



International Narcotics  
Control Board

1998

# Precursors

and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture  
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

INCB

**EMBARGO**

Observe release date:  
Not to be published or broadcast before  
Tuesday, 23 February 1999,  
0900 hours (GMT)

**CAUTION**



UNITED NATIONS

## REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD IN 1998

The *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1998* (E/INCB/1998/1) is supplemented by the following technical reports:

*Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 1999; Statistics for 1997* (E/INCB/1998/2)

*Psychotropic Substances: Statistics for 1997; Assessments of Medical and Scientific Requirements for Substances in Schedules II, III and IV* (E/INCB/1998/3)

*Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1998 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (E/INCB/1998/4)

The updated lists of substances under international control, comprising narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, are contained in the latest editions of the annexes to the statistical forms ("Yellow List", "Green List" and "Red List"), which are also issued by the Board.

### CONTACTING THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

The secretariat of the Board may be reached at the following address:

Vienna International Centre  
Room E-1339  
P.O. Box 500  
A-1400 Vienna  
Austria

In addition, the following may be used to contact the secretariat:

Telephone:	(43 1) 26060
Telex:	135612
Fax:	(43 1) 26060-5867/26060-5868
Cables:	unations vienna
E-mail:	secretariat@incb.org

The text of the present report is also available on the Internet at the following location: <http://www.incb.org>.



INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

# Precursors

and chemicals frequently used in the  
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and  
psychotropic substances

Report of the  
International Narcotics Control Board for 1998  
on the Implementation of Article 12  
of the United Nations Convention  
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and  
Psychotropic Substances of 1988



UNITED NATIONS  
New York, 1999

E/INCB/1998/4

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION  
Sales No. E.99.XI.4  
ISBN 92-1-148108-2

---

## Preface

The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,<sup>a</sup> article 12, paragraph 13, provides that the International Narcotics Control Board “shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this article and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Tables I and II”.

In addition to its annual report and other technical publications (*Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*), the Board has decided to publish its report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in accordance with the following provisions contained in article 23 of that Convention.

“1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the information at its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Parties, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. The Board may make such additional reports as it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission which may make such comments as it sees fit.

2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution.”

---

<sup>a</sup> *Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).

### Explanatory notes

The following abbreviations have been used in this report:

INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
LSD	lysergic acid diethylamide
MDA	methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDMA	methylenedioxymethamphetamine
3,4-MDP-2-P	3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
MEK	methyl ethyl ketone
MIBK	methyl isobutyl ketone
P-2-P	1-phenyl-2-propanone

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

## Contents

	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
Introduction .....	1-4	1
I. Framework for precursor control and action taken by Governments .....	5-93	1
A. Twentieth special session of the General Assembly .....	5-8	1
B. Status of adherence to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and reporting by Governments under article 12 .....	9-34	2
1. Status of the 1988 Convention .....	9-11	2
2. Reporting to the Board under article 12 .....	12-18	2
3. Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention .....	19-34	4
C. Findings from cases of diversion and attempted diversion and actions taken to prevent diversion, including proposals for further action .....	35-69	6
1. Examination of actions taken by Governments related to cases of diversion and attempted diversion .....	36-42	6
2. Findings from actions taken, reviewed by substance .....	43-54	8
3. Findings from other actions taken by Governments and by the Board and proposals for further action .....	55-69	11
D. Scope of control .....	70-93	13
1. Assessment of phenylpropanolamine for possible inclusion in Table I of the 1988 Convention .....	73-83	14
2. The limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances, and proposals for action by Governments .....	84-93	16
II. Analysis of data on seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors and trends in illicit manufacture of drugs .....	94-135	17
A. Overview .....	94-100	17
B. Trends in the illicit traffic in precursors and the illicit manufacture of drugs .....	101-135	18
1. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine .....	101-105	18
2. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin .....	106-111	19
3. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants .....	112-121	20
4. Use of non-scheduled substances in illicit drug manufacture, the illicit manufacture of precursors and the availability of designer drugs .....	122-135	22

## Annexes

	<i>Page</i>
I. Tables .....	28
1. Parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention .....	28
2. Submission of information by Governments pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention (Form D) for the years 1993-1997 .....	33
3. Seizures of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board .....	39
3a. Seizures of substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board .....	41
3b. Seizures of substances in Table II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board. ....	49
4. Submission of information by Governments on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. ....	57
5. Governments that have requested pre-export notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention .....	62
II. Substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and their typical use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances .....	64
A. List of scheduled substances .....	64
B. Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances .....	64
C. Comparative significance of seizures of precursors .....	69
<i>Table. Street doses of drugs manufactured illicitly using precursors</i> .....	69
III. Treaty provisions for the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances .....	71
IV. Resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly relevant to implementation by Governments of article 12 of the 1988 Convention .....	72
V. Summary of the recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board relevant to implementation by Governments of article 12 of the 1988 Convention .....	84
A. Legislation and specific control measures .....	84
B. Identifying competent authorities responsible for implementation of article 12 .....	86
C. Providing the Board with details of control measures applied by Governments .....	86
D. Collection of data and their provision to the Board .....	86
E. Information exchange .....	87
F. Follow-up actions after discovery of the illicit manufacture of drugs .....	90

## Figures

	<i>Page</i>
I. Status of adherence to the 1988 Convention .....	3
II. Accession to the 1988 Convention: States parties and non-parties by region .....	4
III. Communication links .....	6
IV. Number of cases of prevented diversion and number of shipments involved, as reported to the Board for the years 1994-1997 .....	7
V. Number of cases of prevented diversion and number of shipments involved, as reported by Governments as of 1 November 1998 .....	7
VI. Number of cases of prevented diversion and diversion, by substance, as reported to the Board since 1994 .....	8
VII. Number of cases of prevented diversion and diversion of substances listed in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention .....	8
VIII. Quantities of potassium permanganate prevented from diversion, 1995-1998 .....	9
IX. Number of cases of prevented diversion and quantities of P-2-P involved, 1994-1997 .....	9
X. Number of cases of, and quantities involved in, prevented diversion of precursors for MDMA and related drugs, 1994-1997 .....	10
XI. Number of cases of prevented diversion, number of shipments and quantities of ephedrine involved, 1994-1997 .....	10
XII. Number of cases of diversion, number of shipments and quantities of ephedrine involved, 1994-1997 .....	11
XIII. Some cases of diversion and attempted diversion of cocaine chemicals .....	19
XIV. Cases of diversion and attempted diversion of, and trafficking in, acetic anhydride .....	20
XV. Some cases of attempted diversion of, or trafficking in, precursors for amphetamine and MDMA .....	21
XVI. Some cases of diversion and attempted diversion of ephedrines .....	23
XVII. Use of non-scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of drugs .....	25
XVIII. Illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin .....	65
XIX. Illicit manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine .....	66
XX. Illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs .....	67
XXI. Illicit manufacture of LSD, methaqualone and phencyclidine .....	68



## Introduction

1. In exercising its functions under the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,<sup>1</sup> the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing systems to facilitate practical cooperation between Governments and with the Board, and stressed that a concerted effort is required by all Governments to prevent traffickers from exploiting as points of diversion those countries and territories where controls currently in place are inadequate. To that end, the Board, over the years, has made specific recommendations for concrete action to be taken in precursor<sup>2</sup> control, pursuant to its mandate under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. In particular, as timely information exchange is the key to precursor control, it has focused on assisting Governments in building up working mechanisms and standard operating procedures that competent national authorities should establish among themselves, and also with the Board and other competent international bodies, for sharing and checking information on shipments of substances included in the Tables of the 1988 Convention.

2. The Board continues to note successes in preventing diversions of precursors from licit channels into illicit traffic, as a rapidly increasing number of countries and territories are now systematically verifying the legitimacy of individual shipments. The Board has repeatedly noted in its previous reports that, as a result of those successes, the methods and routes of diversion used by traffickers have become more visible, and that traffickers respond quickly to strengthened controls and exploit vulnerable points in the international control system. In 1997, in continuing to monitor closely the efforts made by competent national authorities to secure the necessary exchange of information, the Board further noted that some Governments had been successful in establishing communication links, while others had yet to do so. Ten years after the adoption of the 1988 Convention, the Board deems it appropriate, and indeed necessary, to initiate a general assessment of the performance of Governments in the implementation of article 12 of the Convention. Its findings so far are reflected in the present report.

3. In 1996, the Board drew the attention of the international community to the fact that it had to establish priorities in undertaking activities under the 1988 Convention, and to defer some of those activities because of the insufficient resources allocated to it. The Board had decided to continue to give the highest priority to assisting Governments in fully implementing the provisions of

article 12; the deferred activities included those related to possible modifications in the scope of control of the 1988 Convention. While staffing resources allocated to it continue to be minimal, the Board was able in 1998 to start its assessment of a substance for possible inclusion in the Tables of the Convention<sup>3</sup> and to establish a limited international special surveillance list of substances, as requested by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1996/29. The details of the findings and recommendations of the Board are also contained in the present report.

4. The Board has, over the years, made a number of specific recommendations for action that Governments should take in order to prevent the diversion of substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. They were based on its examination of uncovered cases of diversion and attempted diversion, and have been endorsed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and, subsequently, by the Economic and Social Council. Having scrutinized also the most recent cases brought to its attention, the Board finds that its recommendations made so far continue to be valid. It further recognizes that Governments may need to take the actions proposed in a progressive manner, reviewing how they should implement each in the light of changing circumstances faced by the competent authorities. The Board therefore invites all Governments to revisit those recommendations with a view to refining the controls currently exercised. It also invites all competent authorities to provide it with any feedback from their experiences in applying the actions proposed. Annex V to the present report contains an updated summary of those recommendations. The Board wishes to reiterate that it stands ready, within its treaty functions, to assist competent national authorities in applying the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention and effectively preventing diversion of substances in Tables I and II into the illicit manufacture of drugs.

## I. Framework for precursor control and action taken by Governments

### A. Twentieth special session of the General Assembly

5. The General Assembly, at its twentieth special session, held in June 1998, adopted resolution S-20/4 B on the control of precursors. The Board welcomes that resolution, which highlights the increased interest by

Governments in finding mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention. A key theme of the resolution is the need for concerted and uniform application, by all Governments, of the provisions of article 12, strict compliance with the provisions and proposals of relevant resolutions of the Commission and the Council and implementation of the recommendations of the Board relating to precursor control.

6. Under the resolution, a primary measure for the exchange of information on substances in Table I is extended to specific substances in Table II, namely acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate, which are key chemicals for the illicit manufacture of heroin and cocaine, respectively. Governments have agreed to provide some form of pre-export notice not only for all substances in Table I, but also, upon request to the Secretary-General by the importing country, for acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate.

7. By endorsing Assembly resolution S-20/4 B, Governments have also moved towards accepting proposals to prevent the diversion of non-scheduled chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and considering as criminal offences, with appropriate sanctions, activities related to such diversion. The latter proposal is of crucial importance to the effectiveness of law enforcement activities. A summary of the main points in the resolution is given in annex IV to the present report.

8. The Board, as part of its functions under article 12, will continue to monitor the progress made by Governments in taking the actions agreed to in Assembly resolution S-20/4 B, and stands ready to assist Governments in their efforts to do so. In particular, it will assist in ensuring that pre-export notices are sent, and that appropriate feedback from importing countries is given to all pre-export notices and specific inquiries.

## **B. Status of adherence to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and reporting by Governments under article 12**

### **1. Status of the 1988 Convention**

9. As of 1 November 1998, the Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by a total of 148 States, and formally confirmed by the European Union (extent of competence: article 12). That represents 77 per cent of all

countries in the world. Since the report of the Board for 1997 on the implementation of article 12 was issued,<sup>4</sup> five States (Georgia, Iraq, Lithuania, Mozambique and Viet Nam) have become parties to the 1988 Convention. Figure I reflects the current status of adherence.

10. The Board notes with satisfaction the high rate of accession to the Convention during the first 10 years since its adoption. That development compares favourably with the rate of accession to the other international drug control treaties, namely, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961<sup>5</sup> (79 States parties by 1971) and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971<sup>6</sup> (74 States parties in 1981). The Board also notes with satisfaction that most of the major manufacturing, exporting and importing countries have already acceded to the 1988 Convention, and that some non-parties, such as South Africa and Switzerland, are taking concrete steps to apply control measures in conformity with the Convention. The Board reiterates its request to all States that have not already done so to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible, and hopes that all Governments, parties and non-parties alike, will put into effect the provisions of article 12 in order to ensure their universal application.

11. In annex I, table 1, the parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention are listed by region. The rates of accession have been as follows: Africa (72 per cent); Americas (100 per cent); Asia (78 per cent); Europe (84 per cent); and Oceania (21 per cent). Figure II below gives the distribution of States parties and non-parties by region.

### **2. Reporting to the Board under article 12**

12. The Board transmits to all Governments, parties and non-parties alike, an annual questionnaire on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, known as Form D.

13. As of 1 November 1998, a total of 104 States and territories, including nine individual member States of the European Union,<sup>7</sup> had submitted Form D for 1997. That represents 50 per cent of the 210 countries and territories requested to provide the information, which is similar to the rate of return in previous years. A total of 54 per cent of all parties submitted data for 1997.

14. The Board notes with regret that the relevant information has not been submitted by the European Union on behalf of its member States. Lack of such data is of particular concern since the European Union is one of the most important chemical trading areas in the world, where

Figure I  
Status of adherence to the 1988 Convention



"The following are non-party States:

Africa: Angola, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and South Africa;

Asia: Cambodia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Israel, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Thailand;

Europe: Albania, Andorra, Estonia, Holy See, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Switzerland;


Oceania: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

significant amounts of psychotropic substances are illicitly manufactured. Without that information, it is difficult to conduct an analysis of data on seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors and on trends in illicit manufacture of drugs.

15. It is also of concern to the Board that a large number of parties, that is, 46 per cent, continue to fail to submit the requisite data, showing that they do not comply with their reporting obligations under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Some States parties, among them Argentina, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala,

Iceland, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Republic of Moldova, Senegal, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, have not provided Form D for the last two or more years. The Board urges all countries that have not yet done so, as well as the European Union, to submit, as soon as possible, the information required under article 12 of the Convention. The Board reiterates that the timely and comprehensive reporting of information to the Board as required by the 1988 Convention is the basis for the effective functioning of the international

Figure II  
**Accession to the 1988 Convention: States parties and non-parties by region**



*Note:* In addition, the European Union has formally confirmed the 1988 Convention (extent of competence: article 12).

precursor control system, as well as an indicator of the existence of adequate mechanisms to monitor precursors and of appropriate coordination within Governments for data collection.

16. In contrast, the Board noted with appreciation that Form D has been submitted by a number of non-parties (17). It was also noted that certain parties (the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Slovakia, Suriname and the Syrian Arab Republic) and several non-parties (Estonia, Solomon Islands and Thailand) which had not submitted reports to the Board for two or more years, furnished Form D for 1997.

17. The submission of information to the Board as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention for the years from 1993 to 1997 is reflected in annex I, table 2.

18. The Board has noted that a smaller number of Governments (27), as compared with previous years, have reported seizures of precursors in 1997. Some States, all of them parties to the Convention (Argentina, China, India, Pakistan and Ukraine), have informed the Board of isolated seizures effected during 1997, but did not submit

any collated data on Form D. The Board is grateful to the countries concerned for the data submitted. At the same time, the Board wishes to remind those Governments that reporting to the Board of data related to seizures, methods and routes of diversion and illicit drug manufacture in the form and manner provided for by the Board is a treaty obligation. As stated in paragraph 15 above, lack of such reporting may indicate that appropriate coordination mechanisms within Governments are not yet in place.

### 3. Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention

19. Since 1995, the Board, in accordance with Council resolution 1995/20, has requested the provision, on Form D, of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for scheduled substances. The submission of such information is reflected in annex I, table 4.

20. When systems for collecting and reporting relevant information are in place, Governments are in a position to report both on licit trade in and on uses of and requirements for precursors. The Board is therefore pleased to note that 29 Governments have reported data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for such substances in each of the last three years (1995-1997), and that the number of parties and non-parties that do so is growing: as of 1 November 1998, a total of 64 countries and territories had reported such data for 1997.

21. The Board has noted that the European Commission, acting on behalf of the States members of the European Union, and some of those individual member States are still not in a position to provide the requested information on licit trade in precursors, although 9 of the 15 States members of the European Union supplied information. The Board would welcome any positive development in that direction.

22. On Form D for 1997, France reported that it could not provide data on licit commerce for reasons of confidentiality. Other European countries have not faced similar problems with confidential information, or have found practical solutions where necessary. The Board stresses that reported commercial data are kept confidential if so requested. In addition, it wishes to reiterate that the protection of commercial secrets should not be allowed to benefit traffickers by becoming an obstacle to the prevention of diversions. Data on the trade in and uses of scheduled substances are essential to enable Governments to identify discrepancies between exports

and imports and uncover possible cases of diversion. Such data also help them to find areas where strengthening of controls is necessary for the full implementation of the provisions of the Convention.

**(a) Export data**

23. The Board welcomes the fact that many major manufacturing and exporting countries now report export data, either on Form D or separately. Among major trading countries and territories, the Governments of Australia, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)), the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Japan, South Africa, Spain and the United States of America have provided comprehensive information on all their exports of scheduled substances. In addition, China, India, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have reported on exports of some substances.<sup>8</sup>

24. The Board is particularly pleased to note that most of the information required on exports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (precursors used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine) has been made available by major manufacturing and exporting countries known to the Board, and that such information has contributed to the results achieved in preventing diversion (see paras. 52-54 below). The Board now urges all countries and territories export the two substances, as well as transit countries, to provide detailed data, so that a comprehensive picture of worldwide trade in those substances can be drawn.

25. The Board also urges all Governments, in particular those of major manufacturing and exporting countries, to collect and provide to the Board information on their exports of other scheduled substances.

26. More specifically, some of the above-mentioned exporting countries have made available information on exports of precursors for methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and related drugs and on acetic anhydride. That information now needs to be complemented by data from other major manufacturers and exporters of precursors for MDMA and related drugs, particularly those located in Asia (for example, in China, Taiwan Province of China, Indonesia and Viet Nam). As regards major manufacturers of acetic anhydride, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom are invited to do the same for that substance.

27. Limited information is available on exports of 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), a precursor for amphetamine, and potassium permanganate. The Board therefore invites

all countries and territories to collect and provide information on exports of those substances, in particular of P-2-P to Europe (because of the large-scale illicit manufacture of amphetamine in the region) and potassium permanganate to Latin America.

**(b) Data on imports of and licit requirements for specific substances**

28. The Board welcomes the fact that a number of Governments have provided data on imports and licit requirements, including, in particular, Governments in areas where illicit manufacture exists, or in transit areas, and invites other Governments to follow suit. As a first step, such data can be collected for substances of major concern, determined by the cases of diversion and attempted diversion known to have occurred in the region, as reflected in chapter II of the present report.

29. In Europe, cases of diversion or attempted diversion following imports of precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants have been uncovered.<sup>9</sup> The Board appreciates that many Governments in eastern Europe that have only recently established a legislative basis for precursor control have supplied data on imports of and licit requirements for those substances.<sup>10</sup> It now urges all European countries that have not already done so, and that could become vulnerable to the risk of diversion of those substances if they remain unaware of actual imports that could subsequently be trans-shipped through Europe, to collect such data and provide it to the Board.

30. Traffickers have used countries in all regions as transit points in the attempt to divert ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. The Board therefore urges all Governments to provide data on import of and approximate licit requirements for those substances.

