have repeatedly been found:

(a) Traffickers are well aware of control measures currently applied by Governments and try to circumvent them by routing shipments through countries where no, or inadequate, control measures are in place;

(b) Diversions and attempted diversions from international trade start with licit exports;

(c) Shipments are routed through third countries, some with weak or non-existent monitoring systems, to disguise the final destination;

(d) Inadequate or false labels and falsified documents (for example, bills of lading) are used to disguise the true contents of the shipment in question;

(e) Falsified documents (for example, import authorizations) are used to disguise the fact that importers are not authorized to import the consignment;

(f) Importers use companies that do not exist, or that are not authorized to import the precursor in question;

(g) The name of the final consignee is lacking from the documentation or refers to a non-existent person;

(h) While brokers make arrangements from within their country for imports and subsequent re-exports, actual consignments often do not enter their country. That makes the monitoring of such transactions difficult;

(i) Consignments are often stored for considerable periods in third countries, sometimes in free ports or free trade zones, before being reshipped to final destinations. At that point shipments are sometimes repackaged, documents are changed, and shipments are rerouted to disguise the final destination;

(j) Legal requirements of the importing country are knowingly disregarded.

2. Actions taken by the Board, in cooperation with some Governments

19. In an effort to prevent further diversions of the type mentioned above, the Board has contacted as an immediate priority the competent authorities of the countries concerned, urging them to adopt, as soon as possible, remedial measures to strengthen existing controls.

20. The Board invited representatives of the Czech Republic, Germany, Mexico, Switzerland and the United States to an informal closed meeting in June 1994 at Vienna, to facilitate information exchange on past or future attempts, arrange working mechanisms and procedures to be followed to prevent future diversions, and discuss possible further action to be taken by the parties concerned, or by the Board.

21. The participants agreed that a good working mechanism to coordinate activities between exporting, importing and transit countries was essential to prevent diversions. Bilateral contacts and the routine sharing of knowledge of national requirements for control was considered critical in that respect. Particular follow-up activities as agreed in the meeting include providing the Board and other participants with proper authentic documents (for example, import certificates issued by the competent authorities to check against fraud).

22. In addition, procedures for information sharing, checking the legitimacy of orders etc. were institutionalized between the countries concerned to ensure that such procedures are adequately

followed. It was agreed in particular that the manufacturing and exporting country (Czech Republic) provide importing (Mexico) or transit countries (Germany, Switzerland) with details of the planned exports of ephedrine before the transaction takes place. It was further agreed that the exporting countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Switzerland) will not authorize exports (or re-exports) until the importing (Mexico) or transit countries (Germany, Switzerland) have indicated that they have no objection to such exports.

23. Finally, it was agreed that the transit countries (Germany, Switzerland) will: monitor, based on advance information of exports destined to their country, the movement of such shipments within their country; and, in case consignments are to be re-exported to Mexico, verify the legitimacy of such further shipments with the competent authorities of the Government of Mexico.

24. Appropriate actions as agreed above have been taken since the meeting, including the following:

(a) Mexico has provided the Board and the other concerned countries with authentic import certificates, to enable authorities of exporting countries to check against fraud;

(b) Through such an exchange of documents, one case of falsified import authorization has been detected by the Governments of Switzerland and Mexico;

(c) Controlled deliveries have been arranged to enable the detection of illicit laboratories and trafficking groups, resulting in several arrests.

The Board therefore trusts that concrete working arrangements made between the countries concerned during that meeting will effectively identify suspicious cases in those countries in the future.

3. Extension of procedures to other countries

25. The Board and all Governments concerned have agreed that mechanisms and procedures as arranged during the above-mentioned informal closed meeting need to be strengthened by extending them to other countries as outlined below. Other major ephedrine (and pseudoephedrine) manufacturing and exporting countries* or transit points will otherwise be targeted in the future by traffickers as an alternative source of ephedrine.

26. All manufacturing and exporting countries should at least advise the importing countries of any trends in the exports of precursors. Wherever possible, they should consider sending out pre-export notifications to inform the Governments of the importing countries in advance of all consignments of ephedrine, since it would otherwise often not be possible to trace further individual consignments. Such notifications should mention in particular the names of the importing companies and the dates of dispatch of consignments. The Board proposes that the exporting Governments send out pre-export notifications even without formal request of the importing countries under article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention.

27. The Board is further of the opinion that all countries that are importing ephedrine, and in particular those countries where it might be diverted and/or illicitly used, such as Mexico, should invoke as soon as possible article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, in order to be informed at an early stage about all exports of that substance destined to their territories.

*The following list of countries where manufacture, export or transit of ephedrine exists, or is assumed to exist, is based on openly available guides to the international chemical industry, and on information received by the Board either from ephedrine-exporting countries or from investigations of ongoing cases of diversions and attempted diversions: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

28. The Board and all Governments concerned consider it a matter of priority to approach known or assumed ephedrine-manufacturing and -exporting countries to obtain information about the names and addresses of companies that are licitly dealing with that substance, the approximate quantities manufactured and exported and the companies in the importing countries to which they are exporting. The information received should enable the Board to assist exporting countries in verifying the legitimacy of export orders and also help to detect new or additional diversion routes.

29. Commercial secrecy should be protected, but should not be allowed to benefit traffickers by becoming an obstacle to preventing diversions. In that context, the Board wishes to thank those Governments that have already separately provided it, on a confidential basis in some cases, with information of the type described above.

30. Since transit countries were used for some of the shipments of ephedrine to Mexico, the competent authorities of all countries that have a large transit trade in chemicals should check whether the control measures in place are sufficient to identify transactions dealing with ephedrine, and, if that were not the case, should establish additional procedures to prevent similar cases in the future.

31. One particular problem has been that brokers and trading companies located in free trade zones are sometimes not monitored in the same way as other operators, and that therefore it is not always possible to identify suspicious transactions of the type described. In that connection, Germany has informed the Board that after the introduction of a new draft law requiring that brokers and trading companies located in free trade zones would also be subject to the same obligations as other operators, diversions or attempted diversions similar to those reported above would not go undetected by the German authorities. The Board suggests that other transit countries consider taking similar steps.

4. Attempted diversions of other substances

32. The Board has also been informed of the successful prevention of diversions or of illegal imports of other substances. For example, the German authorities informed the Board in 1992 that two companies located in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country in a region where illicit manufacture of heroin occurs, allegedly ordered a total of 26,000 litres of acetic anhydride. The Board was asked for assistance in verifying the authenticity of the orders.

33. As a result of inquiries by the Board, it was ascertained that the companies in question had no valid import authorization and the orders were therefore cancelled. As in the above-mentioned cases, contact between the competent authorities of the exporting country and the importing country, once established, had proven to be effective in preventing unwanted or illegal consignments from entering the importing country in question.

34. Similarly, the Board has been informed by, for example, Germany and the United States, that export orders for methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) have been stopped because direct contacts with the competent authorities of the importing countries had revealed that the importing companies were not registered to do business with that substance, or because fraudulent import permits had been provided.

35. The lessons to be learned from the above-described cases of diversion and attempted diversions are discussed in detail in the next section, and may be summarized as follows:

(a) Governments need to establish or refine mechanisms and procedures to monitor the movement of precursors. The actions to be taken should include:

(i) Regular sharing of information on exports;

- (ii) Follow-up of information on imports;
 - (iii) Follow-up of questions relating to the legitimacy of transactions and stopped shipments;
 - (iv) Informing other countries of national requirements for precursor control;
 - (v) informing other countries of issued import authorizations;
- (b) Governments will have to establish or improve mechanisms for data collection;
 - (c) Governments and international organizations will have to coordinate technical assistance relating to precursor control activities.

B. Actions required by Governments to prevent diversion

1. Establishing mechanisms and procedures to monitor the movement of precursors

36. To prevent diversions of any substance in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, practical working mechanisms and procedures to coordinate activities between exporting, importing and transit countries are essential. Bilateral contacts and the routine sharing of knowledge of national requirements for control, as described above, are critical. In the present section the Board therefore summarizes the actions which should be taken by Governments to prevent diversions. They are based on the practical experience gained in the past few years, as highlighted in the examples given above.

37. The Board emphasizes that such working mechanisms and procedures need to be, and can be, established, even when proper legislation has not yet been enacted. In the examples given above, some countries where comprehensive chemical control legislation is yet to be adopted (for instance, the Czech Republic) have cooperated to prevent such diversions, and have been able to act accordingly by taking appropriate practical steps. On the other hand, countries that already have legislation in place still need to establish such mechanisms and procedures to put into effect the control measures as contained in their national laws.

38. Such working mechanisms and procedures should incorporate the activities of all the relevant regulatory and enforcement authorities involved in precursor control. They should also encompass the work of industry to elicit relevant data from chemical producers, distributors and trade organizations, having due regard for lawful commercial interests. In that connection, the Board welcomes the fact that, in 1994, the World Customs Organization (WCO), formerly the Customs Co-operation Council, signed a memorandum of understanding with the International Council of Chemical Industry Associations, which represents approximately 80 per cent of all chemical manufacturers. The memorandum of understanding is aimed at assisting WCO member States to facilitate the monitoring of trade in precursors, and to improve communication between industry and, in particular, customs authorities, through the more effective exchange of information between the various parties concerned.

39. It has also to be emphasized that any country can be, and many countries have actually been, targeted by trafficking groups as source or transit countries of precursors. The Board therefore reiterates that all countries, parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention, should take the steps outlined below to prevent diversions.

(a) Regular sharing of information on exports

40. Through the diversion cases uncovered, it has been proven essential for the prevention of diversion of precursors that countries that export precursors should routinely provide at least general information on those exports to the respective importing countries. Such information should include as a minimum the names of the importing companies and export trends.

41. In particular, it has been found extremely important that exporting countries provide the information as early as possible, preferably before the actual transaction takes place. The Board therefore urges all exporting countries to consider establishing such a mechanism as a first priority, even if the importing countries have not yet formally invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), relating to pre-export notifications for substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention.

42. The Board further proposes that a similar mechanism should also be established for substances in Table II, particularly for consignments of such substances destined to specific regions. As has been noted earlier, that is the only way to ensure that the Governments of importing countries are aware of such transactions, and that consignments can be traced through various transit countries to their final destinations.

43. In that connection, countries which, under their national laws, already have in place an export authorization system for precursors are invited routinely to send a copy of the export authorization to the competent authorities of the importing countries.

(b) Follow-up of information of past and intended imports by the importing country

44. Similarly, importing countries should follow up information that they receive on imports into their territory, particularly pre-export notifications. Unfortunately, exporting countries that do provide pre-export notifications on a routine basis have informed the Board that the importing countries that receive such notifications are not always taking the appropriate steps to follow them up, or that they do not inform the exporting country in return of any findings concerning follow-up activities related to notifications.

45. As an important first step, the Board therefore advises countries that have a system of registration or licensing for importers to check whether the importing company indicated in the information sent by the exporting country is registered or licensed. Past experience has shown that thanks to such checks unlicensed importers have been detected. Countries are warned, however, that even a properly maintained registration or licensing system is no guarantee of the legitimacy of importing companies. In some countries, a significant proportion of all registered companies have been found to be fictitious.

46. Where no such system is in place, information provided by the exporting country may help the Government of the importing country to establish a list of importing companies. That will be useful to the authorities, for example, in collecting data on licit requirements of precursors, alerting legitimate industries to the need for proper controls, and establishing good contacts with the companies concerned as a basis for a voluntary monitoring system with the cooperation of industry.

47. In addition, the competent authorities of the importing country should further contact the importing companies to find out whether the consignment in question is to remain in the country, or is intended for re-export. In the latter case, the authorities should contact the next importing country and provide the information described above.

(c) Follow-up of questions relating to the legitimacy of transactions and stopped shipments

48. It is of particular importance that importing countries that have been asked to assist in verifying the legitimacy of a particular transaction should reply as soon as possible to the

exporting country. They should answer all the questions that may have been raised in connection with the inquiry, and inform the exporting country especially if legal requirements for such imports have not been met or if there is a danger that the consignment in question may subsequently be diverted. Likewise, when they receive pre-export notifications or copies of export authorizations, they should provide feedback to the exporting countries. It is in the interest of the importing country to respond immediately, since there may be a possibility that the competent authorities of the exporting country can then stop an unwanted export before it takes place, or arrange for a controlled delivery.

49. Some countries have informed the Board that they have stopped exports of precursors, based on suspicion that the consignments in question might be diverted, and that in those cases they have informed the competent authorities of the importing countries. They have, however, also informed the Board that often no feedback has been received from the importing countries.

50. The Board therefore urges Governments that receive notifications on stopped or suspended shipments to investigate all cases brought to their attention, and to reply to the authorities of the exporting country, informing them whether the suspicion was indeed justified, or whether the investigations have cleared the company. Again, such an exchange of information and such close cooperation are in the interest of the importing country, to ensure that its legitimate trade is protected from unfounded suspicion and from difficulties in obtaining licitly required precursors. Where suspicions are confirmed, the importing country should also take appropriate steps against the company in question, comparable with current national legislation.

(d) Informing other countries of national requirements for precursor control

51. Countries that have in place a national control system for the movement of precursors should inform the Board as a first priority of the details of their national requirements. The information will be added to the directory of national control measures which the Board maintains for use by other Governments, in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29 of 30 July 1992 (see paragraph 73 below). The Board further wishes that importing countries that require individual import certificates for the import of precursors provide it with copies of authentic documents to enable it to assist Governments in verifying the authenticity of documents.

