Annual Report 1995

40. As of 1 November 1995, the States parties to the international conventions on narcotic drugs numbered 153, of which 19 were parties to only the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 ^{8 (see notes)} and 134 were parties to that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol.^{9 (see notes)} Since the Board last published its report, the following four States have succeeded or acceded to the 1961 Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol: Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Moldova, Swaziland and Uzbekistan. In addition, Ethiopia, Mali and Mauritius, which had already been parties to the 1961 Convention, acceded to the 1972 Protocol amending that Convention. The Government of Switzerland has recently informed the Board that it foresees that it will ratify the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Convention by April 1996.

41. Of the States that have yet to accede to the international conventions on narcotic drugs, 12 are in Africa, 6 are in Asia, 5 are in Central America and the Caribbean, 3 are in Europe and 6 are in Oceania. In addition, a number of newly independent States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have yet to indicate whether they intend to succeed or accede to the international conventions on narcotic drugs.

42. The Board hopes that the States concerned will not only take speedy action to become parties to the international conventions on narcotic drugs, but will also enact the necessary national legislation and regulations to conform to those conventions. The Board believes that accession to the 1961 Convention could soon result from mechanisms already in place in States such as Azerbaijan, Bhutan, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which have already become parties to the more recent international drug control treaties, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971^{10 (see notes)} and the 1988 Convention, and are benefiting from international assistance.

43. Some other States, namely Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Chad, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine, which are already parties to the 1961 Convention, have not yet ratified the 1972 Protocol amending that Convention. The Board expects that ratification by those States will take place soon since they have all acceded to the more recent international drug control treaties.

44. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned to it under the international conventions on narcotic drugs, the Board maintains a continuous dialogue with Governments. The information provided by Governments enables the Board to study the licit movement of narcotic drugs, thereby ensuring that all Governments strictly observe the provisions prescribed under those conventions to limit the manufacture and importation of narcotic drugs to the quantities required exclusively for medical and scientific purposes and that measures are taken to prevent the diversion of narcotic drugs into illicit channels. This information, which is published every year by the Board, should be used by Governments to verify whether or not they have adequately applied the provisions of the conventions.

45. Annual estimates of narcotic drug requirements for 1996 were received from 157 States and territories. The Board established such estimates for 52 States and territories that had failed to furnish their own estimates for 1996. The Board notes with concern that a number of States and territories have repeatedly failed to furnish estimates of narcotic drug requirements. It urges the Governments concerned to appreciate the significance of global application of the estimate system and to take effective measures to improve the situation.

46. No annual estimates of narcotic drug requirements have been received for the last three years from the following States: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Viet Nam and Zambia. The Board understands that some of these States, because of their political situation, are not yet in a position to cooperate.

47. The Board notes with satisfaction that Saint Lucia and the United Republic of Tanzania, after having failed to furnish estimates for several years, have recently furnished estimates for 1996. The Board hopes that the two Governments will continue to cooperate with it by furnishing annual estimates on narcotic drugs in a timely manner.

48. As for the statistical returns required under article 20 of the 1961 Convention, 114 States and territories submitted to the Board complete statistical returns for 1994. The Board notes with satisfaction that Saint Lucia and Sierra Leone have again started submitting statistical returns and that, for the first time, Kyrgyzstan is also reporting data on narcotic drugs. Moreover, Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin and China, whose unsatisfactory cooperation in the past had been brought to the attention of the Board, have provided the required data for 1993 and 1994.

49. No statistical returns were received for 1994 from 28 States and territories, of which the following have failed to furnish statistical returns for the past several years: Cambodia, Djibouti, Gabon, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Somalia and Zambia.

50. The Board emphasizes once again that the submission of statistical data is important for the efficient monitoring of the international control system. It hopes that States that are not yet able to comply with that requirement will soon remedy the situation, if necessary by requesting assistance in establishing the required control mechanism.

51. In recent years, there has been an increasing number of supplementary estimates furnished to and confirmed by the Board; that number exceeded 700 in 1995. The frequent submission of supplementary estimates may be an indicator of a Government's response to growing medical needs. It may, however, indicate the need for a Government to review its method of estimation. The Board requests that the Governments concerned, if they have not yet done so, should critically examine the method that they use for determining the quantities shown in their estimates, bearing in mind any new development in the medical use of such drugs in their countries. The Board emphasizes that the 1961 Convention allows supplementary estimates to be used in order to cope with unforeseen conditions, not in order to lessen the need to take care in preparing annual estimates.

52. The estimates most frequently amended in 1995 were for morphine, followed by pethidine, codeine, fentanyl, alfentanil, opium and methadone. The rising trend in morphine consumption is expected to continue with the expansion of the World Health Organization (WHO) three-ladder programme for cancer pain relief in an increasing number of countries. Governments should take into account any foreseeable needs when preparing annual estimates in order to avoid as far as possible the need for supplementary estimates.

53. Because the worldwide application of the treaty-based estimate and statistical returns systems has generally proved to be satisfactory, diversion of narcotic drugs into illicit channels in international trade continues to be minimal despite the vast number of transactions involved. Deficiencies in the application of control measures relating to international trade in narcotic drugs, however, particularly at points of entry in the countries of destination, have contributed to a situation whereby small quantities of narcotic drugs were found missing.

54. In 1994 and in the first half of 1995, the Board was informed of four cases concerning missing parts of consignments of narcotic drugs. Those cases involved shipments of fentanyl, sufentanil and dihydrocodeine. The Board would like to stress the importance of the provisions relating to international trade of article 31 of the 1961 Convention and to advise Governments to strengthen control measures for the transportation and distribution of certain narcotic drugs such as fentanyl and its analogues.

55. According to article 20, paragraph 1 (e), of the 1961 Convention, Governments have to furnish to the Board statistical data on "seizures of drugs and disposal thereof". These data, which are to be submitted annually to the Board, comprise the substance and quantity seized, the quantity destroyed and the quantity used for licit purposes.

56. Seizure data are an important tool for gauging global trends in illicit trafficking and may also serve as an indicator of the effectiveness of a given national drug control administration. Failure to submit information on seizures to the Board is often the result of inadequate coordination between different national bodies.

57. Since many Governments have repeatedly failed to submit data on seizures, the Board, in 1991, reminded Governments that had not provided seizure data during that year of their treaty obligations in that regard. In the course of 1995, the Board conducted a review of seizure data for 1993; it compared the seizure data submitted to it with data reported to ICPO/Interpol and to the Secretary-General.

58. Non-reporting of seizure data or inconsistencies in such data might indicate shortcomings in coordination among different governmental authorities, or even failure to apply treaty provisions. Governments approached by the Board on this matter might, therefore, find it necessary to review the efficiency of their special administrations (provided for in the 1961 Convention, article 17) in cooperating with other national bodies involved in drug control, in order to fully satisfy the reporting obligations specified in the 1961 Convention, article 20.