31. In addition, since abuse of ephedrine is believed to take place in many countries in west Africa, exports to all African countries should be carefully screened. The Board therefore encourages all African countries, particularly those in west Africa, to ensure the early provision of data on imports of and requirements for those substances.<sup>11</sup>

32. For acetic anhydride, the Board invites countries in Asia and eastern Europe to provide such data. It also invites Governments in Latin America, and in particular Colombia and Mexico where illicit manufacture of heroin is known to occur, to collect such data and provide it to the Board.<sup>12</sup>

33. For potassium permanganate, the Board encourages Governments in Latin America<sup>13</sup> to provide data on

imports of and approximate licit requirements for that substance in the future, and, where they cannot do so because of a lack of the necessary systems for data collection and reporting, to put in place the required mechanisms.

34. In that connection, the Board notes with appreciation that some Governments are collecting data on past imports and approximate licit requirements from legitimate industries and government agencies, such as central statistical services and customs authorities, and trusts that other Governments will follow suit.

### C. Findings from cases of diversion and attempted diversion and actions taken to prevent diversion, including proposals for further action

35. The following sections give an account of the findings of the Board from cases of diversion and attempted diversion so far brought to its attention. It will be noted that, where recommended actions were put into

effect, particularly those related to the exchange of information, diversions were prevented or uncovered. The Board continues to promote such exchange, since it considers that timely sharing of information is the key to effective precursor control. The flow of information and the communication links necessary for the effective exchange of information are reflected in figure III.

#### 1. Examination of actions taken by Governments related to cases of diversion and attempted diversion

36. The Board has examined the cases<sup>14</sup> of diversion and attempted diversion of scheduled chemicals reported to it by Governments since 1994. Since that time, and as of 1 November 1998, the Board has been made aware of 126 cases of prevented diversion and 10 cases of identified diversion. Figure IV shows the number of cases of prevented diversion, including the number of shipments involved, as reported to the Board for the period 1994-1997. Figure V reflects the action taken by individual Governments under the 1988 Convention in preventing diversion and in reporting to the Board data on cases of diversion and attempted diversion, as of 1 November 1998.

Figure III  
Communication links




Figure IV  
Number of cases of prevented diversion and number of shipments involved, as reported to the Board for the years 1994-1997





Figure V  
Number of cases of prevented diversion and number of shipments involved, as reported by Governments as of 1 November 1998



#### (a) Communications about individual transactions

37. In most of the known cases of attempted diversion, Governments have prevented the diversion by exchanging information, prior to shipment, with the competent authorities of other countries in verifying the legitimacy of individual transactions. In 50 cases (about 40 per cent of the cases reported to it during the past five years), the Board has assisted Governments in such verification.

38. The review of cases confirms that, in the absence of apparent suspicion, pre-export notices are among the most effective means of preventing diversion. For example, about one sixth of the successfully prevented diversions have been identified as a result of some form of pre-export notice having been sent, on a regular basis, by the competent authorities of some exporting countries. Many of the countries that have had sent pre-export notices have done so without formal request from importing countries; they were able to do so even when there were no mandatory requirements for export authorizations for the specific substances involved.

39. In addition, cases of attempted diversion have been identified following specific inquiries by exporting countries because of suspicions concerning the destination or routing of shipments. The Governments of those exporting countries have stopped a number of shipments because their suspicious nature was confirmed through the use of various forms and means of checking their legitimacy with the authorities in the country of destination.

40. A large number of cases, especially those reported by Germany and the United Kingdom, have been discovered after industry had alerted the authorities to suspicious orders for controlled chemicals by reporting on, for instance, unknown customers, or unusual packing or payment instructions, mode of transportation or quantities that seemed to exceed possible legitimate needs. Verification with the countries of destination had confirmed the suspicion, and shipments have been stopped.

41. Pre-export notices or inquiries on individual transactions have enabled the competent authorities of importing countries to verify the legitimacy of those transactions and to identify attempted diversions. Even when importing countries do not yet have systems of control, they are able, when contacted about specific transactions, to verify their legitimacy by ascertaining, for instance, whether the importing companies exist, whether they have licit needs for the substance etc. Such checks, promptly conducted, were effective, as traffickers often used "front" companies

created solely to sell chemicals to drug traffickers, placed orders in the name of legitimate companies, and falsified import certificates or end-user declarations. In more than one third of the total cases, when traffickers tried to use complex routing to disguise the final destination (or shipped the chemicals to countries with less strict controls), such an exchange of communications has prevented diversion attempts.

**(b) Alerts to Governments to prevent diversion**

42. In a number of cases, the competent authorities of exporting countries have been made aware by other Governments, often through the Board, of previously uncovered cases of diversion and attempted diversion. The details of previous cases (substances and companies involved, methods and routes of diversion) have helped the authorities to identify the suspicious character of the proposed transactions. The Board therefore notes with satisfaction the growing number of Governments providing alerts, including on the standard form established by the Board (see also para. 55 below), and urges all competent national authorities to communicate details of cases identified to the Board and to other countries that may be targeted. The growing awareness of the importance of alerts by Governments to prevent diversion is shown by the fact that most cases that were uncovered after the delivery of alerts have happened in the last two years.

**2. Findings from actions taken, reviewed by substance**


43. Figure VI shows the distribution of cases, by substance. For the past five years, Governments have identified more cases of attempted diversion or diversion involving substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention than those in Table II (see figure VII). Among prevented diversions, 74 involved substances in Table I, and 52 involved substances in Table II.

**(a) Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine**


44. Of the 52 cases of prevented diversion of substances in Table II, 22 have been reported by the United States of America. In particular, from 1994 to 1997, the United States has stopped 1,300 tons of methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) destined to Colombia, 800 tons of acetone going to Brazil and Honduras, and 1,670 tons of toluene intended for Guatemala and Honduras. Those quantities combined (3,770 tons) would have been sufficient for the illicit

manufacture of up to 250 tons of cocaine. In addition, Belgium, Germany, South Africa and the United Kingdom have reported some stopped shipments of acids and solvents destined to Latin America.

**Figure VI**  
Number of cases of prevented diversion and diversion, by substance, as reported to the Board since 1994




**Figure VII**  
Number of cases of prevented diversion and diversion of substances listed in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention



45. Although the number of uncovered cases involving potassium permanganate is relatively small, the quantities of the substance prevented from diversion in 1997 and 1998 have increased, as shown in figure VIII. Several seizures of large shipments of potassium permanganate, effected by the United States in 1998, account for most of the increase reported for that year.

Figure VIII  
Quantities of potassium permanganate prevented from diversion, 1995-1998

(kilograms)



\* As of 1 November 1998.

**(b) Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin**

46. The total quantity of acetic anhydride prevented from diversion in 22 cases known to the Board for the period 1994-1998 is 824 tons. That quantity would have been sufficient to make 330 tons of heroin. The Board welcomes the actions by Governments that led to those results. Of those cases, 15 were attempted exports from countries in Europe, destined either to south-west Asia or to countries in central and eastern Europe through which they were to be trans-shipped. Most of the shipments (10 of which were proposed exports from States members of the European Union) were destined to other countries

not included in the list of "sensitive destinations" as defined by the European Union.<sup>15</sup>


47. The Board continues to be concerned about the lack of knowledge of the trafficking situation for chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin in Mexico and the Andean region, since practically no seizures of the chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin have been reported by the countries concerned.

**(c) Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants**

*Amphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants related to MDMA (Ecstasy)*

48. The total quantity of P-2-P involved in the known cases of prevented diversion since 1994 amounts to 84,500 kilograms, which would have been sufficient to manufacture up to 40 tons of amphetamine (see figure IX). The destination of most of the shipments was Europe.

Figure IX  
Number of cases of prevented diversion and quantities of P-2-P involved, 1994-1997




49. Many European countries, especially within the European Union, are still not in a position to monitor shipments of P-2-P imported into their territories. The

Board welcomes the steps now being taken by the European Commission to address that situation.

50. The situation with regard to precursors for the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs is similar. As the Board noted in its report for 1997, there has been a major increase in the number of cases of, and the quantities involved in, prevented diversion since 1996 (see figure X). The precursors prevented from diversion (47,500 kilograms) would have produced about 25,000 kilograms of the drugs.

Figure X  
Number of cases of, and quantities involved in, prevented diversion of precursors for MDMA and related drugs,<sup>a</sup> 1994-1997



<sup>a</sup> 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, piperonal and safrole.


51. As in the case of precursors for amphetamine, most of the shipments involved were destined to the European region. However, attempted diversions to or through other countries, including Ghana, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Suriname, Thailand and Zimbabwe, have been uncovered. The Board further notes that there are many major exporting countries in various parts of the world, and that

the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs is reportedly spreading (see chapter II).

*Methamphetamine*

52. The amount of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine prevented from diversion in the cases known to the Board is 200 tons, which would have produced more than 130 tons of methamphetamine (see figure XI).

Figure XI.  
Number of cases of prevented diversion, number of shipments and quantities of ephedrine involved, 1994-1997




53. Governments have prevented the diversion of increasing quantities of ephedrine. The quantities of ephedrine diverted have decreased (see figure XII), while the number of shipments has remained approximately the same (see figure XI). The Governments of Australia, China (Hong Kong SAR) and the Czech Republic have reported shortages of ephedrine for use by traffickers in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, as greater amounts have been prevented from diversion into illicit channels.

54. The following table shows how different regions were involved in diversions of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

**Number of cases of diversion and attempted diversion of ephedrine by region of destination, 1994-1997**

Destination	Number of cases			
	1994	1995	1996	1997
Africa		1		2
Americas				
North	2	4	3	
Central		3		1
South			1	2
Asia			4	5
Europe		2	2	1

**Figure XII**  
**Number of cases of diversion, number of shipments and quantities of ephedrine involved, 1994-1997**



**3. Findings from other actions taken by Governments and by the Board and proposals for further action**

**(a) Use of a standard form for exchange of information**

55. The Board notes that several countries are currently using the standard form developed by the Board with input

from various countries to facilitate effective communication of pre-export notices, inquiries about shipments of concern, the provision of information about stopped shipments and alerts to other Governments, and to provide follow-up to inquiries. The form was made available to Governments in all of the official languages of the United Nations in January 1998. The Board invites other Governments to utilize the form for the purposes indicated, to the extent that their national legislation and administrative frameworks allow.

**(b) Actions being taken by Governments in line with General Assembly resolution S-20/4 B**

*Exchange of Information*

56. The Board notes with satisfaction that an ever-increasing number of Governments of chemical-exporting and -importing and transit countries are using some form of pre-export notices to inform Governments of importing countries of shipments destined to their territory. For example, the Board has been informed that States members of the European Union now regularly provide pre-export notices for all transactions involving substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention and for substances in Table II when destined to "sensitive areas".

57. The Board has proposed that exporting countries send pre-export notices of some sort, regardless of whether they were formally requested to do so by the importing countries. However, the Board also understands that some exporting countries, if they are to provide pre-export notices on a regular basis under their current laws and regulations, find it helpful if importing countries officially request the provision of such notices. To facilitate such an exchange of information, the Board therefore urges all Governments of importing countries to request pre-export notifications for substances in Table I by invoking article 12, paragraph 10 (a) of the 1988 Convention. Only nine Governments have so far invoked that provision (see annex I, table 5). Of those, four countries and a territory have also requested pre-export notifications for substances in Table II of the Convention, including acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate. The Board hopes that as a result of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly, more Governments will follow suit.

58. Exporting countries should similarly consider requesting pre-export notifications where substances in Tables I and II are imported for subsequent re-export. As the Board has repeatedly noted in its previous reports, circuitous routes involving imports and re-exports through

third countries have always been used by traffickers in their attempt to divert precursors into illicit channels. Some form of pre-export notice will serve all Governments as an effective tool for monitoring precursor shipments into and out of their territories.

59. Finally, for pre-export notices to be effective in preventing diversion, timely feedback should be given by the importing countries concerned, confirming that they have no objection to the transactions in question, or otherwise requesting the authorities of the exporting countries to take appropriate action. Where such feedback is not immediately feasible, the countries concerned should individually agree on appropriate modalities to maintain the exchange of information; a number of Governments have done so.

#### *Substitute chemicals*

60. The General Assembly, in its resolution S-20/4 B, also promoted the monitoring of non-scheduled substances that may be used as substitutes for the substances included in the Tables of the 1988 Convention, to prevent the diversion of those substances from legitimate channels into illicit manufacture. The Board is therefore pleased to note that the European Parliament is considering steps to revise the current legislation established by the European Community for precursor control and to establish close cooperation between the competent authorities and industry in order to identify unusual transactions involving non-scheduled substances and to prevent their diversion.

#### **(c) Penal and administrative sanctions for precursor-related activities**

61. The Board has become aware that some parties have not yet established as a criminal offence, liable to sanctions which take into account the grave nature of the offences, as required under the terms of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the manufacture, transport or distribution of substances included in the Tables of the Convention, knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The Board has further become aware that some Governments have no sanctions for non-compliance with the laws or regulations for monitoring the licit movement of those substances. In the first case, Governments do not implement the provisions of the 1988 Convention; in the latter case, their national laws for the monitoring of precursors cannot be enforced.

62. The Board has therefore contacted Governments of major chemical-exporting and -importing and transit countries and territories and requested information on the following points:

(a) Whether offences have been established under relevant national laws in relation to article 3 of the 1988 Convention and, as appropriate, whether associated penal sanctions apply to those offences;

(b) Whether sanctions are applied to non-compliance with the laws and regulations as such, even if there is no suspicion of intended use in illicit manufacture;

(c) Whether cases of non-compliance have been identified, either where there was known intent to use the substances in question in illicit manufacture, or where the offence arose only from non-compliance as such, and, if so, what sanctions have been applied in those cases.

63. From the replies received so far, the Board notes that most Governments have provisions in their national laws for sanctions in accordance with article 3 of the 1988 Convention, and many also have such provisions for non-compliance with relevant rules and regulations for the monitoring of precursors where the intended use was not known. However, a number of countries that have had the relevant laws in place for several years, including some countries in which cases of diversion and attempted diversion had been identified, have reported that no cases of non-compliance with those laws have been detected. The Board is concerned about that fact, since it might show inadequate monitoring of the implementation of the relevant laws.

64. The Board wishes therefore to remind all Governments that adequate sanctions should be provided for under their national legislation. As an interim measure, and subject to their legal systems, Governments may consider applying sanctions for activities related to the improper handling of the substances concerned, including actual diversion, on the basis of their existing legislation concerning intentional participation in, or conspiracy or attempts to engage in, the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, in accordance with article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and article 22 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. It wishes also to re-emphasize the importance of applying, especially in cases of wilful or repeated non-compliance, sanctions designed to act as a deterrent to criminal or negligent behaviour and ensure proper implementation of the laws and regulations.

**(d) Control of intermediaries**

65. Intermediaries have often been involved in uncovered cases of diversion or attempted diversion of precursors and psychotropic substances. In its resolution 1996/30, the Council requested the Board, *inter alia*, "to study, in consultation with Governments, the feasibility of formulating specific guidelines for use by Governments on the control of intermediaries involved in international trade of psychotropic substances, on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board/Pompidou Group Expert Consultation on Control of Brokers and Transit Operators Handling Psychotropic Substances and Precursors". Pursuant to that request, the Board convened an expert consultation on the control of intermediaries, held at Vienna in December 1997.

66. The conclusions and recommendations of that meeting, including, in particular, the general guidelines on the control of intermediaries, are reproduced in the main report of the Board for 1998.<sup>16</sup> Recommendations of particular relevance for the control of precursors may be summarized as follows:

(a) As already stated in the report of the Board for 1995 on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention,<sup>17</sup> Governments should apply to intermediaries the same control requirements as those applied to other operators who handle or use precursors. In particular, intermediaries should be subject to registration or licensing requirements, where appropriate; should be required to keep appropriate records; and should face regulatory and penal sanctions if they are found to be facilitating diversions;

(b) Applications for export authorizations should identify any intermediaries associated with a given transaction involving precursors, as well as the owner of the consignment, and should specify the final destination of that consignment;

(c) In addition, the voluntary cooperation of industry should be sought in order to identify intermediaries;

(d) Moreover, competent authorities in one country that become aware of intermediaries in another country should inform the country where the intermediary is located of that fact; for that purpose, they might use the standard form developed by the Board for the exchange of information.

**(e) Application of controls and possible hindrance of legitimate trade**

67. The Board has noted that some Governments in exporting countries have decided to suspend or delay authorization of exports for an indefinite period, while full investigation of the individual transactions involved is completed.

68. The Board expects that exporting countries will check with importing countries to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions, especially when an established pattern of trade appears to be changing in a way that raises concern. For such shipments of concern, Governments may find it necessary to suspend shipments, or not authorize future shipments, while the necessary investigations are carried out, even if the intended shipments are destined to a known company.

69. At the same time, a *de facto* embargo of shipments should be avoided. The Board has already, in its 1994 report on the implementation of article 12, added a word of caution to that effect, by noting that, in deciding to stop a shipment intended for export, competent authorities should make every effort to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions and identify the exact circumstances of the case. In particular, it noted that "adequate monitoring, exercised judiciously, should not hinder legitimate trade in chemicals".<sup>18</sup> It is essential, therefore, that in those cases where shipments are suspended, appropriate action is taken rapidly by all concerned to verify the legitimacy of the individual transactions.

**D. Scope of control**

70. The responsibilities of the Board under article 12 of the 1988 Convention include the assessment of substances for possible inclusion in Table I or Table II of the Convention and the review of the adequacy and propriety of the Tables. In addition to those functions, the Council, in its resolution 1996/29, has requested the Board, in cooperation with the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, "to establish a limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances for which substantial information exists of their use in illicit drug trafficking in order to allow, according to the nature and trade patterns of each product, for appropriate measures to prevent use by traffickers of those substances".

71. In pursuance of those functions, the Board conducted the following activities in 1998:<sup>19</sup>

(a) Assessment of phenylpropanolamine<sup>20</sup> for possible inclusion in Table I of the 1988 Convention, as notified by the Government of the United States;

(b) Establishment of a limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances.

72. The results of the assessment of phenylpropanolamine by the Board and its recommendations with regard to the limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances are set out below.

### 1. Assessment of phenylpropanolamine for possible inclusion in Table I of the 1988 Convention

#### (a) Background

73. In September 1997, the Government of the United States submitted a notification to the Secretary-General, pursuant to article 12, paragraph 2, of the 1988 Convention, proposing that phenylpropanolamine, including its salts and enantiomers (optical isomers), should be included in Table I of that Convention. The notification stated that phenylpropanolamine had been increasingly used as a precursor for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine in the United States and in Mexico. The problem had reached such proportions that, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, it was necessary to place the substance under international control.

74. The increasing use of phenylpropanolamine in illicit manufacture is believed to be a direct result of the successful introduction of controls to prevent the diversion of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, *inter alia*, into North America. Those substances are listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention because of their frequent use in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. Phenylpropanolamine may be used in illicit manufacture, applying the same methods, conditions and co-reagents, in the same way as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. However, the final product is amphetamine, and not methamphetamine. Seizures from illicit laboratories have revealed end products containing both amphetamine and methamphetamine, indicating that phenylpropanolamine may have been used to supplement short supplies of ephedrine. Amphetamine is already replacing methamphetamine on the street market in some parts of the United States.

#### (b) Assessment

75. Article 12, paragraph 4, of the 1988 Convention stipulates those factors which the Board is to consider

when assessing a substance for possible control, as follows:

"If the Board, taking into account the extent, importance and diversity of the licit use of the substance, and the possibility and ease of using alternate substances both for licit purposes and for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, finds:

(a) That the substance is frequently used in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance;

(b) That the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance creates serious public health or social problems, so as to warrant international action, it shall communicate to the Commission an assessment of the substance, including the likely effect of adding the substance to either Table I or Table II on both licit use and illicit manufacture, together with recommendations of monitoring measures, if any, that would be appropriate in the light of its assessment."