(e) Informing exporting countries of issued import authorizations

52. The Board advises all Governments that have an authorization system in place to provide the names of companies authorized to import precursors to the competent authorities of the exporting countries.

53. In cases where individual import certificates are required, the Board further urges Governments of importing countries to provide copies of the import certificates to the competent authorities of the exporting countries. That should be done as early as possible, preferably when the order is placed with the exporting company. Such information will assist the Governments of the exporting countries in verifying whether a particular consignment is intended for legitimate purposes.

2. Establishing mechanisms for data collection

54. The Board is aware of the fact that many Governments experience difficulties in collecting the information required under the provisions of article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention (see paragraph 107 below). Some countries have informed the Board that they have not yet established adequate mechanisms to collect the information. Such data collection mechanisms must be established as a matter of priority. That will require appropriate national coordination between administrative services and law enforcement authorities, as well as the identification of the competent authorities for reporting to the Board. The information thus collected will enable Governments to evaluate the efficacy of current precursor controls, identify new substances that

should be put under national control, and assess the situation regarding illicit precursor movement within the country.

55. In addition, Governments that have not already done so need to establish mechanisms to collect data on the licit manufacture of and trade in precursors to monitor their movement. As a minimum, Governments should be aware of the companies dealing with precursors, and of approximate quantities manufactured, exported, imported and used. The basic information gathered will assist Governments in establishing licit national precursor requirements, and therefore facilitate the monitoring of licit movement of precursors in their territories. Data on authorized importing companies and import trends further assist other Governments in preventing diversions from international trade.

56. Finally, the Board invites Governments to supply further data on stopped or suspended shipments. After proper analysis of the information received the Board is then in a position to communicate such data to other Governments, in order to alert them to new diversion techniques, alternative routes etc., and to assist them in preventing diversion from other sources. For that purpose, details on such cases should include the reasons why the shipments were suspended or stopped and the facts that first raised suspicions in the minds of the competent authorities, and indicate whether suspicious circumstances were cleared up afterwards.

3. Ensuring coordination of technical assistance relating to precursor control activities

57. The Board notes with satisfaction that technical assistance is already being provided to a number of Governments to help them establish suitable systems for precursor control. Such assistance is being provided bilaterally by other Governments and by international organizations. The Board emphasizes that all such programmes of assistance must be properly coordinated, and particularly recalls that the Council, in its resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993, has requested the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to coordinate assistance that international organizations or Governments may provide for the implementation of chemical control regimes.

58. In that connection, the Board considers that international cooperation in matters relating to precursors and in the coordination of global activities should be improved. To provide structured programmes of technical assistance, it is necessary, prior to and during the execution of the projects, to exchange information on specific activities planned and on experiences gained through the execution of projects. Such information should include the scope of assistance, approaches taken, the target groups, timing and schedules.

59. The Board has noted with satisfaction that UNDCP has made every effort to inform individual Governments and competent international organizations of the activities it is planning and carrying out. For example, observers from international organizations (for example, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol)) and from countries with a particular interest or expertise in precursor control participated in the joint INCB/UNDCP workshop on precursor control held in Thailand in February 1994. That workshop, the first of a series to be held in Asia, took place within the context of a wider project currently being implemented by UNDCP with a view to establishing working mechanisms in South-East Asia to prevent the diversion of, and traffic in, precursors. A similar project, aimed at enhancing precursor controls in South Asia and South-West Asia, is being implemented by UNDCP. The Board has been informed that, in developing the latter project, UNDCP has discussed all its plans with interested parties.

60. The Board also notes the UNDCP projects currently being implemented in Bolivia and Colombia. The project in Bolivia has already provided assistance to help create an administrative structure at the level of the National Directorate for Registration and Control of controlled substances and precursors, and a study of the licit requirements for precursors in the country has been undertaken. In Colombia, a recently initiated project to study the substances most frequently

used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs in that country has already provided extensive evidence of major diversions of precursors from licit commercial enterprises into illicit drug manufacture.

61. When Governments or international organizations consider providing assistance for precursor control activities in South America, and specifically in Bolivia and Colombia, the Board invites them to take those findings into consideration, and to work with UNDCP in finalizing project proposals.

62. Activities of the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe have highlighted how effective coordination could optimize results. In 1990, the Ministerial Conference of the Pompidou Group adopted a work programme which, *inter alia*, required the Pompidou Group to undertake further work in relation to the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, taking into consideration work already being carried out by, for example, UNDCP, CEC, and the Chemical Action Task Force set up by the heads of State or Government of the seven major industrialized countries (Group of Seven) and the President of CEC at the sixteenth annual economic summit, held at Houston, Texas, in July 1990.

63. During 1992 the Pompidou Group developed a comprehensive strategy to enhance European cooperation in preventing the diversion of precursors. As part of its programme of action, the Pompidou Group has been instrumental in arranging a series of workshops devoted to precursor control. To ensure complementarity of efforts within the region, the Board, UNDCP and competent national authorities and international organizations have been closely involved in the planning and execution of those workshops.

64. In December 1993 the first workshop was held at Strasbourg, France, organized jointly by CEC and the Pompidou Group, with the primary aim of helping countries, on the basis of current regulations of the European Economic Community (EEC), to develop legislative frameworks to effectively counter chemical diversions. The second workshop was held in May 1994, organized by the United Kingdom National Criminal Intelligence Service and the Pompidou Group, with the aim of assisting participating countries in establishing effective systems and procedures for monitoring domestic trade in precursors. The third and final workshop will be held in early 1995, and will be organized jointly by the Board and the Pompidou Group. It will assist participating countries in establishing procedures for monitoring the international trade in precursors.

65. It is particularly important that programmes of assistance directed towards central and eastern Europe are well coordinated, because of the profusion of programmes focused on the region in recent years. In that context, the Board notes that the second phase of the PHARE programme of CEC, providing technical assistance and training to countries of central and eastern Europe in the field of drug and precursor control, has now begun. The PHARE programme consists of several targeted actions related to the control of the illicit supply of and traffic in drugs, and to the prevention and reduction of drug abuse. It is anticipated that the assistance provided will promote the development of effective measures for the control of drugs and precursors in the region.

66. In connection with the provision of technical assistance and the potential for duplication of effort, the Board has been informed that UNDCP has raised with CEC the general issue of the need for improved exchange of information concerning precursors. The Board is confident that a convenient procedure will be established between CEC and UNDCP to ensure early sharing of information related to the provision of technical assistance.

C. Tools for control available to Governments

1. Directory of competent authorities under article 12

67. The Council, in its resolution 1992/29, invites the Board to publish and maintain a directory listing the names, addresses and telephone and telefacsimile numbers of the competent administrative and law enforcement authorities.

68. Three communications requesting the names and addresses of competent national authorities responsible for implementing the provisions of article 12 were sent out by the Secretary-General to all Governments in October 1991, July 1992 and August 1993. During 1994 the Board sent a reminder to all Governments that had not yet identified the competent authorities, asking them to provide the relevant information.

69. As of 1 November 1994, 97 countries and one territory out of a total of 212, representing only 46 per cent, had provided the information requested. In addition, CEC has identified itself as being responsible for legislative matters and coordination between individual member States of the European Union. The new and updated information will be included in the 1994 issue of the publication on competent authorities.²

70. The directory of competent authorities has been found to be particularly useful for exporting countries to verify, through direct contact with the importing country, that exports to other countries are intended for licit purposes. The Board is therefore making arrangements to provide them with updated lists of competent authorities on a regular basis. All Governments in need of regular updates of the directory are invited to contact the Board.

71. Direct contacts are the most expeditious means of identifying and stopping suspicious transactions. To that end, Governments should as a matter of urgency identify the competent authorities and their respective roles in the implementation of article 12, and provide the Board with that information together with contact addresses.

72. The table below shows the identification of competent authorities responsible for implementing article 12, by region. Governments are invited to compare this table with the status of adherence to the 1988 Convention (as reproduced in table 1 of annex I).

Summary of government replies relating to competent authorities

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of countries and territories within the region</i>	<i>Number of Governments that identified the competent authorities responsible for implementing article 12</i>	<i>Percentage per region of Governments that identified competent authorities</i>
Africa	54	17	31
America	46	21	46
Asia	48	24	50
Europe	44	32	73
Oceania	20	4	20
Total	212	98	46

73. In its resolution 1992/29, the Council also invites the Board to publish and maintain a summary of the regulatory controls that apply in each State. The Board notes with concern that

still very few Governments have advised it of specific measures applicable in their countries. The Board again appeals to all Governments to provide the information required, so that such a directory can be issued.

74. To assist exporting countries in obtaining information about the legal requirements of importing countries, the Board has updated the list of countries where a permit system for imports is in place. Tables 4 and 6 of annex I provide lists highlighting, in particular, countries that request pre-export notification and/or require individual import certificates prior to every import.

2. Guidelines for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursors and essential chemicals

75. In its 1993 report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention,³ the Board referred to the guidelines for use by national authorities in preventing diversion of precursors and essential chemicals, completed in January 1993 and transmitted by UNDCP to all Governments. The Council, in its resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993, urges Governments to consider fully and, where appropriate, to apply those guidelines.

76. The guidelines give guidance and advice on the procedures to follow when authorizing exports or imports of precursors. They are general enough to be useful to countries with differing national control systems, from those with strict regimes requiring specific export and import authorizations for each transaction, to those which at present have less strict systems for controlling the international trade in such chemicals. Governments are also invited to submit, on the basis of their practical experience, any comments that they may have on the guidelines to the Board, so that the contents of future editions can be revised.

3. International databases

77. The guidelines note that comprehensive international databases are required to assist Governments in considering applications for authorizations to export or import controlled chemicals, and to investigate suspicious transactions.

78. For that purpose Governments are invited to make use of a network of available international precursor databases. The Board stands ready to assist, where necessary and to the extent possible, in all such actions. In so doing, the Board will fully exploit its expected role as a "gateway" for the exchange of information, within the international network of databases and between individual Governments, through direct electronic communication links where these have been established. To ensure the proper handling of sensitive information to which the Board has access, guidelines have been prepared which aim specifically at meeting the security requirements for disclosure of information held in the INCB precursor database. As the database network develops further, the security guidelines may be of value to Governments and to international organizations in connection with the exchange of sensitive information generally.

79. As part of the development of working arrangements for the exchange of information, the Board, together with ICPO/Interpol and WCO, will continue to work together to identify the scope and actual contents of the precursor databases maintained by the separate organizations, and to review security needs based on the sensitivity of the information available.

D. Legislative and administrative efforts by Governments

80. The review presented below has been prepared on the basis of the information made available to the Board by Governments. Other countries and territories that have adopted similar measures may not yet have informed the Board about them. In addition, where information is available on legislative and administrative measures applicable to Tables I and II substances, very often specific

details have not yet been communicated to the Board. As has been mentioned in section B above, it is essential that such details are made known to other countries, to assist them in identifying and preventing diversions from international trade. The Board again requests all Governments to inform it of the specific details of the legislative and administrative actions they are taking. Despite the limitations referred to above, the review has been prepared to reflect efforts made by Governments in complying with the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention. At the same time, the review shows, on a regional basis, any weaknesses in the currently applied controls, and provides recommendations on how those controls may be strengthened.

1. Africa

81. In Africa, 10 countries have indicated that relevant legislation is in place; four of them have informed the Board of the adoption of new laws for the control of precursors since publication of the 1993 report of the Board on the implementation of article 12. Eight countries are applying some control measures to international trade in substances listed in Tables I and II, and in six countries various measures are also applied to the domestic movement of precursors. However, it is the understanding of the Board that existing control measures in the region, specifically those for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, are often based on the potential for abuse of those substances as psychoactive substances. The recent development of illicit manufacture of, for example, methaqualone in the region, and the need to control the precursors used in such illicit manufacture, is not yet sufficiently reflected in the control measures currently applied. Other Governments, Madagascar for example, have reported that recently introduced control measures are not yet fully applied. The Board reiterates its appeal to all Governments to exercise vigilance over the movement of substances in Tables I and II before any serious diversion attempts in the region begin.

82. As is mentioned in the regional analysis in chapter II of the present report, controls and/or monitoring procedures should be established as a matter of urgency in the countries already affected by local illicit manufacture of methaqualone, particularly Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. In that connection, the Board welcomes the new legislation introduced by the Governments of South Africa and Zambia as a basis for the control of substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. The Board notes, however, that actual control measures for such substances have yet to be established.

2. America

83. As reported already in its report for 1993, a total of 21 States, that is, 60 per cent of the countries in the region, and two territories have indicated that they have, or are introducing, relevant legislation. Among the countries that have recently adopted new laws for the control of precursors are Chile, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

84. The Board notes with satisfaction that in America control measures in the various countries are harmonized, as a result of the efforts of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Most of the member States of CICAD have now incorporated the OAS Model Regulations to Control Chemical Precursors and Chemical Substances, Machines and Materials⁴ into their national legislation. Nearly half of all the countries and territories in the region, that is, 21 countries and territories out of 46, have specifically indicated that control measures are applied to international trade in substances listed in Tables I and II.

85. In addition, among those countries that have control measures over international trade, 18 States also have control measures applicable to domestic movement of scheduled substances.