59. The Board has been aware of the abuse in certain countries of pharmaceutical preparations containing small amounts of narcotic drugs listed in Schedule III of the 1961 Convention. Such preparations are usually consumed in the form of cough syrup, and codeine is frequently the active ingredient. In some countries, such products can easily be obtained over the counter, without medical prescription. Cross-border smuggling, with ensuing sale in "parallel markets", is also frequent. Apparently some abusers use the cough syrup as a party drink.

60. Although statistical reporting on international trade in such preparations is not required under the provisions of the 1961 Convention, additional measures have been adopted in many countries to prevent the abuse of the preparations. The Board recommends that, when appropriate, control measures should be strengthened, not only related to internal consumption, but also with regard to import and transit procedures.

61. The Board is concerned about trade in poppy seeds obtained from opium poppy plants in countries where poppy cultivation is prohibited. The Board urges Governments to be vigilant in order to ensure that poppy seeds traded for culinary purposes are not derived from illicitly cultivated poppy plants. Otherwise, they would inadvertently be promoting such illicit cultivation.

62. The application of the export and import authorization system makes the quick international transportation of controlled drugs to sites of acute emergencies virtually impossible. Recognizing the difficulty involved, the Board in its report for 1994^{11 (see notes)} proposed that the control obligations could be limited to the competent authorities of exporting countries in such situations. That proposal was endorsed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its thirty-eighth session.^{12 (see notes)}

63. The Board has subsequently been informed by WHO that the practice of limiting control obligations to the competent authorities of exporting countries in acute emergency situations is not yet widely known to national authorities, as few of them have implemented the practice. The Board recognizes the need for a more explicit statement of its position concerning this matter.

64. On the basis of the 1961 Convention, article 32, and the parallel article of the 1971 Convention, article 14, as well as the logic inherent in those articles, the Board affirms that the transportation and provision of controlled drugs needed for humanitarian aid in acute emergencies of natural or human origin constitute a genuine justification for non-application of the normal, regular control requirements. It recommends that national authorities of exporting countries should conclude standing agreements with a limited number of bona fide suppliers of humanitarian aid. *Such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), WHO, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross and bona fide national suppliers. Such agreements may specify that in acute emergency situations the need for import and export permits may be replaced by an emergency procedure to allow the rapid import and export of controlled drugs. In such a situation, the humanitarian agency concerned would report the shipment of the controlled drugs to the authorities of the recipient country as soon as possible and would inform the authorities of the exporting country immediately. The authorities of the exporting country would take the responsibility for reporting to the Board.

65. In response to Economic and Social Council resolutions 1990/31 and 1991/43, in which the Council requested the Board to accord priority to monitoring the implementation of the recommendations contained in its 1989 special report on the demand for and supply of opiates for medical and scientific needs,^{13 (see notes)} the Board initiated a study during 1995 on the availability of opiates for medical needs. The purpose of the study is as follows:

(b) To identify Governments that had not yet fully implemented the recommendations and the reasons;

66. The study includes a survey of the competent authorities of all Governments and inquiries to WHO and to relevant professional organizations. A significant number of Governments of developing and developed countries responded to the survey. It is expected that once information contained in delayed replies is included in it, the survey will provide a comprehensive view of the world situation. The study also provides a review of trends in the consumption of opiates in an effort to better understand the situation in many countries and the changes that are occurring.

67. The Board will analyse the information collected and will publish its findings and recommendations.

68. Annual global consumption of opiates stabilized at around 200 tonnes in morphine equivalent during the 1980s. Since the beginning of the 1990s, consumption has increased, reaching 230 tonnes in morphine equivalent in 1993, the highest level ever recorded. In 1994, global consumption of opiates continued to be high, reaching 223 tonnes in morphine equivalent, the second highest level ever recorded. The increase compared with pre-1991 levels can be partly attributed to increased consumption of codeine. In 1993, for example, codeine consumption rose to 182 tonnes in morphine equivalent, compared with the annual average consumption of 167 tonnes in morphine equivalent before 1991. As shown in figure I, the consumption of codeine in 1993 increased substantially, compared with the average level prevailing during the period 1980-1990, in the following major user countries: Australia, Canada, France, India, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. Those countries accounted in 1993 for 44 per cent of total codeine consumption.

69. Morphine and dihydrocodeine also accounted for the increase in global consumption of opiates. In fact, in 1994, global consumption of morphine, as well as global consumption of dihydrocodeine, reached the highest level ever. As illustrated in figure II, global consumption of morphine has steadily increased since 1984, and since 1991 it has increased by an average of 2 tonnes each year, reaching 14 tonnes in 1994. This upward trend has been particularly noticeable in France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. Dihydrocodeine consumption has also shown a rapid increase in the last few years; for example, it increased from 21 tonnes in morphine equivalent in 1991 to 30 tonnes in morphine equivalent in 1994.

70. Codeine consumption oscillated at around 167 tonnes in morphine equivalent in the 1980s and was at that level in 1994. Based on estimates furnished for 1995 and 1996, codeine consumption in those years is likely to increase compared with the 1994 figure, owing to anticipated consumption increases in certain major user countries. As the increase in morphine consumption has been both steady and persistent in recent years, a further increase can be expected in the future. With the forecasted increase in the use of dihydrocodeine in Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, as indicated by their estimates for the coming years, its consumption is also expected to continue to rise.

Figure I. Consumption of codeine by major user countries,
in morphine equivalent, 1980-1994

71. In view of the above, it is estimated that global annual consumption of opiates will continue to rise slowly in the next few years. The 1995 figure for calculated consumption is likely to be above 223 tonnes in morphine equivalent, the level reached in 1994, thereby continuing to follow the fluctuating pattern observed in recent years.

72. Because of substantial increases in the actual areas harvested in India and Turkey in 1995 compared with 1994, global production of opiate raw materials reached 279 tonnes in morphine equivalent, in spite of poor harvests in Australia and Spain (see figure III). According to the most recent statistics, the area harvested in India in 1995 was 22,799 hectares, almost twice the area harvested in 1994 and the largest area harvested in that country since 1987. The area harvested in Turkey in 1995 rose to 60,051 hectares, the largest area ever harvested in any country for licit purposes. Production of opiate raw materials in India and Turkey amounted to 89.3 tonnes and 80.6 tonnes in morphine equivalent respectively, together accounting for 61 per cent of the world total in 1995.

73. Based on the estimates, global production of opiate raw materials in 1996 is expected to increase to approximately 290 tonnes in morphine equivalent, under normal weather conditions. In response to an unexpected and exceptional shortfall in Australia of more than 40 per cent of production in 1995, which was caused by drought, the area under poppy cultivation in that country will be increased in 1996 by 1,350 hectares to 10,600 hectares. In India, because of insufficient rainfall in 1995 and a predicted low yield, the area licensed for cultivation has been increased to 35,000 hectares in order to reach the production level estimated for 1996. The actual area harvested may remain well below the area authorized for cultivation.