76. In making its assessment, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 4, of the 1988 Convention, the Board had at its disposal, in addition to the information contained in the notification submitted by the Government of the United States, comments and supplementary information received from Governments pursuant to article 12, paragraph 3. A total of 32 countries and territories and the European Commission had responded to the questionnaire sent out by the Secretary-General. Of those, 12 countries and territories supported, or recorded no objection to, the proposal to include phenylpropanolamine in Table I of the 1988 Convention. The Board hopes that for future assessments, as required under the provisions of article 12, Governments will promptly communicate their comments concerning a notification to the Secretary-General, together with all supplementary information that may assist the Board in making its assessment, and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in reaching a decision.

77. When assessing phenylpropanolamine, the Board particularly considered the applicability of its past recommendations regarding control measures as contained in annex V of the present report. Its findings and recommendations concerning phenylpropanolamine are set out below.

78. The factors taken into account by the Board were as follows:

(a) Phenylpropanolamine is used mainly in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine, which, together with its salts and isomers, is included in Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971;<sup>21</sup>

(b) The current use of phenylpropanolamine in the illicit manufacture of drugs relates to the need by traffickers to find a precursor to serve as an alternative to the strictly controlled ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, both of which are listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention;

(c) Current controls may increasingly push traffickers to illicit use of phenylpropanolamine;

(d) Phenylpropanolamine is an immediate precursor for amphetamine, is chemically similar to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, and may be converted relatively easily to amphetamine using the same manufacturing method as that applied in converting those substances to methamphetamine;

(e) Phenylpropanolamine is commercially available, with licit use limited entirely to the pharmaceutical industry where it is included in many over-the-counter products and prescription medicines used as nasal decongestants and cough and cold remedies.

79. In view of the above-mentioned factors, the Board finds that:

(a) Phenylpropanolamine is a highly suitable substance for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine, and could therefore play an important role as a precursor. Although such use has not yet been reported outside Mexico or the United States, given the ease of the illicit manufacturing process and the ready availability of phenylpropanolamine, illicit use of the substance may spread to other regions. In particular, clandestine laboratories in Europe, where most of the known illicit manufacture of amphetamine worldwide has occurred, may also shift in future to the use of phenylpropanolamine in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine because of stricter controls over the necessary precursors;

(b) Amphetamine primarily derived from illicit manufacture is a widely abused substance worldwide. That abuse is spreading to countries previously unaffected. The volume and extent of illicit manufacture of amphetamine creates serious public health and social problems of a multiregional nature warranting international action. Although reports of seizures of phenylpropanolamine and occurrences of illicit manufacture using phenylpropanolamine were restricted to only one region, North America, the problem of diversion had potentially

international dimensions, particularly in view of the methods and routes of diversion;

(c) Phenylpropanolamine is only used by the pharmaceutical industry, an already well-regulated industry with a good record of cooperation in implementing controls over the analogous substances ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

### (c) Recommendations

80. The Board considered that strict international control of phenylpropanolamine would limit its availability to traffickers and reduce the quantity of amphetamine manufactured illicitly. However, it has deferred for one year any decision concerning the scheduling of phenylpropanolamine while it studies further, in close cooperation with the World Health Organization, the possible impact of scheduling under the 1988 Convention on the availability for medical use of pharmaceutical products containing that substance, in particular, in countries that did not previously provide relevant data.

81. In view of the foregoing, and until the further study is completed, the Board has included phenylpropanolamine in the limited international special surveillance list (see para. 87 below).

### (d) Nomenclature

82. The term "phenylpropanolamine" has been used as a collective term to cover norephedrine and its stereoisomer norpseudoephedrine (analogous to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine already listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention). Because it was the intention of the United States proposal to control only norephedrine, the Board recommends that, to avoid any confusion over terminology, the substance should not be referred to as phenylpropanolamine but as *norephedrine*. In addition, since norephedrine may exist in two isomeric forms (*d*-norephedrine and *l*-norephedrine), and as a racemic mixture (*d,l*-norephedrine), the Board has decided to include phenylpropanolamine in the special surveillance list as *norephedrine (and its salts, optical isomers and salts of optical isomers)*.

83. In that connection, the Board recognizes that use of the phrase "and its salts, optical isomers and salts of optical isomers" would lead to inconsistencies in the nomenclature currently used to describe other substances already included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, specifically ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which also exist in different isomeric forms (for example,

*d*-ephedrine and *l*-ephedrine). It will examine the nomenclature used, and propose modifications, to provide clarification of the scope of the Tables of that Convention.

## **2. The limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances, and proposals for action by Governments**

### **(a) Background**

84. Traffickers have sought to obtain chemicals that may be used as substitutes for those that may be more closely monitored. There is, for example, increasing use of legitimately obtained non-scheduled precursors in those regions where drugs are illicitly manufactured. In addition, traffickers have identified and used new methods for processing or manufacture, requiring substances currently not listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. They have also manufactured so-called controlled drug analogues, many of which again require as starting material substances currently not listed in Tables I and II. It is for that reason that Council resolution 1996/29, which relates to the establishment of the limited international special surveillance list, was adopted.

85. The aim of the special surveillance list is to aid competent authorities in preventing the diversion of non-scheduled substances important to the illicit manufacture of drugs, by providing a more flexible system of control able to respond quickly to emerging trends and situations. That goal could be achieved by identifying those non-scheduled substances most likely to be diverted from legitimate trade, and recommending what action Governments may take to prevent such diversion.

### **(b) Formulation of the limited international special surveillance list**

86. In establishing the limited international special surveillance list, the Board had before it documents that identified and provided background information on 78 non-scheduled substances considered for possible inclusion in the list. Almost two thirds of the Governments provided some information in response to a questionnaire sent to all major manufacturing, exporting and importing countries seeking further information on the licit international trade in, and trafficking and illicit uses of, the 78 chemicals, and on existing measures already taken by Governments to prevent diversion of the substances of concern.

87. From the 78 substances provisionally identified, the Board has selected 26 for inclusion in the limited

international special surveillance list.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the final list includes norephedrine (and its salts, optical isomers and salts of optical isomers), since the Board has deferred for one year any decision concerning the scheduling of that substance (see paras. 73-83 above).

### **(c) Recommendations and actions to be taken by Governments**

88. The Board has recommended a series of actions to be taken by Governments, in close cooperation with industry, towards preventing the diversion of the substances on the special surveillance list. The list, and the recommended actions, have been distributed to the competent authorities of all Governments.

89. In so doing, the Board emphasized that the special surveillance list, and the accompanying actions, if they are to achieve their objectives, are aimed jointly at industry and regulatory and law enforcement authorities, but with prime responsibility on industry and law enforcement. The monitoring measures associated with the list should be applied through voluntary cooperation with the chemical industry, with no prescriptive regulatory requirement or sanction, in order to highlight the complementary need for more strict control of the substances listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention.

90. The special surveillance list will assist Governments in taking action, in accordance with article 12 of the 1988 Convention, to prevent the diversion and use by traffickers of the substances included in the list. Use of the list, and implementation of the accompanying actions, should therefore:

(a) Help regulatory and law enforcement authorities, as well as industry, become more sensitive to, and enhance their understanding of, the use of non-scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of drugs, and create greater awareness of the need to adopt measures to prevent diversion of such substances into illicit channels, and to achieve closer cooperation in doing so;

(b) Facilitate the building of systems for identifying suspicious cases involving non-scheduled substances and investigating diversions and attempted diversions of such substances, which would complement and make use of the existing mechanisms applied on an informal and voluntary basis by industry;

(c) Facilitate the development and harmonization, at the national and regional levels, of complementary lists of non-scheduled substances that would be more comprehensive than the limited international special surveillance

list, and of the appropriate legal or administrative framework for rapid adoption and implementation of related monitoring measures;

(d) Help to encourage a climate of self-regulation by industry and a culture of active cooperation between industry and the competent authorities, whereby suspicious transactions, and not regulatory control, would trigger investigations.

91. The Board stresses that the special surveillance list should be viewed separately from Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, and should not be seen as a "Table III" of that Convention; the substances included in the list are not internationally controlled substances. Consequently, the actions to be taken by Governments with regard to the list should complement the controls over precursors listed in the Tables of the Convention. The Board notes that inclusion of a substance on the list should be seen neither as a prerequisite for, nor a stepping stone to, scheduling. Nevertheless, by the nature of the list, it recognizes that the added information obtained through a practical monitoring system associated with the list may lead to initiation of the scheduling procedure.

92. Finally, the Board wishes Governments to take note that, while the measures proposed for use with the special surveillance list should complement those provided for in the 1988 Convention to control scheduled substances, and while the systems used for implementation should not duplicate existing regulatory systems, many of the recommended actions may also be advantageously applied to the substances currently listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention.

93. In its turn, the Board will develop procedures for amending the list, and will conduct an annual review of its scope, paying special attention to any changes that may be required to the accompanying recommendations for action.

## **II. Analysis of data on seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors and trends in illicit manufacture of drugs**

### **A. Overview**

94. The following analysis provides an overview of major trends in seizures and cases of diversion, attempted diversion and trafficking of substances listed in the Tables

of the 1988 Convention. It also reviews trends in the illicit manufacture of drugs in the context of growing knowledge of the worldwide trafficking in precursors, and the increasing use of substances that are currently not listed in the Tables of the Convention. In the analysis of available data, consideration has been given to information provided by Governments not only on seizures, but also on known cases of diversion and attempted diversion, stopped or suspended shipments and illicit manufacture of drugs, as well as to findings of investigations undertaken.

95. The present report contains seizure data<sup>23</sup> for the five-year period from 1993 to 1997, furnished by Governments under the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention (see annex I, tables 3a and 3b).<sup>24</sup>

96. Seizure data, or data on diversions and attempted diversions, have been reported for all scheduled substances with the exception of those used in the illicit manufacture of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and methaqualone. Those data have highlighted the use of scheduled solvents and acids, reported to have been seized in particularly large quantities in 1997, in the illicit manufacture of cocaine, and the extent of trafficking of the Table I substances used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances such as amphetamine, methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants related to methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA) and MDMA (Ecstasy). Although the lack of comprehensive seizure data limits the scope of analysis, the available information does confirm the trends identified over the past two to three years.

97. As highlighted in chapter I, there is growing evidence that diversion of, and trafficking in, scheduled substances occurs on a global scale, with new and complex routes of diversion continuously emerging, involving many countries and territories as sources, transit points or destinations. That is true of precursors for all drugs, even those manufactured and distributed regionally, such as amphetamine and meth-amphetamine. Nevertheless, seizure data do highlight also the regional movement of precursors between, for example, western European countries (especially precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamines), and within east and south-east Asia (for illicit manufacture of meth-amphetamine), and of acids and potassium permanganate (for cocaine processing) between South American countries.

98. Despite the fact that relatively few countries, compared with previous years, have submitted seizure data to the Board, 86 non-scheduled substances have been reported seized in 1997. Most of those have again been salts and solvents used in the illicit processing of cocaine.

Many have also been substitute or alternative precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamines. In addition, mixtures and other commercial products containing scheduled substances have been used. Those products have included pharmaceutical preparations, for example containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for use in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, solvent mixtures for use in the illicit processing of cocaine, and natural products such as safrole in the form of sassafras oil in the illicit manufacture of MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine) and related substances.

99. On the basis of the available information, the following major observations can be made:

(a) Complex routings continue to be used to divert scheduled substances;

(b) More information needs to be collected on seizures and stopped shipments, diversions and diversion attempts, and on routes and methods of diversion, for both scheduled substances and substances not currently included in the Tables of the Convention. In particular, little is known about the illicit movement of chemicals used for the illicit manufacture of heroin in Latin America;

(c) Clandestine laboratory operators have increasingly avoided controls by illicitly manufacturing the required precursors, or obtaining precursors illicitly manufactured by others;

(d) Professional chemists continue to be involved in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants, either recruited by organized traffickers or working independently, indicating the greater expertise required in the ongoing search for new drug-manufacturing and -processing methods;

(e) More comprehensive follow-up of clandestine laboratories is required to provide more information on the origin and methods of diversion of the precursors used;

(f) Methods and advice related to the illicit manufacture of drugs and to sources of precursors are readily available on the Internet and exploited by traffickers, increasing the risk of future expansion of the illicit manufacture of drugs using substitute and alternative precursors, and creating a potentially high demand for new precursors that are not currently controlled.

100. In chapter I, section C, above, the Board makes recommendations to counter some of the above-mentioned

problems, and proposes courses for further action to strengthen current controls.

## **B. Trends in the illicit traffic in precursors and the illicit manufacture of drugs**

### **1. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine**


101. The Board has previously reported on diversions and attempted diversions of cocaine chemicals. Some of the more recent cases, as well as some of those already described in previous reports, are shown in figure XIII. Several of the cases involve complex routing used to ship chemicals to cocaine-producing areas.

102. The available information suggests that traffickers have sent shipments from or via Europe in order to avoid controls in the United States. In turn, the strengthening of European chemical controls, including those applied to potassium permanganate as a result of the meeting of major exporters of potassium permanganate held in April 1997,<sup>25</sup> might have led to a shift to purchasing chemicals directly from other manufacturing countries with less strict controls. The cases involving potassium permanganate and methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) may indicate that, as more inquiries are made into the legitimacy of shipments, traffickers tend to go directly to source countries (for example, China and South Africa), thus avoiding the additional layer of controls encountered in some transit countries. That concern has been raised in connection with exports of large quantities of MEK, originating from South Africa, which have been shipped through Europe to Colombia.

103. In its report for 1997,<sup>26</sup> the Board highlighted the concerns regarding increasing exports of potassium permanganate to Latin America, although little is known about the uses of and requirements for the substance in that region. The special attention paid by exporting countries to shipments of potassium permanganate to Latin America after the above-mentioned meeting in April 1997 has led to results confirming that large amounts of the substance, in excess of actual licit needs, are being imported into Latin America. There is now evidence also about recent large-scale diversion of potassium permanganate from Chinese sources to Colombia. In particular, between December 1997 and March 1998, the United States seized six shipments of potassium permanganate totalling 80 tons en route to Colombia.

Figure XIII

## Some cases of diversion and attempted diversion of cocaine chemicals



104. The quantity of potassium permanganate reported seized in South American countries during 1997 (112 tons) is the largest since 1989, and more than the last four years combined. Other reported seizures of chemicals used in cocaine processing have also been significant: the quantities of solvents such as acetone, ethyl ether and MEK reported have been the largest in the last five years, and quantities of hydrochloric and sulphuric acids seized have been the largest ever reported. By far the largest seizures have been made in Colombia, although Bolivia and Peru have also reported significant seizures of the solvents used to extract and purify cocaine.

105. Finally, reports seem to suggest an increase in Europe of the number of clandestine laboratories set up to convert cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride. A major laboratory of that type was discovered in Italy during 1997, processing cocaine base smuggled from Colombia. In addition, small quantities of precursors for the illicit synthesis of cocaine have been seized at a laboratory site in Spain. A similar laboratory was dismantled in that country in 1996.

## 2. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin


106. Figure XIV shows some recent cases of diversion and attempted diversion of acetic anhydride, as well as some of those shown in previous reports.

107. Since 1995, the Board has been warning that States in central Asia have been targeted as a source of, or as transit countries for, acetic anhydride used in the illicit manufacture of heroin in south and west Asia. Now there is more evidence of trafficking in acetic anhydride via those countries, in addition to quantities diverted from Europe, as illustrated by the recent seizure by the Uzbek authorities of 16 tons of acetic anhydride, originating from China, en route to Afghanistan. There may be a link between that case and the 38 tons of acetic anhydride, also believed to have originated from China, seized in Turkey in 1996 and shipped in similar containers.

108. Other countries in south and west Asia have also reported large seizures of acetic anhydride during 1997: 7.2 tons in Turkey, 9 tons in India and 5.2 tons in

Figure XIV

## Cases of diversion and attempted diversion of, and trafficking in, acetic anhydride



Pakistan. The customs authorities of Pakistan have also uncovered several attempts to smuggle acetic anhydride from Kuwait by air, and from China to Pakistan by land route. China, India and the Islamic Republic of Iran have stopped large shipments of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Romania. In one case, the Board is given to understand that 46 tons of acetic anhydride had been smuggled across the border from China into Pakistan, and a further 26 tons were seized by the Chinese authorities. In late 1998, the authorities in Pakistan seized 10,000 litres of acetic anhydride being smuggled from Germany, via Hungary and Dubai (United Arab Emirates), for use in laboratories manufacturing heroin in Afghanistan. That seizure is reported to be the largest single seizure ever made in Pakistan.

109. There are no reports of cases of diversion of acetic anhydride from international trade involving south-east Asia. That may reflect the Board's lack of knowledge of patterns of diversion in international trade to and within the region, or, more likely, it may imply that much of the substance is smuggled within the region.

110. The Board has previously expressed its concern about the lack of knowledge of the trafficking situation for

chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin in Mexico and the Andean region. There are indications that the illicit processing of heroin continues, and that high-quality heroin originating from the Andean region, is readily available.

111. The Board has been made aware of reports of the spread of heroin abuse in the United States. Indicators in many cities reportedly show an increase in heroin consumption. According to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, behind the surge are supplies of pure and cheap heroin from Colombia. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), European countries have also reported seizures of heroin from Colombia in 1997. At the same time, there is still very limited information on trafficking, and very few seizures reported, of acetic anhydride in the Americas.

### 3. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants

112. A detailed overview of trends in the illicit traffic in, and manufacture of, precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants was presented in the report for 1997. Since that time, Governments have continued to identify cases of

diversion or attempted diversion of precursors for amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA (Ecstasy). Since the beginning of 1997, 47 such cases have been reported to the Board. As with other scheduled substances, attempts at diversion of the necessary precursors have involved new routes. Figure XV illustrates those developments.


113. In 1993, the Board noted that there was a relatively small number of reports of seizures concerning precursors for MDMA and its analogues, contrasting markedly with the spreading abuse of the drugs themselves. The Board forecasted in 1994 that illicit requirements for the necessary precursors were likely to increase, and might diversify, as the illicit manufacture of the drugs becomes a global problem. The analysis of the recent cases reported, and the growing knowledge of trafficking situations, have confirmed those predictions, particularly the conclusion that diversion of the relevant precursors is also a global problem. That is illustrated by a number of examples involving diversion and attempted diversion from India

and China to Europe, and by several stopped shipments from the United Kingdom to Nigeria, South Africa and Thailand. Nevertheless, the Board notes with concern the continuing small number of seizures of precursors for amphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants generally.

114. Cases identified as a result of actions taken by Governments have involved as countries of origin, transit or destination an ever-growing number of countries in both western and, notably, eastern Europe, including: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Europe, however, remains a major market for illicitly manufactured amphetamines, particularly amphetamine itself, and MDMA and related drugs. Methamphetamine has been manufactured illicitly in the Czech Republic, but such manufacture may also be spreading, as evidenced by the reported discovery of two methamphetamine laboratories in Germany in 1997.

Figure XV

Some cases of attempted diversion of, or trafficking in, precursors for amphetamine and MDMA



115. Some of the cases of diversion and attempted diversion involving eastern European countries (for example, the attempted diversion of 24 tons of P-2-P from Latvia to Ukraine in 1997), together with the dismantling in December 1997 by the Bulgarian authorities of a large-scale clandestine factory for the manufacture of amphetamine, provide further indication of an extension of the clandestine manufacture of amphetamine to new locations within the European region. Indeed, Interpol has reported increased illicit manufacture of amphetamine in a number of eastern European and Baltic States. In 1995 and 1996, the Board warned about such possible developments.

116. The Board stated in its 1997 report that an increase in the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs could occur in the region of Asia and the Pacific. In one case that has come to the attention of the Board, the United Kingdom stopped a shipment of 1.5 tons of piperonal to an importing company in Thailand. On checking, it was discovered that the company was only a front company. It is understood that clandestine MDMA laboratories currently exist in Thailand. Although illicit manufacture of MDMA or related drugs has been reported in China, there is still no firm evidence of such manufacture. Illicit manufacture of MDMA has also been reported in Australia.

