

the Board, in accordance with their treaty obligations. In addition, authorities of member States of the European Union should adequately monitor the movement of relevant precursors within the Union borders to ensure the legitimate end use of those precursors.

H. Regional precursor priorities: Oceania

143. There are two priorities for Oceania. One priority is utilizing the basic tools of precursor control in all the small Pacific island States. Of the nine States that have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention, five are Pacific island States;³⁷ Tonga is the only Pacific island State that has invoked article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the Convention; only three Pacific island States have registered to use the PEN Online system; and only one (Samoa) has registered to use PICS.

144. The second priority in Oceania is the further enhancement of cooperation, at the national and international levels, in Australia and New Zealand. It is particularly important for countries used as sources of precursor chemicals to address, through global initiatives such as Project Prism, the problem of precursors of methamphetamine being smuggled into Australia and New Zealand.

I. Global precursor priority

145. In addition to the identified regional precursor priorities and in the spirit of shared responsibility, countries that are in a position to do so are encouraged to support other countries in their efforts to address weaknesses in precursor control and to implement the action outlined in the present chapter.

Table 6. Action to enhance international precursor control: regional priorities

<i>Region</i>	<i>Invoking article 12, para. 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention</i>	<i>Registering to use PEN Online</i>	<i>Submitting form D on a regular basis</i>	<i>Providing annual estimates of legitimate requirements for precursors</i>	<i>Registering to use PICS</i>	<i>International cooperation, including activities of Project Prism and Project Cohesion</i>
Africa	X	X	X	X	X	X
Central America and the Caribbean	X		X	X	X	X
North America						X
South America					X	X
East and South-East Asia and South Asia	X				X	X
West Asia	X		X	X	X	X
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe	X				X	X
Western and Central Europe					X	X
Oceania	X	X ^a	X ^a	X ^a	X ^a	X ^a

^a Mainly among small Pacific island States.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

146. The present chapter contains broad conclusions and recommendations to fill existing gaps in the control system that have implications at the global level; to address current challenges; and to make the system of international precursor control more fit for the future.

147. The 1988 Convention and subsequent resolutions provide a comprehensive framework for international cooperation in preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals. In addition, a number of the legal and practical tools available to States provide the basis for the international monitoring of precursor chemicals. However, those tools are not utilized to the same extent in all countries or regions (see tables 5 and 6), and that provides opportunities for chemical trafficking organizations to circumvent existing legislation and hampers the efforts of other members of the international community. If the available tools were fully and systematically used by

³⁷ Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.

Governments, that would significantly reduce the chances of traffickers meeting the illicit demand for those chemicals.

148. Despite the fact that the 1988 Convention entered into force more than 20 years ago, the Governments of a number of countries have still not made use of the basic tools of international precursor control. In fact, a number of States parties to the Convention³⁸ have not utilized a single one of the basic tools. A second group of Governments are using the tools but still need to strengthen their domestic control system, taking into account their legitimate requirements for those precursor chemicals, and to take steps to facilitate their control over the imports and exports of those chemicals. A third group of Governments have made use of all the tools but still need to increase their cooperation efforts in support of regional and/or international investigations. The Board therefore encourages Governments to identify where weaknesses exist and take remedial action to comply with their treaty obligations and responsibility vis-à-vis other members of the international community, in order to prevent substances from reaching illicit markets.

149. Diversions of precursor chemicals from legitimate international trade are encountered far less frequently than in the past, trafficking patterns are more complex and licit chemical markets are becoming increasingly more diverse; the investigative potential of monitoring and/or following the distribution of certain substances not under international control that (in addition to internationally controlled substances) are required in the illicit drug manufacture has not yet been fully explored. There is also a need to share information with a level of detail that is far greater than in the past. The present report has illustrated the discrepancy between reported seizures of ephedrine in certain regions and the predominant substance traded in the same regions. The Board therefore encourages authorities to be cognizant of the investigative value of information about non-scheduled chemicals, details such as the specific type and form of ephedrine (and other chemicals) seized, details regarding labels on containers found in clandestine laboratories or used in intercepted shipments, and details about methods of diversion, and to share such details with their counterparts in the countries concerned.

³⁸ In Africa: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan and Swaziland; in Central America and the Caribbean: Dominica, and Saint Kitts and Nevis; in East and South-East Asia: Timor-Leste; in West Asia: Kuwait; in South-Eastern Europe: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and in Oceania: Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

150. The less frequent diversion of chemicals from legitimate international trade means that greater emphasis needs to be placed on understanding the domestic market of controlled chemicals and strengthening measures at the national level. One area that appears to be the least regulated in many countries is the verification of end users. In some regions, there is a need to focus more on understanding, regulating and reporting on the licit manufacture of controlled substances. The Board is concerned that in many regions, there are significant weaknesses in controls at the national level; the Board has therefore launched an operation called Eagle Eye, among other things, to shed light on priority areas requiring improvement in each of the participating countries. The Board encourages Governments to make every effort to participate in this and other time-bound operations under Project Prism and Project Cohesion aimed at improving the understanding of the licit and illicit markets for precursors at the national and international levels, and to support backtracking investigations and controlled (or monitored) deliveries of shipments of precursors, as a means of identifying the trafficking organizations involved.

151. One of the key challenges for international precursor control is the emergence of non-scheduled substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, particularly ATS. Until an international legal framework is in place to deal with such non-scheduled substances, the early and systematic sharing of all available operational information will be instrumental in building up cases and, more importantly, alerting authorities in other countries about the *modi operandi* used and new trends. PICS provides a means of sharing in real time such information; however, it is still not used enough for sharing such information about non-scheduled chemicals, as authorities appear to be uncomfortable about sharing incomplete information or information about shipments that were temporarily stopped but later released. The Board wishes to remind Governments that communicating incidents involving new substances that have not previously been encountered in a given jurisdiction may help to establish or confirm new trends and may contribute to the development of countermeasures. Early communication of information about a suspicious shipment or of concerns about a shipment is critical in that it alerts the relevant authorities at the national and international levels so that similar shipments routed through different border crossings, ports or countries can be identified.

152. If long-term solutions are to be identified, addressing current challenges and preparing the international precursor control system for the future, there is a need for a strategic discussion aimed at establishing the necessary

framework and commitment to enable national authorities to cooperate with one another so that they can effectively address the challenges of emerging and other non-scheduled substances used in illicit drug manufacture. The Board is willing to support such a process in the hope that Governments will use the high-level segment of the

Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its fifty-seventh session, in March 2014, as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for this and other discussions in preparation of the special session of the General Assembly to be held in 2016. At the same time, the Board remains committed to assisting Governments in utilizing the basic tools of international precursor control detailed in the present report.