(c) Balance between the production of opiate raw materials and the consumption of opiates

74. In 1994, the calculated consumption of opiates exceeded the production of opiate raw materials by 12.8 tonnes in morphine equivalent. In 1995, however, as a result of rising production in India and Turkey in reaction to the prevailing stock situation, total production is expected to exceed consumption by approximately 50 tonnes in morphine equivalent. According to projections, in 1996, production may again exceed consumption; the difference could reach over 60 tonnes in morphine equivalent (see figure IV).

75. Figure V shows the stocks of opiate raw materials held by India and Turkey from 1982 to 1994. It should be noted that, at the end of 1994, the stocks held by India amounted to 36.9 tonnes in morphine equivalent, of which about 14 tonnes were of commercial grade. The total amount of concentrate of poppy straw held in stocks at the end of 1994 by Australia, France, Spain and Turkey was approximately 47 tonnes in morphine equivalent, of which 33 tonnes were held by Turkey.

76. The amount of opium that will be available in India from 30 June 1995 until the next harvest, in May and June of 1996, is estimated at approximately 1,025 tonnes, including the 1995 harvest. According to information received during informal consultations held in March 1995 in response to Economic and Social Council resolution 1994/5, this amount should be sufficient for the world supply for the period 1995-1996. The Government of India has estimated that approximately 35 tonnes of opium will remain in stocks until the next harvest.

77. During the informal consultations held in March 1995, concern was expressed by representatives of importing countries over the depletion of opium stocks in India. However, it was believed that there was no shortage of supply of opiate raw materials, but rather a low level of opium stocks (see table).

78. As of 1 November 1995, the number of States parties to the 1971 Convention stood at 140. Since the issuance of the last report of the Board, Belgium, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Swaziland and Uzbekistan have become parties to that Convention.

79. Of the States that have yet to become parties to the 1971 Convention, 14 are in Africa, 17 are in Asia, 6 are in Central America and the Caribbean, 7 are in Europe and 7 are in Oceania. These figures include several newly independent States that have yet to indicate whether they wish to succeed or otherwise become parties to that Convention. The Board invites those States to confirm their adherence to the 1971 Convention at the earliest possible date.

80. The Board welcomes the recent parliamentary approval of accession to the 1971 Convention by Switzerland. The Government of Austria informed the Board in a letter received in October 1995 of its intention to accede to the 1971 Convention by the end of 1995. The Board is, therefore, confident that the forthcoming accession of these major manufacturing and exporting countries to the 1971 Convention will strengthen the international control system for psychotropic substances.

81. The Board notes that some other States that are not parties to the 1971 Convention, including Andorra, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Namibia, Oman, Sao Tome and Principe and Yemen, have already enacted laws and regulations in conformity with that Convention. The Board hopes that those States will soon accede to the 1971 Convention.

Production of opiate raw materials, consumption of opiates and balance between the two, 1982-1996
(Area harvested in hectars; production, consumption and balance in tonnes of morphine equivalent)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996ª
Australia Area harvested Production	2 459 20.5	5 273 41.4	5 738 42.3	4 851 49.4	3 994 38.5	3 274 31.8	3 462 38.5	5 011 38.8	5 581 43.0	7 155 67.5	8 030 89.8	6 026 66.9	6 735 66.0	8 139 45.6	10 600 90.5
France Area harvested Production	4 460 25.0	3 731 12.7	3 705 23.2	4 029 20.7	3 200 15.7	3 300 16.6	3 113 21.4	2 644 13.4	2 656 19.5	3 598 30.2	3 648 21.8	4 158 28.8	4 431 32.9	4 866 41.1	5 500 36.8
India Area harvested Production	31 958 108.0	31 359 113.8	18 620 53.4	25 153 86.8	23 811 75.1	22 823 76.8	19 858 63.8	15 019 53.9	14 253 48.0	14 145 43.1	14 361 54.3	11 907 38.1	12 694 46.8	22 799 89.3	35 000 85.8
Spain Area harvested Production	1 602 2.2	3 311 11.4	4 567 17.3	4 042 11.2	3 458 5.6	3 252 12.3	2 935 10.8	2 151 5.7	1 464 8.0	4 200 24.2	3 084 12.8	3 930 9.0	2 539 5.1	3 623 4.6	6 000 10.9
Turkey Area harvested Production	8 534 13.3	7 002 11.5	12 569 20.8	4 902 9.2	5 404 8.4	6 137 9.2	18 260 24.7	8 378 7.2	9 025 13.3	27 030 57.9	16 393 18.7	6 930 7.8	25 321 41.1	60 051 80.6	70 000 49.7
Other countries Area harvested Production	.. 15.5	.. 23.9	.. 28.8	.. 34.6	.. 27.1	.. 30.3	.. 36.9	.. 18.4	.. 38.0	.. 31.2	.. 14.9	.. 13.2	.. 18.3	.. 18.0	.. 18.0
Total Area harvested Production (1)	.. 184.5	.. 214.7	.. 185.8	.. 211.9	.. 170.4	.. 177.0	.. 196.1	.. 137.4	.. 169.8	.. 254.1	.. 212.3	.. 163.8	.. 210.8	.. 279.2	.. 291.7
Total consumption (2)	183.6	192.2	194.5	202.4	202.3	206.8	200.9	204.7	198.3	218.0	207.1	229.5	223.0	230.0	230.0
Balance ((1) minus (2))	+0.9	+22.5	-8.7	+9.5	-31.9	-29.8	+4.8	-76.3	-28.5	+36.1	+4.4	-65.7	-11.8	+49.2	+61.7

Note: Because the method used in recent years to calculate consumption of opiate in terms of morphine equivalent did not adequately reflect consumption trends, the International Narcotics Control Board decided to modify the way in which consumption levels, expressed in morphine equivalent, were calculated; as a result, minor adjustments have been made in some of the data in the table since the Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.XI.4) was published.

82. At its thirty-eighth session, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its decisions 1 (XXXVIII), 2 (XXXVIII) and 3 (XXXVIII), decided to include etryptamine and methcathinone in Schedule I, zipeprol in Schedule II and aminorex, brotizolam and mesocarb in Schedule IV of the 1971 Convention. Thus, the total number of substances controlled under the 1971 Convention has increased to 111. The Commission also decided, in its decision 4 (XXXVIII), to transfer flunitrazepam from Schedule IV to Schedule III of the 1971 Convention. The Board requests Governments to take appropriate action to bring existing domestic control regulations for these substances in line with the provisions of the 1971 Convention, as required in article 2, paragraph 7, of that 1971 Convention.