117. Attempts at diversion of ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine have continued in south-east Asia. For example, as a result of the exchange of information, it has been established that between January and July 1997, a total of 8,700 kilograms of ephedrine was diverted from Singapore via Malaysia to Thailand. Therefore, Malaysia strengthened its control measures over ephedrines.

118. During the past several years in that sub-region, substantial quantities of ephedrine have been reported seized in Myanmar, for example, 3,074 kilograms in 1996 and 2,420 kilograms in 1997. A part of that precursor may have originated in India. In 1998, the Board was informed of a series of seizures of ephedrine, totalling 350 kilograms, effected in India close to its border with Myanmar, en route to that country. The Board notes similar recent reports of seizures of ephedrine that have been effected by land customs authorities in India to Pakistan. Moreover, the Board has learned, for the first time, of seizures of ephedrine of Indian origin in Myanmar, totalling some 250 kilograms. Ephedrine is also reported to be smuggled into that country from China.

119. In recent years, there have been reports indicating that methamphetamine is now being illicitly manufactured

in Myanmar, with laboratories located on the borders of Myanmar with China and Thailand. It is not clear to what extent those laboratories are actually synthesizing the drug, or simply tableting methamphetamine powder manufactured illicitly elsewhere. At the beginning of 1998, two clandestine tableting laboratories were dismantled in Myanmar. In addition, a clandestine laboratory manufacturing methamphetamine was raided in the Philippines in 1997, and sufficient chemicals seized to manufacture 50 kilograms of the drug. A similar laboratory illicitly manufacturing amphetamines (and heroin) was discovered in the Lao People's Democratic Republic at the beginning of 1998.

120. Further attempts at diversion of ephedrine and preparations containing ephedrine to Africa have taken place. Recent cases have involved exports of ephedrine from Germany to Gabon for further shipment to Ghana. In March 1998, China stopped a suspicious shipment of 20 tons of ephedrine to a South African company. As mentioned in paragraph 51 above, there are also indications that the African continent is also being targeted for diversion of precursors for Ecstasy.

121. Finally, as illustrated by stopped shipments from China and India destined to South Africa, European countries and North America, precursors for methamphetamine continue to involve a variety of routes (see figure XVI). A stopped shipment of 20 tons of ephedrine from Germany to Honduras points again to the complex routes used to divert such precursors to North America.

#### **4. Use of non-scheduled substances in illicit drug manufacture, the illicit manufacture of precursors and the availability of designer drugs**

122. Traffickers have attempted to find new ways to ensure the continued illicit supply of drugs to the market. Many of those activities have resulted in the use, in the illicit manufacture of drugs, of substances that are not listed in the Tables of the Convention, or commercial and natural products containing scheduled substances.

123. The facts known to the Board about the clandestine use of substitute and alternative precursors are presented below. The Board is aware that the introduction of such substances and the clandestine manufacture of precursors may have a significant impact on existing chemical controls. It is against that background that the Board has therefore developed a limited international special


surveillance list of non-scheduled substances for which substantial information exists of their use in the illicit manufacture of drugs. The need for, and the importance of, that list and the accompanying recommendations for action by Governments are outlined in more detail in paragraphs 88-93 of the present report. The maintenance and utilization of the list and the full implementation of the recommendations for action are intended to provide for a monitoring system, within a framework of voluntary cooperation between industry and the relevant national authorities, that is capable of responding rapidly to prevent the use of new precursors by traffickers.

124. In the context of the facts given below, the Board urges all Governments that may be affected to take action, as recommended by the Board, with regard to the substances included in the limited international special surveillance list and, in particular, to monitor and collect information on the new chemicals being used in order to establish their legitimate patterns and scope of trade and to prevent any widespread diversion.

#### (a) Illicit processing of cocaine

125. As well as solvent mixtures, individual solvents have been used to substitute for scheduled substances in illicit cocaine-processing laboratories. Data provided by the United States show that, while methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) remains a solvent of choice, a large number of other solvents have been used. An average of 11 such solvents has been detected in samples of seized cocaine analysed by the United States authorities in 1997. While substitute solvents have for many years been reported to the Board by countries in South America, the number of such substances continues to grow. The most recent analytical data provided by the United States indicate the increased use of ethyl acetate and n-propyl acetate, although the latter substance has not yet been reported to the Board in seizure statistics. Also in connection with the illicit manufacture of cocaine, substances such as potassium dichromate and sodium hypochlorite are reported to have been successfully used to substitute for potassium permanganate in the purification of coca paste.

Figure XVI  
Some cases of diversion and attempted diversion of ephedrines



**(b) Illicit manufacture of heroin**

126. According to reports a number of years ago, ethylidene diacetate was being used in south-east Asia as a substitute for acetic anhydride in the conversion of morphine to heroin. In 1998, the Board was also informed of seizures of acetyl chloride, another potential substitute for acetic anhydride, at clandestine laboratory sites that were illicitly manufacturing heroin in India.

**(c) Illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances**

127. An important development has been the use of phenylpropanolamine as a substitute for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the illicit manufacture of drugs. The particular problem with phenylpropanolamine and details of the assessment of that substance, by the Board, including its findings and recommendations, are set forth in chapter I, part D, above. Seizures of phenylpropanolamine have been reported in Australia, Mexico and the United States.

128. With regard to the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, and in particular amphetamines, traffickers have also adapted to controls by setting up laboratories for the illicit manufacture of substances already listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention. The available information seems to suggest that the trend continues, and is growing, with such laboratories becoming larger, more sophisticated and more widespread. Since 1992, the illicit manufacture of precursors has been reported in Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), South Asia (India), North America (Canada and the United States) and Oceania (Australia).<sup>27</sup>

129. Substances in Table I have been manufactured at clandestine laboratory sites for immediate use from substances in Table II that were controlled less strictly in many countries. For example, P-2-P has been manufactured from phenylacetic acid for use in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine in Europe, and anthranilic acid has been converted to N-acetylanthranilic acid by reaction with acetic anhydride for use in the illicit manufacture of methaqualone in India.

130. More recently, clandestine laboratories have been used to manufacture controlled chemicals from starting materials currently not listed in Tables I and II. For example, benzyl cyanide has been used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine in Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, and phthalic anhydride and urea in the illicit

manufacture of methaqualone in South Africa (see figure XVII). In addition, inquiries about ordering acetylphenyl carbinol have been made in India.

131. In some of the larger-scale clandestine laboratories, the Board understands that the purpose of manufacture has been to supply other illicit drug manufacturing operations with the precursors required. Such a laboratory, suspected of having manufactured and delivered several tons of precursors for use in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants in the Netherlands, was uncovered in the Czech Republic in 1998. In Germany, in 1997, safrole in the form of sassafras oil was used to manufacture isosafrole and 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P), which in some cases have been sold to other clandestine operations to manufacture amphetamine derivatives.


**(d) Alternative routes of illicit manufacture**

132. As well as manufacturing scheduled substances, traffickers have also identified alternative routes for the illicit manufacture of drugs, again requiring substances currently not listed in the Tables of the Convention. Some examples are given below.

<i>Alternative precursor</i>	<i>Drug manufactured</i>
Benzaldehyde	Amphetamine
Benzyl chloride	Methamphetamine
Ergot	LSD
Isatoic anhydride	Methaqualone

Benzaldehyde, which may be used for the manufacture of P-2-P, has been increasingly used directly for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine, and is understood now to be the precursor of choice in Europe for such manufacture. Benzyl chloride has been used as a starting material for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in North America and Australia. Isatoic anhydride has been used instead of N-acetylanthranilic acid for the illicit manufacture of methaqualone in South Africa. In the light of a continuing lack of reports of seizures of the precursors for LSD that are scheduled in Table I of the 1988 Convention (that is, ergometrine, ergotamine and lysergic acid), the Board notes with particular interest the intended use of ergot (*Claviceps purpurea*) in the small-scale illicit manufacture of LSD in Poland. As reported by the Government of Poland, lysergic acid was to have been obtained through saprophytic cultivation of ergot. The proposed method of manufacture had been obtained from the Internet.

Figure XVII  
Use of non-scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of drugs



#### (e) Designer drugs

133. Finally, and with particular reference to the increasing use and illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants related to MDMA in Europe and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere, traffickers have also manufactured so-called designer drugs, which are not controlled under existing international or national legislation. Many of those drugs require as starting material substances currently not listed in Tables I or II of the 1988 Convention, the intention being also to avoid controls over the scheduled precursors. While it is possible, in theory, to synthesize any number of designer drugs, relatively few, in practice, have appeared on the market. Those include, in particular, amphetamine derivatives, derivatives of the synthetic opioid fentanyl and derivatives of methaqualone.

134. The most frequently encountered designer drugs are based on amphetamine, mainly because that substance may be easily modified; there are many relatively simple

methods of synthesis; non-scheduled precursors may be used in manufacture; those precursors are readily available; and they may be used to make a number of different drugs.

135. Drugs such as MDA, MDMA, MDEA (3,4-methylene-dioxyethylamphetamine) and MBDB (N-methyl-1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-butanamine) have been reported seized in relatively large quantities over a number of years, especially in Europe, but increasingly elsewhere, including south-east Asia. At the same time, other related amphetamine derivatives such as MDOH (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-hydroxy-amphetamine), MMDA (3-methoxy-4,5-methylenedioxy-amphetamine), 2C-B (2,5-dimethoxy-4-bromophenethylamine) and Bromo-STP (4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine) have been reported in isolated cases. Many of those drugs had originated in the Netherlands, but clandestine laboratories have also been discovered in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).
- <sup>2</sup> The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances listed in Table I or II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances" was introduced in the Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, the Board has decided to use it in the present report for the sake of convenience.
- <sup>3</sup> The Government of the United States of America, in a notification addressed to the Secretary-General in August 1997, proposed that phenylpropanolamine should be included in Table I of the 1988 Convention.
- <sup>4</sup> *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.XI.4).
- <sup>5</sup> United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 520, No. 7515.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* vol. 1019, No. 14956.
- <sup>7</sup> Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- <sup>8</sup> Some Governments reported the data separately, not on Form D.
- <sup>9</sup> *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997 on the Implementation of Article 12 ...*, para. 44
- <sup>10</sup> The Board notes that 19 out of 45 countries in Europe have already reported data on imports of the precursors. In addition, the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom have provided data on approximate licit requirements.
- <sup>11</sup> In West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria have reported data on imports of and their approximate licit requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, and 14 other countries in Africa have reported imports of those substances. Five African countries have reported their licit requirements.
- <sup>12</sup> Of the 64 Governments in areas where illicit manufacture of heroin exists or at points actually or potentially used for transit of precursors to those areas, 11 (Bulgaria, Brunei Darussalam, China (Hong Kong SAR), Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Ukraine) have provided data on imports of acetic anhydride. In addition, 12 Governments (China, Hong Kong SAR of China, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine) reported their approximate licit requirements.
- <sup>13</sup> Among the countries in Latin America, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and Peru have reported imports of the substance, and Costa Rica and Ecuador have also reported their licit requirements. In addition, Paraguay and Peru have been able to provide data on imports of other substances included in Table II of the 1988 Convention that are used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine.
- <sup>14</sup> A connected series of shipments, involving the same substance, countries of origin and destination, methods of diversion etc., has been treated as a single case.
- <sup>15</sup> The countries of destination were: Czech Republic, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Romania, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates.
- <sup>16</sup> *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1998* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.XI.1), paras. 93-97.
- <sup>17</sup> *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.XI.4), paragraph 82.
- <sup>18</sup> *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.XI.1), para. 126.
- <sup>19</sup> In that context, the Board convened a meeting of its Advisory Expert Group in June 1998. The Group provides expertise to assist the Board in the discharge of its functions, under article 12, paras. 2 to 7, of the 1988 Convention, among other things, in relation to possible modifications in the scope of control of the Tables of the Convention. The work of the

Group was conducted in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Board at its fiftieth session in October 1991, and its comprehensive report served as the basis for the discussions of the Board.

- <sup>20</sup> The term "phenylpropanolamine" has been used as a collective term to describe two substances, norephedrine and its stereoisomer norpseudoephedrine. A clarification of the nomenclature is given in para. 81.
- <sup>21</sup> In addition, phenylpropanolamine has been used in the illicit manufacture of another Schedule II substance, phenmetrazine, the Schedule IV substance, phendimetrazine, and the non-schedule substance, 4-methylaminorex. Phenylpropanolamine may also be used to manufacture the Schedule I substance, cathinone.
- <sup>22</sup> The 26 substances were selected on one or more of the following grounds:
- (a) The substance was a direct substitute for, or co-reactant with, a substance already listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention;
  - (b) The substance had multiple uses in the illicit manufacture of drugs, relating either to the number and types of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances that are illicitly manufactured using the substance, or to the number of different routes, methods or chemical processes actually used;
  - (c) Suspicious transactions had been reported to the Board;
  - (d) The substance was critical to the illicit manufacturing process, and the chemical properties of the substance allowed for its easy use;
  - (e) The substance was commercially available;
  - (f) For salts and bases (for example, calcium oxide and sodium carbonate used in the illicit processing of cocaine), reports indicated that they were seized frequently and in significant quantities;
  - (g) The substance was not controlled under any other international convention.
- <sup>23</sup> To assist in understanding the importance of the individual chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, a comprehensive list of the substances currently scheduled in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and an outline of their typical uses in illicit manufacture are given in annex II. Information also provided in annex II may be used to calculate how much of a drug could be manufactured from a given quantity of seized substance.
- <sup>24</sup> The Board is aware that the available data are not comprehensive. Therefore, for the purposes of the review, the data have been supplemented, where possible, with more recent information provided by Governments and other competent international bodies.
- <sup>25</sup> *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997*

*on the Implementation of Article 12 ...*, para. 38.

- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 84.
- <sup>27</sup> While the clandestine laboratories appear to have been operated by criminal organizations, other isolated cases in Japan and South Africa have been run on a much smaller scale.

## Annex I

## Tables

Table 1  
Parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention <sup>a</sup>

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Africa	Algeria (09.05.1995)	Malawi (12.10.1995)	Angola	Gabon
	Benin (23.05.1997)	Mali (31.10.1995)	Central African Republic	Liberia
	Botswana (13.08.1996)	Mauritania (01.07.1993)	Comoros	Mauritius
	Burkina Faso (02.06.1992)	Morocco (28.10.1992)	Congo	Namibia
	Burundi (18.02.1993)	Mozambique (08.06.1998)	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Rwanda
	Cameroon (28.10.1991)	Niger (10.11.1992)	Djibouti	Somalia
	Cape Verde (08.05.1995)	Nigeria (01.11.1989)	Equatorial Guinea	South Africa
	Chad (09.06.1995)	Sao Tome and Principe (20.06.1996)	Eritrea	
	Côte d'Ivoire (25.11.1991)	Senegal (27.11.1989)		
	Egypt (15.03.1991)	Seychelles (27.02.1992)		
	Ethiopia (11.10.1994)	Sierra Leone (06.06.1994)		
	Gambia (23.04.1996)	Sudan (19.11.1993)		
	Ghana (10.04.1990)	Swaziland (08.10.1995)		
	Guinea (27.12.1990)	Togo (01.08.1990)		
	Guinea-Bissau (27.10.1995)	Tunisia (20.09.1990)		
	Kenya (19.10.1992)	Uganda (20.08.1990)		
	Lesotho (28.03.1995)	United Republic of Tanzania (17.04.1996)		
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (22.07.1996)	Zambia (28.05.1993)		
	Madagascar (12.03.1991)	Zimbabwe (30.07.1993)		
	<i>Regional total</i> 53	38	15	

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>
<b>Americas</b>	Antigua and Barbuda (05.04.1993)	Haiti (18.09.1995)	
	Argentina (10.06.1993)	Honduras (11.12.1991)	
	Bahamas (30.01.1989)	Jamaica (29.12.1995)	
	Barbados (15.10.1992)	Mexico (11.04.1990)	
	Belize (24.07.1996)	Nicaragua (04.05.1990)	
	Bolivia (20.08.1990)	Panama (13.01.1994)	
	Brazil (17.07.1991)	Paraguay (23.08.1990)	
	Canada (05.07.1990)	Peru (16.01.1992)	
	Chile (13.03.1990)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (19.04.1995)	
	Colombia (10.06.1994)	Saint Lucia (21.08.1995)	
	Costa Rica (08.02.1991)	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17.05.1994)	
	Cuba (12.06.1996)	Suriname (28.10.1992)	
	Dominica (30.06.1993)	Trinidad and Tobago (17.02.1995)	
	Dominican Republic (21.09.1993)	United States of America (20.02.1990)	
	Ecuador (23.03.1990)	Uruguay (10.03.1995)	
	El Salvador (21.05.1993)	Venezuela (16.07.1991)	
	Grenada (10.12.1990)		
	Guatemala (28.02.1991)		
	Guyana (19.03.1993)		
	<i>Regional total</i>	35	0

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Asia	Afghanistan (14.02.1992)	Myanmar (11.06.1991)	Cambodia	Lao People's Democratic Republic
	Armenia (13.09.1993)	Nepal (24.07.1991)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Maldives
	Azerbaijan (22.09.1993)	Oman (15.03.1991)	Indonesia	Mongolia
	Bahrain (07.02.1990)	Pakistan (25.10.1991)	Israel	Republic of Korea
	Bangladesh (11.10.1990)	Philippines (07.06.1996)	Kuwait	Thailand
	Bhutan (27.08.1990)	Qatar (04.05.1990)		
	Brunei Darussalam (12.11.1993)	Saudi Arabia (09.01.1992)		
	China (25.10.1989)	Singapore (23.10.1997)		
	Georgia (08.01.1998)	Sri Lanka (06.06.1991)		
	India (27.03.1990)	Syrian Arab Republic (03.09.1991)		
	Iran (Islamic Republic of) (07.12.1992)	Tajikistan (06.05.1996)		
	Iraq 22.07.1998	Turkey (02.04.1996)		
	Japan (12.06.1992)	Turkmenistan (21.02.1996)		
	Jordan (16.04.1990)	United Arab Emirates (12.04.1990)		
	Kazakhstan (29.04.1997)	Uzbekistan (24.08.1995)		
	Kyrgyzstan (07.10.1994)	Viet Nam (04.11.1997)		
	Lebanon (11.03.1996)	Yemen (25.03.1996)		
	Malaysia (11.05.1993)			

*Regional total*  
45

35

10

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Europe	Austria (11.07.1997)	Luxembourg (29.04.1992)	Albania	Liechtenstein
	Belarus (15.10.1990)	Malta (28.02.1996)	Andorra	San Marino
	Belgium (25.10.1995)	Monaco (23.04.1991)	Estonia	Switzerland
	Bosnia and Herzegovina (01.09.1993)	Netherlands (08.09.1993)	Holy See	
	Bulgaria (24.09.1992)	Norway (14.11.1994)		
	Croatia (26.07.1993)	Poland (26.05.1994)		
	Czech Republic (30.12.1993)	Portugal (03.12.1991)		
	Cyprus (25.05.1990)	Republic of Moldova (15.02.1995)		
	Denmark (19.12.1991)	Romania (21.01.1993)		
	European Union b) (31.12.1990)	Russian Federation (17.12.1990)		
	Finland (15.02.1994)	Slovakia (28.05.1993)		
	France (31.12.1990)	Slovenia (06.07.1992)		
	Germany (30.11.1993)	Spain (13.08.1990)		
	Greece (28.01.1992)	Sweden (22.07.1991)		
	Hungary (15.11.1996)	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (13.10.1993)		
	Iceland (02.09.1997)	Ukraine (28.08.1991)		
	Ireland (03.09.1996)	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (28.06.1991)		
	Italy (31.12.1990)	Yugoslavia (03.01.1991)		
	Latvia (25.02.1994)			
	Lithuania (08.06.1998)			

*Regional total*  
45

38

7

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>	<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Oceania	Australia (10.11.1992)  Fiji (25.03.1993)  Tonga (29.04.1996)	Kiribati  Marshall Islands  Micronesia (Federated States of)  Nauru  New Zealand	Palau  Papua New Guinea  Samoa  Solomon Islands  Tuvalu  Vanuatu
<i>Regional total</i> 14	3	11	
<i>World total</i> 192	149	43	

<sup>a</sup> The date on which the instrument of ratification or accession was deposited is indicated in parentheses.

