

IV. Conclusions

133. **Following the review of data available on licit trade in, diversion of, and trafficking in precursors, the Board has made a number of specific recommendations, including the major ones presented below.**

134. To prevent traffickers from obtaining the precursor chemicals they need for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, it is important for **Governments to estimate their licit requirements for the relevant precursors and submit those data to the Board.**

135. The illicit manufacture of methamphetamine is spreading throughout the world at an alarming rate because of the simple manufacturing process and the availability of the required precursors. The Board **recommends to Governments that they control pharmaceutical preparations containing scheduled substances in the same way as the scheduled substances they contain.** This applies in particular to preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. While the Board notes with appreciation that many Governments have already done so, it wishes to encourage all other Governments to follow suit, as appropriate.

136. Furthermore, the Board encourages the Governments of **exporting countries to provide pre-export notifications for exports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,** including the pharmaceutical preparations containing those substances.

137. The illicit manufacture of MDMA is spreading to regions previously not affected by such activity. Saffrole-rich oils are traded in multi-ton consignments, usually without passing through any control or monitoring mechanisms, and have been discovered in illicit laboratories. The Board recommends that saffras oil, due to its high saffrole content and because it may be readily used in illicit drug manufacture, should be considered as saffrole itself and referred to as "saffrole in the form of saffras oil"; it **should be controlled in the same way as saffrole in its pure form.** The Board invites Governments to consider ways **to ensure the acceptance of saffras oil as saffrole by the competent authorities and the industry.**

138. Traffickers in different regions are adopting different methods to divert the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants. **Governments need to develop region-specific responses to the threat now posed, as envisaged under Project Prism.**

139. The continuing illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan has been made possible because acetic anhydride is readily available in the country. Afghanistan has no licit requirements for the substance, which is smuggled into the country. Little progress has been made in identifying and dismantling routes used for smuggling precursors within Afghanistan and in its neighbouring countries. **The Board therefore calls upon Governments in the region, supported by the international community, to launch comprehensive operations to identify and dismantle the networks responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals into Afghanistan.**

140. Traffickers now appear to have found ways to avoid the controls and monitoring mechanisms introduced under Operation Purple. While limited illicit manufacture of potassium permanganate has been reported in South America, consignments of the substance are diverted from licit trade and smuggled into the countries where illicit manufacture of cocaine takes place. **The Board trusts that the revised procedures identified during the combined meeting of the Operation Purple and Operation Topaz steering committees held in Mexico City in October 2005 will assist in identifying the sources of the potassium permanganate seized.**

141. Traffickers target countries that have not been previously associated with the illicit manufacture of a specific drug or with the diversion of its precursors. Often those activities involve brokers. **Governments are urged to ensure that, when an importing company is identified, the legitimate need of the company for a specific precursor chemical is confirmed before the shipment is authorized. Mechanisms should also be introduced to monitor the activities of brokers, especially when a consignment of precursor chemicals is not shipped to the country where the broker is located.**

142. Precursor control is one of the areas where an illicit activity comes in contact with a licit market.

As such, opportunities exist to identify traffickers and to launch intelligence-driven investigations. **Governments should therefore be proactive in their approach to precursor investigations and develop information and/or intelligence related to stopped shipments and/or attempted diversions.**

Notes

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1582, No. 27627.

² *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.XI.1), paras. 14-24.

³ *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.XI.6), para. 92.

⁴ The number of seizures ranged from 18 in each of the years 2001-2003 to 14 in 2004 and 0 in 2005.

⁵ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Holy See, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

⁶ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 022, 26 January 2005.

⁷ The Task Force is composed of members representing the major geographical regions, namely, Australia, China, the Netherlands, South Africa and the United States, as well as the European Commission, Interpol and the World Customs Organization as competent international bodies. The Board, through its secretariat, guides the Task Force within the scope of its treaty mandates.

⁸ Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.