86. The legislative and administrative framework for control of precursors and essential chemicals is well established in the United States and in most countries in South America, and the Government of Mexico is currently developing legislation in line with the OAS Model

Regulations. It is, however, the understanding of the Board that Canada in North America, Brazil in South America and a large number of countries and territories in Central America and in the Caribbean have not yet introduced adequate controls for the movement of such substances. As indicated in the regional analysis in chapter II of the present report, some of those countries and territories have already been used as transit points for precursors and chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine. The Board therefore requests those Governments that have not already done so to consider, as a matter of priority, introducing measures that will allow the control of such substances when they are transiting their territories.

87. It is of further concern to the Board that in America, where the status of adherence to the 1988 Convention is greatest amongst all regions, a significant number of States have not yet been able to identify the competent authorities. Parties in America that have failed to do so include Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname.

88. Exporting countries have in addition informed the Board that they experienced difficulties in receiving replies to inquiries about the legitimacy of specific transactions from Governments in the region, including some of those countries where competent authorities had been identified. All Governments should ensure that administrative mechanisms are in place, including coordination between competent national authorities, to handle such requests expeditiously.

89. It is furthermore the understanding of the Board that, in most of the countries in America, and particularly in South America, actual implementation of legislation is still required.

90. Despite the various successes highlighted by reported seizures of precursors in South America, the major chemical-exporting countries of the region, in particular Brazil, still need to introduce or effectively implement controls to regulate exports, and thus prevent the diversion of scheduled substances through international transactions. Further regulation of domestic commerce is also needed to prevent internal diversion of precursors and subsequent smuggling into neighbouring countries where drugs are illicitly manufactured. Reports indicate that widespread smuggling continues; enforcement efforts in the chemical-exporting countries and in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru need to be further strengthened in order to prevent such activities.

3. Asia

91. Since publication of its last report one country in Asia (Malaysia) has reported the existence of relevant legislation and control measures over international trade in at least some of the substances listed in Tables I and II. A total of 16 countries and territories have relevant laws in place. Three countries (China, Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka) have updated the information available to the Board on the measures currently applied.

92. In addition, 16 countries and territories in Asia have indicated that they have control measures applicable to domestic manufacture and/or distribution of substances listed in Tables I and II.

93. The control measures applied by the countries and territories in the region vary considerably from comparatively simple systems of registration or routine provision of pre-export notifications to importing countries, as in the case of exports of acetic anhydride from India, to stricter systems that require individual authorizations for each transaction, as applied in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The Board is pleased to note that current or planned UNDCP projects in the region will include efforts to harmonize systems of control for the monitoring of precursors in those countries.

94. In Asia, in particular, it is the understanding of the Board that control measures are not yet applied to all substances that have been identified as used within the region for the illicit manufacture of drugs, or that have been diverted from the region for such purposes. All

Governments that have control measures in place are requested to extend existing controls to cover additional substances that are problems either because of their domestic use in illicit drug manufacture (for example, anthranilic acid), or because they have been diverted for use in illicit manufacture elsewhere (for example, ephedrine).

95. The regional analysis presented by the Board in chapter II below suggests further that current controls, even if they exist, are inadequate. Governments in the region need to review existing control measures to identify gaps and introduce remedial measures to strengthen the existing controls. All Governments that have not yet established any control measures or have not yet introduced relevant legislation should do so as a matter of priority.

96. Concern over the general drug and precursor control situation in China led the Board to undertake a mission to that country in September 1994. Problems of control and difficulties encountered in establishing controls were discussed. As a result of those discussions, and in the context of preventing the diversion of precursors, the Board has requested Chinese authorities to take specific actions to enhance existing controls.

4. Europe

97. In Europe three countries (Greece, Malta and Sweden) have reported to the Board that they have introduced new legislation for the control of Tables I and II substances since the 1993 report of the Board was published. The total number of countries that have adopted relevant laws in Europe is now 21, together with the European Union as the coordinating body of its member States. Six countries have indicated further that they are still in the process of introducing new legislation. The Government of Belarus has informed the Board that the legislation and the control measures of the Russian Federation are valid in its territory.

98. As regards international trade in Tables I and II substances, in addition to the EEC regulation⁵ adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 1990, and later amended by a regulation⁶ of March 1992, adopted by all member States of the European Union,* 12 other countries have indicated that they have some control measures applicable to international trade. Further, in addition to the member States of the European Union that have established control measures in line with a directive of the Council of Ministers⁷ of June 1993, 10 other European countries have indicated that some measures are applied to domestic movement of those substances.

99. The Board is pleased to note that among the countries of central and eastern Europe, in particular, there is greater awareness of the need for the control of precursors. For example, the Czech Republic, building on existing controls, has taken positive steps to strengthen its measures for the international trade in precursors and for their domestic trade and distribution. The Czech Republic is already routinely providing importing countries with pre-export notifications for all its exports of substances included in Table I of the 1988 Convention. The Board understands also that in Bulgaria individual import and export authorizations are required for the international trade of substances included in Table I, and that operators of Table II substances need to be registered. Latvia is so far the only country worldwide that has invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention to request pre-export notifications for all exports of ephedrine destined to its territory.

100. The Board, however, notes with concern that most countries in central and eastern Europe at present still have weaknesses in their administrative structures and legislative frameworks and in the actual implementation of existing control measures. There still remains a need for continued vigilance on the part of administrative, regulatory and law enforcement authorities of

*Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

the region in controlling the availability of all the substances currently scheduled in the tables of the 1988 Convention.

5. Oceania

101. No change concerning legislation for precursor control or related administrative measures has been reported to the Board from countries in Oceania. Only Australia, where relevant legislation is in place, monitors the international trade and domestic movement of precursors through mandatory and voluntary systems.

6. Required future action

102. In each region considered, despite a number of recent initiatives, there is still a need for greater awareness of the importance of establishing effective control over precursors. That applies both to all authorities concerned with control and to the chemical industry. Control measures should also be harmonized so that weak controls in one country do not jeopardize the efforts of neighbouring countries where controls may be more effective. The cases of recent diversions referred to in chapter I, part A, of the present report highlight those needs.

103. The diversion cases reveal also that there are general weaknesses in existing control measures. The gaps identified in national control systems outlined above should be closed, and, in particular, working mechanisms and procedures should be established. In addition, since precursors continue to be diverted in significant quantities from domestic trade, to be often subsequently smuggled to neighbouring countries where illicit drugs are manufactured, all countries should introduce or strengthen, as appropriate, control measures for the licit manufacture and/or distribution of such substances.

104. While working mechanisms can and should be established to monitor the movement of precursors, if necessary on a voluntary basis, the Board urges Governments to establish, as a matter of priority, an overall legislative basis for control of precursors. It has come to the attention of the Board that in Switzerland, for example, commercial companies known to be involved in the diversion of precursors have also been involved in diversion of psychotropic substances, and continue to operate because of inadequate national chemical and control legislation.

E. Status of the 1988 Convention and reporting by Governments under article 12

1. Status of the Convention

105. As of 1 November 1994 the Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by 103 States, and formally confirmed by EEC (extent of competence: article 12). That represents 54 per cent of the total number of countries in the world. Thirteen States have become parties since the last report of the Board on the implementation of article 12 was issued. The Board wishes to reiterate its request to all States that have not already done so to become parties as soon as possible.

106. Table 1 of annex I shows the parties and non-parties by region. The rates of accession have been as follows: Africa (43 per cent); Americas (77 per cent); Asia (52 per cent); Europe (63 per cent); and Oceania (15 per cent).

2. Reporting to the Board under article 12

107. Under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention, parties are required to submit annually to the Board information on seizures of substances listed in Tables I and II, on substances not included in those Tables but identified as having been used in illicit manufacture of narcotic

drugs or psychotropic substances, and on methods of diversion and illicit manufacture. For that purpose, the Board adopted a questionnaire known as Form D, which is transmitted to all Governments.

108. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 5 (XXXIV) of 9 May 1991, also invites all States that are not yet parties to the Convention to furnish annually to the Board, in a timely manner, the information required in article 12, paragraph 12.

109. As noted in other parts of the present report, in order to be able to report to the Board the information required under article 12, Governments must first have adequate mechanisms to monitor transactions in Tables I and II substances and appropriate national coordination. In addition, adequate legislation and regulations must be put in place. The competent authority for reporting to the Board also needs to be identified, and there must be a data collection mechanism. Lack of reporting to the Board under article 12 may indicate that adequate controls are not yet in place.

110. Table 2 of annex I reproduces the submission of Form D by countries for the period from 1989 to 1993. As of 1 November 1994, a total of 101 Governments had submitted Form D for 1993, including the 12 member countries of the European Union reporting through CEC. That represents 49 per cent of the total of 208 countries and territories requested to supply the information, which is slightly better than the rate of return for previous years.

111. As was the case in previous years, only about a half of all parties (51) had submitted the requested information for 1993. A certain number of countries (Australia, Bhutan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Suriname and Syrian Arab Republic) that were parties already in 1992 have not submitted information for 1992 and 1993. China, which has been a party since 1989, has submitted the requested information only for 1990. A mission of the Board that visited China in 1994 to discuss, *inter alia*, controls over precursors, was informed of the latest developments in the country (see also paragraph 96). The Board trusts that the Government will soon put in place an adequate mechanism for data collection to allow prompt reporting.

112. The Board has sent special communications to those parties that have not submitted the information, requesting them to take all necessary steps to enable full compliance with the provisions of the 1988 Convention, including reporting to the Board.

113. The seizures of substances scheduled under the 1988 Convention, as reported to the Board for the period from 1989 to 1993, are reproduced in table 3 of annex I. To facilitate examination of the data, information is presented by region.

II. ANALYSIS OF DATA ON SEIZURES OF, AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN, PRECURSORS AND TRENDS IN ILLICIT DRUG MANUFACTURING

114. The conclusions drawn in analysis of the global precursor control situation are limited, in so far as the background data on which they are based are incomplete. Despite the growing number of States that have become parties to the 1988 Convention and the increasing number of countries and territories that have introduced controls to prevent the diversion of precursors, relatively few Governments have reported seizures. Even fewer countries have submitted data for all of the years for which data have so far been requested (1989 to 1993). The data submitted by Governments are reproduced in table 3 of annex I.

115. The lack of relevant data presents significant difficulties when examining regional trends and in the interpretation of data on reported seizures of precursors. It may mean that, *inter alia*, the use or diversion of precursors in a particular region is limited. However, it may mean also that national authorities have yet to establish suitable systems to collect the required information, that control mechanisms are not yet in place, or that national authorities cannot effectively implement existing controls, or are not doing so.

116. Further, the fact that seizures of precursors have been reported does not necessarily mean that the countries reporting such seizures have significant problems of illicit drug manufacture. In a number of cases it is known, for example, that reported seizures were made as the substance was transiting the country.

117. Notwithstanding those difficulties, the following analysis attempts to provide a broad overview of major trends in seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors, as well as of illicit drug-manufacturing trends.

118. Tables I and II substances and their typical uses in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are shown in the figures presented in annex IV. Typical therapeutic and street doses of those drugs are also given in annex IV, together with the approximate quantities of precursors required for their illicit manufacture.

A. Overview

1. Seizure data

119. The present report contains, for the first time, seizure data for a five-year period, from 1989 to 1993.

120. For each of the substances listed in the tables of the 1988 Convention, with only one exception (*ephedrine*), the number of countries and territories reporting seizures has increased when data submitted for 1993 are compared with those for 1989. In 1989, 7 of the 12 substances then scheduled were either not reported or were reported by only one country. Of those 22 substances now scheduled, only *N-acetylanthranilic acid* and *ergometrine* have so far not been reported for 1993.

121. As in previous years, the most frequently reported precursors worldwide were *acetic anhydride*, *acetone*, *ethyl ether*, *hydrochloric acid*, *potassium permanganate* and *sulphuric acid*. Reported seizures of *ephedrine* are not as numerous as in previous years. That may be because better covert techniques are now being used to obtain the chemical for illicit purposes, or diversion and illicit use of the substance has been moved to countries or regions where controls

are less effective and/or enforcement successes less obvious. Ephedrine, however, is one of those substances that has been reported every year from 1989 to 1993, together with *3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone* (3,4-MDP-2-P), *1-phenyl-2-propanone* (P-2-P), *pseudoephedrine* (Table I substances), and acetic anhydride, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, *methyl ethyl ketone* (MEK), *phenylacetic acid*, potassium permanganate, and sulphuric acid (Table II substances).

122. The foregoing observations highlight the broad use of acids and solvents not only for the illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin, but throughout illicit drug chemistry. They also highlight the continuing popularity of methamphetamine and amphetamine, the drugs illicitly manufactured using, for example, *ephedrine*, *P-2-P*, *phenylacetic acid* and *pseudoephedrine*.

123. It is interesting to note that those substances reported as having been seized in more countries in 1993 than in 1992 relate particularly to the illicit manufacture of 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), known as "Ecstasy", and its analogues (*isosafrrole*, *3,4-MDP-2-P* and *piperonal*). The data better reflect the widespread abuse of those drugs than has been apparent from the available information in previous years. They also present a marked contrast to the situation reported in the last report of the Board, when there had been only a few reported seizures of the then newly scheduled precursors for MDA and related drugs (*isosafrrole*, *3,4-MDP-2-P*, *piperonal* and *safrole*).