<sup>b</sup> Extent of competence: article 12.

Table 2

**Submission of information by Governments pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention (Form D) for the years 1993-1997**

Notes: Territories are in italics.

A blank signifies that Form D was not received.

X signifies that a completed Form D (or equivalent report) was submitted, including nil returns.

n.a. signifies not applicable.

Parties to the 1988 Convention (and the years since they became parties) are shadowed.

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Afghanistan					
Albania					
Algeria		X	X	X	X
Andorra	X	X		X	
Angola					
<i>Anguilla</i>	X			X	X
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X	X	X	X
Argentina	X	X			
Armenia		X	X	X	
<i>Aruba</i>					
Ascension Island	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X
Austria		X	X	X	
Azerbaijan		X			
Bahamas	X	X			
Bahrain	X	X	X	X	X
Bangladesh	X	X			
Barbados	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus		X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X
Belgium	X	X	X	X	
Belize					
Benin	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Bermuda</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Bhutan		X			
Bolivia	X	X	X	X	
Bosnia and Herzegovina					
Botswana	X		X	X	X
Brazil	X	X	X		X
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>		X			
Brunei Darussalam	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	X	X	X	X	X
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	X	X
Burundi					

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Cambodia					
<del>Cameroon</del>		X			
Canada	X	X	X		
Cape Verde	X	X	X	X	
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	X		X	X	X
Central African Republic	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Chad</del>		X	X	X	
Chile	X		X	X	X
<del>China<sup>a</sup></del>			X	X	
<i>Hong Kong SAR of China</i>	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Christmas Island</i>					
<i>Cocos (Keeling) Islands</i>					
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros					
Congo	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Cook Islands</i>	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Costa Rica</del>	X	X	X	X	
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>		X	X	X	X
<del>Croatia</del>				X	X
Cuba	X	X	X	X	X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Czech Republic</del>	X		X	X	X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea					
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Denmark</del>	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti			X		
<del>Dominica</del>		X	X		
<del>Dominican Republic</del>	X	X			X
Ecuador	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Egypt</del>	X	X	X	X	X
<del>El Salvador</del>					
Equatorial Guinea	X	X	X		
Eritrea		X	X	X	X
Estonia					X
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	X	X	X		
<del>Fiji</del>	X	X	X	X	X
<del>Finland</del>		X	X	X	X
<del>France</del>	X	X	X	X	X
<i>French Polynesia</i>					
Gabon					

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Gambia					
Georgia		X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>
Germany	X	X	X	X	
Ghana	X	X	X	X	X
Gibraltar	X		X		
Greece	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	X	X	X		X
Guatemala					
Guinea	X				
Guinea-Bissau					
Guyana	X	X			
Haiti	X		X		
Honduras		X	X		
Hungary			X	X	X
Iceland	X	X			
India	X	X	X	X	
Indonesia			X	X	X
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	X	X	X	X	X
Iraq	X	X	X	X	X
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
Israel	X	X	X	X	X
Italy	X	X	X	X	X
Jamaica	X	X	X		X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X				X
Kazakhstan		X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>
Kenya		X			X
Kiribati	X	X			
Kuwait					
Kyrgyzstan		X	X	X	X
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia		X	X	X	X
Lebanon			X		
Lesotho	X				X
Liberia		X			
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya					
Lithuania	X		X	X	X
Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	
Macao	X	X	X	X	X
Madagascar	X	X	X	X	X
Malawi					X

Country or territory	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Malaysia	X	X			X
Maldives	X	X	X		X
Mali	X	X	X		
Malta	X	X	X	X	
Marshall Islands					
Mauritania					
Mauritius	X	X	X	X	X
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X
Micronesia (Federated States of)			X	X	
Monaco					
Mongolia	X	X			
Montserrat	X	X	X	X	
Morocco	X	X	X	X	X
Mozambique					X
Myanmar	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia					
Nauru	X	X	X		
Nepal	X		X	X	X
Netherlands	X	X	X	X	
Netherlands Antilles	X	X	X	X	X
New Caledonia				X	
New Zealand				X	
Nicaragua	X	X	X		X
Niger	X	X			
Nigeria		X	X		
Norfolk Island					
Norway	X		X	X	
Oman		X	X	X	X
Pakistan	X	X	X	X	
Palau	n a				
Panama	X		X	X	X
Papua New Guinea				X	
Paraguay	X	X		X	
Peru	X	X	X	X	X
Philippines	X	X	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	
Qatar	X	X	X	X	
Republic of Korea	X	X	X	X	X
Republic of Moldova		X <sup>b</sup>			
Romania	X	X	X	X	X

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Russian Federation		X	X	X	X
Rwanda					
<i>Saint Helena</i>		X	X		
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	X			
Saint Lucia		X			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X		X	X	
Samoa	X	X	X		
Sao Tome and Principe	X	X	X	X	X
Saudi Arabia	X	X	X	X	X
Senegal		X			
Seychelles	X	X	X	X	X
Sierra Leone	X	X			
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	X	X			X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X
Solomon Islands		X			X
Somalia					
South Africa		X	X	X	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan					
Suriname					X
Swaziland	X	X	X		
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X
Switzerland				X	X
Syrian Arab Republic		X			X
Tajikistan		X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>
Thailand	X	X			X
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia					
Togo	X	X			
Tonga					
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X		X	
<i>Tristan da Cunha</i>	X	X	X	X	
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan		X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>
<i>Turks and Caicos Islands<sup>a</sup></i>		X	X	X	
Tuvalu					
Uganda	X	X	X		
Ukraine	X	X	X	X	
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
United Republic of Tanzania					
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay	X	X		X	
Uzbekistan		X <sup>b</sup>	X	X	X
Vanuatu	X				
Venezuela			X		
Viet Nam				X	X
<i>Wallis and Futuna Islands</i>			X	X	
Yemen					
Yugoslavia					
Zambia				X	
Zimbabwe	X	X	X		X
Total Forms D <sup>d</sup>	122	140	129	118	104
Total Governments <sup>e</sup>	209	210	210	210	210

<sup>a</sup>Territorial application of the 1988 Convention

<sup>b</sup>Information was provided by the Russian Federation

<sup>c</sup>For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China

<sup>d</sup>In addition, the Commission of the European Communities has submitted Form D for the years 1993-1996

<sup>e</sup>Number of Governments requested to provide information

**Table 3**  
**Seizures of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board**

Table 3a and 3b show information on seizures of the substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, furnished to the Board by Governments in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12.

The tables include data on domestic seizures and on seizures effected at the point of entry or exit. They do not include reported seizures of substances where it is known that they were not intended for the illicit manufacture of drugs (for example, seizures effected because of administrative shortcomings, or seizures of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine preparations to be used as stimulants). Stopped shipments are also not included. The information may include data not submitted by Governments on Form D.

*Units of measure and conversion factors*

Units of measure are indicated for every substance. Fractions of full units are not listed in the table; the figures are, however, rounded.

For several reasons, quantities of individual substances seized are reported to the Board using different units; one country may report seizures of acetic anhydride in litres, another in kilograms.

To enable a proper comparison of collected information, it is important that all data are collated in a standard format. To simplify the necessary standardization process, figures are given in grams or kilograms where the substance is a solid, and in litres where the substance (or its most common form) is a liquid.

Seizures of solids reported to the Board in litres have not been converted into kilograms, and are not included in the table, since the actual quantity of substance in solution is not known.

For seizures of liquids, quantities reported in kilograms have been converted into litres using the following factors:

<i>Substance</i>	<i>Conversion factor (kilograms to litres)<sup>a</sup></i>
Acetic anhydride	0.926
Acetone	1.269
Ethyl ether	1.408
Hydrochloric acid (39.1% solution)	0.833
Isosafrole	0.892
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	0.833
Methyl ethyl ketone	1.242
1-phenyl-2-propanone	0.985
Safrole	0.912
Sulphuric acid (concentrated solution)	0.543
Toluene	1.155

<sup>a</sup> Derived from density, quoted in *The Merck Index* (Rahway, New Jersey, Merck and Co., Inc., 1989).

As an example, to convert 1,000 kilograms of methyl ethyl ketone into litres, multiply by 1.242, i.e.  $1,000 \times 1.242 = 1,242$  litres.

For the conversion of gallons to litres it has been assumed that in Colombia the United States gallon is used, with 3.785 litres to the gallon, and in Myanmar the imperial gallon, with 4.546 litres to the gallon.

**In those cases where reported quantities have been converted, the converted figures are listed in the table in italics.**

*Notes:* Territories are in italics.

- Signifies nil (the report did not include data on seizures of the particular substance in the reporting year).
- ° Signifies less than the smallest unit of measurement shown for that substance (for example, less than 1 kilogram).

Discrepancies may occur with the regional total seizure figures and the world total figures because of rounding to whole numbers of the actual quantities seized.

Table 3a  
Seizures of substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P * **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>AFRICA</b>											
<b>South Africa</b>											
1995	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	202
1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
<b>Uganda</b>											
1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-
<b>Zambia</b>											
1996	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total region</b>											
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0
1995	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	202
1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
<b>AMERICAS</b>											
<b>North America</b>											
<b>Canada</b>											
1994	-	255	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1995	-	40	-	-	5	-	-	8	-	-	11
<b>Mexico</b>											
1993	-	4 817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	6 668	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	607	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>United States of America</b>											
1993	-	4 026	-	-	°	-	-	178	4 270	26	5
1994	6	8 997	-	-	°	-	-	796	1	478	21
1995	-	15 618	-	-	°	-	29	81	25 000	20 528	477
1996	-	1 628	-	-	°	-	-	24	10	2 673	46
1997	-	1 103	-	-	-	-	°	29	-	8 772	9
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	0	8 843	0	0	0	0	0	178	4 270	26	5
1994	6	15 664	0	0	0	0	0	796	1	478	23
1995	0	15 658	0	0	5	0	29	89	25 000	20 528	488
1996	0	1 628	0	0	°	0	0	24	10	2 673	46
1997	0	1 710	0	0	0	0	0	29	0	8 779	9
<b>South America</b>											
<b>Brazil</b>											
1995	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>ASIA</b>											
<b>East and South-East Asia</b>											
<b>China<sup>a</sup></b>											
1995	-	18 025	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	10 305	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Hong Kong SAR of China<sup>b</sup></b>											
1997	-	271	-	-	-	-	2 561	125	4 200 000	28	°
<b>Japan</b>											
1994	-	202	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Lao People's Democratic Republic</b>											
1996	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	270	-
<b>Myanmar</b>											
1996	-	3 075	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	2 420	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthrnic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Philippines</b>											
1996	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	56	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Republic of Korea</b>											
1993	-	358	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	164	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Thailand</b>											
1994	-	1 519	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	0	358	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	1 821	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	18 189	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	13 533	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	270	0
1997	0	2 785	0	0	0	0	2 561	125	4 200 000	28	0
<b>West Asia</b>											
<b>Armenia</b>											
1996	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Azerbaijan</b>											
1994	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>											
1994	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	°	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>EUROPE</b>											
<b>Bulgaria</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	154	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 460	-	-	-
<b>Croatia</b>											
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	-	-	-
<b>Cyprus</b>											
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	980	-	-	-
<b>Czech Republic</b>											
1993	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	17	-	-	-	-	846	-	-	-	-
1996	-	894	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Latvia</b>											
1994	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Lithuania</b>											
1995	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Malta</b>											
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	591	-	-	-
<b>Norway</b>											
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	45	-	-
<b>Poland</b>											
1993	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 135	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	710	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P ** **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Russian Federation</b>											
1996	-	8	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	3 535	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Slovakia</b>											
1997	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Slovenia</b>											
1995	-	2 750	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Ukraine</b>											
1994	-	<sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	<sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<sup>c</sup>	-
<b>European Union</b>											
<b>Austria</b>											
1994	-	-	-	-	°	-	-	1	-	-	1
<b>Belgium</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<sup>c</sup>	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	-	-	-
<b>Denmark</b>											
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
<b>Finland</b>											
1995	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>France</b>											
1996	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthratic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Germany</b>											
1993	-	°	-	-	°	-	-	2 425	250	-	2
1994	-	°	-	-	°	-	-	602	2	-	12
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
1996	-	59	100	50	°	-	-	6	2	°	1
<b>Ireland</b>											
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22 960	-	-
1996	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Italy</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	36	-	-
1995	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Netherlands</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	5 450	3	<sup>c</sup>	30	-	-	60
1994	-	5 500	-	-	-	-	-	1 035	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	3	-	139	-	-	100	2 400
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 600	3 000	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	-	40	-	1 400	10 200	-	-	40
<b>Spain</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49 332	-	-
<b>Sweden</b>											
1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	°	-	-	-
<b>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</b>											
1993	-	3	-	300	24	-	-	°	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-	1	-	40	-	-	-	-
1996	-	300	-	-	1	-	-	478	-	-	-
1997	-	10	-	-	18	-	-	13	1 000	-	200

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylanthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Total region</b>											
1993	0	4	0	300	5 474	3	17	2 609	286	0	62
1994	0	5 501	0	0	1	0	40	2 782	2	0	13
1995	0	2 805	0	0	3	0	1 485	714	23 005	100	2 402
1996	0	1 267	140	50	1	0	4 600	5 455	2	0	1
1997	0	3 614	0	0	58	0	1 400	11 673	50 332	0	240
<b>OCEANIA</b>											
Australia											
1993	-	°	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	25	10
1994	-	4	-	-	2	5	-	5	1 200	9	1
1995	-	1	-	°	-	-	°	212	-	°	2
1996	-	3	-	-	°	-	°	6	10 050	4	2
1997	-	25	-	-	3	4	-	9	-	°	°
New Zealand											
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-
<b>Total region</b>											
1993	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	25	10
1994	0	4	0	0	2	5	0	5	1 200	9	1
1995	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	212	0	0	2
1996	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	26	10 050	4	2
1997	0	25	0	0	3	4	0	9	0	0	0

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>N-acetylthranilic acid*</i>	<i>Ephedrine</i>	<i>Ergometrine</i>	<i>Ergotamine</i>	<i>Isosafrole*</i>	<i>Lysergic acid</i>	<i>3,4-MDP-2-P **</i>	<i>1-phenyl-2-propanone</i>	<i>Piperonal*</i>	<i>Pseudoephedrine</i>	<i>Safrole*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>grams</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>WORLD TOTAL</b>											
1993	0	8 847	0	300	5 474	5	17	2 788	4 556	51	77
1994	6	23 246	0	0	3	5	40	3 583	1 203	537	37
1995	30	36 653	0	0	47	0	1 514	1 015	48 005	20 628	2 892
1996	0	16 431	140	50	1	0	4 600	5 505	10 062	2 947	251
1997	0	8 134	0	0	101	4	3 961	11 836	4 250 332	8 808	252

Notes: \*Included in Table I of the 1988 Convention in 1992.

\*\*3,4-MDP-2-P = 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.

Côte d'Ivoire (1997), Mali (1993-1995) and Norway (1996) have reported seizures of preparations containing ephedrine believed not for use in illicit manufacture.

<sup>a</sup>For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>b</sup>On 1 July 1997, the territory of Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China.

<sup>c</sup>The exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

Table 3b  
Seizures of substances in Table II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>AFRICA</b>											
South Africa											
1995	-	50	25	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	225
1996	-	5	-	13	8	-	-	-	-	-	3
1997	5	25	-	25	5	-	-	-	-	3	70
Uganda											
1994	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	-	-	2	-
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1994	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	2	0
1995	0	50	25	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	225
1996	0	5	0	13	8	0	0	0	0	0	3
1997	5	25	0	25	5	0	0	0	0	3	70
<b>AMERICAS</b>											
North America											
Canada											
1994	-	179	-	198	170	170	-	9	-	1	4
1995	2	31	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	28	10
Mexico											
1997	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1 317
United States of America											
1993	772	1 489	885	1 038	2 401	6	692	69	3	273	951
1994	195	817	2	793	1 160	40	204	28	6	91	313
1995	351	5 886	1	2 058	3 031	-	847	172	0	242	441
1996	341	3 905	-	618	3 540	194	146	4	4	669	619
1997	23	4 348	-	633	2 834	140	34	-	60 004	667	1 079
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	772	1 489	885	1 038	2 401	6	692	69	3	273	951
1994	195	996	2	991	1 330	210	204	37	6	92	317
1995	353	5 917	1	2 058	3 036	0	847	173	0	270	451
1996	341	3 905	0	618	3 540	194	146	4	4	669	619
1997	23	4 348	0	633	2 837	140	34	0	60 004	667	2 396