83. Approximately 170 States and territories annually provide the Board with statistical reports on psychotropic substances pursuant to article 16 of the 1971 Convention. Such reports are furnished by both parties and non-parties to that Convention. The timely submission, comprehensiveness and reliability of the annual statistical reports indicate the extent to which Governments have implemented the provisions of the 1971 Convention and have followed the relevant recommendations of the Board, endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in its resolutions. Several parties to the 1971 Convention have submitted annual statistical reports for 1994 after 30 June 1995, the deadline established by the Board for their submission. The Board urges the Governments concerned to ensure timely compliance with their reporting obligations.

84. The data provided by Governments to the Board are continuously analysed to identify weaknesses in systems of national control and any attempts to divert psychotropic substances from licit manufacture and trade into the illicit traffic. By its analysis and subsequent investigations, the Board has assisted Governments in the identification of companies and individuals diverting or attempting to divert psychotropic substances into illicit channels and those contravening domestic drug control regulations.

85. While most parties to the 1971 Convention have regularly submitted annual statistical reports, the Board is concerned that the following States have failed to submit the requisite data for three or more years: Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania and Zambia. All of these States have benefited from different forms of assistance provided by the Board or UNDCP. The Board will continue its dialogue with those parties to facilitate improvements in their control of psychotropic substances and in their meeting of reporting obligations.

86. A few parties to the 1971 Convention, including Canada, Luxembourg and New Zealand, do not yet control international trade in all substances in Schedules III and IV and do not report to the Board on exports and imports some of those substances. The Board has repeatedly reminded the Governments of those States of their failure to comply with the relevant treaty obligations and of the imminent risk involved, as such a situation could be exploited by traffickers. Explanations on the control of international trade in psychotropic substances were provided to the competent authorities of Canada and Luxembourg during missions of the Board to those countries in 1995 and 1994, respectively (for details on developments following the mission to Canada, see paragraphs 225-226, below). A mission of the Board is scheduled to visit New Zealand in January 1996. The Board trusts that the Governments of the parties concerned will act expeditiously to close a serious gap in the control of international trade in psychotropic substances.

87. As in the previous years, the control system for international trade in substances in Schedules I and II of the 1971 Convention continues to operate in a satisfactory manner. In conformity with the provisions of article 12 of that Convention, international trade in those substances is controlled by the system of import and export authorizations. In addition, pursuant to article 7 of the 1971 Convention, international trade in substances in Schedule I is restricted to small quantities needed for scientific and very limited medical use. With respect to substances in Schedule II, the simplified estimate system has been in place since the early 1980s, providing competent authorities of exporting countries with information on the legitimate requirements for those substances in importing countries.

88. The availability of information on legitimate needs for substances in Schedule II in importing countries facilitates the identification by exporting countries and the Board of attempts to divert such substances by means of falsified import authorizations. Governments now carefully review the legitimacy of orders for those substances and consult the Board in cases of doubt. Several attempts by traffickers to divert significant quantities of such substances, mainly fenetylline and methaqualone, have been thwarted as a result of close cooperation between Governments and the Board. No major diversion of substances in Schedule II has been detected since 1990. It appears, therefore, that preparations containing amphetamines, fenetylline and methaqualone on illicit markets in various parts of the world no longer originate in the licit pharmaceutical industry.

89. The Board is concerned that the mass media in some countries have given publicity to views glamorizing the recreational use of some psychotropic substances in Schedule I, including methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as "ecstasy". The Board emphasizes that such views can lead to false perceptions and can undermine drug abuse prevention efforts. The Board, therefore, calls on the media to ensure that their publications and broadcasts are not damaging and counterproductive to their otherwise valuable and necessary contribution to the campaign to prevent drug abuse.

90. The worldwide use of methylphenidate, a substance in Schedule II of the 1971 Convention, increased from less than 3 tonnes in 1990 to more than 8.5 tonnes in 1994 and continued to rise in 1995. The global trend largely reflects developments in the United States, which accounts for approximately 90 per cent of total world manufacture and consumption of the substance. Methylphenidate is increasingly being used in the United States for the treatment of attention deficit disorder (ADD) in children. Some other countries have also reported increases in the use of methylphenidate for this purpose, but at a markedly lower rate (see figure VI).

91. At present, 3-5 per cent of all schoolchildren in the United States have reportedly been diagnosed as suffering from ADD and are treated with methylphenidate, frequently without the benefit of other forms of assistance recommended in treatment guidelines. According to some reports, ADD may be diagnosed too often as other causes of attention and behavioural problems might be overlooked. An investigation by the competent authorities of the United States revealed divergent prescribing practices for methylphenidate among primary-care physicians, as a very small percentage of such physicians issued the majority of the prescriptions for methylphenidate. Many children remain on methylphenidate treatment for longer periods of time, frequently into adolescence and even adulthood. The abuse of methylphenidate in the United States has increased and cases have been reported of serious damage to health as a result of such abuse. Methylphenidate is mainly abused by adolescents who illegally obtain the substance in tablet form from children undergoing treatment for ADD.

Note: The United States authorities reported that consumption of methylphenidate is expected to increase further by 50 per cent and will reach 350 million defined daily doses (DDD) by 1996.

92. The competent authorities of the United States have informed the Board of their concern at the sharp increase in the use of methylphenidate, especially the preparation sold under the trade name Ritalin. Treatment of ADD with Ritalin is being actively promoted by an influential "parent association" that has received significant financial contributions from the leading manufacturer of this preparation in the United States.

93. The Board is concerned about this situation. It therefore requests the authorities of the United States to continue to carefully monitor future developments in the diagnosis of ADD in children and the extent to which methylphenidate and other stimulants (such as dexamfetamine and pemoline) are used in the treatment of ADD, in order to ensure that these substances are prescribed in accordance with sound medical practice as required under article 9, paragraph 2, of the 1971 Convention. In addition, the Board invites the authorities of the United States to review whether article 10, paragraph 2, of the 1971 Convention, prohibiting the advertisement of controlled substances to the general public, is not being undermined by the activities of "parent associations" advocating the use of methylphenidate.

94. The Board requests all Governments to exercise the utmost vigilance in order to prevent "overdiagnosing" of ADD in children and medically unjustified treatment with methylphenidate and other stimulants. The Board invites WHO to evaluate, as a matter of priority, the prevalence of ADD in various parts of the world, the diagnostic criteria for ADD, and the use of methylphenidate and other stimulants and any other forms of treatment of that disorder in children. The Board also invites WHO to bring the results of the evaluations to the attention of national public health authorities.

95. Over the past 10 years, the Board has repeatedly urged Governments to apply additional control measures to international trade in psychotropic substances in Schedules III and IV. The Board has emphasized that the control measures for international trade in such substances, as laid down in the 1971 Convention, have in practice not been effective enough in preventing diversion. Large quantities of psychotropic substances have continued to be diverted into the illicit traffic from countries that have not yet implemented supplementary control measures recommended by the Board.

