International Narcotics Control Board

2002

Precursors

and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

EMBARGO

Observe release date:
Not to be published or broadcast before
Wednesday, 26 February 2003,
0001 hours (GMT)

CAUTION

UNITED NATIONS

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

Precursors

and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Report of the
International Narcotics Control Board for 2002
on the Implementation of Article 12
of the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 2003

Reports published by the International Narcotics Control Board in 2002

The *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002* (E/INCB/2002/1) is supplemented by the following technical reports:

Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 2003; Statistics for 2001 (E/INCB/2002/2)

Psychotropic Substances: Statistics for 2001; Assessments of Medical and Scientific Requirements for Substances in Schedules II, III and IV (E/INCB/2002/3)

Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/INCB/2002/4)

The updated lists of substances under international control, comprising narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, are contained in the latest editions of the annexes to the statistical forms ("Yellow List", "Green List" and "Red List"), which are also issued by the Board.

Contacting the International Narcotics Control Board

The secretariat of the Board may be reached at the following address:

Vienna International Centre
Room E-1339
P.O. Box 500
A-1400 Vienna
Austria

In addition, the following may be used to contact the secretariat:

Telephone: (43 1) 26060
Telex: 135612
Fax: (43 1) 26060-5867/26060-5868
Cables: unations vienna
E-mail: secretariat@incb.org

The text of the present report is also available on the Internet at the following location: http://www.incb.org

E/INCB/2002/4

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. E.03.XI.4
ISBN 92-1-148155-4

Preface

The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,[1] article 12, paragraph 13, provides that the International Narcotics Control Board "shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this article and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Tables I and II".

In addition to its annual report and other technical publications (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances), the Board has decided to publish its report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in accordance with the following provisions contained in article 23 of that Convention:

"1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the information at its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Parties, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. The Board may make such additional reports as it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission which may make such comments as it sees fit.

"2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution."

[1] *Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).

Contents

Explanatory notes

The following abbreviations have been used in this report:

Europol	European Police Force
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
LSD	lysergic acid diethylamide
MDA	methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDMA	methylenedioxymethamphetamine
3,4-MDP-2-P	3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
MEK	methyl ethyl ketone
P-2-P	1-phenyl-2-propanone

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Countries and areas are referred to by the names that were in official use at the time the relevant data were collected.

The maps in the present publication are intended to indicate the movement and seizures of the substances listed in the Tables of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Owing to lack of space, names of countries, territories, cities or areas may not appear at their exact geographical location.

The boundaries shown on maps in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Summary

To prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals for use in the illicit manufacture of drugs, Governments must have adequate legislation, in line with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, and effective working mechanisms, as well as procedures for information feedback between the authorities involved in the control of precursor chemicals. In exercising its functions under the 1988 Convention, in particular the monitoring of treaty compliance by Governments, the International Narcotics Control Board, in its report for 2002 on the implementation of article 12 of the Convention, examines actions recently taken, drawing attention to both the successes achieved and the shortcomings identified. In so doing, the report focuses, inter alia, on major international operations launched with the assistance of the Board.

A. Treaty adherence and reporting by Governments

The number of States parties to the 1988 Convention has continued to grow and now stands at 166, including almost all the major manufacturing, exporting and importing countries. As in previous years, about half of the countries and territories requested to furnish annual information on precursor chemicals on Form D have done so for 2001. It is of concern that over 40 per cent of the States parties have not provided the required information. Data on licit trade, which Governments are requested to furnish, on a voluntary basis, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995, are now provided by a growing number of Governments, including those of most of the major trading countries. The data enable the Board to improve its assistance to Governments in verifying the legitimacy of individual transactions. The Board urges all those major exporting and importing countries that have not already done so to supply the requested information as a matter of priority. The status of treaty adherence and reporting by Governments is examined in detail in chapter II, section A, of the report.

B. Prevention of diversion

The use of pre-export notifications is one of the most effective tools in detecting and preventing attempted diversions. The Board is therefore pleased to note that the number of Governments requesting pre-export notifications under article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention has grown rapidly over the past few years, and now stands at 56, including the States members of the European Union. Most exporting countries and trans-shipment points are now regularly providing pre-export notifications for substances listed in Table I, and for some substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention, in particular under the two international operations for monitoring acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate. As a result, a number of diversions and attempted diversion of precursor chemicals have been uncovered and prevented.

Operation Purple, the international programme for potassium permanganate launched in 1999, has continued to achieve successes in preventing diversions of that key chemical for the illicit manufacture of cocaine. Through the application of

the working mechanisms and standard operating procedures of Operation Purple, the 30 participating States and territories have prevented the diversion of 14 shipments, amounting to nearly 1,200 tons of potassium permanganate, from international trade into illicit drug manufacture. If diverted, that amount of potassium permanganate would have been sufficient to process 6,000 tons of cocaine. The overall impact of the Operation is reflected in chapter II, section A, of the report.

The stringent monitoring of licit shipments carried out by the 40 States and territories participating in Operation Topaz, the international programme for acetic anhydride, a critical chemical for the illicit manufacture of heroin, has enabled the Board to gain a thorough understanding of the trade in that substance. That knowledge is being used to assist Governments in fine-tuning the mechanisms and procedures currently in place. Under the law enforcement component of Operation Topaz, which includes, inter alia, investigations to trace seized chemicals back to their sources, after thorough backtracking investigations, the authorities concerned have been able to identify those responsible for diversions from domestic distribution channels and to prevent further diversions from those sources. The results of the related follow-up investigations are presented in chapter III of the report. At a recent consultation organized by the Board, the representative of Afghanistan announced that his country is also prepared to participate in Operation Topaz. Given the currently limited capacity of the authorities in Afghanistan to conduct extensive backtracking investigations, the Steering Committee of Operation Topaz announced the formation of an international task force to provide, if so requested, technical assistance to Afghanistan, and neighbouring countries, in such investigations (see chapter II).

During June 2002, the Board, in cooperation with the Government of the United States of America and the European Commission, convened an international meeting on precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, in order to devise working mechanisms to prevent diversions of those substances into illicit traffic. The 38 States and territories agreed to launch an international operation, named “Project Prism”, to address diversions of amphetamine-type stimulant precursors. In view of the diverse nature of the issues to be addressed relating to those precursors, individual operations will be carried out under the umbrella of Project Prism (for further details, see chapter II, section C).

Since the transfer, in 2001, of acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate from Table II to Table I of the 1988 Convention, the Board has continued to closely monitor the licit trade in those substances. It has noted that no State has reported any difficulties in implementing the related treaty requirements under the Convention.

C. Overview and analysis of illicit traffic

To facilitate understanding of the methods and routes used by traffickers for diversions and attempted diversions, an overview and analysis of the trends observed in the illicit traffic in precursors and other chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs is presented in chapter III. The analysis is based both on information supplied by Governments relating to, inter alia, seizures, stopped shipments and methods and routes of diversion, and on further information received

from other sources, including the international tracking operations and actual cases of diversion or attempted diversion.

Seizures of 21 of the 23 substances controlled under the 1988 Convention, as well as of a number of non-controlled substitutes, have been reported by nearly 40 Governments. The trends observed show that traffickers are becoming more sophisticated in their diversion attempts, and highlight, in particular, the need for competent authorities to launch follow-up investigations into interceptions, seizures and stopped shipments. The purpose of such investigations should be not only to prevent diversions, but also, and more importantly, to identify and prosecute those behind the activity. Details of the actual cases uncovered can be found in chapter III.

D. Annexes

An overview of the implementation by Governments of treaty requirements and of the provisions of the relevant resolution of the Economic and Social Council is set forth in tables included in annex I, relating to the following:

(a) Status of adherence to the 1988 Convention (table 1);

(b) Listing of Governments that have submitted the required information for the period 1997-2001 (table 2);

(c) Statistical information on seizures of precursor chemicals, showing where the different substances were seized, for the period 1997-2001 (tables 3a and 3b);

(d) Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for precursor chemicals in accordance with the relevant Economic and Social Council resolution (table 4).

In addition, to assist the competent authorities of exporting countries, a list of all Governments that have requested pre-export notifications for the substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention is given in annex I, table 5.

It is important to be able to relate the seizures of precursor chemicals and their prevented diversion into illicit traffic to the drugs that they could have been used to manufacture illicitly. To that end, annex II contains information on the substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and on their typical use in the illicit manufacture of drugs, as well as on the drug yields that could be obtained if the substances were used for such illicit manufacture. Information on the licit uses of the precursor chemicals is also included.

Relevant provisions of the 1988 Convention are included in annex III to assist the competent authorities in ensuring that their national legislation is in accordance therewith.

I. Introduction

1. In the course of monitoring the implementation by Governments of the provisions of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,[1] the International Narcotics Control Board has placed the highest priority, in particular since the mid-1990s, on assisting Governments in establishing working mechanisms and standard operating procedures to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals.[2] Specifically, the Board has continued to provide, through practical forums, a framework for establishing such mechanisms and procedures. Within that framework, it has made every effort to assist competent national authorities in verifying the legitimacy of individual shipments and initiating investigations after attempts at diversion or smuggling have been uncovered or intercepted.