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>South America</b>											
<b>Argentina</b>											
1993	-	105	-	101	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	60	-	58	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Bolivia</b>											
1993	-	13 817	-	6 415	983	-	-	-	745	17 574	-
1994	-	39 469	-	24 376	1 572	-	-	-	609	29 476	-
1995	-	6 769	-	-	527	-	-	-	387	7 258	-
1996	-	24 546	-	24 618	3 476	-	-	-	740	33 793	-
<b>Brazil</b>											
1993	-	8 634	-	2 287	-	-	-	-	50	200	-
1994	-	1 849	-	4 346	48	-	-	-	-	2	-
1995	-	1 979	-	1 879	136	-	-	-	<sup>a</sup>	-	-
1997	-	-	-	50	9 832	-	-	-	856	4 430	-
<b>Chile</b>											
1995	-	25 200	-	-	208	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	25 955	-	-	7 985	-	-	-	-	2 814	-
1997	-	2	-	°	78	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Colombia</b>											
1993	-	512 961	-	226 766	112 981	215 194	-	-	29 049	419 975	-
1994	4 701	880 910	-	170 931	397 452	1 537 758	-	-	26 916	538 908	212 842
1995	45	694 475	-	280 366	37 313	200 937	-	-	37 940	239 957	204 840
1997	545	1 244 461	-	320 090	421 664	759 637	-	-	111 154	438 687	211 070
<b>Ecuador</b>											
1993	-	-	-	220	40	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	3 711	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 655	-
1995	-	209 889	-	891	4 194	19 475	-	-	-	829	-
1996	-	6 799	-	480	1 472	9 951	-	-	-	3 635	55
1997	-	15	-	293	3 305	3 290	-	-	-	3 642	698
<b>Paraguay</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 750	-
1994	-	-	-	-	5 375	-	-	-	-	3 206	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Peru</b>											
1993	-	25 697	-	-	363	-	-	-	1 811	18 128	-
1994	-	1 711	-	-	16 053	-	-	-	240	41 379	-
1995	-	681	-	7	23 011	-	-	-	224	26 485	-
1996	-	14 085	-	12	4 663	76	-	-	78	46 670	617
1997	-	17 306	-	54	5 014	889 893	-	-	156	31 720	26
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	0	561 214	0	235 789	114 367	215 194	0	0	31 655	459 627	0
1994	4 701	927 710	0	199 711	420 500	1 537 758	0	0	27 765	615 626	212 842
1995	45	938 992	0	283 143	65 389	220 412	0	0	38 551	274 530	204 840
1996	0	71 385	0	25 111	17 596	10 027	0	0	818	86 912	672
1997	545	1 261 785	0	320 487	439 892	1 652 820	0	0	112 166	478 479	211 794
<b>ASIA</b>											
<b>East and South-East Asia</b>											
<i>China<sup>b</sup></i>											
1995	22 257	-	-	19 150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	19 352	-	-	15 322	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Hong Kong SAR of China<sup>c</sup></i>											
1996	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	-
<b>Japan</b>											
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
<b>Lao People's Democratic Republic</b>											
1996	-	278	-	300	725	-	552	-	-	-	-
<i>Macao</i>											
1993	-	5 475	-	-	4 000	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Myanmar</b>											
1993	4 546	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	5 413	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	3 280	-	-	636	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	23 101	-	-	2 110	580	-	-	-	-	968	-
1997	11 133	1 987	-	4 505	1 296	-	-	-	-	8 701	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Philippines</b>											
1996	-	393	-	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Thailand</b>											
1993	-	-	-	986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	1 150	362	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	60	160	-	1 280	-	-	-	-	-	30	-
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	4 546	5 475	0	986	4 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	6 563	362	0	224	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	25 537	0	0	19 786	0	0	9	0	0	0	0
1996	42 453	671	0	17 971	1 305	0	562	0	0	968	0
1997	11 193	2 147	0	5 785	1 296	0	0	43	0	8 731	0
<b>South Asia</b>											
<b>India</b>											
1993	19 758	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	47 740	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	9 282	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	4 627	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Nepal</b>											
1995	260	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	19 758	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	47 740	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	9 542	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	4 627	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>West Asia</b>											
<b>Armenia</b>											
1995	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Azerbaijan</b>											
1994	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>											
1995	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
Lebanon											
1995	99	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan											
1993	3 880	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	2 822	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	5 495	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	1 927	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey											
1993	179	13	-	153	29	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	20 087	130	-	243	163	-	-	-	-	164	-
1995	49 344	184	-	70	338	-	-	-	-	176	-
1996	41 295	426	-	255	266	-	-	-	-	277	-
1997	6 637	10	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	2	-
United Arab Emirates											
1995	38 050	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uzbekistan											
1996	23 335	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total subregion</b>											
1993	4 059	13	0	153	29	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	22 921	130	0	243	163	0	0	0	0	164	0
1995	92 995	184	0	70	338	0	0	0	0	176	0
1996	66 559	426	0	255	266	0	0	0	0	277	0
1997	6 645	10	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	0
<b>EUROPE</b>											
Bulgaria											
1995	423	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	5 226	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	3 420	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic											
1993	-	21	-	-	22	40	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	149	-	-	-	-	-	-
Croatia											
1996	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Cyprus</b>											
1996	9 236	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Lithuania</b>											
1993	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Norway</b>											
1995	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Romania</b>											
1995	292	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	18 520	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Russian Federation</b>											
1997	17 123	156 666	-	114 294	243 588	351 026	445	-	200	1 262 760	1 964
<b>Slovakia</b>											
1997	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4
<b>Slovenia</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Ukraine</b>											
1994	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	-	-	<i>o</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	1 510	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<i>o</i>	-
1996	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	-	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	-	-	-	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
<b>European Union</b>											
<b>Austria</b>											
1994	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
<b>Belgium</b>											
1994	-	32 486	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	400	-	145	325	3 000	-	-	-	38	<i>a</i>
1996	3 889	273	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Denmark</b>											
1995	55	3	-	13	9	-	-	-	-	11	1
<b>Finland</b>											
1994	-	1	-	-	-	600	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
1996	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<i>Country or territory, by region</i>	<i>Acetic anhydride</i>	<i>Acetone</i>	<i>Anthranilic acid</i>	<i>Ethyl ether</i>	<i>Hydrochloric acid*</i>	<i>Methyl ethyl ketone*</i>	<i>Phenylacetic acid</i>	<i>Piperidine</i>	<i>Potassium permanganate*</i>	<i>Sulphuric acid*</i>	<i>Toluene*</i>
<i>Unit</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>kilograms</i>	<i>litres</i>	<i>litres</i>
<b>Germany</b>											
1993	1	9	°	16	14	°	-	5	°	8	1
1994	121	29	100	4	10	-	-	3	°	3	1
1995	55	3	-	13	9	-	-	-	-	11	1
1996	10	89	-	1	42	-	-	-	-	1	4
<b>Ireland</b>											
1995	-	-	-	280	30	-	-	-	-	25	-
<b>Italy</b>											
1993	-	11	-	25	6	°	-	-	1	2	-
1994	-	582	-	111	40	-	-	-	-	3	-
1995	-	1 269	-	5 632	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	130	-	7 311	1 041	-	-	-	-	407	-
1997	-	88 831	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Netherlands</b>											
1993	-	-	-	"	805	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	1 385	-	1 360	825	-	-	-	-	1 035	-
1995	-	1 310	-	88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	-	54	34	-	-	-	14	-
<b>Portugal</b>											
1993	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Spain</b>											
1993	-	17	-	57	6	-	-	-	-	16	-
1995	-	288	-	173	13	200	-	-	-	-	10
1996	2	75	-	184	50	-	2	-	-	48	-
1997	-	254	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	5
<b>Sweden</b>											
1993	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	-	-	4	-	-	9	-	-	1	-
1997	°	2	-	-	163	-	9	-	-	49	1
<b>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</b>											
1993	406	74	-	26	45	-	1 000	-	°	62	13
1994	5	3	-	30	30	-	2	-	-	33	1
1995	40	23	20	27	65	-	1	-	-	35	20
1996	20	257	-	25	385	-	20	-	-	200	-
1997	-	-	-	25	20	-	-	-	-	25	10

Country or territory, by region	Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid*	Methyl ethyl ketone*	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate*	Sulphuric acid*	Toluene*
Unit	litres	litres	kilograms	litres	litres	litres	kilograms	kilograms	kilograms	litres	litres
<b>Total region</b>											
1993	460	115	0	67	912	80	1 000	5	1	72	14
1994	126	34 487	100	1 506	905	600	2	3	0	1 074	5
1995	810	4 805	20	6 358	591	3 200	7	0	0	108	31
1996	36 903	824	0	7 531	1 518	0	31	0	0	657	4
1997	20 543	245 753	0	114 322	243 831	351 060	454	0	200	1 262 848	1 984
<b>OCEANIA</b>											
<b>Australia</b>											
1993	66	92	-	11	119	-	-	-	-	80	27
1994	815	25	-	1 459	96	-	316	-	-	811	4
1995	146	275	-	63	164	-	72	3	-	283	59
1996	109	281	-	163	163	-	7	-	1	61	225
1997	206	187	-	454	329	-	0	0	0	114	398
<b>New Zealand</b>											
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-
<b>Total region</b>											
1993	66	92	0	11	119	0	0	0	0	80	27
1994	815	25	0	1 459	96	0	316	0	0	811	4
1995	146	275	0	63	164	0	72	3	0	283	59
1996	109	281	0	163	163	0	107	0	1	61	225
1997	206	187	0	454	329	0	0	0	0	114	398
<b>WORLD TOTAL</b>											
1993	29 661	568 399	885	238 044	121 828	215 280	1 692	74	31 659	460 051	992
1994	83 061	963 709	102	204 134	423 049	1 538 568	522	39	27 772	617 769	213 168
1995	129 168	950 223	46	311 478	69 523	223 612	934	176	38 551	275 366	205 606
1996	146 365	77 497	0	51 661	24 395	10 221	846	4	823	89 544	1 523
1997	39 160	1 514 255	0	441 706	688 195	2 004 020	488	43	172 370	1 750 844	216 642

Notes: \*Included in Table II of the 1988 Convention in 1992.

<sup>a</sup>The exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

<sup>b</sup>For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>c</sup>On 1 July 1997, the territory of Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China.

**Table 4**  
**Submission of information by Governments on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention**

Governments of the countries and territories indicated have provided information on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention on Form D for 1995, 1996 and 1997. That information was requested in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995. Details may be made available on a case-by-case basis, subject to confidentiality of data.

*Notes:* Territories are in italics

X signifies that relevant information was submitted on Form D.

<i>Country or territory</i>	1995		1996		1997	
	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Uses and/or requirements</i>	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Uses and/or requirements</i>	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Uses and/or requirements</i>
Afghanistan						
Albania						
Algeria						
Andorra			X	X		
Angola						
<i>Anguilla</i>						
Antigua and Barbuda			X	X	X	X
Argentina						
Armenia	X		X	X		
<i>Aruba</i>						
<i>Ascension Island</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Austria						
Azerbaijan						
Bahamas						
Bahrain						
Bangladesh						
Barbados						
Belarus	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium						
Belize						
Benin			X	X	X	X
<i>Bermuda</i>						
Bhutan						
Bolivia	X		X	X		
Bosnia and Herzegovina						
Botswana	X					
Brazil	X					
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>						
Brunei Darussalam	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burkina Faso						
Burundi						
Cambodia						

Country or territory	1995		1996		1997	
	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements
Cameroon						
Canada						
Cape Verde						
<i>Cayman Islands</i>			X	X		
Central African Republic						
Chad						
Chile	X	X	X	X	X	X
China <sup>a</sup>						
<i>Hong Kong SAR of China</i>	X		X	X	X	X
<i>Christmas Island</i>						
<i>Cocos (Keeling) Islands</i>						
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros						
Congo						
<i>Cook Islands</i>	X	X	X	X		
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X		
Côte d'Ivoire					X	X
Croatia						
Cuba						
Cyprus	X		X	X	X	X
Czech Republic	X	X	X	X	X	X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea						
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X	X	X	X
Denmark	X		X	X	X	X
Djibouti						
Dominica						
Dominican Republic					X	X
Ecuador	X	X	X	X		
Egypt						
El Salvador						
Equatorial Guinea						
Eritrea						
Estonia					X	X
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	X	X				
Fiji	X	X	X	X	X	X
Finland					X	X
France						
<i>French Polynesia</i>						
Gabon						
Gambia						
Georgia			X	X		
Germany						
Ghana						
<i>Gibraltar</i>						

Country or territory	1995		1996		1997	
	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements
Greece	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada						
Guatemala						
Guinea						
Guinea-Bissau						
Guyana						
Haiti						
Honduras						
Hungary	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland						
India						
Indonesia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	X	X	X		X	X
Iraq			X	X	X	
Ireland						
Israel						
Italy			X	X	X	X
Jamaica	X	X			X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan					X	X
Kazakhstan			X	X		
Kenya					X	X
Kiribati						
Kuwait						
Kyrgyzstan				X	X	X
Lao People's Democratic Republic			X	X	X	X
Latvia	X	X	X		X	X
Lebanon						
Lesotho						
Liberia						
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya						
Lithuania	X			X		X
Luxembourg						
Macao					X	X
Madagascar						
Malawi					X	X
Malaysia					X	X
Maldives					X	X
Mali						
Malta	X	X	X	X		
Marshall Islands						
Mauritania						
Mauritius			X	X	X	X
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X	X
Micronesia (Federated States of)		X				
Mongolia						

Country or territory	1995		1996		1997	
	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements
Montserrat						
Morocco	X		X		X	X
Mozambique						
Myanmar						
Namibia						
Nauru						
Nepal			X	X		X
Netherlands						
Netherlands Antilles	X	X	X	X	X	X
New Caledonia						
New Zealand			X			
Nicaragua					X	X
Niger						
Nigeria	X	X				
Norfolk Island						
Norway			X	X		
Oman	X	X	X	X	X	X
Pakistan						
Palau						
Panama	X					
Papua New Guinea						
Paraguay			X	X		
Peru			X	X		
Philippines	X	X	X	X	X	X
Poland	X		X	X	X	
Portugal						
Qatar						
Republic of Korea					X	X
Republic of Moldova						
Romania	X	X	X	X	X	X
Russian Federation			X	X	X	X
Rwanda						
Saint Helena						
Saint Kitts and Nevis						
Saint Lucia						
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						
Samoa	X	X				
Sao Tome and Principe					X	X
Saudi Arabia						
Senegal						
Seychelles	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sierra Leone						
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia						
Slovenia			X	X	X	X

Country or territory	1995		1996		1997	
	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements	Trade	Uses and/or requirements
Solomon Islands						
Somalia						
South Africa					X	X
Spain			X			
Sri Lanka	X	X	X		X	X
Sudan						
Suriname						
Swaziland						
Sweden			X	X	X	X
Switzerland					X	X
Syrian Arab Republic						
Tajikistan			X	X		
Thailand					X	X
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia						
Togo						
Tonga						
Trinidad and Tobago			X	X		
<i>Tristan da Cunha</i>	X	X		X		
Tunisia						
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan			X	X		
<i>Turks and Caicos Islands</i>	X	X	X	X		
Tuvalu						
Uganda						
Ukraine	X	X	X	X		
United Arab Emirates	X	X		X	X	X
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	X	X	X	X	X	X
United Republic of Tanzania						
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay			X	X		
Uzbekistan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vanuatu						
Venezuela	X					
Viet Nam			X		X	X
<i>Wallis and Futuna Islands</i>	X	X	X	X		
Yemen						
Yugoslavia						
Zambia			X			
Zimbabwe	X	X			X	X
Total submissions	55	44	68	64	64	64
Total Governments <sup>b</sup>	209	209	209	209	209	209

<sup>a</sup>For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>b</sup>Number of Governments requested to provide information.

**Table 5**  
**Governments that have requested pre-export notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention**

All Governments of exporting countries and territories are reminded that it is an obligation to provide pre-export notifications to Governments that have requested them pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, which provides that:

“... upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country:

- (i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee;
- (ii) Name of the substance in Table I;
- (iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;
- (iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
- (v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties.”

Governments that have requested pre-export notifications under the above provisions are listed alphabetically, followed by the substance(s) to which the provisions should apply and the date of notification of the request transmitted by the Secretary-General to Governments.

Governments may wish to note the possibility of requesting that a pre-export notification for all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention be also sent.

<i>Notifying Government</i>	<i>Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies</i>	<i>Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General</i>
<i>Cayman Islands<sup>a</sup></i>	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	7 September 1998
<i>Colombia<sup>a</sup></i>	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	14 October 1998
<i>Costa Rica</i>	All substances included in Table I	3 September 1996
<i>Ecuador<sup>a</sup></i>	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	1 August 1996
<i>Latvia</i>	Ephedrine	27 May 1994
<i>Malaysia<sup>a</sup></i>	All substances included in Table I acetic anhydride, anthranilic acid, ethyl ether, phenylacetic acid, piperidine and potassium permanganate	21 August 1998
<i>Turkey<sup>a</sup></i>	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	2 November 1995

---

<i>Notifying Government</i>	<i>Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies</i>	<i>Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General</i>
United Arab Emirates <sup>a</sup>	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	26 September 1995
United States of America	Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine	2 June 1995

---

<sup>a</sup>The Secretary-General has informed all Governments that, at the request of the notifying Government, a pre-export notification for all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention is also required.

## Annex II

### Substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and their typical use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

#### A. List of scheduled substances

##### *Table I*

*N*-acetylthranilic acid  
 Ephedrine  
 Ergometrine  
 Ergotamine  
 Isosafrole  
 Lysergic acid  
 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone  
 1-phenyl-2-propanone  
 Piperonal  
 Pseudoephedrine  
 Safrole

The salts of the substances in this Table whenever the existence of such salts is possible.

##### *Table II*

Acetic anhydride  
 Acetone  
 Anthranilic acid  
 Ethyl ether  
 Hydrochloric acid\*  
 Methyl ethyl ketone  
 Phenylacetic acid  
 Piperidine  
 Potassium permanganate  
 Sulphuric acid\*  
 Toluene

The salts of the substances in this Table whenever the existence of such salts is possible.

---

\* The salts of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid are specifically excluded from Table II.


#### B. Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

1. The scheduled substances and their use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances depicted in figures XVIII to XXI below represent classic production and manufacturing methods. The extraction of cocaine from the coca leaf and the purification of coca paste and the crude base products of cocaine and heroin require solvents, acids and bases. A wide range of such chemicals has been used at all stages of drug production.

Figure XVIII

**Illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin**

(Scheduled substances and the approximate quantities required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of cocaine or heroin hydrochloride)



**Figure XIX**  
**Illicit manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine**

(Scheduled substances and the approximate quantities required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of amphetamine sulphate and methamphetamine hydrochloride)





Figure XX

**Illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs**

(Scheduled substances and the approximate quantities required for the illicit manufacture of 100 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P)

*Note:*

Approximately 250 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDA hydrochloride; and 125 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDMA or MDEA (3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine).


<sup>a</sup>Including safrole in the form of sassafras oil.

<sup>b</sup>MDA = 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine.

<sup>c</sup>MDMA = 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine.

**Figure XXI**  
**Illicit manufacture of LSD, methaqualone and phencyclidine**

(Scheduled substances and the approximate quantities required for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of LSD and 100 kilograms of methaqualone and phencyclidine)



### C. Comparative significance of seizures of precursors

2. The figures above outline the typical use of precursors in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The numbers shown in parentheses in the figures are the approximate quantities of precursors required for illicit drug manufacture. These data may be used to calculate how much drug could be manufactured from a known quantity of seized precursor.

3. To assess the significance of such manufacture in terms of drug doses on the illicit market, the table below gives details of typical street doses of some narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, together with the approximate number of such doses that may be manufactured illicitly from 1 kilogram (or 1 litre) of the relevant precursor.

#### Street doses of drugs manufactured illicitly using precursors

<i>Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance</i>	<i>Street dose<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Precursor</i>	<i>Approximate number of street doses of drugs manufactured using one kilogram (or 1 litre) of precursor</i>
Amphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Phenylacetic acid (kilograms)	1 000 to 25 000
		1-phenyl-2-propanone (litres)	2 000 to 50 000
Cocaine	100 mg to 200 mg	Potassium permanganate (kilograms)	25 000 to 50 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	250 to 500
Heroin	100 mg to 500 mg	Acetic anhydride (litres)	800 to 4 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	100 to 500
LSD	50 µg to 80 µg	Ergometrine/ergotamine (kilograms)	2 500 000 to 4 000 000
		Lysergic acid (kilograms)	8 500 000 to 13 000 000
Methamphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Ephedrine/pseudoephedrine (kilograms)	2 500 to 70 000
Methaqualone	250 mg	Anthranilic acid (kilograms)	4 000
		N-acetylanthranilic acid (kilograms)	3 200

<i>Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance</i>	<i>Street dose<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Precursor</i>	<i>Approximate number of street doses of drugs manufactured using one kilogram (or 1 litre) of precursor</i>
MDA and analogues	100 mg	Safrole (kilograms)	1 000 <sup>b</sup>
		Isosafrole (kilograms)	2 000 <sup>b</sup>
		Piperonal (kilograms)	2 000 <sup>b</sup>
		3,4-MDP-2-P (litres)	4 000 <sup>b</sup>
Phencyclidine	1 mg to 10 mg	Piperidine (kilograms)	100 000 to 1 000 000

<sup>a</sup>Doses may vary depending, *inter alia*, on the route of administration (by mouth, injection, inhalation etc.) and on the frequency of drug use.

<sup>b</sup>For illicit manufacture of MDA. The numbers of street doses of MDMA or MDEA that could be manufactured are approximately twice the figures given.

4. Using the data given in the figures, and in the above table, it can be seen that, for example, 1 kilogram of ephedrine may be used for the manufacture of approximately 0.7 kilogram of methamphetamine. That quantity of drug is equivalent to a maximum of about 70,000 street doses.

5. Similarly, 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be used to manufacture approximately 0.7 kilogram of LSD. That quantity of drug, however, is equivalent to about 10 million dosage units.

6. Therefore, in terms of the availability of the two drugs on the illicit market, the seizure of 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be considered to have an impact approximately 150 times greater than the seizure of the same quantity of ephedrine (10 million divided by 70,000).

## Annex III

### **Treaty provisions for the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances**

1. Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961<sup>a</sup> provides as follows:

“The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.”

2. Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971,<sup>b</sup> provides as follows:

“The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.”

3. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 contains provisions for the following:

(a) General obligation for parties to take measures to prevent diversion of the substances listed in Table I and Table II and to cooperate with each other to that end (paragraph 1);

(b) Mechanism for amending the scope of control (paragraphs 2-7);

(c) Requirement to take appropriate measures to monitor manufacture and distribution, to which end parties may: control persons and enterprises; control establishments and premises under licence; require permits for such operations; and prevent accumulation of substances listed in Tables I and II (paragraph 8);

(d) Obligation to monitor international trade to identify suspicious transactions; to provide for seizures; to notify the authorities of the parties concerned in case of suspicious transactions; to require proper labelling and documentation; and to ensure maintenance of such documents for at least two years (paragraph 9);

(e) Mechanism for advance notice of exports of substances listed in Table I, upon special request (paragraph 10);

(f) Confidentiality of information (paragraph 11);

(g) Reporting by parties to the Board (paragraph 12);

(h) Report of the Board to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (paragraph 13);

(i) Non-applicability of the provisions of article 12 to certain preparations (paragraph 14).

#### *Notes*

<sup>a</sup>United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 520, No. 7515.

<sup>b</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 1019, No. 14956.

## Annex IV

### **Resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly relevant to implementation by Governments of article 12 of the 1988 Convention**

1. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 5 (XXXIV) of 9 May 1991:

*“Urges* source, transit and receiving States to act together but also independently, particularly with regard to specific activities originating in their territories, by establishing measures whereby the legitimacy of chemical shipments may be determined and those found to be suspicious may be investigated, communicating with each other concerning such shipments and taking the action necessary to prohibit such shipments where there is sufficient evidence that they may be diverted into the illicit traffic” (paragraph 5);

*“Urges* all States involved in the international commerce of chemicals commonly used in the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly those listed in Tables I and II of the Convention, to support the development of secure and effective means of communication whereby States may promptly transmit and receive relevant information on the legitimacy of specific transactions” (paragraph 6).

2. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29 of 30 July 1992:

*“Underlines* the importance of applying suitable regulatory measures, in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the 1988 Convention, to every stage of the receipt, storage, handling, processing and delivery of precursor and essential chemicals in free ports and free-trade zones and in other sensitive areas such as bonded warehouses” (paragraph 2);

*“Invites* all chemical-manufacturing States to monitor routinely the export trade in precursor and essential chemicals in a way that will enable them to identify changes in export patterns that suggest the diversion of such chemicals into illicit channels” (paragraph 4);

*“Invites* States in which precursor and essential chemicals are manufactured and States in regions in which narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are illicitly manufactured to establish close cooperation in order to prevent the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals into illicit channels and, if necessary, on a regional basis, to consider the establishment of bilateral agreements or arrangements where appropriate” (paragraph 5);

*“Urges* States that export chemicals essential to the illicit production of heroin and cocaine, namely acetic anhydride, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, MEK, potassium permanganate, sulphuric acid and toluene, to establish suitable mechanisms to detect and prevent their diversion and illicit trafficking and, where there is a risk of diversion of or illicit trafficking in those substances, to ensure that:

“(a) Exporters of those essential chemicals are identified;

“(b) Exporters of those essential chemicals are required to keep detailed records of all export transactions, including details of ultimate consignees, and to make these available for inspection by the competent authorities;

“(c) An export authorization is required in respect of any consignments of commercial quantities of those essential chemicals to any State that has been identified as being concerned by the illicit manufacture of heroin or cocaine on its territory or as sensitive as regards the possible diversion of essential chemicals, taking into account the relevant reports of the International Narcotics Control Board, the Customs Cooperation Council and the International Criminal Police Organization;

“(d) Applicants for export authorizations are required to provide full details of ultimate consignees and transport arrangements;

“(e) The competent authorities, in considering applications for export authorizations, take reasonable steps to verify the legitimacy of transactions, in consultation, where appropriate, with their counterparts in importing countries” (paragraph 6);

“*Recommends* that, if permitted by the basic principles of their legal systems, States should strengthen law enforcement cooperation by applying the technique of controlled delivery at the international level in appropriate circumstances to suspect consignments of precursor and essential chemicals” (paragraph 7);

“*Invites* Governments to establish close cooperation with the chemical industry with a view to identifying suspicious transactions of precursor and essential chemicals and, where appropriate, to encourage the industry to establish codes of conduct to complement and enhance compliance with regulatory requirements” (paragraph 16).

3. The Council, in its resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993:

“*Calls upon* all Governments, which were invited by the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29, to establish effective measures to implement article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, to take fully into consideration the recommendations contained in the final report of the Chemical Action Task Force” (paragraph 1);

“*Urges* Governments to consider fully and, where appropriate, to apply the guidelines disseminated by the Programme, which have been prepared for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals” (paragraph 9).

4. The Council, in its resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995:

“1. *Urges* that Governments, where appropriate, invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, in order to give importing countries advance notice of any shipment of substances listed in Table I of the Convention;

“2. *Requests* the Government of an exporting country, subject to its legal provisions, to provide the following information to the competent authorities of the importing country prior to any export, even when the importing countries have not yet formally requested such notification under article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention:

“(a) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, of the consignee;

“(b) Name of the substance listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention;

“(c) Quantity of the substance to be exported;

“(d) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;

“(e) Such other information as the exporting Government may deem relevant;

“3. *Requests* that, for any substance listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention, the Government of an importing country, upon receipt of any form of pre-export notification from the exporting country, should undertake, through its regulatory authorities and in cooperation with the law enforcement authorities, an investigation of the legitimacy of the transaction, and, with the possible assistance of the International Narcotics Control Board, convey information thereon to the exporting country;

“4. *Urges* exporting Governments at the same time to conduct their own investigation in questionable cases and to seek information and views from the Board, international organizations and Governments as appropriate, in as much as additional facts establishing suspicion may be available to them;

“5. *Further requests* Governments, where there is sufficient evidence that a substance may be diverted into illicit channels, to stop the shipments or, where circumstances warrant, to cooperate in controlled deliveries of suspicious shipments in special circumstances if the security of the shipment can be sufficiently ensured, if the quantity and nature of the chemical involved is such that it can be managed feasibly and safely by the competent authorities, and if all States whose cooperation is necessary, including transit States, agree to the controlled delivery;

“6. *Urges* Governments to exercise, as a matter of urgency, increased vigilance over the activities of brokers handling substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention, in view of the special role that some of them play in the diversion of such substances, and to subject them to licensing or other effective control measures as necessary;

“7. *Urges* Governments to ensure, as far as possible, that shipments entering or leaving free ports, free zones and bonded warehouses, be subject, where permitted, to the controls necessary to safeguard against diversion;

“8. *Urges* Governments, subject to the provisions of national legislation on confidentiality and data protection, to inform the Board on a regular basis, upon request of the Board and in the form and manner provided for by it, of the quantities of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention that they have imported, exported or trans-shipped, and encourages them to estimate their annual licit needs;

“9. *Requests* the Board, drawing upon the capabilities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, to collect information pursuant to paragraph 8 above, and to further develop and strengthen its database in order to assist Governments in preventing diversion of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention, and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in discussing the control of illicit manufacture of, trafficking in and use of psychotropic substances, especially of stimulants and their precursors, and in formulating policy recommendations in this field;

“10. *Requests* all Governments to provide the Secretary-General, subject to the provisions of national legislation on confidentiality and data protection, with names and addresses of the manufacturers, within their countries, of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention, and further requests the Secretary-General to include that information in the publication entitled *Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances under International Control*;<sup>a</sup>”

“... ”

“13. *Encourages* Governments to consider strengthening, where necessary, the working mechanisms to prevent diversion of substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention, as described in the present resolution.”

5. The Council, in its resolution 1996/29 of 24 July 1996:

“I

“SPECIAL SURVEILLANCE OF SCHEDULED  
AND NON-SCHEDULED SUBSTANCES

“1. *Calls upon* all States parties to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 to enact any legislation necessary to provide their competent authorities with the legal basis fully to implement the chemical controls required or recommended by the Convention and all related resolutions;

“2. *Calls upon* the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the International Narcotics Control Board, drawing upon the expertise of competent national authorities as needed, to establish a limited international special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances for which substantial information exists of their use in illicit drug trafficking, in order to allow, according to the nature and trade patterns of each product, for appropriate measures to prevent use by traffickers of those substances;

“3. *Urges* all States parties to the 1988 Convention to establish arrangements, whether voluntary, administrative or legislative, whereby their domestic exporters, importers and distributors of the chemicals and substances included in the special surveillance list will report suspicious orders or thefts of such chemicals, and cooperate with national enforcement and control authorities with regard to those chemicals and substances;

“4. *Urges* States parties to the 1988 Convention, subject to their legal provisions, to take civil, criminal or administrative action, as appropriate, against suppliers of scheduled substances or, where possible, substances included in the special surveillance list for failure to cooperate with the authorities with regard to those substances;

“5. *Strongly urges* States that export scheduled chemicals not to permit exports of such chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention in sensitive cases which may be identified by the Board, or to brokers or intermediaries who facilitate trade, but are not themselves end-users, unless prior identification of any genuine consignee and such inquiries as may be appropriate be also made;

“6. *Further urges* States, in accordance with their legal provisions, not to permit the importation of chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention

where a risk of diversion exists, until evidence establishes the legitimacy of the importer and the purpose of the chemical import;

“7. *Urges* States, except in cases where a known risk of diversion exists, and prior to permitting the importation of chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, to require, in accordance with their legal provisions, evidence of legitimacy of importers and domestic distributors of those chemicals which are intended for subsequent sale or delivery to bulk domestic distributors;

“8. *Urges* Governments to consider ways of reinforcing international cooperation, including, where appropriate, bilateral and multilateral arrangements or agreements against the diversion of scheduled substances and their substitutes;

“9. *Invites* Governments that have not yet done so to designate, as a matter of priority, authorities competent for the control of scheduled substances, to inform the Secretary-General that they have taken such action and to enhance the establishment of bilateral relations between importing, exporting and transit countries.

## “II

### “RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

“1. *Urges* Governments to implement specific actions to control scheduled chemicals as requested in its resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995;

“2. *Requests* the International Narcotics Control Board to collect and compile data that would establish a pattern of trade in chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, including any significant volume of transactions, to draw the attention of the competent authorities of countries concerned to any irregularities that the Board, in its judgement, may identify, and to invite those authorities to provide the Board with any additional information, as necessary, and to take appropriate action, especially preventive action; such action by Governments, both importing and exporting, ought to include:

“(a) Consulting with and providing relevant data to the Board in conformity with legal requirements of confidentiality and data protection, where concern exists that an export or trans-shipment of such chemicals or substances may be diverted into the illicit traffic;

“(b) Verification by the importing country of the legitimacy of transactions on the basis of pre-export notifications of such substances to be sent by the exporting countries, as provided for in article 12 of the 1988 Convention;

“(c) Not permitting the export of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and, where possible, substances included in the special surveillance list, to areas of special risk where it is known that they are commonly used to produce illicit drugs, until information is available to establish the legitimate purpose of the chemicals or substances to be imported;

“3. *Requests* that, pursuant to the initiatives taken by the Board in accordance with paragraph 2 above, the Governments of exporting and importing countries and territories verify the legitimacy of the individual transactions concerned and prevent the release of such shipments until the competent authority of the importing country

or territory has, in compliance with the time constraints of the exporting country, indicated that it has no objection to the transaction in question;

“4. *Recommends* that, wherever possible, Governments should obtain early notification from operators of all proposed transactions of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention in order to check their legitimacy, and inform other countries and territories accordingly, in compliance with the provisions of that Convention;

“5. *Requests* all Governments of countries and territories to alert other Governments, as appropriate, through the Board, as soon as diversion attempts are identified, and to cooperate in controlled deliveries, if necessary, in order to prevent traffickers from turning to other countries or regions to obtain the precursors they require;

“6. *Urges* Governments with free ports and free-trade zones to closely monitor, in particular, the movement of amphetamine-type stimulants and scheduled substances under the 1988 Convention through such trading centres, pursuant to the Convention, and to provide for a mechanism to seize consignments when adequate grounds for suspicion have been established;

“7. *Requests* Governments with free ports and free-trade zones to provide information as requested by the Board in order to strengthen measures to monitor the movement of the amphetamine-type stimulants and scheduled substances under the 1988 Convention in those ports and zones;

“8. *Encourages* Governments of countries and territories to examine the scope of their current controls over domestic distribution in order to prevent internal diversion of scheduled substances under the 1988 Convention, which could be subsequently smuggled to neighbouring countries where illicit manufacture of drugs takes place;

“9. *Invites* Governments to consider monitoring the intermediaries and brokers who facilitate trade but are not themselves end-users by appropriate measures, such as applying the current control procedures and resorting to the sanctions applicable to other operators that handle or use controlled substances.”

6. The Council, in its resolution 1997/41 of 21 July 1997:

“I

“GENERAL MEASURES

“...

“4. *Requests* Governments and regional organizations, as they establish mechanisms for the collection of data on the licit and illicit manufacture, trafficking and use of amphetamine-type stimulants and their precursors, to cooperate and coordinate with the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the International Narcotics Control Board;

“...

“II

“MEASURES TO COUNTER THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE,  
TRAFFICKING AND ABUSE OF AMPHETAMINE-TYPE  
STIMULANTS

“...

“5. *Requests* Governments to provide available evidence and data to the International Narcotics Control Board on chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, and requests the Board to assess that information for possible inclusion in a limited international special surveillance list to be established for use by the international community;

“6. *Urges* Governments:

“(a) To consider applying civil, criminal and administrative sanctions to those who knowingly supply non-controlled chemicals for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants;

“(b) To establish mechanisms for international cooperation between law enforcement and other relevant agencies, in order to support investigations where competent national authorities were able to determine that non-controlled chemicals were being used for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants;

“7. *Urges* Governments, in States where illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants exists:

“(a) To improve, in particular by a system of licensing and inspection, the monitoring of the domestic manufacture and distribution of key precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988;

“(b) To support research by competent authorities in order to determine which non-controlled chemical substances are being used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants;

“8. *Requests* the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, drawing on extrabudgetary resources, in consultation with the International Narcotics Control Board, to assist Governments, as required, by providing technical advice on ways of establishing which non-controlled chemical substances are being used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants;

“9. *Urges* Governments to establish the necessary legal basis for the prevention of the clandestine manufacture of and trafficking in new amphetamine-type stimulants, and for that purpose:

“(a) To exchange information about the new non-controlled amphetamine-type stimulants with other concerned Governments;

“(b) To consider developing flexible and anticipatory scheduling approaches for analogues of controlled substances and other substitutes, for example, by the emergency scheduling of structurally similar groups, or by the establishment of controls based on similarities in structure or pharmacological effects;

“(c) To cooperate in ensuring the compatibility of such legislation;

“...

“III

“VERIFICATION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF TRANSACTIONS

“1. *Requests* Governments to make every effort to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions involving precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants listed in Table I and, where possible, those listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention, using the guidelines disseminated by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursors and essential chemicals, which were endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993;

“2. *Requests* Governments of States exporting those precursors referred to in paragraph 1 above, prior to permitting shipments to proceed, to inquire with the authorities of importing States about the legitimacy of transactions of concern, and to inform the International Narcotics Control Board of the action taken, particularly when they do not receive any reply to their inquiries;

“3. *Also requests* Governments of States exporting such precursors to inform the States concerned and the Board as soon as possible, if export orders are cancelled pending a reply to inquiries made to importing States;

“4. *Requests* Governments of both importing and exporting States, in cooperation with the Board, to take appropriate action to protect the legitimate interests of industries that cooperate in inquiries to verify the legitimacy of transactions involving the precursors specified in paragraph 1 above;

“5. *Also requests* Governments of importing and exporting States to take steps to initiate a cooperative, rapid and effective exchange of information, with each other and with the Board, concerning stopped or cancelled shipments of such precursors, in order to alert Governments of other States that might be targeted as points of diversion.”

7. The General Assembly, in its resolution S-20/4 B on the control of precursors, adopted at its twentieth special session on 10 June 1998, requested the following action:

“I. MEASURES TO PREVENT THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE, IMPORT,  
EXPORT, TRAFFICKING AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRECURSORS  
USED IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC  
DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES

“A. Legislation and national control systems

“....

“4. States in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:

“(a) Adopt and implement, where they have not already done so, the necessary national laws and regulations required for strict compliance with the provisions and proposals of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, and related resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council, including, in particular, the establishment of a system of control and

licensing of the enterprises and persons engaged in the manufacture and distribution of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and a system for monitoring the international trade in such substances for the purpose of facilitating the detection of suspicious shipments, and designate competent national authorities responsible for implementing such controls;

“(b) Review regularly, and take appropriate steps to strengthen existing precursor controls should any weaknesses be identified, giving full consideration to the related recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board as contained in the annual reports of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention;

“(c) Adopt penal, civil or administrative measures for punishing, in accordance with their legislative provisions, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the unlawful conduct of individuals or companies in connection with the diversion of precursors from legitimate commerce into the illicit drug manufacture;

“(d) Exchange experience on procedures for the adoption of legislation and on the application of measures for combating and punishing illicit traffic in, and diversion of, precursors, including the use, where appropriate, of controlled deliveries;

“(e) Submit timely reports to the International Narcotics Control Board on national regulations adopted to control the export, import and transit of precursors, including details of the requirements that have to be met for the authorization of imports and exports;

“(f) Adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the disposal of seized chemicals has no harmful effect on the environment.

#### “B. Information exchange

“...

“7. States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary, and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:

“(a) Improve their mechanisms and procedures for monitoring trade in precursors, including the following actions:

“(i) Regular exchange of information between exporting, importing and transit States, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, on exports of precursors before they take place, including, in particular, the provision by exporting States of pre-export notification to the competent authorities in importing countries for all transactions involving the substances in Table I and, in addition to the requirements of article 12, paragraph 10, of the 1988 Convention, acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate upon request to the Secretary-General by the importing country. Recognizing the importance and usefulness of pre-export notifications for combating effectively the illicit production of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and, particularly, of amphetamine-type stimulants, the same efforts should be made with regard to the remaining substances listed in Table II. These measures should complement tight

domestic controls in all countries which are also necessary to ensure the prevention of diversion of precursor chemicals;

- “(ii) Promotion of the implementation, by competent national authorities, of mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of transactions before they take place, including: the exchange of information on the legitimate domestic need for the chemical; timely feedback to exporting States by States that have received pre-export notifications; and provision by exporting States, when requested by the importing State, to allow for adequate time, to the extent possible, up to fifteen days, to verify the legitimate end-use;
- “(iii) Exchange of information between exporting, importing and transit States, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, on suspicious transactions involving precursors and, where appropriate, on seizures effected and denials made;

“(b) Keep confidential any industrial, business, commercial or professional secrets or trade processes contained in the reports provided by States on the export, import or transit and intended use of precursors, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, paragraph 11, of the 1988 Convention. Where necessary, an appropriate legal framework should be set up to ensure the suitable protection of personal data;

“(c) Notify, as rapidly as possible, the International Narcotics Control Board, and the other States concerned as they consider necessary, of any decision to deny a permit for the shipment of a precursor if it has not been possible to verify the legitimacy of a transaction, whether an import, export or trans-shipment, providing all relevant information concerning the reasons for the denial, so that other States may consider taking a similar course of action. Whenever an importing, exporting or transit State is considering issuing a permit for shipment, it should make its decision with due assessment of all the elements of the case, and in particular of any such information provided to it by the State that has denied the issue of a permit for that shipment.

#### “C. Data collection

“...