96. Additional control measures recommended by the Board for the export and import of psychotropic substances in Schedules III and IV include use of the system of import and export authorizations and the system of assessments (simplified estimates). Governments have also been requested to provide, in their annual statistical reports to the Board, details on imports and exports of those substances. All of these recommendations have been endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in several of its resolutions, the most recent being resolutions 1991/44 and 1993/38. The majority of Governments have already implemented such voluntary control measures. The Board invites Governments that have not implemented such measures to do so without further delay.

97. At present, import authorizations are required by national legislation in 120 countries and territories for all substances in Schedules III and in 100 countries and territories for all substances in Schedule IV. In an additional 40 countries and territories, the requirement of import authorization has been introduced for at least some substances in those schedules. Over 140 Governments have provided the Board with assessments (simplified estimates) of their legitimate annual requirements for substances in Schedules III and IV. All countries exporting psychotropic substances are regularly informed of the assessments. About 90 per cent of Governments have included in their annual statistical reports to the Board details on the countries of origin of imports and the countries of destination of exports of substances in Schedules III and IV. Those details are now furnished to the Board by all major exporters and importers of psychotropic substances and enable the detection of diversion and of weaknesses in the control systems.

98. The Board notes with satisfaction that most Governments have already established effective mechanisms for the control of exports of substances in Schedules III and IV of the 1971 Convention. A number of them regularly consult the Board regarding the legitimacy of suspicious import orders. In 1995, the Board and the competent authorities of several exporting countries carried out joint investigations into the legitimacy of more than 60 commercial orders, thereby preventing the diversion of hundreds of millions of tablets containing psychotropic substances, including stimulants (amfepramone and pemoline), sedative-hypnotics and tranquillizers (chlordiazepoxide, diazepam, nitrazepam and temazepam) and anti-epileptics (phenobarbital). In most of those cases, traffickers attempted to divert psychotropic substances by using falsified import authorizations.

99. Developments in 1995 showed that exporting countries should exercise the utmost vigilance with respect to orders for the delivery of psychotropic substances to countries in which the political situation is unstable. Traffickers often attempt to take advantage of administrative weaknesses existing in those States. In one such case, the Indian authorities brought to the attention of the Board several suspicious orders for the delivery to Liberia of a total of 100 million tablets and capsules containing chlordiazepoxide and diazepam. Those orders were supported by import authorizations and letters purportedly from the competent authorities of Liberia. Also submitted were orders and supporting documents for more than 50 million ephedrine tablets. Investigations in Liberia initiated by the Board, however, confirmed that supporting documents had been falsified or had been erroneously issued by authorities misled by traffickers. In 1995, falsified import authorizations, purportedly issued by the authorities of Afghanistan and Somalia, were also used by traffickers in attempts to divert psychotropic substances.

100. A number of attempts were made by traffickers in 1995 to divert phenobarbital raw material and phenobarbital tablets into illicit channels in various parts of the world. Traffickers attempted to divert large quantities of this substance to countries in West Asia where phenobarbital is used for the purpose of adulterating illicitly manufactured heroin. The Board would like to commend the authorities of Hungary for their vigilance which led to the prevention of the diversion of at least 6 tonnes of phenobarbital into illicit channels in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Board requests Governments to carefully review the legitimacy of all orders for phenobarbital, in particular those destined for delivery to countries in West Asia.

101. Some Governments in Africa, Asia and South America have informed the Board of the detection of consignments of psychotropic substances, mainly amfepramone, phenobarbital and different benzodiazepines, that have been exported to their countries without the import authorizations required under national legislation. Those exports were effected by companies in Belgium and Switzerland, States not yet applying adequate export controls. The Board hopes that, following the adherence of those States to the 1971 Convention (see paragraphs 78 and 80, above), further diversion of psychotropic substances from their territories will be prevented.

102. The Board is concerned that some Governments were not in a position to respond promptly to its requests for details of suspicious exports of psychotropic substances from their territories. Such problems were mainly experienced by States including some major exporters of psychotropic substances which have not yet started to control their exports of all substances in Schedules III and IV using the system of import and export authorizations. The Board requests the Governments concerned to strengthen their national control provisions regarding record keeping and reporting obligations by companies to ensure the prompt submission of responses to the Board's enquiries on suspicious transactions.

103. The Board notes that some exporting countries applying the system of export authorizations for substances in Schedules III and IV have not yet verified every import order against assessments (simplified estimates) of annual legitimate requirements of importing countries. Consequently, traffickers have been able to divert psychotropic substances by means of falsified import authorizations. For example, more than 800 kg of chlordiazepoxide were exported from Italy to Nigeria in 1994 and 1995 while the assessment of annual legitimate requirements of Nigeria for that substance was only 78 kg. The investigations initiated by the Board revealed that Nigerian import authorizations, on the basis of which the exports took place, had been forged. More than 80 million capsules containing chlordiazepoxide were diverted into the illicit traffic in Nigeria.

104. The Board welcomes the action taken by the authorities of Italy and Nigeria to investigate this case and prevent further diversion of chlordiazepoxide. The Board urges all Governments to use systematically as guidance, during the review of legitimacy of import orders, assessments of annual legitimate requirements of importing countries. Exporting countries are encouraged to consult the Board in all cases when import authorizations or other supporting documents appear to authorize imports higher than the annual legitimate requirements of the importing country or when there is any suspicion that the order might be ultimately destined for the illicit traffic.

105. The Board is concerned that some companies have been repeatedly involved in the diversion of psychotropic substances. The Board, therefore, urges Governments to ensure that licences to manufacture or trade psychotropic substances are only granted to persons who are adequately qualified for the effective and faithful execution of the provisions of laws and regulations enacted in pursuance of the 1971 Convention, as required under article 8, paragraph 4, of that Convention.

106. Very large quantities of preparations called "black pearls" (also known as Tung Shueh, Cows Head and Chiufong Toukawan pills) are being illicitly imported, primarily into the United States. The pills are described by their distributors as herbal medicine to treat arthritis and other ailments in elderly persons and have been sold as over-the-counter medication. Contrary to their labelling, "black pearls" contain some synthetic substances including diazepam, a tranquillizer in Schedule IV of the 1971 Convention. The covert and medically inappropriate use of these substances has led to severe health problems and, in a number of cases, death. Adulterated "black pearls" are smuggled in bulk into the United States out of countries in east Asia. A record seizure of 31 million "black pearls" was made in June 1994.

107. Inquiries of the Board with the competent authorities of Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore revealed that they also had encountered problems with preparations marketed as traditional medicine under the name of "black pearls" or under one of the other above-mentioned names. Though the combination of substances contained in the pills varied, it included diazepam and substances that were not internationally controlled, such as indomethacin, prednisolone, mefenamic acid and hydrochlorothiazide.

108. The marketing of adulterated "black pearls" and similar products appears to be an international problem. Therefore, the Board has drawn the attention of WHO to this matter, particularly in view of the serious health threat associated with the illicit use of diazepam and the other active ingredients contained in the preparations. The Board invites all Governments to investigate whether these adulterated products are being illegally distributed in their countries. Governments of countries in east Asia, in which the manufacture of those traditional medicines takes place, are requested to ensure that no diazepam is being diverted for illicit use as an adulterant in their manufacture.