2. Such forums led, inter alia, to international operations that were launched with the assistance of the Board. In 1999, an intensive international tracking programme, known as Operation Purple, was initiated for potassium permanganate, an important chemical used in illicit cocaine manufacture. As potassium permanganate was found to be usually diverted from licit international trade into the illicit traffic, such an intensive tracking programme, from the point of origin to the end-user, was devised and has proven to be effective. In 2001, a comparable programme, known as Operation Topaz, was undertaken for acetic anhydride, a critical chemical used in the illicit manufacture of heroin. In addition to establishing an intensive tracking programme for international trade, Operation Topaz has included a particular focus on law enforcement activities aimed at tracing back seizures and interceptions to their original sources. That was necessary because acetic anhydride is not only diverted from international trade, but is also frequently obtained through domestic distribution channels and then smuggled out of the country to final destinations elsewhere.

3. Both operations have been successful in tracking, and verifying the legitimacy of, individual shipments in international trade. As a result, a number of attempted diversions into the illicit traffic were effectively uncovered and prevented. Detailed accounts of the latest situation are given in the present report. Moreover, the extent and diversity of trade in both acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate have been determined, a result once thought unfeasible because they are traded so widely. The Governments concerned effectively implemented a number of the recommendations of the Board for action. Those recommendations appear to have stood the test of time, as evidenced by the success of the operations. It is also noteworthy that the standard operating procedures used under Operation Purple in the intensive tracking of shipments in licit international trade are in fact applied by a large number of countries, including non-participating Governments. The Board therefore considers it opportune to institutionalize those procedures, possibly through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. As shown in the present report, traffickers will target any country as a possible point of diversion. The standardized application of effective procedures by all trading countries is therefore essential.

4. The Board notes that investigations, in particular by law enforcement authorities, should be carried out more systematically when shipments have been stopped in international trade because of suspicious circumstances or irregularities. Immediate investigations, jointly conducted by the Governments concerned, are essential if the traffickers behind diversion attempts are to be found and prevented from placing orders elsewhere. Moreover, when precursor chemicals are seized or intercepted in smuggling cases, immediate law enforcement investigations must be initiated to track them back to the sources of diversion, in particular from domestic distribution channels, often in other countries. Under Operation Topaz, a major focus of which is backtracking investigations, the mechanisms to carry out such systematic law enforcement actions are being developed. The same requirement applies also to Operation Purple, since traffickers are increasingly resorting to smuggling attempts, as opposed to diversions directly from international trade. The present report provides some detailed accounts of major cases dealt with and sets out concrete proposals for further action.

5. In 2002, the Board provided another forum to further enhance international activities to prevent diversions of precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants. While international actions since the mid-1990s have effectively prevented diversions into illicit traffic of precursors for methamphetamine, concerted actions to prevent diversions of precursors for other

amphetamine-type stimulants, in particular methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) (Ecstasy) and its analogues, should now be taken. In 2001, the Board, recognizing the urgent need to address the issue, began to scrutinize the situation with a view to launching major international action aimed at the effective prevention of diversions of such precursors.[3] The international meeting on amphetamine-type stimulant precursors, which the Board convened in Washington, D.C., in June 2002, launched an international project to be known as Project Prism, an umbrella project under which specific operations are planned through working groups. A task force established to manage the Project has met to initiate working group activities, focusing on preventing diversions of different groups of precursors, as well as on equipment, materials and the use of the Internet. Planned activities are reflected in the present report. The Board trusts that Project Prism will meet with the full cooperation of Governments and that it will, through specific operations, constitute a major breakthrough in preventing the diversion into the illicit traffic of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants.

6. In addition to the precursor chemicals mentioned above, the Board has observed that concerted actions have effectively prevented the diversion of a number of other substances controlled under the 1988 Convention. As the Board has repeatedly emphasized, the key to the effective control of precursor chemicals in all cases has been the exchange of information and intelligence. Within its treaty mandates, it continues to stand ready to assist the competent national authorities in that field.

II. Framework for precursor control and action taken by Governments

A. Status of adherence to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and reporting by Governments under article 12

1. Status of the 1988 Convention

7. As of 1 November 2001, the 1988 Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by a total of 166 States, and formally confirmed by the European Community (extent of competence: article 12). That represents 87 per cent of all countries in the world. Since the report of the Board for 2001 on the implementation of article 12[4] was issued, four States (Eritrea, Israel, Rwanda and Thailand) have become parties to the Convention. Figure I shows the current status of adherence.

8. While the Board is pleased to note that most of the major manufacturing, exporting and importing countries have already become parties to the 1988 Convention, it encourages the remaining 26 States that have not already done so to take steps as a matter of priority to implement the provisions of that Convention, and to become parties as soon as possible. As the Board has repeatedly pointed out, traffickers always target those countries where appropriate controls may not be in place in attempting to divert precursor chemicals into illicit traffic. It is therefore essential that necessary monitoring mechanisms are put in place in all countries to enable Governments to effectively cooperate with each other to prevent such diversions.

9. In annex I, table 1, of the present report, the parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention are listed by region. The rates of accession are as follows: Africa (85 per cent); Americas (100 per cent); Asia (89 per cent); Europe (93 per cent); and Oceania (29 per cent). Figure II below gives the distribution of States parties and non-parties by region.

2. Reporting to the Board under article 12

10. The Board transmits to all Governments, parties and non-parties alike, an annual questionnaire on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, known as Form D. As of 1 November 2002, a total of 120 States and territories had submitted Form D for 2001, which represents over half of those Governments requested to provide the information. A total of 59 per cent of all parties and 46 per cent of non-parties submitted data for 2001. The situation concerning the submission of information to the Board as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention for the years 1997 to 2001 is shown in annex I, table 2.

Figure I
Status of adherence to the 1988 Convention
(As of 1 November 2002)



[a] The following States are non-parties:

Africa: Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Namibia and Somalia;

Asia: Cambodia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Timor-Leste;

Europe: Holy See, Liechtenstein and Switzerland;

Oceania: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

Figure II
Accession to the 1988 Convention: States parties and non-parties by region
(As of 1 November 2002)



Note: In addition, the European Union has formally confirmed the 1988 Convention (extent of competence: article 12).

11. While more than half of the parties continue to comply with their reporting obligations under article 12 of the 1988 Convention, it is of concern to the Board that the percentage of parties failing to do so has remained high (41 per cent). The Board notes with regret that the nine parties that have never submitted Form D, namely Albania, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Comoros, Gambia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yemen and Yugoslavia, have not yet been able to furnish the requisite information. The Board is also concerned that 27 parties[5] have now failed to submit Form D for at least three consecutive years. The Board urges all States and territories concerned to submit, as soon as possible, the information required under article 12 of the Convention. The Board reiterates that the timely and comprehensive reporting of such information is the basis for the effective functioning of the international precursor control system, while lack of reporting may indicate that the framework and mechanisms for adequate control are not yet in place.

12. In contrast, the Board has noted that a number of parties that have failed to furnish Form D for several consecutive years have now resumed fulfilling their reporting obligations, namely, Armenia, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda. In addition, two non-parties, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Solomon Islands, have also furnished Form D for 2001 for the first time in several years.

13. With regard to the data submitted, approximately the same number of Governments (38) reported seizures of precursors for 2001, as compared with previous years. However, several countries that are known to have either effected seizures in 2001 or reported seizures or stopped shipments in previous years have not yet submitted Form D for 2001. The States parties in question include Brazil, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan. The Board has raised that issue with the Governments concerned, and trusts that the requisite information will be supplied to it as soon as possible.

3. Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention

14. Since 1995, the Board, in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995, has requested the provision, on Form D, of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for scheduled substances.[6] Such data are requested on a voluntary basis and are treated as confidential by the Board when so requested. The submission of such information in response to that request is reflected in annex I, table 4.

15. The Board is pleased to note that the rate of return for such types of information has grown steadily. For 2001, a total of 93 of States and territories had reported, by 1 November 2002, data on licit trade, and 80 Governments had furnished information on licit uses of and requirements for such substances. In addition, the European Commission has furnished comprehensive information representing submissions from all 15 States members of the European Union. Since many other States continue to furnish Form D after a long delay, it is expected that the rate of return for 2001 will increase to a level similar to that of previous years. Figure III below shows the reporting by Governments for 1995-2001 in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20.

16. The pattern of reporting by region has also remained largely similar to that of previous years. Figure IV below shows the States and territories reporting to the Board for 2001, by region.

Figure III

Reporting by Governments for 1995-2001 in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20



Figure IV

Reporting to the Board of information for 2001 in accordance with article 12 of the 1988 Convention, and with Council resolution 1995/20, by region



17. When systems for collecting and recording relevant information are in place, Governments are in a position to report on the licit movement of precursor chemicals. The Board therefore notes with appreciation that the Governments of a number of countries and territories have for the first time provided information on trade in, uses of and requirements for substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. Those countries are Armenia, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands and Uganda, as well as the territory of French Polynesia. Furthermore, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a non-party, has resumed reporting for 2001.

18. As in previous years, many manufacturing, exporting and importing countries and trans-shipment points have furnished relevant information for 2001. Several other countries have not yet done so, among them Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Particularly in view of diversion attempts recently uncovered involving the territories of a number of those countries, the Board invites the Governments concerned, among others, to make every effort to collect and supply to it such information. Furthermore, it continues to be of concern that Canada (a major importer of *acetic anhydride*, *potassium permanganate* and *pseudoephedrine*), China (a major exporter of precursor chemicals) and Pakistan (a major importer of *ephedrine* and pseudoephedrine) are still not in a position to provide data on trade and licit uses and requirements, as requested in Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20.

19. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, States on the Balkan route, both of which import considerable quantities of acetic anhydride and where diversions and attempted diversion of that substance have taken place, as well as Croatia, through which many of the shipments transit en route to those countries, do not yet supply their trade data to the Board. It is also of concern that Egypt and Israel, significant importers of precursor chemicals in the Near East, do not report data on their imports, although, for instance, Egypt has recently been targeted by traffickers in attempted diversions of potassium permanganate (see chapter III, section B).