“9. States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary, and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:

“(a) Design and establish flexible and effective mechanisms, where they do not already exist, subject to provisions for confidentiality and data protection, for obtaining data on the licit manufacture, import or export of precursors, and on any other activity related to the trade in precursors and for monitoring the movement of such substances, including the establishment of a register of public or private companies engaged in any activity relating thereto, which are to report suspicious orders for, or cases of theft of, precursors and to cooperate at all times with the competent national authorities;

“(b) Establish or strengthen cooperation with associations of the chemical trade and industry, and with persons or companies engaged in any activity related to precursors, for example, through the establishment of guidelines or a code of conduct, to intensify efforts aimed at controlling such substances;

“(c) Establish the principle of “know your client” for those who manufacture or market chemicals in order to improve the exchange of information.

“II. TOWARDS MORE UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
IN PRECURSOR CONTROL

“...

“12. States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary, and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:

“(a) Institutionalize uniform procedures to facilitate the widespread, multilateral exchange of information on suspicious transactions and stopped shipments in the course of implementing national precursor control laws and regulations based on the international drug control conventions and related resolutions, guidelines and recommendations in such a way as to complement bilateral or regional agreements;

“(b) Promote multilateral arrangements that encourage the exchange of essential information for effective monitoring of the international trade in precursors, to complement similar bilateral or regional agreements, with special emphasis on devising practical systems for sharing information on individual transactions;

“(c) Disseminate more systematic information on the ways and means used by criminal organizations for illicit trafficking in, and diversion of, precursors, with a view to adopting measures to prevent such illicit activities, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12 (c), of the 1988 Convention;

“(d) Promote technical assistance programmes for States upon request, according the highest priority to those with the least resources, for the purpose of strengthening control of precursors and avoiding their diversion for illicit purposes;

“(e) Promote the exchange of experience relating to police, customs and other administrative investigation, interception, detection and control of diversion of precursors;

“(f) Organize expert meetings, where necessary, on combating the illicit traffic in, and diversion of, precursors, in order to promote professional skills and raise levels of expertise.

“III. SUBSTITUTE CHEMICALS

“...

“14. States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary, and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:

“(a) Cooperate with the International Narcotics Control Board in the preparation of a limited international special surveillance list of substances currently not in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and for which substantial information exists of their use in illicit drug trafficking, as requested by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1996/29, section I, of 24 July 1996, contributing to the maintenance of that list by informing the Board on a regular basis, in accordance

with article 12, paragraph 12, of non-scheduled substances that have been diverted from licit channels to illicit traffic and promoting studies of the potential use of non-scheduled substances with a view to the timely identification of any that could be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs;

“(b) Apply monitoring measures, whether voluntary, administrative or legislative, in cooperation with the chemical industry, so as to prevent the diversion from licit channels to the illicit traffic of substances included on the special surveillance list, including specific monitoring measures for those substances that are relevant at the national or regional levels. In addition, States shall consider punishing, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the diversion of non-scheduled chemical substances with the knowledge that they are intended for use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and introducing related penal, civil and administrative sanctions.”

#### *Notes*

- <sup>a</sup> Publication brought up to date and reissued as follows: *Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors* (ST/NAR.4/1998/1).

## **Annex V**

### **Summary of the recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board relevant to implementation by Governments of article 12 of the 1988 Convention**

1. A summary of recommendations relating to the application of controls by Governments, contained in previous reports of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, is presented below. For ease of reference, the recommendations appear under the following headings:

- (a) Legislation and specific control measures (legislation; working mechanisms and operating procedures; control measures in general; international trade; domestic distribution; intermediaries; pharmaceutical preparations and natural products);
- (b) Identifying competent authorities responsible for implementation of article 12;
- (c) Providing the Board with details of control measures applied by Governments;
- (d) Collection of data and their provision to the Board;
- (e) Information exchange (prerequisites; first steps; pre-export notifications and follow-up by importing countries; verification of legitimacy of transactions; general export data and follow-up by importing countries; system to alert other countries of suspicious shipments and follow-up of such alerts; informing exporting countries of issued import authorizations; confidentiality; extension of existing mechanisms);
- (f) Follow-up actions after discovery of the illicit manufacture of drugs.

The annex will be updated in future versions of the report, as necessary.

#### **A. Legislation and specific control measures**

##### **1. Legislation**

2. Governments should establish a legislative basis for regulatory control over substances listed in Tables I and II, and, within that framework, provide for related sanctions and penal provisions to ensure strict enforcement of the legislation put in place and act as deterrents of criminal activity.

3. In view of the increased use of non-scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of drugs, Governments should adopt penal, civil or administrative measures for punishing, in accordance with their legislative provisions, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the unlawful conduct of individuals or companies in connection with the diversion of substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. Legislation should refer to the intention to manufacture drugs illicitly, regardless of whether the chemicals to be used are under national or international control or not.

##### **2. Working mechanisms and operating procedures**

4. Governments should, whether or not they already have in place any comprehensive legislation for the control of substances listed in Tables I and II, establish or refine practical working mechanisms and operating procedures to monitor the licit movement of

such substances. Such working mechanisms and procedures can be established through informal, yet institutionalized, arrangements even when the relevant legislation is not yet in place.

5. Such working mechanisms and procedures should incorporate the activities of all the relevant regulatory and enforcement authorities involved in the control of substances included in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention. They should also encompass the work of industry to elicit relevant data from chemical producers, distributors and trade organizations, having due regard for lawful commercial interests.

### **3. Control measures in general**

6. Within geographical regions, in particular, control measures should be harmonized so that weak controls in one country do not jeopardize the efforts of neighbouring countries where controls may be more effective.

### **4. International trade**

7. Governments that experience difficulties in monitoring imports of substances listed in Table I should invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), for those substances, to request formally that pre-export notifications be sent to their competent authorities.

8. Governments should also consider requesting pre-export notifications for substances listed in Table II. In such cases, the Secretary-General will inform all Governments that, at the request of the notifying Government, a pre-export notification for substances listed in Table II is also required.

9. Exporting and transit countries should monitor all shipments, and not just those to regions where illicit manufacture is known to take place, so that they are able to identify suspicious shipments, regardless of their destinations.

10. Countries through which substances listed in Tables I and II transit should consider especially their dual responsibilities in acting both as importing and exporting countries. For the controls of re-exports to be effective, they should also monitor imports, some of which may later be re-exported and subsequently diverted elsewhere.

### **5. Domestic distribution**

11. Since substances listed in Tables I and II continue to be diverted in significant quantities from domestic trade, to be often subsequently smuggled to neighbouring countries where illicit drugs are manufactured, all countries should introduce or strengthen, as appropriate, control measures for the licit manufacture and/or distribution of such substances.

### **6. Intermediaries**

12. Applications for export authorizations should identify any intermediaries associated with a given transaction involving substances listed in Tables I and II, as well as the owner of the consignment, and should specify the final destination of that consignment.

13. Governments should apply to intermediaries the same control requirements as are applied to other operators handling or using substances listed in Tables I and II. In particular, intermediaries should be subject to registration or licensing requirements,

where appropriate; should be required to keep appropriate records; and should face regulatory and penal sanctions if they are found to be facilitating diversions.

**7. Pharmaceutical preparations and natural products**

14. To provide for the proper control of pharmaceutical preparations containing scheduled substances, such pharmaceutical preparations, if, technically, they can be readily used in the illicit manufacture of controlled substances, should be controlled in the same way as the scheduled substance they contain.

15. Natural products that contain a high content of a substance included in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention, and because of this may be readily used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, should be controlled in the same way as the scheduled substance they contain. In particular, sassafras oil, because of its very high content of safrole, should be considered as safrole itself and referred to as "safrole in the form of sassafras oil"; it should be controlled in the same way as safrole in its pure form.

**B. Identifying competent authorities responsible for implementation of article 12**

16. Governments should identify the competent authorities, and communicate to the Board their official titles, contact addresses and respective roles in the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29.

**C. Providing the Board with details of control measures applied by Governments**

17. Governments should inform the Board of the control measures currently applied or envisaged by the various authorities, especially with regard to the import and export of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention.

18. Importing countries that require individual import certificates for the import of substances listed in Tables I and II should provide the Board with copies of authentic documents.

**D. Collection of data and their provision to the Board**

19. Data on stopped and suspended shipments should be provided to the Board. Collected information on methods of diversion and the illicit manufacture of drugs should include: specific methods used in the illicit manufacture of drugs; capacities of laboratories seized; the identities of the substances used in the illicit manufacture, including, in particular, substances that are not yet listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention; and the quantities used.

20. Governments should establish mechanisms to collect data on the licit manufacture of and trade in substances listed in Tables I and II in order to monitor their movement. As a minimum, Governments should be aware of the companies dealing with such substances, and of the approximate quantities manufactured, exported, imported and used.

## **E. Information exchange**

### **1. Prerequisites**

21. As a prerequisite for any of the actions mentioned below, Governments need to identify the names and contact addresses of the competent authorities responsible for the control of substances listed in Tables I and II, and to share that information with other Governments. They need an established system of data collection to keep track of intended and past exports and imports, and of operators dealing with those substances. At the national level, they also need a mechanism to enable all government agencies concerned with control of the substances to share information. Finally, Governments need a legislative basis for the control of the substances, and details of actual control measures applied need to be shared with other Governments.

### **2. First steps**

22. As a first step in verifying the legitimacy of transactions involving substances in Tables I and II, Governments should use the "Guidelines for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursors and essential chemicals", which have been distributed to all Governments by UNDCP pursuant to Council resolution 1993/40.

23. In some countries, end-use declarations showing the specific intended uses of the substance in question, and also whether it is destined for re-export, are required from the purchaser for certain transactions. Since an end-use declaration can be a useful tool in the screening process to identify suspicious circumstances related to orders received, Governments should encourage exporting companies to request an end-use declaration, wherever appropriate.

24. When sharing information on individual transactions with another Government or a competent international body, regardless of whether they are suspicious or not, countries should consider using the standard form for exchange of information provided by the Board to all Governments.

### **3. Pre-export notifications and follow-up by importing countries**

25. Some form of pre-export notifications provided to the competent authorities in importing countries regardless of suspicions of possible diversions will enable Governments of importing countries to be aware of shipments of scheduled substances destined to their territories.

26. For that purpose, Governments of exporting countries should provide such notifications for all substances listed in Table I. For substances in Table II, Governments should, as a minimum, provide pre-export notifications regarding shipments of acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate, critical chemicals for illicit manufacture of, respectively, heroin and cocaine.

27. To the extent possible, the notifications should be sent on a regular basis, even when no formal request under the provisions of the 1988 Convention, article 12, paragraph 10 (a), has been received from the importing countries, and even if exports appear, prima facie, to be legitimate. They should, as a minimum, provide information on the substance and the importer in question, and on the approximate date of shipment.

28. The Governments of importing countries receiving pre-export notifications or copies of export authorizations should take immediate action upon receiving such notices to examine whether or not the transactions in question are legitimate, including visits to the companies, especially when a systematic monitoring mechanism has not yet been established. They should then provide feedback to the exporting country. As with requests to verify the legitimacy of transactions, it is in the interest of the importing country to respond immediately, since there may be a possibility that the competent authorities of the exporting country can then stop an unwanted export before it takes place, or arrange for a controlled delivery.

29. In addition, the competent authorities of the importing country should further contact the importers to find out whether the consignment in question is to remain in the country, or is intended for re-export. In case the shipment in question is for re-export, the Government of the transit country or territory should use the above-mentioned guidelines, and, as necessary, send an inquiry concerning the legitimacy of the transaction, or a pre-export notification to the next importing country.

#### **4. Verification of legitimacy of transactions**

30. Governments should carefully check individual transactions, even if the importer in question appears to be authorized, and especially when established patterns of trade are changing in a way that may raise concern, or where individual transactions involve large quantities of substances listed in Tables I and II. Wherever practicable on a regular basis, and especially where there exists a suspicion of the possible diversion of the substance in question, exporting countries should verify the legitimacy of individual transactions either directly with the authorities of the importing country, or through the Board, before releasing the shipment in question. Further, they should not authorize exports until the authorities in the importing or transit country have indicated that they have no objection to such exports. For important cases, Governments should inform the Board of those actions, even if they have not requested its assistance.

31. Importing countries should respond to inquiries concerning the legitimacy of specific transactions, indicating whether the shipment should be released or stopped. If licit trade is not to be unduly delayed, it is therefore essential that the Governments of importing countries reply in a timely manner to such inquiries. Governments should immediately inform the Board if export orders have been cancelled while they are awaiting a reply from importing countries.

32. Similarly, exporting countries which do not receive a reply to their inquiries about individual shipments should inform the Board of this fact.

33. If the authorities of the importing country find an element of suspicion in the transaction in question but are not able to complete the investigation in the time requested by the exporting country, they should immediately contact the Government of the exporting country, and the Board, and request that the shipment be suspended pending further investigation.

34. In those cases where inquiries about transactions have uncovered suspicious circumstances, the competent authorities should consider not only stopping the export, but also arranging controlled deliveries with their counterparts, in order to help identify the site of the illicit manufacture of drugs and the arrest and prosecution of the illicit manufacturers involved. In considering the option of carrying out a controlled delivery,

due account should be taken of practical and legal difficulties in doing so, and of the risks involved.

#### **5. General export data and follow-up by importing countries**

35. Countries that export substances listed in Tables I and II should routinely provide at least general information on those exports to the respective importing countries. Such information should include as a minimum the names of the importing companies and export trends.

36. Importing countries should provide feedback on the ultimate use and legitimacy of the shipments of which they have been informed by the exporting countries.

#### **6. System to alert other countries of suspicious shipments and follow-up of such alerts**

37. If the verification process has established suspicion about the transaction concerned, the competent authorities of the exporting country should, unless controlled deliveries have been arranged, immediately make arrangements to stop<sup>a</sup> the shipment. Acting in concert, the Governments of the exporting and/or importing countries should then provide alerts about such a diversion attempt to other Governments which in their view might be targeted as points of diversion. Such alerts should be provided also in cases where the exporting country has stopped the shipment without contacting the importing country.

38. If, for any reason, the shipment could not be stopped, the authorities of the exporting countries should provide more details to the importing country to enable it to intercept the shipment in question upon arrival.

39. Governments should also provide the Board with details of diversion attempts and stopped shipments, including the reasons why the shipments were stopped and the facts that first raised suspicions in the minds of the competent authorities, and indicate whether suspicious circumstances were cleared up afterwards.

40. Governments that receive notifications on stopped shipments involving companies or individuals located in their territories should investigate all cases brought to their attention, and reply to the authorities of the exporting country, informing them whether the suspicion was indeed justified, or whether the investigations have cleared the company. Where suspicions are confirmed, the country should also take appropriate steps against the company or individual in question, in accordance with current national legislation.

41. All Governments should alert their counterparts of suspicious attempts to obtain substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, wherever necessary through the Board, so that traffickers who have failed to obtain chemicals in one country do not succeed in another.

42. All Governments with a mechanism in place to alert neighbouring countries as soon as diversion attempts are identified should extend that mechanism, as appropriate through the Board, to other Governments, since, once identified, traffickers are likely to turn to other countries or regions to obtain the substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. For that purpose, countries should again consider using the standard form for exchange of information provided by the Board to all Governments.

**7. Informing exporting countries of issued import authorizations**

43. Governments of importing countries that have an authorization system in place should provide the names of companies authorized to import substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs to the competent authorities of the exporting countries.

44. In cases where individual import certificates are required, Governments of importing countries should provide copies of the import certificates to the competent authorities of the exporting countries. That should be done as early as possible, preferably when the order is placed with the exporting company.

**8. Confidentiality**

45. Commercial secrecy should be protected, but should not be allowed to benefit traffickers by becoming an obstacle to preventing diversions.

**9. Extension of existing mechanisms**

46. Governments should promote the development of multilateral arrangements, and especially practical means, that encourage the exchange of essential information for the monitoring of substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. They should also institutionalize uniform procedures to facilitate the widespread, multilateral exchange of information in the course of implementing controls of those substances, to ensure universal cooperation.

**F. Follow-up actions after discovery of the illicit manufacture of drugs**

47. When dismantling a clandestine laboratory, law enforcement authorities should either seize any chemicals on the premises, since they might be intended for use in illicit manufacture, or make a detailed record of those chemicals. If all chemicals appear to have been used and the final drug has been manufactured, any remaining evidence of the chemicals used should be seized (including, for example, empty bottles or drums that may have contained them).

48. On the basis of the information derived from those seizures or records, law enforcement agencies should make every effort to identify the substances used in illicit manufacture (for example, through chemical analysis) and determine, where possible, their origin.

49. Law enforcement authorities should then report their findings, including, in particular, substances which had been identified and are not yet listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention, to their national authorities, which should subsequently share the information with other Governments and relevant international bodies, for example, the Board (see also section D above on this issue).

\*\*\*\*

50. The Board stands ready to assist Governments, where necessary and to the extent practicable, in their endeavour to prevent diversion of substances included in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention, by contacting other Governments, providing additional relevant information available to the Board, or accessing information that may be available in

databases maintained by Governments or other international and regional organizations. In so doing, the Board will act as a gateway for the exchange of information, within the international network of databases and between individual Governments, through direct electronic communication links where these have been established.

*Notes*

- <sup>a</sup> For the purpose of the following paragraphs, the term “stopped shipment” includes any shipment stopped, suspended or voluntarily withdrawn by the exporter, because of suspicion.

### **كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة**

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو أكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

#### **如何购取联合国出版物**

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。 请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

### **HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS**

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

### **COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES**

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

### **КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ**

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

### **COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS**

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

## THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

The International Narcotics Control Board is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ, established by treaty, for the implementation of the international drug control treaties. It had predecessors under the former drug control treaties as far back as the time of the League of Nations. The responsibility of the Board is to monitor and promote compliance by Governments with the provisions of the international drug control treaties and to assist them in their efforts to fulfil their obligations under those treaties.

The functions of the Board are laid down in the following treaties: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1953 as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Broadly speaking, the Board deals with the following:

(a) As regards the licit manufacture of, trade in and use of drugs, the Board endeavours, in cooperation with Governments, to ensure that adequate supplies of drugs are available for medical and scientific uses and that the diversion of drugs from licit sources to illicit channels does not occur. The Board also monitors Governments' control over chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and assists them in preventing the diversion of those chemicals into the illicit traffic;

(b) As regards the illicit manufacture, trafficking and use of drugs, the Board identifies weaknesses in national and international control systems and contributes to correcting such situations. The Board is also responsible for assessing chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, in order to determine whether they should be placed under international control.

In the discharge of its responsibilities, the Board:

(a) Administers a system of estimates for narcotic drugs and a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances and monitors licit activities involving drugs through a statistical returns system, with a view to assisting Governments in achieving, *inter alia*, a balance between supply and demand;

(b) Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments to prevent the diversion of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and assesses such substances to determine whether there is a need for changes in the scope of control of Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention;

(c) Analyses information provided by Governments, United Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other competent international organizations, with a view to ensuring that the provisions of the international drug control treaties are adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends remedial measures;

(d) Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to assist them in complying with their obligations under the international drug control treaties and, to that end, recommends, where appropriate, technical or financial assistance to be provided.

The Board is called upon to ask for explanations in the event of apparent violations of the treaties, to propose appropriate remedial measures to Governments that are not fully applying the provisions of the treaties or are encountering difficulties in applying them and, where necessary, to assist Governments in overcoming such difficulties. If, however, the Board notes that the measures necessary to remedy a serious situation have not been taken, it may call the matter to the attention of the parties concerned, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council. As a last resort, the treaties empower the Board to recommend to parties that they stop importing drugs from a defaulting country, exporting drugs to it or both. In all cases the Board acts in close cooperation with Governments.

The Board meets at least twice a year. Each year, it issues a report on its work, supplemented by technical reports on narcotic drugs, on psychotropic substances and on precursors and other chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