109. In its report for 1993,^{14 (see notes)} the Board expressed the opinion that because of a substantial reduction in the diversion of pemoline into the illicit traffic in countries in western Africa, traffickers would attempt to divert other stimulants into the illicit traffic in that subregion. In addition, the Board expressed its concern about reports of suspicious exports of ephedrine to Africa. Ephedrine is not included in any of the schedules of the 1971 Convention but is controlled under the 1988 Convention as a precursor *The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances in Table I or II of the 1988 Convention, except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances" was introduced in the Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, the Board has decided to use it in the present report for the sake of convenience. for internationally controlled stimulants such as methamphetamine and methcathinone.

110. In 1995, a number of attempts to divert large quantities of ephedrine tablets into countries in Africa were detected. The methods and routes of diversion of such pharmaceutical preparations are often the same as those for psychotropic substances. The countries affected by detected diversion attempts were Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The information received from those and other countries in western Africa confirms that ephedrine tablets are being diverted for abuse as stimulants. The Board requests the Governments concerned to examine the extent of abuse of and illicit trafficking in ephedrine and pseudoephedrine preparations and to bring any information at their disposal to the attention of the Board and WHO, which is collecting information for possible future review of those substances.

111. The Board notes with concern that, in addition to diversion from international trade, significant quantities of psychotropic substances are diverted from domestic distribution channels. The substances are sold for local abuse or are smuggled into other countries in which illicit markets for those substances exist. For example, the increasing illicit traffic in flunitrazepam tablets in the United States, a country in which this substance is neither manufactured nor licitly sold, appears to be fuelled mainly by diversion of the tablets from their licit wholesale and/or retail distributors in other countries, including Colombia and Mexico. Similarly, traffickers in Turkey have attempted to obtain large quantities of flunitrazepam tablets for local abuse by diversion from licit domestic distribution channels in Bulgaria.

112. According to reports by ICPO/Interpol, during smuggling attempts in 1994 and 1995, several countries made significant seizures of preparations containing psychotropic substances that had been manufactured by the licit pharmaceutical industry in other countries and diverted from domestic distribution channels. Governments of countries where large seizures are made should always provide relevant information to the authorities of the country where the diversion took place, if that country has been identified. The Board is at the disposal of Governments to facilitate the exchange of information in order to identify the companies and individuals involved in the diversion.

113. Governments should make efforts to raise the awareness of pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesale and retail distributors of the methods of diversion used by traffickers and should encourage their cooperation with the competent authorities. When appropriate, relevant control regulations should be strengthened. The Board notes with appreciation that national regulations in the United Kingdom on temazepam, a benzodiazepine in Schedule IV of the 1971 Convention, have recently been strengthened to tackle the almost epidemic problem of its local abuse. For several years, millions of temazepam capsules and tablets have been diverted annually in the United Kingdom by well-organized criminal groups using a variety of means, including large-scale theft and bogus exports. New regulations in the United Kingdom restrict the prescribing of temazepam in capsule form, make unlawful possession of temazepam a criminal offence, impose stricter controls on import and export and require manufacturers, wholesalers and retail pharmacies to keep the drug in secure conditions.

114. In countries where no control system for psychotropic substances exists, it is not possible to prevent their diversion from domestic distribution channels. Furthermore, the absence of laws and regulations precludes the prosecution of traffickers, as shown by a case in Austria that was mentioned in the report of the Board for 1994.^{15 (see notes)}

115. The Board and the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe jointly organized a Conference on Control of International Trade in Psychotropic Substances in Europe, held at Strasbourg, France, from 3 to 5 March 1993. That Conference drew up recommendations for the enhancement of the control of licit international trade by member States of the Pompidou Group in order to prevent diversion. The objective of the follow-up conference, which took place at Strasbourg from 18 to 20 October 1995, was to review the implementation of the recommendations of the 1993 Conference and to examine recent trends in the diversion of psychotropic substances from the licit manufacture and trade in Europe into illicit channels.

116. One of the conclusions of the follow-up conference was that until the control of international trade in psychotropic substances in Schedules III and IV by the system of import and export authorizations was applied by all countries, its effectiveness would remain limited and the diversion of those substances would continue. The conference recommended that parties to the 1971 Convention should propose an amendment under the simplified procedure (article 30) to make it a treaty obligation to apply the system of import and export authorizations for substances in Schedules III and IV and the system of assessments (simplified estimates) for psychotropic substances.^{16 (see notes)}

117. The follow-up conference noted with concern the risk of cuts in staff resources of regulatory authorities in some European countries, including important manufacturers and exporters of psychotropic substances. That was in contradiction with the increased number of substances under international control and the increased number of transactions to be monitored.^{17 (see notes)} Such a development would have a negative impact on the control capacity of not only the countries concerned, but also the international community as a whole.

118. The Board hopes that, in addition to the European countries concerned, countries in other regions, especially those that are major manufacturers and/or exporters of psychotropic substances, will ensure adequate resources for their national regulatory authorities.

119. In the course of investigations into attempts to divert large quantities of controlled stimulants into the illicit drug traffic in Africa, the Board had received information that those stimulants were purportedly required for veterinary purposes. However, a recent study carried out by the secretariat of the Board, in close cooperation with Governments throughout the world, confirmed that stimulants were not being utilized for veterinary purposes. Psychotropic substances in veterinary practice are mainly from the group of sedative hypnotics and tranquillizers. These substances are utilized in clinical treatment, for transport and grouping of animals, anaesthesia and euthanasia.

120. The Board would like to remind all Governments that the provisions of the 1971 Convention and the recommendations contained in the relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Council are applicable to psychotropic substances independent of the purpose of their use. Therefore, reports of Governments on manufacture, use and international trade in psychotropic substances, as well as assessments of legitimate requirements for such substances, should include quantities destined for veterinary purposes.

121. As of 1 November 1995, five years after the entry into force of the 1988 Convention, 119 States and the European Community had become parties to that Convention. That number represents 62 per cent of all the States in the world. Since the report of the Board for 1994 was issued, 16 States have acceded to the 1988 Convention: Algeria, Belgium, Cape Verde, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Mali, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

122. The Board welcomes this development. It is, however, concerned that some major manufacturing and exporting States are not yet parties to the 1988 Convention. The Board wishes to reiterate its request to all those States that have not yet already done so to become parties to that Convention as soon as possible.

(a) Reporting to the International Narcotics Control Board under the 1988 Convention

123. As of 1 November 1995, a total of 115 Governments had submitted to the Board information for 1994 relating to precursors pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention, including those States members of the European Union that had furnished the data through the European Commission. The figure represents over one half of the countries and territories requested to provide information, a rate of return similar to that in previous years. The Board notes, however, that despite some improvement only 68 per cent of all parties have submitted the requisite data for 1994 and that a certain number of parties have not reported to the Board for the last two years.