20. The Board again requests the Governments of all States and territories that have not already done so to put in place control mechanisms that allow them to monitor licit trade in precursor chemicals as a matter of priority, and to report those data to the Board. The Board reiterates that information on licit trade and licit requirements is essential for Governments, and the Board, to uncover possible cases of diversion and to identify areas where strengthening of controls is necessary for the full implementation of the Convention.

(a) Export data

21. The Board is pleased to note that most of the major manufacturing and exporting countries are now providing their export data. As in previous years, many of those Governments have provided, for 2001, comprehensive information on all their exports of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention.

22. The Board regrets that the Government of France, which in previous years had provided comprehensive data on all exports of substances in Tables I and II, has not furnished its export data for 2001. Moreover, the Government of South Africa, unlike in previous years, has only furnished partial information. Other major exporting countries and trans-shipment points, among them Brazil and the Russian Federation, which had previously provided export data, have not yet done so for 2001 (see section B, below). Canada and China[7] remain the only major exporting countries that do not report their exports to the Board on Form D. The Board urges the Governments concerned to take the necessary measures to collect data on their exports of precursor chemicals and to submit them as soon as possible.

23. The majority of the States and territories that report export data for Table I substances to the Board have now also furnished detailed data on their exports of *acetic anhydride* and *potassium permanganate*, substances that are key chemicals for the illicit manufacture of heroin and cocaine, respectively, and that were transferred from Table II to Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2001. The Board is pleased to note that the Governments of India and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have provided on Form D, for the first time in 2001, detailed information on their exports of potassium permanganate. The latter

country has also furnished, for the first time since 1996, detailed export data for acetic anhydride.

24. Under Operation Purple and Operation Topaz, which include intensive international tracking programmes, potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride are closely monitored. The major exporting countries and territories participating in the operations have continued to submit information on individual exports of those substances, mainly by providing pre-export notifications, including from States that do not yet submit such data annually. For instance, China is doing so for both acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate, India for acetic anhydride and Ukraine for potassium permanganate. For more details on Operation Purple and Operation Topaz, see section B, below.

25. As in previous years, most of the countries and territories that are major manufacturers and exporters of *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine*, precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants and used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, have continued to report their export data. It has also been noted with appreciation that a number of those countries and territories, among them Argentina, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Japan, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, are now also in a position to provide such data for *norephedrine*, which was included in Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2000.

26. In contrast, comprehensive information is not yet available on patterns of trade in certain other precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, in particular *3,4-methydenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P)*, *1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P)* and *safrole*. While trade in 3,4-MDP-2-P and P-2-P is limited, safrole is traded widely. Some manufacturing and exporting countries and territories have started to provide relevant information on P-2-P and safrole, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong SAR of China, India, Italy, Spain, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In view of the need for better monitoring of the movement of those substances, the Board is pleased that at the recent international meeting on precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants convened by the Board in Washington, D.C., in July 2002, concerned Governments launched a voluntary international project, named Project Prism, for the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants of major concern (see section B, below). The Board trusts that the Governments participating in Project Prism will take the necessary measures to control and monitor both international trade and domestic distribution of those precursor chemicals and furnish the relevant data to the Board. It also encourages all non-participating Governments to follow suit.

(b) Data on imports of, and licit requirements for, specific substances

27. The Board welcomes the fact that the number of States and territories furnishing data on imports of and licit requirements for scheduled substances has been growing steadily over the past few years. It is essential for all Governments to have monitoring mechanisms in place that will allow them to know the types and quantities of precursor chemicals entering their territories and the quantities needed for licit purposes.

28. For the period 1995-2001, information on imports of *acetic anhydride* is available for over 80 countries and territories. Of those, 58 have reported imports of that substance on Form D for 2001, the highest number ever for a given year, including major importing countries.[8] There has also been a steady increase in the number of reports received on licit requirements for acetic anhydride, from 16 submissions for 1995 to 49 for 2001. The fact that more and more Governments are able to collect and report such data may be attributed to the intensified monitoring of trade in that substance under Operation Topaz, as well as to the transfer of acetic anhydride from Table II to Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2001.

29. For *potassium permanganate*, which was also transferred from Table II to Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2001, information about imports of that substance is available for about 90 countries and territories for the period 1995-2001. In 1999, when the intensive international tracking of that substance through Operation Purple began, the number of Governments furnishing import data for that substance almost doubled, as compared to the years before. Since then, between 50 and 60 Governments have reported imports of potassium permanganate per annum on Form D, among them many major importing countries and countries and territories that re-export sizeable quantities of that substance.[9] Since the beginning of

Operation Purple, there has also been a similar increase in the number of Governments reporting licit requirements for that substance, with about 50 States and territories supplying information for 1999. Since then, about the same number of Governments has been reporting annually such information to the Board.

30. The number of Governments furnishing information on imports of and requirements for *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine*, key precursors for methamphetamine, has remained high, with over 70 Governments supplying relevant import data every year. The rate of reporting on those two substances is considerably higher than for any other substance controlled under the 1988 Convention. The comprehensive information available to the Board on the patterns of licit trade in those two substances has been instrumental in assisting Governments in detecting recent attempted diversions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas (see also chapter III, section B). Of the countries known to be major importers of ephedrines, only Canada and Pakistan do not yet provide import data, and the Republic of Korea has not done so since 1997. In contrast, the Board has noted with satisfaction that a number of Governments have provided data on imports and requirements of *norephedrine*, among them Argentina, Australia, Germany, Hong Kong SAR of China, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

31. Concerning other precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, namely, *3,4-MDP-2-P*, *P-2-P* and *safrole*, the information available to the Board on imports continues to be limited. The Board hopes that under Project Prism, the voluntary international project for the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants of major concern, more countries will start to systematically gather information on their imports of and licit requirements for those substances and supply them to the Board.

B. Prevention of diversion

1. Examination of actions taken by Governments to detect and prevent diversion of precursors for the illicit manufacture of drugs

(a) Actions related to facilitating the exchange of information

32. The rapid exchange of information on individual shipments between Governments of importing and exporting countries is the most effective means of preventing diversion of precursor chemicals. In most of the known cases of attempted diversion, Governments have been able to prevent the diversion by exchanging information, through pre-export notices and enquiries about the legitimacy of individual transactions, with the competent authorities of other countries prior to shipment. The Board is therefore pleased to note that most of the Governments of the major manufacturing and exporting countries and trans-shipment points now send prior notices of exports involving precursors to importing countries or enquire about the legitimacy of transactions before the actual shipment takes place. In particular under Operation Purple and Operation Topaz, the comprehensive international operations for *potassium permanganate* and *acetic anhydride*, respectively, the majority of the attempted diversions of those chemicals that have been prevented were discovered through such exercises. The Board is confident that similar successes will be achieved in the prevention of diversions of the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants under the recently launched Project Prism (see section 3, below).

33. The Board has repeatedly recommended that Governments of exporting countries and trans-shipment points should regularly send pre-export notices for shipments of all Table I substances. The number of countries that have recently established, or are establishing, monitoring mechanisms to provide pre-export notices for such substances on a regular basis has continued to grow. Pre-export notices are now issued for exports of all 14 Table I substances by the Government of Hungary, which also sends such notices for Table II substances on a case-by-case basis upon analysis of the risk of diversion. Canada is in the process of establishing a mechanism for the provision of pre-export notices for Tables I and II substances upon request by the importing country through the Secretary-General. Other Governments, including

those of China, Hong Kong SAR of China, the Czech Republic, India, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, as well as the States members of the European Union, have already done so. Japan has also extended the mechanism for sending pre-export notices for acetic anhydride.

34. While many of those Governments provide pre-export notices even when not formally requested by the importing countries, a number of exporting countries, under their current laws and regulations, find it helpful if importing countries officially request the provision of such pre-export notifications through the Secretary-General, by invoking article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention. The Board therefore calls upon the Governments of all importing countries that have not already done so to consider formally requesting, where appropriate, that pre-export notifications be sent to their competent authorities. At the same time, it also encourages the Governments of exporting countries to request pre-export notifications to enable them to ensure the adequate monitoring of shipments of precursor chemicals entering their territories that may be destined for subsequent re-export.

35. The Board is pleased to note that the number of Governments that have formally requested the provision of pre-export notifications, at least for some substances, has grown rapidly over the past few years. Since the last report of the Board on the implementation of article 12 was issued, the Governments of Haiti and Lebanon have requested pre-export notifications for all substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention. The Government of the latter country, as well as that of the Dominican Republic, have further notified the Secretary-General of their request to receive pre-export notifications also for the substances included in Table II of that Convention.

36. As of 1 November 2002, 39 States and two territories have requested pre-export notices pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention. In addition, the European Commission has invoked that article on behalf of all 15 States members of the European Union, bringing to 56 the total number of Governments having made use of that provision. The specific requests received from Governments so far are reproduced in annex I, table 5, of the present report.

37. In assisting Governments in verifying the legitimacy of transactions, the Board has continued to pay special attention to maintaining and improving cooperation between Governments, and to facilitating the exchange of information between countries that have been targeted by traffickers in attempted diversions of precursor chemicals. As direct working-level contacts between competent national authorities on specific issues with which they have common concerns often result in practical arrangements to address such issues effectively, the Board, in an attempt to expand further the information-sharing networks, in particular on precursor control, continues to provide such forums on different occasions.