124. Despite a greater focus on monitoring international trade in precursors, the United States of America and Germany were the only countries to report the stopping, suspension or voluntary cancellation of suspicious exports of scheduled substances during 1993. The United States reported a number of major cases, including suspicious shipments of solvents (*MEK*) and acids (*hydrochloric and sulphuric acids*) suitable for the manufacture of cocaine and heroin to Latin America, solvents (*MEK*) to Costa Rica, and *phenylacetic acid* and *pseudoephedrine* (both potential precursors for amphetamines) to Mexico. Shipments of *acetic anhydride* and *piperonal* to India were also halted. In addition, the United States also reported that a number of exports of chemicals had been blocked by the authorities of other countries, in cooperation with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

125. Germany reported the stopping of suspicious shipments of *MEK* to Latin America, and *P-2-P* to the Netherlands and the United States. In addition, it is known that through close cooperation between the chemical industry and police, suspicious orders for a total of 94 tonnes of *P-2-P* and *3,4-MDP-2-P* were cancelled in Germany in 1992 and 1993. While some of those shipments were destined to countries where illicit drug manufacture is well documented (for example, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States), others were destined to countries less well known for the illicit manufacture of drugs. The latter included shipments of precursors (for amphetamines) to New Zealand, which were stopped not only by German, but also by United States authorities.

126. In that connection the Board wishes to add a word of caution. It trusts that, in deciding to stop an export shipment of any scheduled substance, competent authorities are making every effort to identify the exact circumstances of the case, by taking the necessary actions as described in chapter I of the present report. Adequate monitoring, exercised judiciously, should not hinder legitimate trade in chemicals.

2. Illicit traffic in precursors and illicit drug manufacturing trends

127. Illicit manufacturers of cocaine appear to obtain necessary chemicals through a variety of routes: diversions from, in order of magnitude, North America, Europe and Asia are known to have taken place. Increasing quantities are, however, reportedly diverted within the region concerned, and subsequently smuggled from neighbouring countries into cocaine-producing areas.

128. Chemicals, particularly *acetic anhydride*, used for the illicit manufacture of heroin in the Golden Triangle (Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Thailand), are obtained largely through smuggling into the border areas of Myanmar from China, India and Thailand. In the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan), chemicals are smuggled from India into Pakistan or Afghanistan via Pakistan, and possibly from China. Precursors are also suspected of originating from, or transiting through, the central Asia countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, in both the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent, diversion of legal imports of precursors from other parts of Asia, and from Europe and America, has taken place.

129. The relatively large-scale illicit manufacture of amphetamine is a continuing problem in western Europe and a growing problem in central and eastern Europe. Diversion and smuggling of precursors for amphetamine have been reported, increasingly involving the countries of central and eastern Europe. Diversions and suspicious consignments of the relevant precursors for amphetamine have also been reported worldwide. Amphetamine and fenetylline have been smuggled into the Arabian peninsula following illicit manufacture in Europe and, possibly, Turkey.

130. Illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in North America and South-East Asia also continues. Diversions of *ephedrine* originating from major producing countries (for example, China, Czech Republic, Germany and India) have been identified (see chapter I, section A). Several countries and territories (including Germany, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates) have been used for diversions or as transit points, with Mexico or the United States as final destinations. Ephedrine has been diverted and smuggled into the United States from Mexico and Canada.

131. India continues to be a major source of the illicit methaqualone reported in Africa. It is understood that the necessary precursors for the manufacture of this drug are freely available in India. However, recent law enforcement successes in that country have led to the identification of laboratories tableting methaqualone and, for the first time, synthesizing the drug. The successes may have contributed in part to the reported increase in illicit methaqualone manufacture outside India, notably in eastern and southern Africa. None of the key methaqualone precursors diverted from licit sources has ever been seized in India, but seizures have been reported in Africa. These chemicals are believed to have been either obtained locally (especially from South Africa), or diverted from, *inter alia*, Europe.

132. Identified diversions of precursors necessary for the illicit manufacture of MDA and related drugs, or illicit laboratories manufacturing MDA etc., have been reported in Africa, America, Asia and Europe. Illicit precursor requirements are likely to increase, and may diversify, as the illicit manufacture of these drugs has become a global problem in recent years. The problem may have been fuelled by the publication in 1991 of a book containing "recipes" for the manufacture of nearly 200 different MDA-type drugs. Since publication of the book, a number of new MDA analogues have appeared on the illicit market in Europe.

133. Despite the fact that relatively few countries licitly produce lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) precursors, there is little information on the illicit (or licit) movement of these substances. The source(s) of the precursors used in illicit drug manufacture remain unknown.

B. Regional analysis

1. Africa

134. There is a lack of reported data on seizures and trafficking of precursors in Africa; no seizures of any of the substances listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention, or of any non-

scheduled substances, have been reported from African countries for 1993. As noted in 1993, therefore, with the exception of a single small seizure of *ergotamine* in Saint Helena, only seizures of *ephedrine*, probably for consumption as a stimulant rather than for use in illicit drug manufacture, have been reported from the region.

135. The lack of seizure data from Africa should not be understood to mean that the continent does not have potential either as a source of precursors, as a point for diversion, or as a transit region for diverted precursors. The region has been involved in diversions and attempted diversions of scheduled substances. In one case, methaqualone precursors originating in Europe are believed to have transited the region, and then returned to Europe (Luxembourg), where illicit drug manufacture took place. Diverted precursors for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) are also believed to have transited the region.

136. More recently, in May 1994, a cocaine laboratory and 1.5 kilograms of cocaine were seized in South Africa, another example of how the region has the potential to become a significant source or transshipment point for drugs, particularly now that trade restrictions have been lifted with South Africa.

137. As indicated in paragraph 82, only a few countries in Africa have indicated that precursor controls are in place. The development of controls, as a matter of urgency, to prevent diversion of precursors, and to minimize illicit drug manufacture, will be particularly important in those countries already affected by local illicit manufacture of methaqualone, particularly Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

2. America

138. The United States and Mexico have been the only countries in the region to report seizures of Table I substances in 1993. In the United States, all reported cases involved precursors for methamphetamine, amphetamine and MDA and its analogues. Reported data show a steady fall in the quantities of *P-2-P* and *phenylacetic acid* (itself a precursor for *P-2-P*) seized in the United States from 1991 to 1993. At the same time, reported data from 1989 to 1993 on seizures of illicit methamphetamine laboratories in the United States also show a steady fall in activity relating to the clandestine manufacture of that drug within the country. This observation lends support to the view that illicit laboratories are increasingly based outside the United States, particularly in Mexico.

139. Canada reported the seizure by United States authorities of two scheduled substances, *ephedrine* (Table I) and *phenylacetic acid* (Table II), following joint operations by the two countries. ICPO/Interpol has also reported that in Canada motorcycle gangs and other organized crime groups involved in large-scale illicit manufacture of and traffic in methamphetamine, LSD and phencyclidine (PCP) may be increasingly involved in the underground trade in precursors.

140. In Mexico, chemicals for cocaine conversion are known to transit the country; chemicals for the illicit manufacture of heroin can be obtained domestically. Importantly, recent cases of diversions and attempted diversions of *ephedrine* to Mexico (see chapter I, section A) have highlighted the fact that Mexican traffickers are increasingly involved in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and in the smuggling of large quantities of *ephedrine* into the United States for use in illicit laboratories. Reported seizures of *ephedrine* in Mexico have increased rapidly since 1989 (1989 - none; 1990 - none; 1991 - 84.5 kilogram; 1992 - 2,754.8 kilogram; 1993 - 4,816.0 kilogram).

141. MDA and/or MDMA are reported to have been manufactured illicitly in Mexico in recent years; one laboratory was seized in 1989, a second in 1993. The illicit manufacture of MDA was also reported in Brazil in 1993.

142. Seizure data reported for 1993 by the countries of Central America and South America continue to feature strongly chemicals used for the manufacture of cocaine. In Central America, it is believed that problems are related mainly to the transit of such chemicals.

143. In South America, the quantities of *acetone* reported seized has fallen steadily over the five-year period, and there is a downward trend in the reported quantities of *ethyl ether* seized. Seizure data for *MEK*, with quantities seized reaching a maximum in 1991, may indicate that other solvents are also being substituted for this substance. In that connection, it is interesting to note that the German authorities have in the first eight months of 1994 stopped four suspicious shipments of *methyl isobutyl ketone*, a non-controlled substance, to Colombia.

144. Bolivia reported seizures in 1993 of all the major chemicals used for the illicit manufacture of cocaine (acids, solvents and *potassium permanganate*) in quantities comparable to previous years. However, seizures reported by Colombia show a decrease in seizures of *acetone*, *ethyl ether*, *hydrochloric acid* and *sulphuric acid*. Seizure reports from neighbouring countries give no indication, however, that illicit drug manufacturing has increased in those countries. In Ecuador, where it is understood that the number of illicit cocaine processing laboratories on the border with Colombia is growing, seizures of relatively small quantities of ethyl ether and hydrochloric acid have been reported. Those two chemicals are used for the conversion of cocaine base to cocaine hydrochloride, the manufacturing step traditionally associated with clandestine activities in Colombia.

145. Peru and Venezuela, two countries highlighted in the 1993 report of the Board on the implementation of article 12 as possibly being used by Colombian traffickers following disruption of operations in Colombia because of increased enforcement activity, have not yet reported to the Board for 1993. Nearly two thirds of the world's supply of cocaine is produced from coca leaf grown in Peru. While the bulk of the leaf is normally processed to cocaine base near cultivation sites, it is understood that there are still only relatively few cocaine hydrochloride laboratories requiring large volumes of Table II solvents in Peru.

146. In connection with enforcement actions in Colombia, the Board wishes to congratulate the Government of that country on its achievements in preventing diversion of essential chemicals into illicit cocaine manufacture. The Board has been informed that in March 1994, following preliminary investigations, the Colombian authorities inspected a large chemical distributing company and confirmed it to be a major source of chemicals for the illicit manufacture of cocaine. It is understood that, as a consequence, 1,724 tonnes of chemicals were seized, and that the company's permits authorizing it to deal with such chemicals were suspended. In addition to that particular investigation, a number of other raids, seizures and arrests have been carried out successfully in Colombia involving other major chemical distributors.

147. ICPO/Interpol reports that large quantities of coca paste enter Chile from Bolivia, mainly for conversion to cocaine hydrochloride in makeshift laboratories in the border region. However, Chile has not yet reported seizures of any scheduled substance to the Board.

148. Again, as noted in its previous report on the implementation of article 12, despite further evidence of the spread of illicit opium poppy cultivation in the Andean region, and particularly in Colombia, no seizures of *acetic anhydride*, or other acetylating agents, have been reported by any country in the region. Illicit laboratories extracting morphine from raw opium are reportedly operating in Colombia, and it is reported that numerous poppy cultivations have been established in the inaccessible mountain and jungle areas of Peru, under the control of Colombian traffickers.

3. Asia

149. The widespread abuse of illicitly manufactured methamphetamine continues in South-East Asia. However, the Republic of Korea has been the only country in the subregion to report the seizure of related precursors (*ephedrine*) during the last two years. It is increasingly being

recognized that within the subregion China is a major source of either ephedrine or of illicitly manufactured methamphetamine. Large quantities of this drug have been produced illicitly in Guandong province, near Hong Kong. Despite successful interdiction, it is understood that illicit manufacture may still occur in the area.

150. Significant enforcement successes have been made in China in connection with the seizure of precursors (90 tonnes of chemicals were seized in 1993, compared with 9.2 tonnes in 1990). Seizures effected by the end of September 1994, when a mission of the Board visited the country (see paragraph 96), showed a reduction on the 1993 figure, with a total of 18 tonnes of chemicals seized. It is thought that the reduction in seizures results from the introduction of more strict controls in the region. The main chemicals seized were *acetic anhydride* and *ethyl ether*, particularly in the Yunnan border area, *en route* to Myanmar. China has licit manufacturing and is a major exporter of acetic anhydride. Of the Table II substances seized in Asia, major seizures of acetic anhydride were reported in Myanmar (originating mainly from China) and India.

151. Thailand was the only other country in the subregion to have reported seizures of *ethyl ether* in 1993, despite significant seizures of the substance also having been reported from the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar in previous years. While Thailand is most often associated with the illicit heroin trade, increased abuse of amphetamines has been reported more recently. Reports from ICPO/Interpol note the seizure in 1993 and 1994 of large quantities of *ephedrine* and other chemicals (including *acetone*, *ethyl ether* and *hydrochloric acid*) at illicit drug manufacturing sites within the country.

152. The precursor control situation in South and South-West Asia is critical. There is substantial potential for, and risk of, diversion of precursors, since the area contains an important chemical and pharmaceutical industry, and is closely associated with the illicit processing of heroin and methaqualone. Within the subregion there are also licit sources of ephedrine.

153. Existing controls at the national and subregional levels may be inadequate since the extent of illicit drug manufacture in South and South-West Asia, together with seizure statistics, suggest that key precursors are readily available. Since 1991, when data were first submitted by the Indian authorities, the quantity of *acetic anhydride* reported seized has risen steadily (from 1 tonne in 1991 to almost 20 tonnes in 1993). However, despite this notable success, and despite regular reports of seizures by the authorities of India and Pakistan in the border region between the two countries, the quantity and quality of heroin available to western European countries from South and South-West Asia gives no indication of any serious shortage of acetic anhydride (or other acetylating agents) in the region.