124. The timely submission of complete information to the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention is an indicator of whether a Government has put in place: control systems to monitor transactions in precursors; mechanisms to ensure appropriate coordination between different agencies; procedures for data collection and information-sharing; and relevant legislation and regulations. Lack of reporting to the Board may indicate that the necessary framework and systems for control are not yet in place. It is therefore a matter of serious concern to the Board that a number of parties have continued to fail to submit the requisite information. The Board is contacting directly all the countries concerned to examine with the competent authorities the problems that prevent them from reporting to it.

(b) Providing to the International Narcotics Control Board specific information on licit trade

125. The Board welcomes the initiative taken by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and endorsed by the Economic and Social Council, in requesting Governments to provide to the Board data necessary for monitoring the movement of precursors. In its resolution 1995/20, the Council urged Governments, subject to the provisions of national legislation on confidentiality and data protection, to inform the Board on a regular basis, upon request of the Board and in the form and manner provided for by it, of the quantities of substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention that they had imported, exported or transshipped, and encouraged them to estimate their annual licit needs. Such information is indispensable if the monitoring mechanisms provided for under the 1988 Convention are to be effective in preventing diversion of precursors. The Board will contact those countries and territories through which there is a large volume of licit commercial trade in precursors.

126. The Board continues to review action taken by Governments to implement the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention. A detailed examination of such action is given in the 1995 report of the Board on the implementation of article 12.^{18 (see notes)}

127. The diversion of precursors from licit channels into the illicit manufacture of drugs is, almost exclusively, the source of the chemicals required for such illicit manufacture. In 1994 the Board reported the discovery of cases involving the diversion and attempted diversion of large quantities of ephedrine,^{19 (see notes)} a precursor for the stimulant methamphetamine, which is widely abused in various parts of the world. Based on those findings, the Board, in its 1994 report on the implementations of article 12 of the 1988 Convention,^{20 (see notes)} made specific recommendations, providing full details on a number of practical steps that could, and should, be taken by Governments to prevent diversion of precursors. As a result, competent authorities of an increasing number of exporting and importing countries have, as a matter of priority, taken action to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions prior to their release. Those exporting countries have contacted directly the importing countries to verify the legitimacy of transactions or have asked for the Board's assistance in doing so.

128. As a result of that action, a number of other cases involving suspicious transactions and diversion attempts have been identified and those shipments have been stopped. Cases in which diversion actually occurred have also been uncovered, and new or previously unknown routes of diversion have been identified. The large-scale global diversion of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention continues, however, as shown by the continuing ability of drug traffickers to meet the demands of the illicit drug market. Nonetheless, the methods and routes of diversion used are becoming more visible, as effective precursor control systems are being established in a growing number of countries. A brief summary of the major findings of some of those cases is given below.

129. Attempts to divert ephedrine to North America, often using falsified documents, have continued. Following the introduction of stricter controls in Mexico new routes of diversion have emerged. Guatemala continues to be targeted by traffickers as a transshipment point for the diversion of ephedrine to North America. Intermediaries in Slovenia and the United Arab Emirates, an important transit country, were found to be facilitating diversion of ephedrine. Missions of the Board were sent to Guatemala and the United Arab Emirates (see paragraphs 207, 335 and 336, below, for more details).

130. While further action by some Governments is required to minimize the risk, through the cooperation of the Governments of all the countries concerned, the opportunity for diversion attempts following routes such as those described above is being reduced. However, as controls over ephedrine are tightened, some traffickers have turned to using pseudoephedrine as a substitute for ephedrine in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine.

131. In a few cases controlled deliveries were undertaken, resulting in the arrest of traffickers and the seizure of the chemical involved. The ephedrine and pseudoephedrine reported seized or stopped during the 12-month period beginning in September 1994 totalled 95 tonnes, enough to manufacture about 65 tonnes, the equivalent of 6 billion street doses, of the stimulant methamphetamine. About a dozen methamphetamine cases, each involving several tonnes of the substance, were identified when falsified documents were discovered because of efforts by the Governments of the exporting, importing and transit countries concerned, with the assistance of the Board, to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions.

132. Previously unknown routes and points of transshipment for diverted acetic anhydride, a key chemical used in the illicit conversion of morphine to heroin, have also been identified. For example, companies located in the United Arab Emirates played a part in recently uncovered diversion attempts. In one case, acetic anhydride was legally exported in several consignments from Germany to a company in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly for use in the manufacture of insecticides and antiseptics. From there the consignments were smuggled by sea into Turkey. Since mid-1994 over 50 tonnes of acetic anhydride of German origin, enough to manufacture between 20 and 40 tonnes of heroin, have been seized in Turkey. In another case, almost 40 tonnes of acetic anhydride originating in China and destined to be transported through Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Afghanistan to a tribal area in Pakistan, were identified. The authorities of Hong Kong alerted the Board to the transaction, and the authorities of the United Arab Emirates stopped the shipment. These cases illustrate the frequent utilization of complex routes to disguise the country of destination, and of falsified declarations of use to avoid suspicion. The Board commends the governments of the countries and territories concerned for having acted promptly and appeals to all others with major transit trade involving precursors to put in place the necessary control systems to enable them to undertake similar activities.

133. Details of the cases mentioned above, and of other cases involving diversion and attempted diversion, are given in the 1995 report of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention.18 Despite these successes, there remain many points throughout the world that are vulnerable to diversion. Governments are invited to adopt the recommendations of the Board on action to prevent diversion and on more effective control of precursors, which are contained in the above-mentioned report.

134. In order for such action to be effective, however, it is essential that Governments of importing countries reply in a timely manner to inquiries relating to the legitimacy of transactions. While many importing countries do, it is of concern to the Board that some Governments have not replied to queries or have done so only with delays. It has been found that importing countries, especially those such as Guatemala and Mexico, where diversions are known to have occurred, need to reply more promptly to queries relating to the legitimacy of imports destined for their territories. The Board reiterates its appeal to all Governments to establish and institutionalize appropriate working mechanisms and operating procedures with their respective trade partners for making inquiries and for providing immediate feedback to each other in verifying the legitimacy of transactions.

135. The Board re-emphasizes its appeal to Governments of exporting countries to provide pre-export notifications on a routine basis prior to shipment, even when such notifications have not been formally requested by the importing countries under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. The Board is pleased to note that the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1995/20, made a similar request to Governments.

136. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1995/20, requested the Government of an importing country, upon receipt of any form of pre-export notification from the exporting country, to verify the legitimacy of the transaction and, with the possible assistance of the Board, to convey information related to the case to the exporting country. The Council also urged Governments of exporting countries to conduct their own investigation in questionable cases and to seek information and views from the Board, international organizations and Governments as appropriate, inasmuch as additional facts establishing suspicion might be available to them. The Board continues to stand ready to assist Governments wishing to verify the legitimacy of such transactions. The Board also requests that it be informed of any difficulties experienced in this connection, and of cases where no feedback has been provided, so that it may contact the Governments concerned.