38. During 2002, the Board convened two informal round-table consultations in Central Asia and one consultation in Africa, to establish a working system for sharing information with and between regulatory and law enforcement authorities at the national, subregional and regional level. Given the importance of the Central Asian region in preventing acetic anhydride, a key chemical used in the illicit manufacture of heroin, from being diverted or smuggled to Afghanistan, the first consultation was held in Ashghabat, in January 2002, involving the five Central Asian States and the Russian Federation, to make necessary arrangements to detect and prevent diversions of that substance. To maintain the momentum created by that meeting, a second round-table consultation was held in Tashkent, in October 2002, in conjunction with the meeting of the Steering Committee of Operation Topaz, with the competent authorities of the Central Asian States and the Russian Federation. In view of the need to begin working with the authorities of Afghanistan in the field of chemical control, an invitation was extended to the authorities of that country. That was the first time in many years that the Afghan authorities could attend such an international forum. The Board stands ready to assist the Afghan authorities in working closely with, among others, its neighbouring countries in the control of precursor chemicals.

39. Finally, in view of the increasing number of cases, involving countries in Africa, of diversion or attempted diversion of controlled chemicals being uncovered, the Board convened an informal round-table consultation in Pretoria, in July 2002, with the competent authorities of Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the source countries China, India and the United Kingdom. The meeting resulted, inter alia, in the

establishment of a network of information-sharing among the African countries concerned, the relevant source countries and the Board, on licit trade as well as on seizures and stopped shipments of precursors.

(b) Control measures applied by Governments to Tables I and II substances

40. The Board is pleased to note that a number of States, including Brazil, Hungary, Mauritius, Kazakhstan and Uruguay, have recently strengthened existing precursor control legislation with a view to tightening controls over international trade in controlled chemicals and their domestic distribution. Other States, including Cyprus and the Republic of Korea, are currently in the process of doing so. Furthermore, the Board notes that the European Community has embarked on a major evaluation of its existing precursor control legislation and its implementation in the European Union, with a view to better meeting its objective of preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals.

2. Penal and administrative sanctions

41. Under article 3, paragraphs 1 (a) (iv) and 1 (c) (ii), of the 1988 Convention, each State party is obliged to establish criminal offences in relation to the manufacture, transport, distribution and possession of precursor chemicals, knowing that they are to be used for illicit purposes, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system. Furthermore, under article 12, paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b), States parties are obliged to take the measures that they deem appropriate to monitor the manufacture and distribution of substances in Tables I and II. In implementing those provisions, they may choose to apply penal, administrative or both types of sanctions for non-compliance with the measures taken.

42. Since the Board last examined this matter in detail in 1998, it has found that many countries and territories, including the major exporting, importing and transit countries and territories, have already introduced relevant legislation with regard to their treaty obligations, while others have not yet done so. The Board therefore wishes to remind all Governments of the need for appropriate sanctions to act as deterrents of criminal activity, in particular precursor-related offences.

3. Findings and actions taken by Governments and by the Board

(a) Special focus on monitoring the international trade in potassium permanganate, in particular through Operation Purple

43. The Board has noted with satisfaction that, in 2002, Governments[10] continued to achieve successes in preventing diversions of *potassium permanganate* from international trade under Operation Purple, which includes the intensive international tracking programme initiated in 1999.[11] At the international level, the Board, in exercising its functions under the 1988 Convention, continues to assist in the operation and currently serves, through its secretariat, as the international focal point for the necessary exchange of information among participants.

44. In that function, the Board assists Governments in ensuring that the standard operating procedures are applied and in monitoring patterns of trade, in particular trade with non-participating countries, in order to identify diversions and attempted diversions.

45. An examination of the information on the shipments monitored under the current phase of Operation Purple shows that the number of shipments reported to the Board has decreased slightly, from nearly 550 shipments for the period from 1 January to 1 November 2001, to just under 500 shipments for the same period in 2002. The volume of trade monitored under the operation during that period has fallen noticeably, from about 19,000 tons in 2001 to just over 10,000 tons in 2002, a 42 per cent decrease. While the cause of this drop in international trade has not yet been determined, it is important to note that about 60 per cent of both the number of shipments and the total volume reported continues to involve countries not participating in the operation. Those data, including stopped shipments, are shown in figure V. Figure VI, parts (a) to (d), shows the volume of trade in potassium permanganate with participating and non-participating countries, by region, during Phase I and Phase II (2000-2002).

46. Since the first phase of the operation, the Board has continued to closely monitor all shipments of potassium permanganate to countries not participating in the operation. During 2000 and 2001, an increase was observed in the number of attempts by traffickers to divert shipments through such countries for use in

Figure V
Shipments of potassium permanganate tracked under Operation Purple



Figure VI

Exports of potassium permanganate to countries participating, and those not participating, in Operation Purple, by region

(a) Phase I



(b) Phase II (January 2000 to November 2000)



(c) Phase II (January 2001 to November 2001)



(d) Phase II (January 2002 to November 2002)



the illicit manufacture of drugs. While fewer such diversion attempts were uncovered during 2002, the Board urges all non-participating countries to verify the bona fides of all operators involved with potassium permanganate, not only as importers, but also as distributors and end-users, to ensure that subsequent diversion from domestic channels is prevented. In particular, every effort should be made to respond to pre-export notifications sent by exporting countries in a timely manner to prevent both unnecessary delays in licit trade and diversions.

47. As mentioned above, traffickers have been found to be often targeting non-participating countries in their diversion attempts; however, during 2002, 10 of the 15 uncovered diversion attempts targeted countries participating in the operation. This gives a clear indication that traffickers will target any country, and only by the full application of the working mechanisms and standard operating procedures of the operation can such activity be prevented. Participating Governments are therefore also urged to remain vigilant in monitoring the trade, even when the companies

involved are known and trade regularly in the substance, as the names of those companies have been found to be frequently used by traffickers in diversion attempts, as reflected in chapter III below.

48. As may be further seen from figure V, the successes achieved during 2002 in preventing diversions, through the stopping of shipments, was similar to that achieved during 2001. In total, 15 shipments amounting to over 1,180 tons of potassium permanganate were stopped during the first 10 months in 2002 and 17 shipments amounting to 1,175 tons were stopped during the same period in 2001. Traffickers are, however, still able to obtain the substance, as indicated by the seizures reported for 2001.

49. While the amounts seized have fallen since Operation Purple was initiated in 1999, possibly due to decreased availability of the substance as a result of the international monitoring,[12] the standard operating procedures must be fully implemented if diversions of potassium permanganate are to be effectively addressed. In particular, Governments should ensure that appropriate mechanisms exist to investigate stopped shipments on a real-time basis and to exchange relevant information with other concerned parties, with a view to prosecuting those responsible for such diversion attempts. Similarly, when smuggled consignments are intercepted, or seizures made at illicit laboratories, backtracking investigations should, where possible, be initiated immediately to identify the source of diversion, as is done under Operation Topaz.

(b) International operation to monitor acetic anhydride, in particular through Operation Topaz

50. Operation Topaz, which the Board launched in cooperation with concerned Governments has, as its major components: (a) an intensive international tracking programme focusing on licit international shipments of *acetic anhydride*; and (b) law enforcement investigations to track back the seized, or intercepted, chemical to the original sources. It officially commenced on 1 April 2001 and, initially, was to proceed through the end of 2001. At the end of that period, the Steering Committee[13] for the operation reviewed its progress and utility, and concluded that the operation should be extended for an unspecified period. As of 1 November 2002, 40 States[14] and territories were participating in the operation. As with Operation Purple, the Board, in exercising its functions under the 1988 Convention, assists in the operation and serves, through its secretariat, as the international focal point for the exchange of necessary information. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the Customs Cooperation Council (also known as the World Customs Organization) and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) support Operation Topaz in their respective areas of responsibility. At the regional level, the European Commission is also involved for activities taking place within the European Union.

51. The international tracking carried out under Operation Topaz continues to function well. During the period from 1 January to 1 November 2002, exports of 2,800 shipments have been reported from 17 States and territories,[15] involving nearly 300,000 tons of acetic anhydride. The Board commends the competent authorities of the exporting countries, in particular Belgium and the Netherlands, through which the majority of consignments were shipped, for their efforts in ensuring that the international tracking programme is functioning smoothly. The information gathered has enabled the Board to gain a better understanding of the complex licit international trade patterns and routes that exist for acetic anhydride, which is essential if the Board is to assist Governments, in further improving the existing mechanisms and procedures to prevent diversions of acetic anhydride for use in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

52. It has been found that the majority of shipments reported under Operation Topaz are to countries participating in the operation, with nearly 2,600, or 93 per cent, of the total number of shipments. As regards the volume of shipments, 285,000 tons, or 95 per cent, of the total quantity traded during the first 10 months of 2002 were destined for participating countries, with the majority of those transactions taking place between States members of the European Union. In total, nearly 2,400, or 92 per cent, of the shipments monitored were reported by States members of the European Union, and only 260 of them, or 10 per cent, were shipped to States non-members of the European Union. The breakdown of those shipments is shown in figure VII.

Figure VII
Shipments of acetic anhydride between States members and States non-members of the European Union



Note: European Union (EU).

53. The concentration of licit trade within the European Union, coupled with the fact that no diversions or attempted diversions from that trade have been detected, has led the Steering Committee to review the existing working mechanisms and standard operating procedures of the operation for trade within the European Union in order to identify a viable alternative to the shipment-by-shipment tracking. It will be essential that the procedures introduced will lessen the burden on monitoring the licit trade between the countries concerned, without having a negative effect on the overall objectives of the operation. The Board welcomes that initiative, designed to ensure that the operation remains dynamic, with the ability to adapt to changing trends and new information received.

