

## IV. Conclusions

131. The Board has reviewed data available on the licit movement and diversion of and trafficking in precursor chemicals and has made a number of specific recommendations to Governments in the present report. Presented below are some of the main recommendations.

132. **The Board recommends to Governments to estimate their legitimate requirements for precursors frequently used in the illicit manufacture of ATS and to inform the Board of those estimates.** The Board thanks the Governments of the 80 countries and territories which have submitted such data (see annex V). Those data are expected to provide the authorities in exporting countries with an indication of the legitimate requirements of importing countries. **The Board welcomes any feedback and invites Governments to review their needs and advise the Board of any amendments necessary.**

133. Pre-export notifications remain the cornerstone of the system of monitoring international trade. **Therefore, the Board encourages all Governments to utilize the new PEN Online system for the quick and more efficient exchange of data.**

134. Traffickers are increasingly trying to obtain other “forms” of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, including natural products such as ephedra and pharmaceuticals containing the substances. **Therefore, the Board recommends that all Governments control pharmaceutical preparations containing scheduled substances just as they control the scheduled substance themselves. Furthermore, the Board encourages exporting countries to provide pre-export notifications for exports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine preparations and ephedra. The Board particularly urges countries and territories in Africa and West Asia to take measures to monitor the manufacture, distribution and export of preparations of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, to ensure that end-users of such preparations are legitimate and to prevent accumulation in quantities exceeding the market requirements.**

135. While success has been achieved in stemming the flow of precursors for MDMA (“ecstasy”) and amphetamine into Western Europe, little is known on the new methods and routes being used by traffickers

to divert such chemicals into illicit channels. **Every effort should therefore be made to identify those methods and routes.**

136. The Board commends the efforts of the Project Prism Task Force. **The Board invites the Project Cohesion Task Force to continue to design specific activities to address the continuing problem of acetic anhydride being smuggled into Afghanistan. Based on the evaluation of the results of Operation Trans-shipment, Governments should continue targeted operations to identify and dismantle the criminal networks involved.** Similarly, fewer attempts to divert from international trade potassium permanganate, a key chemical used in the manufacture of cocaine, are being uncovered. That may indicate that traffickers have developed new methods and routes of diversion, possibly utilizing domestic distribution channels in third countries, which are not normally associated with the illicit manufacture of cocaine. **There is therefore an urgent need for investigations to be launched, both in Colombia and its neighbouring States, to identify the sources and routes used in smuggling potassium permanganate.**

137. The lack of evidence linking seizures of acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate to diversions directly from international trade, as well as very few suspicious shipments in international trade being identified, also raises concern over the controls exercised by Governments to prevent diversions from domestic distribution channels. **Governments are urged to ensure that the distribution and consumption of those two substances at the national level are properly controlled, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 8, of the 1988 Convention.**

138. Governments should continue to give the highest priority to investigations into seizures and stopped shipments of precursor chemicals and to follow up information provided on attempted diversions. Intelligence-driven investigations and backtracking investigations have proved particularly useful in the identification of those responsible for trafficking and diversion.