154. Since 1991, illicit heroin manufacture in Turkey has been associated mainly with the processing of morphine base originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. ICPO/Interpol has reported that seizures of morphine in Turkey have increased approximately twentyfold from 1991 to 1993, and in the four years since 1990 four illicit heroin laboratories have been identified. In 1993, *acetic anhydride*, *acetone*, *ethyl ether* and *hydrochloric acid*, intended for use in the illicit processing of heroin, were reported seized. It is believed that the acetic anhydride required for conversion of morphine into heroin had been smuggled into Turkey, since no diversion has been identified within the country.

155. The requirement for precursors in South and South-West Asia is likely to increase if reports indicating an increase in the level of heroin manufacture are correct. For the moment, however, there is no evidence from seizure data of such an increased need, and no scheduled substances other than *acetic anhydride* have been reported seized. In that connection, the number of countries in the subregion routinely submitting the information under article 12 is low. All Governments of the region that have not already done so should take the necessary steps to ensure prompt reporting to the Board.

156. Countries of central Asia have reported few seizures of any scheduled substances. It is known, however, that in the subregion there is widespread opium poppy cultivation and wild growth of plants (*Ephedra spp.*) containing *ephedrine*. More importantly, there is some indication that the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States are increasingly being used by traffickers as a source for, or for the transit of, precursors.

157. Despite an eradication programme in Lebanon that has allegedly led to the destruction of most, if not all, local opium production, laboratories manufacturing illicit heroin continue to operate in the region, using as starting material morphine base obtained from Afghanistan and Pakistan and routed through the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. Illicit cocaine processing laboratories are also reported to exist in Lebanon. It is therefore of concern to note that Lebanon has no precursor controls in place. No reports of the seizure of any precursors related to the illicit manufacture of either cocaine or heroin have been submitted to the Board by the Lebanese authorities.

158. In connection with the illicit manufacture of methaqualone, India has, for the first time, reported the dismantling of a major laboratory synthesizing the drug. Methaqualone powder was seized, together with a large quantity of illicitly manufactured *N-acetylanthranilic acid*, equipment and other raw materials for drug manufacture.

4. Europe

159. In Europe, Table I substances were the only ones frequently reported seized in 1993, although small quantities of Table II substances (including *acetic anhydride*, *acetone*, *ethyl ether*, *hydrochloric acid*, *methyl ethyl ketone* and *sulphuric acid*) were reported by a number of countries. The extent and diversity of illicit drug manufacture in Europe is clearly shown by the reported data. Not only have seizures of scheduled substances been reported on a much broader basis than in previous years, but the seizure of a wide range of non-scheduled substances highlights the increased use of substitute chemicals or alternative routes of synthesis, particularly for the illicit manufacture of drugs such as amphetamine.

160. In view of growing evidence of illicit drug manufacture in the region, and especially after the concern expressed by the Board in its previous report, it is noteworthy to see the improved cooperation and reporting by many of the countries of the region. Five countries in central and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and Ukraine) reported seizure data to the Board for the first time.

161. Major precursors for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and, particularly, amphetamine (*ephedrine*, *P-2-P*, and *phenylacetic acid*) were seized throughout Europe. However, as noted in its previous report, the relatively small quantities of the various precursors seized contrasts sharply with the widespread availability of the two drugs. The illicit use of phenylacetic acid as a precursor to manufacture P-2-P has become common practice.

162. Methamphetamine has been manufactured illicitly in the Czech Republic using available licit medicines containing *ephedrine* and *Ephedra vulgaris*, a plant commonly found in southern Slovakia. The other chemicals required for illicit drug manufacture (hydriodic acid, red phosphorus and acetic acid) are reportedly readily available in the country.

163. One significant difference can be reported between the seizure data for 1992 and 1993 from Europe. In the 1993 report of the Board, it was noted that, despite large seizures of MDA and related drugs (that is, MDMA and 3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine (MDEA)) in western Europe, very few reports of seizures of their precursors were made. This situation has changed, with five western European countries (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom) reporting seizures of related precursors.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

172. Diversion and smuggling of precursors used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances continue, and have been reported worldwide. For most of the substances controlled under the 1988 Convention, seizures have been reported on a much broader basis than in previous years, with a greater number of substances being seized in an increasing number of countries and territories.

173. Reported data highlight the broad use of acids and solvents not only for the illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin, but also for the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances such as amphetamine, MDA and its analogues, methamphetamine and methaqualone. The data also highlight a greater illicit demand for the key precursors required for the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs. Reported seizures of a wide range of non-scheduled substances indicate the increased use of substitute chemicals or alternate methods of illicit drug manufacture.

174. These observations suggest that the illicit demand for precursors, and particularly for Table I substances, is likely to increase further. Recent information also shows that diverted precursors are being trafficked by more complex and varied routes.

175. The series of major cases of diversion and attempted diversion of ephedrine identified during 1994 has highlighted the need for more strict control of that substance. The methods of diversion used by traffickers may, however, be applied to any of the substances controlled under the 1988 Convention. As a consequence, the lessons learned from the ephedrine cases described in the present report, and application of the strengthened chemical control regimes that have been developed as a result, are valid for all scheduled substances.

176. Governments, both parties and non-parties alike, should therefore review existing precursor controls and consider, as a matter of urgency, the further actions that may be necessary to prevent diversions, particularly from international trade. Recommendations for action that can, and should, be taken now are summarized below.

177. The Board recommends that Governments should, whether or not they have any comprehensive legislation for precursor control in place, establish or refine practical working mechanisms and operating procedures to monitor the licit movement of precursors.

178. Such working mechanisms and procedures can be established through informal, yet institutionalized, arrangements even when the relevant legislation is not yet in place. Where legislation has been adopted, for example wherever export or import authorization requirements are in place, such mechanisms and operating procedures must be established to implement those control measures and identify suspicious transactions.

179. Governments of chemical-exporting or -importing and transit countries should also share information routinely on the international trade in precursors. For those countries where export or import authorization requirements exist, this may include forwarding a copy of an export authorization to the competent authorities of the importing country, or providing information on issued import authorizations to exporting countries.

180. Where the lack of such authorization requirements does not allow the exchange of relevant documents, Governments of chemical-exporting countries may consider sharing with importing countries general information on export trends, in order to alert them to movements of precursors. They should also consider introducing a specific pre-export notification system to alert importing countries to individual transactions. Finally, chemical-importing countries, and in particular those that have experienced difficulties in monitoring imports of precursors, should consider requesting

pre-export notifications under the existing provisions of article 12, paragraph 10 (a) of the 1988 Convention.

181. All Governments in receipt of any form of pre-export notification, or information on the licit movement of precursors to and from their country, should, as a matter of course, examine it carefully to confirm the legitimacy of individual transactions and the credibility of any developing commercial trends. They should provide routine feedback to all Governments concerned of the results of investigations they may conduct, including details of stopped shipments.

182. Countries through which precursors transit should consider especially their dual responsibilities in acting both as importing and exporting countries when considering the sharing of information, as described above, as part of global efforts to prevent diversion. Transit countries are not immune from such responsibilities.

183. The Board wishes to point out that the cases of diversion and attempted diversion described in the present report have also highlighted some of the major problems introduced by the involvement of brokers in the licit international chemical trade. Those problems have related specifically to tracing the movement of precursors and identifying suspicious transactions. Governments should consider any additional measures that they may need to take to ensure that the activities of brokers handling precursors are controlled in the same way as are the activities of manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers generally.

184. On a number of occasions, it has come to the attention of the Board that the competent authorities of exporting countries have been reluctant to issue export authorizations for shipments of precursors until the reliability of the companies concerned has been confirmed. The Board wishes therefore to remind Governments, particularly those of importing countries, that their best interests are served by putting in place systems of control, for example, to establish the bona fides of persons and enterprises handling precursors. The existence of such systems provides a further opportunity to verify the legitimacy of transactions, and may lead to the possibility that the export of suspicious shipments of precursors can be stopped, thus preventing unwanted imports. It may also help to protect legitimate enterprises from unfounded suspicion and, ultimately, from difficulties in obtaining licitly required precursors.

185. While the present report focuses particularly on preventing the diversion of precursors from international trade, the Board notes also that significant quantities of precursors continue to be diverted from domestic trade, with subsequent smuggling into regions where drugs are illicitly manufactured. Because of the practical difficulty of establishing effective border controls to prevent smuggling in many regions, Governments are therefore reminded that any review of the implementation of existing controls that they may undertake should examine enforcement activities, and should also look closely at the need to develop and strengthen control measures to prevent diversion from manufacture and domestic distribution. At the same time, Governments should not exclude the possibility of using controlled deliveries, where appropriate, to detect sites of illicit manufacture of drugs.

186. The diversion cases identified during 1994 have confirmed the specific actions outlined above to be an essential part of successful chemical control. The Board notes with satisfaction that a number of major chemical-producing and -exporting countries have already taken such steps, and have established controls and working mechanisms and operating procedures of the type described, enhancing their ability to monitor precursor movements. Those countries have legitimate commercial interests to protect, but appropriate monitoring and control mechanisms, carefully established, should not adversely affect those interests by hindering legitimate trade.

187. As a prerequisite to taking any of the actions outlined above, and to facilitate cooperation between Governments, it is essential that all States, as a matter of priority, identify a competent authority responsible for implementing article 12. They should share that information, through

the Board, with other Governments. They should also inform other countries of the regulatory controls that apply in their territories. As a further prerequisite, it is essential that mechanisms are established to collect and share data on the licit manufacture, use and import and export of precursors, and on illicit trafficking and use. While the Board recognizes that some of the information on the licit trade in precursors may be considered commercially sensitive, it reiterates that drug traffickers should not be allowed to benefit from any such commercial confidentiality. Pursuant to article 12, data used to identify suspicious transactions will remain confidential.

Notes

¹E/CONF.82/15 and Corr.2.

²*Competent National Authorities Under the International Drug Control Treaties* (ST/NAR.3/1994/1 (E/NA)).

³*Precursors and Essential Chemicals frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.1).

⁴RM/NARCO/doc.18/90 rev.1.

⁵Regulation (EEC) No. 3677/90 of 13 December 1990.

⁶Regulation (EEC) No. 900/92 of 31 March 1992.

⁷Directive 93/46/EEC of 22 June 1993.

Annex I

TABLES

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION *

Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention	
Africa	Burkina Faso (02.06.1992)	Niger (10.11.1992)	Algeria	Liberia
	Burundi (18.02.1993)	Nigeria (01.11.1989)	Angola	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
	Cameroon (28.10.1991)	Senegal (27.11.1989)	Benin	Malawi
	Côte d'Ivoire (25.11.1991)	Seychelles (27.02.1992)	Botswana	Mali
	Egypt (15.03.1991)	Sierra Leone (06.06.1994)	Cape Verde	Mauritius
	Ethiopia (11.10.1994)	Sudan (19.11.1993)	Central African Republic	Mozambique
	Ghana (10.04.1990)	Togo (01.08.1990)	Chad	Namibia
	Guinea (27.12.1990)	Tunisia (20.09.1990)	Comoros	Rwanda
	Kenya (19.10.1992)	Uganda (20.08.1990)	Congo	Sao Tome and Principe
	Madagascar (12.03.1991)	Zambia (28.05.1993)	Djibouti	Somalia
	Mauritania (01.07.1993)	Zimbabwe (30.07.1993)	Equatorial Guinea	South Africa
	Morocco (28.10.1992)		Eritrea	Swaziland
			Gabon	United Republic of Tanzania
		Gambia	Zaire	
		Guinea-Bissau		
		Lesotho		
<i>No. of countries</i> 53	23		30	
Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention	
The Americas	Antigua and Barbuda (05.04.1993)	Costa Rica (08.02.1991)	Belize	Saint Lucia
	Argentina (10.06.1993)	Dominica (30.06.1993)	Cuba	Trinidad and Tobago
	Bahamas (30.01.1989)	Dominican Republic (21.09.1993)	Haiti	Uruguay
	Barbados (15.10.1992)	Ecuador (23.03.1990)	Jamaica	
	Bolivia (20.08.1990)	El Salvador (21.05.1993)	Saint Kitts and Nevis	
	Brazil (17.07.1991)	Grenada (10.12.1990)		
	Canada (05.07.1990)	Guatemala (28.02.1991)		
	Chile (13.03.1990)	Guyana (19.03.1993)		
	Colombia (10.06.1994)	Honduras (11.12.1991)		

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION* (continued)

Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention	
	Mexico (11.04.1990)	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17.05.1994)		
	Nicaragua (04.05.1990)	Suriname (28.10.1992)		
	Panama (13.01.1994)	United States of America (20.02.1990)		
	Paraguay (23.08.1990)	Venezuela (16.07.1991)		
	Peru (16.01.1992)			
<i>No. of countries</i>	27		8	
35				
Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention	
Asia	Afghanistan (14.02.1992)	Kyrgyzstan (07.10.1994)	Cambodia	Mongolia
	Armenia (13.09.1993)	Malaysia (11.05.1993)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Philippines
	Azerbaijan (22.09.1993)	Myanmar (11.06.1991)	Georgia	Republic of Korea
	Bahrain (07.02.1990)	Nepal (24.07.1991)	Indonesia	Singapore
	Bangladesh (11.10.1990)	Oman (15.03.1991)	Iraq	Tajikistan
	Bhutan (27.08.1990)	Pakistan (25.10.1991)	Israel	Thailand
	Brunei Darussalam (12.11.1993)	Qatar (04.05.1990)	Kazakhstan	Turkey
	China (25.10.1989)	Saudi Arabia (09.01.1992)	Kuwait	Turkmenistan
	Cyprus (25.05.1990)	Sri Lanka (06.06.1991)	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Uzbekistan
	India (27.03.1990)	Syrian Arab Republic (03.09.1991)	Lebanon	Viet Nam
	Iran (Islamic Republic of) (07.12.1992)	United Arab Emirates (12.04.1990)	Maldives	Yemen
	Japan (12.06.1992)			
	Jordan (16.04.1990)			
<i>No. of countries</i>	24		22	
46				

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION* (continued)

Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention	
Europe **	Belarus (15.10.1990)	Netherlands (08.09.1993)	Albania	Liechtenstein
	Bosnia and Herzegovina (01.09.1993)	Poland (26.05.1994)	Andorra	Lithuania
	Bulgaria (24.09.1992)	Portugal (03.12.1991)	Austria	Malta
	Croatia (26.07.1993)	Romania (21.01.1993)	Belgium	Norway
	Czech Republic (30.12.1993)	Russian Federation (17.12.1990)	Estonia	Republic of Moldova
	Denmark (19.12.1991)	Slovakia (28.05.1993)	Holy See	San Marino
	Finland (15.02.1994)	Slovenia (06.07.1992)	Hungary	Switzerland
	France (31.12.1990)	Spain (13.08.1990)	Iceland	
	Germany (30.11.1993)	Sweden (22.07.1991)	Ireland	
	Greece (28.01.1992)	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (13.10.1993)		
	Italy (31.12.1990)	Ukraine (28.08.1991)		
	Latvia (25.02.1994)	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (28.06.1991)		
	Luxembourg (29.04.1992)	Yugoslavia (03.01.1991)		
	Monaco (23.04.1991)			
	<i>No. of countries</i> 43	27		16
	Continent	Party to the 1988 Convention		Non-Party to the 1988 Convention
Oceania	Australia (10.11.1992)		Kiribati	Papua New Guinea
	Fiji (25.03.1993)		Marshall Islands	Samoa
			Micronesia (Federated States of)	Solomon Islands
			Nauru	Tonga
			New Zealand	Tuvalu
			Vanuatu	
<i>No. of countries</i> 13	2		11	
<i>World Total</i> 190	103		87	

* The date on which the instruments of ratification or accession were deposited is indicated in parentheses.

** The European Economic Community formally confirmed the 1988 Convention on 31 december 1990 (extent of competence: article 12).

TABLE 2: SUBMISSION OF FORM D BY COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1989 TO 1993*
(Territories are in *italics*)

COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Afghanistan	?	X	?	?	?
Albania	?	?	?	?	?
Algeria	X	?	?	?	?
Andorra	X	X	?	X	X
Angola	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Anguilla</i>	X	?	?	?	X
<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>	?	?	X	X	X
Argentina	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Aruba</i>	X	X	X	X	?
<i>Ascension Island</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	?	?
Austria	?	X	X	?	?
Azerbaijan	X(a)	X(a)	?	X	?
Bahamas	?	?	X	X	X
Bahrain	X	?	X	?	X
Bangladesh	?	X	X	X	X
Barbados	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Belgium	X	X	X	X	X
Belize	?	?	?	?	?
Benin	X	X	?	?	?
<i>Bermuda</i>	?	X	X	X	X
Bhutan	?	?	X	?	?
Bolivia	?	X	X	X	?
<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	?
Botswana	X	X	?	X	X
Brazil	?	X	X	X	X
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Brunei Darussalam</i>	?	?	X	X	X
Bulgaria	?	?	?	X	X
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	X	X
Burundi	?	?	?	?	?
Cambodia	?	?	?	?	?
Cameroon	X	X	X	X	?
Canada	X	?	?	X	X
Cape Verde	?	?	X	?	?
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	?	?	X	?	X
Central African Republic	?	?	?	?	X
Chad	X	X	X	X	?
Chile	X	?	X	?	X
China	?	X	?	?	?
<i>Christmas Island</i>	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Cocos (Keeling) Islands</i>	?	?	?	?	?
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros	?	?	?	?	?
Congo	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Cook Islands</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	?	X	?	X	?
Croatia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	?
Cuba	X	?	?	?	X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X
Czech Republic	X(c)	X(c)	X(c)	X(c)	X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	?	?	X	?	?

TABLE 2: SUBMISSION OF FORM D BY COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1989 TO 1993*
(Territories are in *italics*)

COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Denmark	X	?	X	X	X
Djibouti	X	X	?	?	?
Dominica	X	X	X	?	?
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	?	?	?	X	X
Ecuador	X	X	?	X	X
Egypt	X	X	X	X	X
El Salvador	X	X	?	?	?
Equatorial Guinea	X	X	X	X	X
Eritrea	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?
Estonia	X(a)	X(a)	?	?	?
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Fiji	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	?	?	X	?	?
France	X	X	X	X	X
<i>French Polynesia</i>	?	?	?	?	?
Gabon	?	?	?	?	?
Gambia	?	?	?	?	?
Georgia	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Germany	?	?	X	X	X
Ghana	X	?	X	X	?
Gibraltar	?	?	?	?	X
Greece	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	X	X	X	X	?
Guatemala	?	?	?	X	?
Guinea	?	X	X	?	X
Guinea-Bissau	X	?	?	?	?
Guyana	?	X	X	?	?
Haiti	X	?	?	X	X
Honduras	X	X	?	X	?
<i>Hong Kong</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Hungary	X	X	X	X	?
Iceland	?	?	X	X	X
India	?	?	X	X	X
Indonesia	?	?	?	?	?
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	?	X	?	?	?
Iraq	X	X	X	?	X
Ireland	?	?	X	X	X
Israel	X	X	?	X	?
Italy	X	?	X	X	X
Jamaica	X	?	?	X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	?	X	X	?	X
Kazakhstan	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Kenya	X	?	?	?	?
Kiribati	X	X	?	X	X
Kuwait	X	?	X	X	?
Kyrgyzstan	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia	X(a)	X(a)	?	?	?
Lebanon	?	?	X	?	?
Lesotho	X	X	?	?	X
Liberia	?	?	?	?	?
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	X	X	?	?	?
Lithuania	X(a)	X(a)	?	?	X

TABLE 2: SUBMISSION OF FORM D BY COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1989 TO 1993*
(Territories are in italics)

COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Luxembourg	?	?	X	X	X
<i>Macao</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Madagascar	X	X	X	?	X
Malawi	?	?	?	?	?
Malaysia	X	X	?	?	?
Maldives	X	?	?	X	X
Mali	X	X	X	X	X
Malta	X	X	X	X	X
Marshall Islands	n.a.	n.a.	?	?	?
Mauritania	?	?	?	?	?
Mauritius	X	?	X	X	X
Mexico	X	X	X	X	?
Micronesia (Federated States of)	n.a.	n.a.	?	X	?
Mongolia	X	?	?	X	X
<i>Montserrat</i>	?	?	X	X	X
Morocco	X	X	X	X	X
Mozambique	X	?	?	?	?
Myanmar	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia	n.a.	?	?	?	?
Nauru	?	?	X	X	X
Nepal	X	?	X	X	X
Netherlands	X	?	X	X	X
<i>Netherlands Antilles</i>	?	X	X	X	X
<i>New Caledonia</i>	?	?	?	?	?
New Zealand	X	X	?	?	?
Nicaragua	X	?	?	X	?
Niger	?	X	?	?	X
Nigeria	X	?	?	X	?
<i>Norfolk Islands</i>	?	?	?	?	?
Norway	?	X	?	X	X
Oman	X	X	?	X	?
Pakistan	X	X	X	X	?
Panama	?	X	?	?	X
Papua New Guinea	X	?	X	?	?
Paraguay	?	?	?	X	X
Peru	?	X	X	X	?
Philippines	X	X	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	?	?	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X
Qatar	X	X	X	X	X
Republic of Korea	X	X	X	X	X
Republic of Moldova	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Romania	X	X	X	X	X
Russian Federation	X(a)	X(a)	X	X	?
Rwanda	X	X	X	X	?
<i>Saint Helena</i>	X	X	?	X	?
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	X	X	X	X
Saint Lucia	?	X	?	?	?
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	?	?	?	X	X
Samoa	X	X	X	X	X
Sao Tome and Principe	X	X	X	X	X
Saudi Arabia	?	X	X	X	?
Senegal	?	X	?	X	?
Seychelles	?	X	?	X	X
Sierra Leone	?	?	?	?	?

TABLE 2: SUBMISSION OF FORM D BY COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1989 TO 1993*
(Territories are in italics)

COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Singapore	X	?	X	X	X
<i>Slovakia</i>	X(c)	X(c)	X(c)	X(c)	?
<i>Slovenia</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	X	X
Solomon Islands	X	?	?	?	?
Somalia	?	?	?	?	?
South Africa	X	?	X	?	?
Spain	?	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan	?	?	X	?	?
Suriname	X	?	?	?	?
Swaziland	X	X	X	X	?
Sweden	?	X	X	X	X
Switzerland	?	?	?	?	?
Syrian Arab Republic	?	?	X	?	?
Tajikistan	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Thailand	?	X	X	?	X
<i>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	?
Togo	?	X	X	X	?
Tonga	?	X	X	?	?
Trinidad and Tobago	?	?	X	?	?
<i>Tristan da Cunha</i>	X	X	?	X	X
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
<i>Turks and Caicos Islands</i>	?	?	?	X	?
Tuvalu	X	X	X	X	?
Uganda	?	X	X	X	X
Ukraine	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X	X	X	X
United Republic of Tanzania	?	?	?	?	?
United States of America	?	X	X	X	X
Uruguay	X	?	?	?	?
Uzbekistan	X(a)	X(a)	X(b)	X(b)	?
Vanuatu	X	X	X	X	X
Venezuela	?	X	?	X	?
Viet Nam	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Wallis and Futuna Islands</i>	?	?	?	?	?
Yemen	?	?	?	?	?
Yugoslavia	?	?	?	?	?
Zaire	X	?	?	X	X
Zambia	X	?	?	X	?
Zimbabwe	?	?	?	X	X
TOTAL (X)	103	101	105	114	101

NOTES: * In addition, the Commission of the European Communities has submitted Form D for 1991, 1992 and 1993.
 ? signifies that Form D was not received.
 X signifies that a completed Form D (or equivalent report) was submitted, including nil returns.
 n.a. signifies not applicable.
 Parties to the 1988 Convention (and the years since they became parties) are shadowed.
 For a), b) and c), only one reply is counted in the total.

- a) Form D from the USSR.
- b) Information was provided by the Russian Federation.
- c) Form D from Czechoslovakia.

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

This table shows information on seizures of the substances included in Tables I or II of the 1988 Convention, furnished to the Board by Governments in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12.

The table includes data on domestic seizures and on seizures effected at the point of entry or exit. It does not include reported seizures of substances where it is known that they were not intended for the illicit manufacture of drugs (for example seizures effected for administrative shortcomings). Stopped shipments are also not included.

Units of measure and conversion factors

Units of measure are indicated for every substance. Fractions of full units are not listed in the table; the figures are, however, rounded.

For several reasons, quantities of individual substances seized are reported to INCB using different units; one country may report seizures of acetic anhydride in litres, another in kilograms.

To enable a proper comparison of collected information, it is important that all data are collated in a standard format. To simplify the necessary standardization process, figures are given in grams or kilograms where the substance is a solid, and in litres where the substance (or its most common form) is a liquid.

Seizures of solids reported to INCB in litres have not been converted into kilograms, and are not included in the table, since the actual quantity of substance in solution is not known.

For seizures of liquids, quantities reported in kilograms have been converted into litres using the following factors:

<i>Substance</i>	<i>Conversion factor (kilograms to litres)^{a/}</i>
acetic anhydride	0.926
acetone	1.269
ethyl ether	1.408
hydrochloric acid (39.1% solution)	0.833
isosafrole	0.892
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	0.833
methyl ethyl ketone	1.242
1-phenyl-2-propanone	0.985
safrole	0.912
sulphuric acid (concentrated solution)	0.543
toluene	1.155

^{a/}Derived from density, quoted in *The Merck Index*, Merck and Co., Inc. (Rahway, New Jersey, 1989).

As an example, to convert 1,000 kilograms of methyl ethyl ketone into litres, multiply by 1.242, i.e. $1000 \times 1.242 = 1,242$ litres.

For the conversion of gallons to litres it has been assumed that in Colombia the United States gallon is used, with 3.785 litres to the gallon, and in Myanmar the imperial gallon, with 4.546 litres to the gallon.

Ephedrine tablets have been assumed to contain 25 milligrams of ephedrine, each.

In those cases where reported quantities have been converted, the converted figures are listed in the table in *italics*.