54. During 2002, with the exception of the Russian Federation, where a single attempted diversion of 1,000 tons of acetic anhydride was uncovered, no other attempted diversions from international trade have been identified, despite the intensive tracking being carried out. This gives a clear indication that traffickers are, for the most part, attempting to divert acetic anhydride from domestic distribution channels and smuggling the substance to areas where the illicit manufacture of drugs takes place.

55. The Board is aware that, with the extremely large domestic trade in acetic anhydride that is carried on throughout the world on a daily basis, it may not be feasible to monitor every domestic transaction to prevent diversions from that source. For that reason, in addition to the international tracking programme, Operation Topaz also focuses on law enforcement activities aimed at intercepting smuggled acetic anhydride and investigating such interceptions, and on seizures at illicit storage facilities or heroin laboratories in order to backtrack to the sources from which the substance was diverted. Where such investigations were carried out thoroughly, the authorities concerned were able to identify those responsible for such diversions from domestic distribution channels and to prevent future diversions from those sources. Several Governments conducted such investigations during 2001 and 2002, and significant cases uncovered during 2002, as well as the results of the related follow-up investigations, are presented in chapter III of the current report.

56. The successes achieved through the backtracking investigations show that there is an urgent need for Governments to place more emphasis on investigations of this nature. Operation Topaz provides an ideal forum through which information on seizures and stopped shipments can be exchanged quickly and securely, allowing follow-up investigations to be initiated in other countries concerned. The Board urges the Governments that intercept smuggled consignments and effect seizures to establish appropriate mechanisms

to ensure that the central national authority identified for the purpose of the operation is informed immediately of all such seizures. Furthermore, that central national authority should, in accordance with the standard operating procedures of the operation, share information with the relevant authorities to ensure that the necessary follow-up investigations are initiated.

57. In addition to conducting backtracking investigations, authorities intercepting smuggled consignments of acetic anhydride are making use of controlled deliveries to identify and prosecute those involved in the illicit traffic of the substance. In particular, the competent authorities in Turkey are successfully utilizing this law enforcement technique. The Board encourages those States not yet making use of this important tool to consider doing so when interceptions or seizures are effected, not only of acetic anhydride, but of any substance used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

58. Finally, taking into consideration that some of the acetic anhydride diverted from licit supply channels is smuggled into Afghanistan for use in the illicit manufacture of heroin in that country, the Board is pleased to note that, for the first time, senior officials from Afghanistan have been able to participate in a round-table consultation on precursor chemical control convened by the Board in Tashkent, in October 2002. The consultation concentrated on the possible trafficking of acetic anhydride through the Central Asian countries to Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the activities carried out under Operation Topaz. During the consultation, the representative of Afghanistan announced that his country was now also prepared to participate in the operation. In view of the currently limited capacity of the authorities in Afghanistan to conduct extensive backtracking investigations, the Steering Committee of Operation Topaz announced the formation of an international task force to provide technical assistance to Afghanistan, and its neighbouring countries, in such investigations, when so requested. The task force consists of law enforcement bodies from Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Board trusts that Governments in the region will make use of the task force to assist in any investigations undertaken.

(c) International activities relating to the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants

59. In response to the increasing concern over the diversions of precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, the Board, in cooperation with the Government of the United States and the European Commission, convened the international meeting on amphetamine-type stimulant precursors, held in Washington, D.C., in June 2002.

60. Representatives from both the regulatory and law enforcement authorities of all countries that are major manufacturers and exporters, transit points and importers of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, as well as those countries through which the substances are diverted or where illicit manufacture takes place, attended the meeting. In total, 38 States and one territory,[16] as well as the European Commission, the European Police Force (Europol), Interpol, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States and UNDCP were represented at the meeting.

61. The meeting agreed to initiate a voluntary international project, named “Project Prism”, to assist Governments in:

(a) Developing and implementing working mechanisms and standard operating procedures to more effectively control and monitor both international trade and domestic distribution of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, in order to prevent diversions from those sources;

(b) Developing and implementing effective mechanisms to facilitate international follow-up investigations by law enforcement authorities into seizures, diversions and smuggling of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, with a view to tracking down the sources of those consignments.

62. In view of the diverse nature of the issues to be dealt with concerning the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants, the meeting decided that individual operations would be carried out under the umbrella of Project Prism. Those operations, to be handled by working groups, would focus on the following: diversions of the precursors of amphetamines;[17] diversions of the precursors of MDMA;[18] and materials and equipment used in illicit manufacture and use of the Internet. The project would also receive support, where required, from a scientific support

component arranged through UNDCP, serving as the focal point. Finally, to ensure consolidated investigations and the sharing of information and intelligence and of the findings of investigations, the meeting established a task force to oversee the project.

63. The task force is composed of members representing the major geographical regions, namely China, the Netherlands, South Africa and the United States, as well as the European Commission, Interpol and the World Customs Organization as competent international bodies. The Board, through its secretariat, guides the task force fully within the scope of its treaty mandates. The first meeting of the task force was held in Vienna in August 2002.

64. At that time, the Task Force established two working groups, one addressing the precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants and the second addressing equipment, materials and the sale of chemicals over the Internet, and identified their priorities and objectives. The first meetings of the working groups are to be hosted by the Government of the Netherlands and Europol, respectively, during December 2002. The Board trusts that the activities initiated by the working groups will result in successes similar to those achieved under Operations Purple and Topaz.

III. Analysis of data on seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors and trends in illicit manufacture of drugs

A. Overview

65. The analysis presented below provides an overview of major trends in diversion and trafficking of the substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. In the analysis of available data, consideration has been given to information provided by the law enforcement and regulatory authorities not only on seizures, but also on known cases of diversion and attempted diversion, on stopped or suspended shipments in international trade, and on the illicit manufacture of drugs. The findings of investigations undertaken are also considered.

66. The present report contains seizure data for the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, furnished by Governments under article 12 of the 1988 Convention (see annex I, tables 3a and 3b).

67. Seizures of most of the substances in Tables I and II have been reported for 2001. No seizures were reported for *ergometrine* and *isosafrole*. Furthermore, more comprehensive information on the methods and routes of diversion has become available to the Board through the international operations currently under way. All Governments are therefore urged to review their procedures for the collection and provision of the information relating to seizures, diversions and stopped shipments of all controlled and non-controlled substances, so that a comprehensive analysis of the current trafficking trends for all chemicals can be carried out.

68. The working mechanisms developed over the years to prevent diversions of precursor chemicals from international trade are functioning well. For 2001, Governments have reported stopping over 20 shipments in international trade, which were believed to be diversion attempts. Nine controlled substances, from both Tables I and II, as well as two non-controlled chemicals, were the subject of those diversion attempts. It is noteworthy that certain Governments are able to identify suspicious orders of even the most widely traded substances such as hydrochloric acid and methyl ethyl ketone.

69. On the basis of the available information, the following observations can be made:

(a) The majority of the seizures effected during 2001 of, in particular, Table I substances, have been made when authorities have intercepted precursor chemicals being smuggled over national borders. When such consignments are intercepted, it is essential for authorities to launch backtracking investigations as soon as possible after the seizure, sharing all relevant information with other concerned Governments, if the source of the seized chemicals is to be identified and future diversions are to be prevented;

(b) Given the large volume of licit trade in certain substances, in particular at the domestic level, the intensive monitoring of transactions may not always be feasible. In such cases, intelligence should be developed, through seizures, interceptions, confidential and other sources etc., so that

investigations can be carried out in a focused, structured and effective manner;

(c) In attempted diversions from international trade, traffickers are continuing to utilize the names of known companies that have licit requirements for the substance sought. In the most recent attempts uncovered, however, traffickers are placing orders for much larger amounts of the substances than were previously noted and, in addition, are supporting those orders with falsified sales contracts and company stamps and also false import certificates;

(d) Corruption continues to be a major factor to be addressed when attempting to prevent diversions or to intercept smuggled consignments of precursor chemicals. Traffickers are now infiltrating the staff or corrupting employees of transport and shipping companies to ensure that consignments are moved through international ports as quickly as possible and with a minimum of problems. Such a position also enables traffickers to obtain prior warning of law enforcement activities concentrating on a specific consignment;

(e) The use of controlled deliveries has proven an effective tool in the identification and arrest of traffickers responsible for diversions of precursors. The controlled deliveries reported have, however, been primarily carried out within a national territory, or at a bilateral level, as difficulties continue to be experienced in organizing multijurisdictional operations. There is an urgent need to examine the possibility of developing working mechanisms and standard operating procedures for controlled deliveries at the international level.

B. Trends in the illicit traffic in precursors and other chemicals and the illicit manufacture of drugs

1. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine

Potassium permanganate

Seizures

70. The Board has noted that seizures of *potassium permanganate* have been steadily declining since the introduction of Operation Purple in 1999, with 150 tons of the substance reported seized in 1999, 77 tons during 2000 and 51 tons for 2001. Furthermore, the Government of Colombia, which consistently reports the largest seizures of the substance, has also reported decreasing seizures during that period, with the amounts seized falling from 71 tons in 1999 to 50 tons in 2001. When viewed in conjunction with other factors, such as the number of stopped shipments, the low level of oxidation of cocaine samples seized during law enforcement actions and the continuing illicit manufacture of potassium permanganate itself, the Board sees the declining seizures as an indication of the effectiveness of Operation Purple, in particular its intensive tracking programme (see chapter II, section B, above), in preventing diversions of the substance from international trade, thereby restricting the availability of the substance for use by traffickers in the illicit manufacture of cocaine.