137. Role of intermediaries in diversions and attempted diversions. Uncovered diversions and diversion attempts have highlighted the role of intermediaries in such activities. Complex routing of shipments that involves a number of intermediaries in different countries makes it difficult for Governments to trace those shipments. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1995/20, therefore urged Governments to exercise, as a matter of urgency, increased vigilance over the activities of brokers in view of the special role that some of them play in the diversion of precursors, and to subject them to licensing or other effective control measures as necessary. The Board, in consultation with the Pompidou Group, convened in May 1995 a meeting of experts to review the issue of intermediaries dealing with precursors, and with psychotropic substances, and to consider concrete measures to control effectively their operations. Specific major recommendations related to precursor control are reflected in the 1995 report of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention^{18 (see notes)} (see also paragraphs 145-152, below).

138. Free ports and free trade zones at transshipment points. Uncovered cases of diversion have, in many instances, involved transactions through free ports and free trade zones. Under the provisions of article 18 of the 1988 Convention, Governments are required to apply measures to the movement of precursors in free ports and free trade zones that are no less stringent than those applied in other parts of their territories. The Board notes with satisfaction that the authorities of Hong Kong and of the United Arab Emirates are taking specific measures to apply controls to relevant transactions through their territories, and it looks forward to being advised of further developments. The Board requests Governments of countries with similar trading environments to follow this example.

139. Previously unknown routes of diversion. In 1994 the Board drew attention to the fact that countries that had not previously been associated with attempts at diverting precursors were being targeted by traffickers, as controls applied in those countries did not allow the Governments to effectively monitor transactions through their territories.^{21 (see notes)} Countries such as Guatemala, through which attempts to divert ephedrine have continued, need to take further steps to prevent diversion. Countries in Africa and the newly independent States in central Asia, among others, may also be targeted as suitable points for diversion (see paragraphs 177, 322, 340). There have also been some cases uncovered where precursors imported into countries in Europe and then re-exported were subsequently diverted.

140. Alerts to diversion attempts. The above-mentioned facts point to a need for Governments, in particular Governments of exporting countries, to share information on diversion attempts, as soon as such attempts are identified, so that other Governments may be alerted. The Board notes with satisfaction that, in this regard, the European Union has in place a system for sharing such information among its member States. The Board invites the members States of the European Union to extend this sharing of information, as appropriate through the Board, to other Governments since, once identified, traffickers are likely to turn to sources outside the region to obtain the precursors that they require.

141. Strengthening regulatory controls over international trade. Authorities of exporting countries should examine their current controls over international trade, since, in order for export controls to be effective, it is also necessary to monitor imports, some of which may later be re-exported and end up in illicit channels.

142. Strengthening regulatory controls over manufacture and domestic distribution. The Board, in its recent reports, has focused on diversion from international trade, as such diversions cannot be identified and prevented by a single Government but require concerted action by all Governments. The Board wishes, however, to re-emphasize the need for further regulation of manufacture and domestic distribution in a number of countries to prevent diversion of precursors, which are often subsequently smuggled into neighbouring countries where illicit drug manufacturing takes place. Despite major successes in precursor control activities in some countries in Asia and Latin America, a large proportion of the chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin are diverted from domestic distribution channels. The Board proposes to review, with the authorities of the countries concerned, the controls currently applied, in particular, to manufacture and domestic distribution.

143. Assistance provided. The Board is pleased to note that some regional bodies assist Governments in developing a legislative basis for precursor control and in establishing administrative infrastructure for its implementation. It has been noted, however, that some of these assistance programmes have not yet led to the expected results. For such assistance to succeed it is first required to assess carefully the specific needs of various competent authorities involved in the light of the actual situations of the countries concerned and to develop individually tailored assistance programmes in the context of the overall illicit drug and precursor trafficking situation. To that end, the Board urges all bodies involved in such efforts to coordinate closely their action through UNDCP and, when appropriate, to consult with the Board with regard to sharing any relevant information gathered by the Board as part of its monitoring of the implementation by Governments of article 12 of the 1988 Convention.

144. Experience has shown that the efforts made by some Governments to prevent diversion are effective. The Board therefore reiterates its appeal to all Governments that have not already done so to take concrete steps, as a matter of urgency, to establish the necessary control mechanisms to fully implement the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Only by such concerted international effort will it be possible to decrease the availability to traffickers of the precursors that they require for illicit drug manufacture. The Board has already provided, and will continue to provide, where appropriate, guidance and assistance to Governments in establishing such mechanisms and in ensuring their effective implementation.

145. Intermediaries were involved in major cases of diversion and attempted diversion of psychotropic substances and precursors in 1994 and 1995. Traffickers have identified intermediaries as convenient conduits for diversion as they are able and sometimes willing to facilitate and otherwise promote the illicit traffic in psychotropic substances and precursors alongside their legitimate business interests.

146. The Board, in cooperation with the Pompidou Group, convened in May 1995 a meeting of a group of experts to review the control of intermediaries and transit operators dealing in precursors and psychotropic substances.

147. The experts concluded that the failure of certain countries to introduce control measures provided for in the international drug control treaties, as well as those recommended by the Economic and Social Council in its relevant resolutions, had been central to the problem of diversion of psychotropic substances and precursors involving intermediaries. That situation was further exacerbated by the fact that some countries complying with the requirements of the treaties and the Council resolutions had inadvertently facilitated such diversion by regularly permitting psychotropic substances and precursors to be exported to countries with very poor import and/or export controls.

148. The expert group therefore made a number of recommendations covering not only the control of intermediaries' activities, but also the control of international trade in psychotropic substances and precursors in general. *Specific recommendations concerning the control of intermediaries engaged in trade in precursors are summarized in the report of the Board for 1995 on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention.18

149. Regarding countries with deficient control regimes, the expert group recommended that exporting countries should exercise the utmost vigilance in processing import orders for substances controlled under the 1971 Convention and for those listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention in order to prevent uncontrolled re-exportation. Exports to free zones were also to be avoided in the absence of controls on such re-exportation.

150. It was further recommended that no exporting country should permit the shipment of psychotropic substances and substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention in excess of the annual legitimate domestic requirements, particularly the shipment of any such substances that are subject to frequent diversion.

151. The experts concluded that countries that had systematically applied the requisite control measures of the 1971 Convention and the 1988 Convention, as well as those recommended by the Economic and Social Council in its relevant resolutions, would not face problems involving diversion of controlled substances through intermediaries.*

152. The Board has examined and endorsed the findings of the expert group. The Board is currently reviewing the expert group's specific requests to the Board to provide further assistance to Governments and to engage in new activities in this field.