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
AFRICA											
Côte d'Ivoire											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Guinea											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saint Helena											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Senegal											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Total region											
1989	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	0	14	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
AFRICA											
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>Guinea</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
<i>Saint Helena</i>											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>Senegal</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
Total region											
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1989
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1990
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1991
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1992
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
THE AMERICAS											
<i>Argentina</i>											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Aruba</i>											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Bahamas</i>											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	114	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Bolivia</i>											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Brazil</i>											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
THE AMERICAS											
<i>Argentina</i>											
-	651	-	775	84	-	-	-	-	21	-	1989
-	2634	-	2188	457	-	-	-	-	186	-	1990
-	771	-	884	39	-	-	-	-	51	-	1991
-	349	-	347	60	-	-	-	-	12	-	1992
-	105	-	101	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
<i>Aruba</i>											
-	2664900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>Bahamas</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
<i>Bolivia</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	19183	-	20368	5222	-	-	-	3726	13566	-	1990
-	11444	-	3431	26438	-	-	-	1883	44863	-	1991
-	14468	-	4481	1144	-	-	-	531	16057	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>Brazil</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	2858	-	2444	-	-	-	-	-	1129	-	1990
-	20536	-	5871	360	-	-	-	-	160	-	1991
-	1175	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	8634	-	2287	-	-	-	-	50	200	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	Unit	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
		kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Canada												
1989		-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992		-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colombia												
1989		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador												
1989		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico												
1989		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991		-	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-
1992		-	2755	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-
1993		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Paraguay												
1989		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
Canada											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Colombia											
-	3336474	-	2883110	-	-	-	-	172424	536603	-	1989
-	1037065	-	824549	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	853108	-	1047302	284351	264899	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	785235	-	514643	127790	191646	-	-	43505	483296	-	1992
-	487850	-	215665	116960	204689	-	-	29049	399416	-	1993
Ecuador											
-	47130 b)	-	1160	c)	4080	-	-	-	650	d)	1989
-	75	-	43560	-	17160	-	-	-	10	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	3217	-	60	12	2200	-	-	91	-	-	1992
-	-	-	220	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Mexico											
4	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
4350	4350	-	-	1900	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
Paraguay											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	525	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3750	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Peru											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
United States of America											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	4693	-	-	-	-	a)	561	a)	34	-
1991	-	1156	-	-	9	-	1	748	2400	21	-
1992	e)	2091	-	-	°	-	-	231	-	°	6
1993	-	4026	-	-	°	-	-	178	4270	26	5
Venezuela											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Total region											
1989	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	0	4693	0	0	0	0	0	561	0	34	0
1991	0	1241	0	0	9	0	1	862	2400	521	0
1992	0	4848	0	0	°	0	0	231	0	50	6
1993	0	4026	0	0	°	0	0	178	4270	26	5

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	Peru
-	2410	-	56	-	-	-	-	3659	9872	-	1989
-	4646	-	43366	189	27171	-	-	991	19095	-	1990
-	13579	-	-	1911	-	-	-	2751	53005	-	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
United States of America											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
1859	2136	-	1580	-	a)	2744	2	a)	-	a)	1990
1653	3769	389	5173	-	26088	1346	2	-	-	1224	1991
1415	2453	°	3320	2313	17784	993	16	40	1081	792	1992
772000	1489	885	1038	2401	6	692	69	3	273	951	1993
Venezuela											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	24	-	113	-	84609	-	-	-	380	2900	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
Total region											
4	6049155	0	2885045	89	4080	0	0	172424	537274	0	1989
1859	1066361	0	894745	5679	17160	2744	2	7385	24763	0	1990
1653	894274	389	1106027	311377	318158	1346	2	2874	64169	1224	1991
5765	824850	°	522964	135655	296239	993	16	46918	553831	3692	1992
772000	498078	885	219311	119401	204695	692	69	29102	403839	951	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
ASIA											
<i>Azerbaijan</i>											
1989	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1990	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1991	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1992	-	f)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
<i>China</i>											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
<i>Hong Kong</i>											
1989	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>India</i>											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Japan</i>											
1989	-	o	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
ASIA											
<i>Azerbaijan</i>											
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1989
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1990
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1991
12	600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>China</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
7390	-	-	1873	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
<i>Hong Kong</i>											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
15167	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
<i>India</i>											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
1080	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
11530	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
19758	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
<i>Japan</i>											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
	Unit kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Kuwait											
1989	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Lao People's Democratic Republic											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Macao											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malaysia											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Myanmar											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Kuwait
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
-	-	-	820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Lao People's Democratic Republic
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Macao
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	4169	-	-	-	4251	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	5475	-	-	4000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	Malaysia
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Myanmar
292	-	-	1634	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
1191	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
5164	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
4546	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Pakistan											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines											
1989	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Republic of Korea											
1989	-	690	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	294	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	235	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	267	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	358	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thailand											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
											Pakistan
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
1785	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
3206	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
											Philippines
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
											Republic of Korea
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
											Thailand
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
120	-	-	1408	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	254	-	684	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
-	-	-	986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
											Turkey
785	190	-	282	13	-	-	-	-	45	-	1989
13818	32	-	70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
25344	216	-	218	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	10	-	65	16	-	-	-	-	10	-	1992
179	13	-	153	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Total region											
1989	0	706	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	0
1990	0	295	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	0	337	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	269	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1993	0	358	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EUROPE											
Austria											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Bulgaria											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	154	-	-	-
Czech Republic g)											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	95	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania											
1989	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1990	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1991	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
Total region											
1285	190	0	1102	15	0	0	0	0	45	0	1989
21621	32	0	4985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1990
29400	470	0	902	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1991
35079	4779	0	65	16	4251	0	0	0	10	0	1992
24483	5488	0	1139	4029	0	0	0	0	0	0	1993
EUROPE											
Austria											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	/	-	1	-	-	3	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
Bulgaria											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Czech Republic g)											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	21	-	-	22	40	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Lithuania											
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1989
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1990
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
a)	a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	Unit	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
		kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Norway												
	1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
	1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland												
	1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1991	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	1993	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Slovenia												
	1989	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	1990	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	1991	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden												
	1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
	1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
European Union h)												
Belgium												
	1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a)	-	-	-
	1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-
	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
Norway											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Poland											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Slovenia											
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1989
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1990
n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Sweden											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
122	28	-	75	35	-	53	-	2	24	6	1992
53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
European Union h)											
Belgium											
26	120	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	a)	-	a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Denmark											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	197	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75
1992	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	1	-	-	°	-	-	30	-	-	°
1992	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	7	3680	-	°
1993	-	°	-	-	°	-	-	2425	250	-	2
Ireland											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	36	-	-

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
Denmark											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
France											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
19	200	-	10	70	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	150	-	-	-	-	60	150	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Germany											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
2	28	-	25	55	-	-	-	°	11	1	1991
1	77	-	117	-	-	°	2	-	18	45	1992
1	9	°	16	14	°	-	5	°	8	1	1993
Ireland											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Italy											
-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	1	-	2	9	-	-	-	-	°	-	1992
-	11	-	25	6	°	-	-	1	2	-	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
Netherlands											
1989	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1600	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	492	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	5450	3	a)	30	-	-	60
Portugal											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spain											
1989	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland											
1989	-	252	-	-	3	-	2	-	-	-	-
1990	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1135	-	-	-
1991	-	250	-	-	3	-	-	22	10000	-	-
1992	a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	500	-	°
1993	-	3	-	300	24	-	-	°	-	-	-
Total region											
1989	0	253	0	0	3	0	2	198	0	0	3
1990	0	97	0	0	0	0	0	1147	0	0	0
1991	0	251	0	0	3	0	0	1663	10000	0	75
1992	0	3	0	0	0	0	200	574	4180	0	°
1993	0	4	0	300	5474	3	17	2609	286	0	62

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
Netherlands											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	a)	805	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Portugal											
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992
-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	1993
Spain											
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1989
-	6	-	22	23	1680	-	-	-	64	-	1990
-	103	-	157	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
9	20	-	32	10	-	-	-	3	11	-	1992
-	17	-	57	6	-	-	-	-	16	-	1993
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland											
3315	1	-	1686	30	-	°	-	-	1	200	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	1990
1	a)	-	a)	-	-	a)	-	-	-	-	1991
30	-	-	5	28	16	67	-	-	57	-	1992
406	74	-	26	45	-	1000	-	°	62	13	1993
Total region											
3341	121	0	1692	30	0	°	0	0	1	200	1989
0	18	0	22	24	1680	26	0	0	66	0	1990
22	333	0	212	125	0	0	0	°	11	1	1991
355	126	0	230	231	16	120	2	5	181	201	1992
460	132	0	124	918	80	1000	5	1	88	14	1993

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table I

Region, country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P * **	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Unit	kilograms	kilograms	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilograms	litres
OCEANIA											
Australia											
1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	-	-	-
1990	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1993	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Total region											
1989	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	0	0	0
1990	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORLD TOTAL											
1989	0	959	0	0	3	0	2	598	0	200	3
1990	0	5098	0	1	0	0	0	1758	0	34	0
1991	0	1829	0	0	12	0	1	2525	12400	521	75
1992	0	5120	0	0	°	0	200	805	4180	51	6
1993	0	4388	0	300	5474	3	17	2787	4556	26	67

* Included in Table I or Table II in 1992.

** 3,4-MDP-2-P = 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.

a) The exact quantity of the seizure was not specified.

b) In addition, another seizure of 674 litres of acetone was reported by a different authority.

c) A seizure of 59 litres of hydrochloric acid was reported by a different authority.

d) A seizure of 76 litres of toluene was reported by a different authority.

e) A solution containing an unknown amount of N-acetylanthranilic acid was seized.

f) A solution of 1.5 litres containing an unknown amount of ephedrine was seized.

g) Data for 1989 to 1992 relate to seizures reported by Czechoslovakia.

h) Data for 1989 and 1990, as well as those for Spain for 1991, were provided by individual countries. All other figures were provided through the Commission of the European Communities.

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Region, country or territory
litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres	Unit
											OCEANIA
											Australia
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1991
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1992
?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1993
											Total region
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1989
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1990
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1991
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1992
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1993
											WORLD TOTAL
4629	6049466	0	2887839	134	4080	°	0	172424	537320	200	1989
23480	1066411	0	899752	5703	18840	2770	2	7385	24829	0	1990
31075	895077	389	1107141	311502	318158	1346	2	2874	64180	1225	1991
41199	829755	0	523259	135902	300506	1113	18	46923	554022	3893	1992
796943	503698	885	220574	124348	204775	1692	74	29103	403727	965	1993

Notes:
 - signifies nil (the report did not include data on seizures of this particular substance for this particular year).
 ? signifies that a statistical report was not furnished.
 ° signifies less than the smallest unit of measurement shown for that substance (for example, less than 1 kilogram).
 n.a. signifies not applicable.

Discrepancies may occur between the sum of the regional total seizure figures and the world total figures because of rounding to whole numbers of the actual quantities seized.

TABLE 4. COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES APPLYING A SYSTEM OF AUTHORIZATION TO IMPORTS OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION

(Territories are in italics)

Table I

Country or territory	N-acetylthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P *	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Argentina	Y		Y	Y				Y			
<i>Aruba</i>											
Australia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bahamas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados		Y	Y	Y		Y		Y		Y	
Bolivia											
Brazil											
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Canada		X	X	X		X		X		X	
Cape Verde		X	X	X		X		X		X	
Colombia											
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X				X		X	
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czech Republic		X									
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt		Y									
European Union **	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gambia		P						P			
<i>Hong Kong</i>		X	X	X						X	
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia											
Iran (Is. Rep. of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan		Y						Y		Y	
Kenya		X								X	
Lao P D Rep.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

TABLE 4. COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES APPLYING A SYSTEM OF AUTHORIZATION TO IMPORTS OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION

(Territories are in italics)

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Country or territory
		Y				Y	Y				Argentina
	Y										<i>Aruba</i>
X		X				X	X				Australia
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Bahamas
Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y				Barbados
Y	Y		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Bolivia
X	X		X								Brazil
											Bulgaria
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Burkina Faso
											Canada
X	X	X	X				X				Cape Verde
X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	Colombia
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	Costa Rica
	Y	Y				Y	Y				Cuba
											Czech Republic
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Ecuador
Y											Egypt
											European Union **
P		P	P								Gambia
X											<i>Hong Kong</i>
		Y				Y	Y				Hungary
Y											Indonesia
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Iran (Is. Rep. of)
						Y					Japan
											Kenya
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Lao P D Rep.

TABLE 4. COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES APPLYING A SYSTEM OF AUTHORIZATION TO IMPORTS OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION

(Territories are in *italics*)

Table I

Country or territory	N-acetylanthranilic acid *	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole *	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P *	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal *	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole *
Malawi		X		X							
Malaysia		X	X							X	
Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico		Y	Y	Y		Y				Y	
Myanmar											
Nepal		X	X	X				X		X	
Nigeria		X	X	X		X		X		X	
Pakistan	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Paraguay		Y						Y			
Peru											
Philippines		Y								Y	
Poland								Y			
Rep. of Korea		X	X	X		X				X	
Romania		X		X							
Russian Federation ***	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Singapore		X								X	
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Thailand		Y	Y	Y						Y	
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay		Y									
Venezuela											

* Included in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention in 1992.

** Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.

*** It is understood that the legislation and control measures of the Russian Federation are also valid in Belarus.

TABLE 4. COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES APPLYING A SYSTEM OF AUTHORIZATION TO IMPORTS OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION

(Territories are in *italics*)

Table II

Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid *	Methyl ethyl ketone *	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate *	Sulphuric acid *	Toluene *	Country or territory
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Madagascar
											Malawi
X											Malaysia
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Malta
							Y				Mexico
X	X	X	X			X	X				Myanmar
											Nepal
X	X	X	X			X	X				Nigeria
X	X										Pakistan
	Y			Y			Y				Paraguay
	Y		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Peru
											Philippines
X			X								Poland
											Rep. of Korea
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Romania
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Russian Federation ***
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Saudi Arabia
X				X					X		Singapore
											Sweden
											Thailand
Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Turkey
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	United States of America
											Uruguay
	Y		Y	Y					Y		Venezuela

NOTES: p signifies import of the substance is prohibited.
x signifies importer needs a license, or individual import authorization is required; it is not always clear which.
y signifies individual import authorization is required.
The absence of an entry signifies that the Board is not aware of any relevant regulation.

TABLE 5. COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES FOR WHICH AUTHORIZATIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR EXPORTS FROM COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION *

Country or territory	Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid **	Methyl ethyl ketone **	Potassium permanganate **	Sulphuric acid **	Toluene **	Country or territory
Argentina		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Argentina
Bolivia		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Bolivia
Brazil		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Brazil
Chile		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Chile
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Colombia
Costa Rica		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Costa Rica
Ecuador		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Ecuador
El Salvador		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	El Salvador
Guatemala	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Guatemala
Honduras		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Honduras
<i>Hong Kong</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	<i>Hong Kong</i>
India	X								India
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	X	X	X	X					Iran (Islamic Rep. of)
Lebanon	X	X	X	X					Lebanon
Malaysia	X								Malaysia
Myanmar	X	X	X	X					Myanmar
Panama		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Panama
Paraguay		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Paraguay
Peru		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Peru
Singapore	X	X	X	X					Singapore
Syrian Arab Republic	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Thailand
Turkey	X	X	X	X					Turkey
Uruguay		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Uruguay

* Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.

** Included in Table II of the 1988 Convention in 1992.

The Secretary-General has transmitted a communication to Governments concerning the requirement for pre-export notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, which provides that:

"... upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country:

- (i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee;
- (ii) Name of the substance in Table I;
- (iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;
- (iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
- (v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties."

Countries that have requested pre-export notifications under the above provisions are listed alphabetically, followed by the substance(s) to which the provisions should apply, and the date of notification of the request by the Secretary-General.

**TABLE 6. COUNTRIES THAT REQUIRE PRE-EXPORT NOTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAPH 10 (a),
OF THE 1988 CONVENTION**

Notifying countries	Substance to which pre-export notification requirement applies	Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General
Latvia	Ephedrine	27 May 1994

Annex II

**TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTROL OF SUBSTANCES FREQUENTLY
USED IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES**

Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 provides as follows:

"The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, provides as follows:

"The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 contains provisions for the following:

(a) General obligation for parties to take measures to prevent diversion of the substances listed in Table I and Table II and to cooperate with each other to that end (paragraph 1);

(b) Mechanism for amending the scope of control (paragraphs 2-7);

(c) Requirement to take appropriate measures to monitor manufacture and distribution, to which end parties may: control persons and enterprises; control establishments and premises under licence; require permits for such operations; and prevent accumulation of substances in Tables I and II (paragraph 8);

(d) Obligation to monitor international trade to identify suspicious transactions; to provide for seizures; to notify the authorities of the parties concerned in case of suspicious transactions; to require proper labelling and documentation; and to ensure maintenance of such documents for at least two years (paragraph 9);

(e) Mechanism for advance notice of exports of substances in Table I, upon special request (paragraph 10);

(f) Confidentiality of information (paragraph 11);

(g) Reporting by parties to the Board (paragraph 12);

(h) Report of the Board to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (paragraph 13);

(i) Non-applicability of the provisions of article 12 to certain preparations (paragraph 14).

Annex III

**RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AND THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL RELEVANT TO IMPLEMENTATION
OF ARTICLE 12 BY GOVERNMENTS**

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 5 (XXXIV) of 9 May 1991:

"Urges source, transit and receiving States to act together but also independently, particularly with regard to specific activities originating in their territories, by establishing measures whereby the legitimacy of chemical shipments may be determined and those found to be suspicious may be investigated, communicating with each other concerning such shipments and taking the action necessary to prohibit such shipments where there is sufficient evidence that they may be diverted into the illicit traffic" (paragraph 5);

"Urges all States involved in the international commerce of chemicals commonly used in the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly those listed in Tables I and II of the Convention, to support the development of secure and effective means of communication whereby States may promptly transmit and receive relevant information on the legitimacy of specific transactions" (paragraph 6);

The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29 of 30 July 1992:

"Underlines the importance of applying suitable regulatory measures, in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the 1988 Convention, to every stage of the receipt, storage, handling, processing and delivery of precursor and essential chemicals in free ports and free trade zones and in other sensitive areas such as bonded warehouses" (paragraph 2);

"Invites all chemical-manufacturing States to monitor routinely the export trade in precursor and essential chemicals in a way that will enable them to identify changes in export patterns that suggest the diversion of such chemicals into illicit channels" (paragraph 4);

"Invites States in which precursor and essential chemicals are manufactured and States in regions in which narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are illicitly manufactured to establish close cooperation in order to prevent the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals into illicit channels and, if necessary, on a regional basis, to consider the establishment of bilateral agreements or arrangements where appropriate" (paragraph 5);

"Urges States that export chemicals essential to the illicit production of heroin and cocaine, namely acetic anhydride, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, MEK, potassium permanganate, sulphuric acid and toluene, to establish suitable mechanisms to detect and prevent their diversion and illicit trafficking and, where there is a risk of diversion of or illicit trafficking in those substances, to ensure that:

- (a) Exporters of those essential chemicals are identified;
- (b) Exporters of those essential chemicals are required to keep detailed records of all export transactions, including details of ultimate consignees, and to make these available for inspection by the competent authorities;

(c) An export authorization is required in respect of any consignments of commercial quantities of those essential chemicals to any State that has been identified as being concerned by the illicit manufacture of heroin or cocaine on its territory or as sensitive as regards the possible diversion of essential chemicals, taking into account the relevant reports of the International Narcotics Control Board, the Customs Cooperation Council and the International Criminal Police Organization;

(d) Applicants for export authorizations are required to provide full details of ultimate consignees and transport arrangements;

(e) The competent authorities, in considering applications for export authorizations, take reasonable steps to verify the legitimacy of transactions, in consultation, where appropriate, with their counterparts in importing countries" (paragraph 6);

"Recommends that, if permitted by the basic principles of their legal systems, States should strengthen law enforcement cooperation by applying the technique of controlled delivery at the international level in appropriate circumstances to suspect consignments of precursor and essential chemicals" (paragraph 7);

"Invites Governments to establish close cooperation with the chemical industry with a view to identifying suspicious transactions of precursor and essential chemicals and, where appropriate, to encourage the industry to establish codes of conduct to complement and enhance compliance with regulatory requirements" (paragraph 16).

The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1993/40:

"Calls upon all Governments, which were invited by the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29, to establish effective measures to implement article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, to take fully into consideration the recommendations contained in the final report of the Chemical Action Task Force" (paragraph 1);


"Urges Governments to consider fully and, where appropriate, to apply the guidelines disseminated by the Programme, which have been prepared for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals" (paragraph 9).

Annex IV

**TABLES I AND II SUBSTANCES AND THEIR TYPICAL USE IN THE
ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES**


The scheduled substances and their use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances depicted in figures I and II below represent traditional production and manufacturing methods. The extraction of cocaine from the coca leaf and the purification of coca paste and the crude base products of cocaine and heroin require solvents, acids and bases. A wide range of such chemicals has been used at all stages of drug production.

Figure I. Manufacture of cocaine and heroin



Note: The figures shown in parentheses are the approximate quantities of chemicals required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of cocaine or heroin hydrochloride.

Figure II. Manufacture of psychotropic substances



a) 3,4-MDP-2-P=3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. Figures given are the respective quantities of safrole, isosafrole and piperonal required for the manufacture of 100 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P. 250 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDA hydrochloride; 125 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDMA or MDEA.

b) MDA=3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine; MDMA=3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine.

c) Anthranilic acid is converted to *N*-acetylanthranilic acid using acetic anhydride. 100 kilograms of anthranilic acid reacted with 100 litres of acetic anhydride will produce sufficient *N*-acetylanthranilic acid to manufacture 100 kilograms of methaqualone.

d) Approximately 5 kilograms of ergometrine or ergotamine, or 1.5 kilograms of lysergic acid, are required for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of LSD. 2.5 kilograms of ergometrine or ergotamine are required to manufacture 1 kg of lysergic acid.

e) 100 kilograms of piperidine is required to manufacture 100 kilograms of phencyclidine.

f) Between 200 litres and 400 litres of P-2-P are required for the manufacture of 100 kilograms of amphetamine sulphate. 100 litres of P-2-P can be manufactured from 200 kilograms of phenylacetic acid.

g) 150 kilograms of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine are required for the manufacture of 100 kilograms of methamphetamine.

h) The manufacture of drug salts requires solvents such as acetone or ethyl ether and acids such as hydrochloric acid or sulphuric acid.

Note: Unless otherwise stated, the figures given are the approximate quantities of precursors required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of drug salt.

COMPARATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEIZURES OF PRECURSORS

Figures I and II above outline the typical use of precursors in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The numbers shown in parentheses in Figures I and II are the approximate quantities of precursors required for illicit drug manufacture. These data may be used to calculate how much drug could be manufactured from a known quantity of seized precursor.

To assess the significance of such manufacture in terms of drug doses on the illicit market, the table below gives details of typical street doses of some narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, together with the approximate number of such doses that may be manufactured illicitly from one kilogram (or one litre) of the relevant precursor.

Street doses of drugs manufactured illicitly using precursors

<i>Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance</i>	<i>Street dose^{a/}</i>	<i>Precursor</i>	<i>Number of street doses of drugs manufactured using 1 kilogram (or litre) of precursor</i>
Amphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Phenylacetic acid (kilograms)	1 000 to 25 000
		1-Phenyl-2-propanone (litres)	2 000 to 50 000
Cocaine	100 mg to 200 mg	Potassium permanganate (kilograms)	25 000 to 50 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	250 to 500
Heroin	100 mg	Acetic anhydride (litres)	4 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	500
LSD	50 µg to 80 µg	Ergometrine/ergotamine (kilograms)	2 500 000 to 4 000 000
		Lysergic acid (kilograms)	8 500 000 to 13 000 000
Methamphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Ephedrine/pseudoephedrine (kilograms)	2 500 to 70 000
Methaqualone	250 mg	Anthranilic acid (kilograms)	4 000
		N-Acetylanthranilic acid (kilograms)	3 200
MDA and analogues	100 mg	Safrole (kilograms)	1 000 ^{b/}
		Isosafrole (kilograms)	2 100 ^{b/}
		Piperonal (kilograms)	5 000 ^{b/}
		3,4-MDP-2-P (litres)	4 000 ^{b/}
Phencyclidine	1 mg to 10 mg	Piperidine (kilograms)	100 000 to 1 000 000

^{a/}Doses may vary depending, *inter alia*, on the route of administration (by mouth, injection, inhalation etc.) and on the frequency of drug use.

^{b/}For illicit manufacture of MDA. The numbers of street doses of MDMA or MDEA that could be manufactured are approximately twice the figures given.

Using the data given in figures I and II and in the above table, it can be seen that, for example, 1 kilogram of ephedrine may be used for the manufacture of approximately 0.7 kilogram of methamphetamine. This quantity of drug is equivalent to a maximum of about 70,000 street doses.

Similarly, 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be used to manufacture approximately 0.7 kilogram of LSD. This quantity of drug, however, is equivalent to about 10 million dosage units.

Therefore, in terms of the availability of the two drugs on the illicit market, the seizure of 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be considered to have an impact approximately 150 times greater than the seizure of the same quantity of ephedrine (10 million divided by 70,000).

The International Narcotics Control Board consists of 13 members who serve in their personal capacities and not as government representatives. Its main responsibilities under the international drug control treaties are to endeavour, in cooperation with Governments: (a) to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and utilization of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to the amounts necessary for medical and scientific purposes; (b) to ensure that the quantities of those substances necessary for legitimate purposes are available; and (c) to prevent the illicit cultivation, production, manufacture of, trafficking in and use of those substances. Moreover, with the entry into force of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, the Board has specific responsibilities related to the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

In the discharge of its responsibilities, the Board:

(a) Administers an estimates system for narcotic drugs and a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances, and monitors international trade in drugs through the statistical returns system, with a view to assisting Governments in achieving, *inter alia*, a balance between supply and demand;

(b) Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments to prevent diversion of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and assesses such substances for possible change in the scope of control of Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention;

(c) Analyses information provided by Governments, United Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other competent international organizations, with a view to ensuring that the provisions of the international drug control treaties are adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends necessary remedial measures;

(d) Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to assist them in complying with their obligations under the international drug control treaties and recommends, where appropriate, technical or financial assistance to be provided to that end.

The Board meets at least twice a year. Each year, it issues a report on its work, supplemented by technical reports on narcotic drugs, on psychotropic substances, and on precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

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