71. While the international tracking of the substance is functioning well in preventing diversions from international trade, traffickers are still able to obtain the substance, as indicated by the interception of smuggled consignments in international trade, detected by the Colombian authorities during 2000 and 2001. During that period, a total of five such cases, amounting to nearly 70 tons of potassium permanganate, were intercepted. In particular, in its report for 2001,[19] the Board noted that, since phase II of Operation Purple commenced in January 2000, all of the potassium permanganate intercepted in Colombia had been smuggled out of Mexico. The Governments of Colombia and Mexico worked together to identify the sources of the potassium permanganate seized and to take measures to prevent further diversions, and no interceptions along that route have been reported for 2002. The Board is continuing its efforts to identify countries possibly being targeted by traffickers in further diversion attempts.

72. Elsewhere in the Latin American region, seizures of potassium permanganate have been reported by Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Of the countries bordering Colombia, only Brazil, a country with a large chemical industry, and Panama, an important trans-shipment point, have not reported whether seizures of the substance have taken place in their respective territories during 2001. In view of the significant intraregional trafficking of potassium permanganate and the attempted diversion of the substance, detected during 2002, involving Brazil, regulatory authorities of all countries in the region

should ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to prevent diversions from domestic distribution channels. Furthermore, law enforcement authorities in those countries should also be aware that traffickers may attempt to smuggle the substance through their territory, and existing mechanisms should be enhanced to identify and intercept any such activity.

73. With regard to seizures outside the Latin American region, Spain and Ukraine, both countries that manufacture potassium permanganate, have each reported seizures of over 100 kilograms of the substance for 2001. The seizures reported in Ukraine are not connected to the illicit manufacture of cocaine,[20] however, those in Spain, where seizures of potassium permanganate have been rising steadily over the last four years, are directly related to the increasing number of illicit cocaine-processing laboratories dismantled in the country.

74. The Spanish authorities have achieved notable successes in detecting and dismantling such laboratories. At the same time, the Board is concerned that, as the chemicals required for such processing become more difficult to obtain in the South American region, and given the relative ease with which those chemicals can be obtained in Europe, other countries in the region may also be targeted for such activities. Therefore, Governments in Europe should take note of the existence of such laboratories and introduce appropriate mechanisms to prevent and detect the illicit processing of cocaine.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

75. As mentioned in chapter II, section B, above, as a result of the successful application of the working mechanisms and standard operating procedures of Operation Purple, a number of exports of potassium permanganate have been stopped in international trade during 2002 because of a suspicion that they were to have been diverted for the illicit manufacture of cocaine. While some of the shipments were stopped for administrative reasons, a total of 15 shipments, involving over 1,180 tons of potassium permanganate, were attempted diversions. The countries that have successfully prevented those diversions are shown in figure VIII. In particular, the Board wishes to commend the competent authorities of China, the country of manufacture, for their work in enabling those diversion attempts to be identified and in stopping the shipments.

76. As was noted in the report for 2001,[21] traffickers continue to use the names of bona fide companies with legitimate requirements for potassium permanganate in the majority of the diversion attempts uncovered. It has only been when the competent authorities contacted the companies concerned directly to verify the legitimacy of the shipments that it has been discovered that the companies in question did not place the orders. Furthermore, during 2002, in the course of follow-up investigations carried out in each of the above cases, investigators have uncovered, for the first time, sales contracts on which the purported buyers' signatures have been falsified. In total, four such cases have been uncovered, involving companies located in Austria, Germany and Ireland. The Board has also noted with concern that the quantities of potassium permanganate ordered in those attempts have been larger than those previously uncovered in diversion attempts, with two of the orders being for 300 tons and a third for 100 tons. From the similarities in the manner of placing the orders, as well as the actual quantities ordered, it appears that the orders in question may have been placed by the same individuals or groups, in the hope that at least one of the shipments might be released by the authorities concerned.

77. In order to prevent diversion and attempted diversions of such a sophisticated nature, backtracking investigations must be initiated to identify and to take action against those responsible for such activities. Since the Board is not aware of any such investigations being carried out during 2002, it reiterates the need for Governments to apply fully the standard operating procedures of Operation Purple which require the competent authorities not only to ensure the physical tracking of each shipment of potassium permanganate from the point of manufacture to its ultimate end-use, but also to ensure that investigations into interceptions, seizures and stopped shipments are carried out.

Figure VIII
Attempted diversions of potassium permanganate identified through successful action by competent authorities, 2001-2002



78. The Board is pleased to note that, following the increasing number of diversion attempts uncovered during 2001 in South-East Asia, in particular in Viet Nam, the Government of that country has now introduced appropriate mechanisms to respond to pre-export notifications in a timely manner, thereby improving the flow of licit trade and preventing traffickers from using the country to divert shipments in international trade. The Board trusts that other countries targeted by traffickers, who have not yet established appropriate mechanisms, will do so as soon as possible.

79. Finally, while successes in preventing diversions and intercepting smuggled consignments have been observed during 2001 and 2002, the Board has been informed of two shipments of potassium permanganate that may have been diverted. The shipments of 20 tons and 260 tons, to Australia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively, were released by China, the exporting country, as no response to the pre-export notification was received within the time frame specified by the exporting country. Subsequent responses from Australia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, both received over four months after the initial enquiries, reported that the Australian company could not be located in that country, and, that the company in the Islamic Republic of Iran denied placing such an order or receiving the shipment. Investigations are being undertaken in the countries concerned to attempt to locate the shipments and to determine whether diversions have actually taken place. The Board reminds all countries that it is essential to respond to pre-export notifications in a timely manner if diversions of this nature are to be prevented. Should it not be possible to immediately verify the legitimacy of a shipment, the importing country should supply the exporting country with an interim reply requesting

more time to complete the necessary inquiries or investigations.

2. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin

Acetic anhydride

Seizures

80. During 2001, activities carried out by law enforcement authorities to intercept and seize smuggled consignments of *acetic anhydride* have been particularly successful, with over 200 tons[22] of the substance being seized, the largest amount ever reported for a single year. Through backtracking investigations into those seizures, it has been possible to identify not only new smuggling routes, but also the sources of the seized substance, and criminal networks have been dismantled. Figure IX shows some of those smuggling routes identified during 2001-2002 through successful action by law enforcement authorities.

81. The United Kingdom reported the largest single seizure effected during 2001, when an attempted diversion of 70 tons of acetic anhydride to Yugoslavia was uncovered. The case, while being a major success for law enforcement authorities, has also shown that certain shortcomings may currently exist in the abilities of countries within Europe to work together in carrying out the thorough investigations required in cases of this nature. For instance, it was not possible for the authorities concerned to carry out a controlled delivery, as was initially proposed by the authorities of the United Kingdom, and the commodity broker who placed the order could not be prosecuted, despite reasons to believe that he was involved in the diversion attempt. The Board urges all Governments to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are put in place to allow for controlled deliveries of chemicals, since that investigative technique should be more widely utilized in precursor investigations. Moreover, since commodity brokers play a major role in the international trade of acetic anhydride and other chemicals, Governments should closely monitor the activities of such operators. National legislation should allow for the prosecution of illicit activities even when the chemicals concerned do not enter a national territory.

82. The Board is pleased to note that the authorities of Turkey continue to prevent large amounts of acetic anhydride from reaching the areas where illicit manufacture of heroin takes place, with the seizures of over 50 tons reported during 2001 being the second highest ever seized in a year by that country. The majority of the substance seized continues to be smuggled into Turkey concealed in cargo trucks from European countries, mainly Yugoslavia, with over 12.5 tons being seized, followed by the Russian Federation, with over 7 tons seized, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with over 5 tons seized during 2001. In addressing those cases, the Turkish authorities have successfully carried out controlled deliveries, thereby dismantling networks operating within their country, and continue to work closely with the Russian authorities in backtracking investigations designed to identify and dismantle the international criminal networks responsible for smuggling between the two countries.

83. Traffickers have, for a number of years, been diverting acetic anhydride through countries in Eastern Europe, in particular Bulgaria and Romania. During 2001, however, no seizures of acetic anhydride have been reported by either country, and Turkey, the country to which the substance was smuggled, has not detected any smuggling from those countries. At the same time, the emergence of new source countries and smuggling routes has been observed, and the Governments concerned, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, are urged to introduce appropriate mechanisms and procedures, as identified under Operation Topaz, to prevent diversions and to investigate cases of smuggling.

84. Elsewhere in Europe, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Slovenia have reported seizures of acetic anhydride. Since those countries all participate in Operation Topaz, the Board trusts that information on seizures was shared in a timely manner with the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee, and that follow-up investigations were initiated in accordance with the standard operating procedures in order to identify the methods and routes of diversions and to prevent future diversions from those sources.

Figure IX
Smuggling routes and attempted diversions of acetic anhydride identified through successful action by competent authorities, 2001-2002



85. During 2000, countries in Western Asia were, for the first time, identified as the source of some of the acetic anhydride seized in Turkey. In a new development, the Syrian Arab Republic, one of the countries identified at that time, has reported seizing nearly 3 tons of the substance during 2001. Furthermore, after the large seizures effected by the Islamic Republic of Iran[23] in Bandar Abbas during 2000 and 2001, follow-up investigations were initiated in the Republic of Korea, the country from which the consignments had been smuggled. As a result of the information supplied by the Iranian authorities, the authorities in the Republic of Korea have now been able to identify those responsible, with one national of the Republic of Korea and two Pakistani nationals being arrested and charged for export fraud.

86. In South and South-East Asia, India and Myanmar have reported seizing large amounts of acetic anhydride, with over 8.5 tons and 13 tons being seized, respectively, during 2001. Since Myanmar does not manufacture acetic anhydride and only imports very small amounts for licit purposes, the acetic anhydride seized had been smuggled into the country from elsewhere. The Board urges the Government to initiate appropriate follow-up investigations, in close cooperation with the Governments of the neighbouring countries, to identify the original sources of the acetic anhydride seized, in order to address the ongoing diversions and smuggling in the region.

87. Regarding the illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan, with the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, none of the countries bordering Afghanistan have reported seizures of acetic anhydride for 2001, even though smuggling of the substance has been detected through those countries in the past. This is of particular concern since, during 2001, the

authorities of the Russian Federation dismantled a network that was planning to smuggle acetic anhydride to an unspecified Central Asian country for onward smuggling to Afghanistan, seizing 1.5 tons of the substance and arresting six individuals in the course of the investigations. While large amounts of acetic anhydride were reported seized in the Central Asia region until 1999, since then, only Kazakhstan has reported seizures, amounting to 23 litres, for 2001. The Board has taken note of the efforts being made by the Governments of the countries bordering Afghanistan to prevent heroin being smuggled through those countries. However, those Governments are urged to make similar efforts to detect smuggling of acetic anhydride, the chemical needed to make heroin, through their countries, and, to that end, to use the available international mechanisms, such as Operation Topaz.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

88. The competent authorities of the Russian Federation have reported stopping the export of 1,000 tons of acetic anhydride to Ukraine, when the Ukrainian authorities determined that the company allegedly placing the order did not exist. The Board has warned in previous reports[24] that, with the increasing diversity of the routes used for heroin trafficking, trafficking of acetic anhydride may take place along those routes in the opposite direction. While Ukraine has reported seizures of over 100 kilograms of the substance for 2000 and 2001, the above case is the first indication that traffickers are now targeting the region in their diversion attempts. Furthermore, as with the seizure in the United Kingdom reported above, a commodity broker was responsible for placing the order. Further investigations into this case are being carried out to identify those responsible for placing the order, as it is believed that similar attempts will be made elsewhere.

89. Trafficking of acetic anhydride along the traditional Balkan route continues, however, and, as reported above, a number of countries in Eastern Europe have been identified as the countries of origin of intercepted smuggled consignments of acetic anhydride. The Board is pleased to note that, in an effort to prevent diversions and subsequent smuggling, Eastern European authorities are increasingly working together to verify the legitimacy of orders prior to a shipment taking place. In doing so, during 2002, the authorities in Slovakia, in collaboration with the Czech authorities, have stopped exports amounting to 20 tons and 500 tons to, respectively, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. Follow-up investigations are under way in Yugoslavia to identify those responsible for placing the orders.

90. Clandestine manufacture of heroin continues in Colombia, and while that country regularly reports seizures of acetic anhydride, with over 10 tons seized during 2001, and has identified the methods of diversion, information on seizures and attempted diversions from the other countries in the region is sporadic. During 2001, however, two shipments in international trade, from Belgium to Brazil, amounting to over 2 tons of the substance, were stopped. The Board trusts that Governments in the region will remain alert to the possibility of attempted diversion of acetic anhydride, in addition to the chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine.

91. The diversion attempts uncovered for acetic anhydride have been similar to those encountered for potassium permanganate, the names of legitimate companies with licit requirements being used without the knowledge of the company concerned. Given the large number of daily transactions involving acetic anhydride, this method of diversion is one that can be easily used for the substance. While it may not be feasible for Governments to monitor every shipment, regular checks should be carried out to verify that companies have duly received all shipments notified to the authorities, in particular, under Operation Topaz. Furthermore, greater emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that the mechanisms that exist are fully utilized to enable backtracking investigations of intercepted consignments. Through effective investigations of that nature, illicit sources will be effectively identified and future diversions prevented.

3. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants

(a) Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine

Seizures

92. The largest seizures of *ephedrine* continue to be reported from South and South-East Asia, with India and Myanmar reporting seizures of nearly 1 ton and 4 tons, respectively. As has been noted previously, the

ephedrine seized was being diverted from domestic distribution channels in China and India and subsequently smuggled to Myanmar. The Board trusts that the Governments of the three countries are continuing to convene the cross-border operational meetings that were initiated in 1999. Operational meetings of this nature are essential if intraregional trafficking is to be effectively addressed and backtracking investigations are to be initiated to locate the sources of the seized substance and also to identify and prosecute the traffickers responsible for the diversions.

93. In Australia, where seizures of ephedrine are consistently reported, those during 2001 were the largest ever, with nearly 650 kilograms seized. This amount includes a single consignment of over 550 kilograms that was intercepted while being smuggled into the country from Yugoslavia. Investigations by Australian customs revealed that the traffickers involved were part of a highly organized group, making use of corrupt employees in legitimate businesses to assist with the smuggling. This is the first case that the Board is aware of where ephedrine has been smuggled from Europe to Oceania, and it has not yet been possible to identify the point of origin of the initial diversion.

94. As Yugoslavia does not manufacture ephedrine, the substance is either legally imported and subsequently diverted from domestic distribution channels or smuggled into the country after having been diverted elsewhere. The Board therefore urges the Governments concerned with the above case to work together and make every effort to identify the source of the ephedrine seized. In particular, full use should be made of the scientific support available. Through a detailed analysis of samples of the seized substance, the synthesis route can be determined and, through the chemical profile, it may be possible to identify the manufacturer. For that reason, chemical investigations of this nature form an essential component of Project Prism described in chapter II, section B, above.

95. A number of other countries in Europe, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, have reported seizures of ephedrine during 2001. In particular, the Board has noted that, over the last two years, seizures of pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine have been increasing in Europe. For 2000, Denmark and Greece reported seizures of such preparations and, in 2001, Finland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom seized large amounts of such preparations. In Slovakia, 60,000 tablets were seized when traffickers attempted to smuggle the consignment into the country through Hungary from Romania, and some of the 30,000 tablets seized in Sweden were smuggled into the country in postal items sent from Greece, Spain and Turkey. The Board is currently determining the circumstances of the seizures reported by Finland (90,000 tablets) and the United Kingdom (150,000 tablets).

96. While the small seizures of ephedrine in the Baltic States and Ukraine can be linked to abuse of methcathinone, illicitly manufactured from ephedrine, there has been no reported illicit manufacture of either methamphetamine or methcathinone, via the ephedrine route, by the four above-mentioned countries. Since it is possible that the ephedrine seized in the Nordic countries could have been destined for smuggling to the Baltic States for use in such illicit manufacture, customs authorities in the region are urged to be on the lookout for such consignments. Furthermore, taking into consideration the "logo index"[25] projects currently under way to identify and classify tablets according to their physical appearance and chemical composition, the countries seizing those tablets should also supply an international or regional focal point, such as Europol or Interpol, with detailed descriptions of the tablets, including photographs. Those organizations could then determine whether similar tablets have been seized elsewhere in Europe or other regions, and it may be possible to determine whether the tablets are destined for use in illicit laboratories manufacturing either methamphetamine or methcathinone, or whether those tablets are simply being sold at nightclubs, raves etc., as imitation MDMA (Ecstasy) or other related substances. The Board continues to monitor the situation closely in collaboration with the Governments concerned.

97. In North America, where pseudoephedrine remains the chemical of choice for use in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, the authorities of Mexico and the United States have reported seizing pseudoephedrine and dismantling laboratories manufacturing methamphetamine. In particular, the United States authorities have been successful in their ongoing investigations to dismantle major pseudoephedrine trafficking networks operating

between Canada and the United States, as reported in the last report of the Board.[26] In total, over 20 tons of pseudoephedrine have been seized, the majority of which was diverted from domestic distribution channels after the substance was legitimately imported into Canada by established pharmaceutical companies. As the national legislation currently in place in Canada does not allow effective monitoring of the sales of the pharmaceutical products manufactured from those imports, traffickers have been able to acquire large amounts of such preparations, which are subsequently smuggled over the border into the United States. From interceptions on the border between Canada and the United States, controlled deliveries were initiated, resulting in the identification and dismantling of illicit storage facilities and laboratories in the United States, as well as the seizure of assets of the traffickers involved. Investigations are under way to identify those responsible for the diversions in Canada.

98. In addition to the large amounts of pseudoephedrine referred to above, Interpol has also reported[27] that small amounts of ephedrine are being smuggled over both the Canadian and Mexican borders into the United States. The amounts of ephedrine involved are usually under 5 kilograms and the substance is dissolved in water and placed in cooler boxes to give the impression of melted ice. The fact that traffickers are prepared to go to such lengths to obtain even small amounts of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine gives an indication of how effective the national control measures over those substances have now become in the United States. The Board trusts that other Governments in the region will be able to apply comparable controls in order to address these ongoing diversions.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

99. As a result of the working mechanisms and standard operating procedures introduced by manufacturing and exporting countries to prevent diversions of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine from international trade, it was possible to identify and prevent several attempted diversions during 2001 and 2002. Through those successes, further insight was gained into the methods employed by traffickers. The routes used by traffickers in attempts to divert ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are shown in figure X.

100. The Board has been informed that, during 2000, Russian customs authorities intercepted an illicit consignment of nearly 700,000 ephedrine tablets that was transiting the Russian Federation en route to the United States from China. It is not clear at the current stage whether the consignment was being smuggled or whether the shipment was an attempted diversion from international trade. While the Russian authorities have previously seized large amounts of ephedrine being brought into the country illegally from China, this is the first time that the end destination has been identified as a country outside the region.

101. Following an unsuccessful attempt to divert 1.5 tons of ephedrine from China to Guatemala by making use of a false import certificate, reflected in the Board's report for 2001,[28] a similar attempt was uncovered a few months later when an order for the same amount of ephedrine was placed in Hong Kong SAR of China, again destined for Guatemala. The authorities concerned, assisted by the Board, were able to determine that the import certificate was again false and the export was stopped. Similar cases were uncovered in Europe during 2002, when, in April, an order for 600 kilograms of ephedrine was received in India and in July an order for 200 kilograms of that substance was received in Germany, with both consignments being destined for Albania. As in the above case, the import permits submitted with the orders were falsifications and the Indian and German authorities stopped the shipments. Finally, the authorities of Mexico have informed the Board that traffickers have also attempted to divert pseudoephedrine from China to their country, with a false import certificate again being submitted with the order.

Figure X

Trafficking routes and attempted diversions of the precursors used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants identified through successful action by competent authorities, 2001-2002



102. These cases serve as examples of how traffickers will attempt to obtain the chemicals they require from multiple sources, and if they are unsuccessful from one source, they will simply make further attempts targeting different companies and countries until they succeed. Unless thorough investigations are carried out to identify those responsible, and unless adequate legislation is in place to prosecute them, precursor chemical control cannot be fully effective. Furthermore, with traffickers now increasingly making use of false import certificates in attempted diversions of precursor chemicals, the Board urges Governments using such certificates to supply it with samples of those documents. A large number of such sample certificates are kept on record by the Board, and, on the basis of preliminary enquiries, it has frequently been possible to suspend shipments pending the outcome of further enquiries with the Governments concerned when a permit on record does not correspond with that submitted with the order.

103. A further attempted diversion of 300 kilograms of ephedrine was uncovered between India and the United Kingdom. Upon enquiries into the order in the United Kingdom, it was discovered that the address to which the consignment was to be sent was a residential address, with no pharmaceutical company operating from there. Investigations are under way in both India and the United Kingdom to identify those responsible for placing the order. This is the first time known to the Board that the United Kingdom has been targeted by traffickers attempting to divert ephedrine, and highlights the fact that traffickers will constantly be looking for new markets and targeting countries not normally associated with diversions or attempted diversions of specific substances.

(b) 1-phenyl-2-propanone and 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone

Seizures

104. While *P-2-P* and *3,4-MDP-2-P* are used in the illicit manufacture of different end products, namely amphetamine/methamphetamine and MDMA, respectively, a number of common features link the substances. Those features relate, in particular, to the limited licit trade in, and the actual licit uses of, those precursors and the fact that consignments have been detected in which the two substances were being smuggled together. During 2001, seizures of P-2-P have been the largest ever reported to the Board, with nearly 23 tons of the substance seized, while those for 3,4-MDP-2-P were the second largest ever reported, with over 11 tons seized during that year.

105. The majority of the seizures have been reported by the authorities of the Netherlands, with over 18.2 tons of P-2-P and nearly 11 tons of 3,4-MDP-2-P seized. Those seizures were effected when smuggled consignments from China were intercepted at the port of Rotterdam. The Board is aware that China exercises strict controls over the export of both substances, and that the country has effectively prevented diversions from international trade in the past. Furthermore, in view of the limited international trade, there is little chance for diversion from that source. It is, therefore, believed that traffickers are either diverting the substances from licit domestic manufacture or are recruiting unauthorized companies to illegally manufacture the substances, and subsequently smuggling them to the countries where illicit manufacture takes place. To effectively address trafficking of that nature, it will be essential for the Government of the Netherlands, and any other country that seizes, or intercepts, those substances, to share available information with the Chinese authorities to allow comprehensive backtracking investigations to be carried out to identify both the source and those responsible for the illicit activity. This is particularly important when attempting to identify companies and individuals involved in the illicit manufacture of those precursors, and in the subsequent smuggling, since neither activity can be detected through the usual regulatory procedures. The Board trusts that the working mechanisms and standard operating procedures developed under Project Prism will improve the exchange of such information.

106. In addressing diversions of those substances, it is also necessary to monitor their manufacture effectively. The Government of China is now starting to register enterprises manufacturing precursor chemicals in order to gain a better understanding of such companies and their activities, including determining the amounts of precursor chemicals manufactured and the identity of the actual end-users. Furthermore, during 2001, China has been active in addressing the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and MDMA within the country. As a result, a number of illicit laboratories manufacturing the substances were dismantled during that year and 4 tons of P-2-P were seized.

107. In addition to the illicit manufacture of MDMA reported in China, an illicit laboratory manufacturing the substance was dismantled in Indonesia during 2002. Over 1.5 tons of 3,4-MDP-2-P were seized at that laboratory, which, it is believed, was capable of manufacturing 150,000 tablets daily. Furthermore, from ballistic examinations carried out on the seized tablets, similarities were discovered with tablets seized in both China and the United States, indicating that the tablets manufactured were not only destined for local markets.

108. Other regions are also increasingly being affected by such illicit manufacture. While small-scale manufacture of MDMA has been reported in South Africa for a number of years, during 2002, 1 ton of 3,4-MDP-2-P was seized in that country. The seizure in question was linked to the dismantling of a methaqualone manufacturing network that was about to initiate illicit manufacture on an industrial scale. At the current stage, it is not clear whether the traffickers intended to manufacture MDMA as well, or whether the 3,4-MDP-2-P was to be smuggled elsewhere.

109. Despite the dismantling of large illicit operations manufacturing amphetamine-type stimulants throughout the world, the majority of such illicit manufacture still takes place in Europe. The German authorities have reported dismantling an MDMA laboratory during 2001, seizing 75 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P, and the Bulgarian authorities dismantled a methamphetamine laboratory, seizing nearly 300 litres of P-2-P. The most significant reports, however, have been received from the Netherlands.

110. In 2001, the authorities in the Netherlands dismantled a total of 35 laboratories. The true extent of such illicit manufacture within the country is only fully

realized when the amount of illegal chemical dumps uncovered is examined. During 2000, over 90,000 litres of different chemicals were discovered at over 100 illegal chemical dumping sites and, during 2001, over 100,000 litres were discovered at over 120 different sites. It is estimated that the chemicals found during those years were the waste materials resulting from the illicit manufacture of over 140 million tablets of MDMA. While the Board has previously expressed concern over the ecological damage caused by the illicit manufacture of drugs, primarily of cocaine and heroin in South America and Asia, those reports from the Netherlands show that all illicit manufacture, regardless of the location or the substance manufactured, presents a real environmental threat that the authorities need to address urgently.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

111. As mentioned above, the licit uses of, and thus the licit international trade in, both P-2-P and 3,4-MDP-2-P are limited and the substances are more frequently diverted from domestic distribution channels and subsequently smuggled to areas where illicit manufacture takes place. Nonetheless, attempts by traffickers to divert the substances from international trade are still detected and prevented.

112. During 2001, an order for 10 tons of P-2-P was received by a company in Germany for export to Liberia, through a broker in Lebanon. While the Government of Liberia did not respond to the requests of the Board to verify the legitimacy of the shipment, the Lebanese authorities were able to verify that the broker in their country was not authorized to trade in controlled chemicals and the German authorities stopped the shipment. In a similar case during 2002, a broker in Singapore placed an order for 14 tons of P-2-P in the Netherlands for delivery to a company in Indonesia. In view of the large amount of the substance ordered and the unusual reported end-use, the shipment was stopped pending the outcome of the investigations in Indonesia.

113. In each of the above-mentioned cases, the competent authorities in the countries receiving the orders have been able to identify such suspicious orders through maintaining close ties with the chemical industry, thereby preventing possible diversions. The Board is pleased to note that more countries are involving industry as an active partner in chemical control and monitoring strategies and urges countries that have not yet done so to establish such close cooperation as part of their chemical control mechanisms.

(c) Safrole (including safrole in the form of sassafras oil)

Seizures

114. Throughout the years, significant seizures of *safrole*, including safrole in the form of sassafras oil, have been reported at illicit laboratories or intercepted at ports of entry when smuggling attempts have been uncovered. During 2001, however, very few seizures of the substance were reported, and only the authorities of the Netherlands have reported seizing a significant amount, with over 200 kilograms of the substance seized.

115. While there is a lack of seizure data, the analysis of chemical waste found at the illicit dump sites in the Netherlands mentioned above confirms that safrole is a substance also commonly used by traffickers in the illicit manufacture of MDMA. As safrole can, however, be obtained from various essential oils, steps must urgently be taken, if illicit use of the substance is to be effectively addressed, to review and clarify which oils containing safrole are currently traded and used in licit markets as well as whether those oils can be used directly for the clandestine manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants. Furthermore, source countries for the essential oils containing the safrole need to be identified, and the Board urges the Governments of those countries to determine the amounts of such oils produced and traded, both internationally and domestically, and to examine what controls are, at present, exercised over those oils, with a view to standardizing necessary international actions. The Board trusts that Governments will support the initiatives being undertaken under Project Prism in this regard.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

116. During 2001, the South African authorities uncovered an attempt to divert 5 kilograms of safrole, in the form of sassafras oil, from international trade. Working with the authorities of France, where the order had been placed, a controlled delivery was

carried out, and an illicit laboratory was dismantled where both MDMA and methamphetamine were being manufactured.

4. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of other psychotropic substances

Methaqualone

Seizures

117. While the abuse of *methaqualone* remains largely restricted to Southern and Eastern Africa, during 2001, the only major seizure of anthranilic acid, an important precursor used in the illicit manufacture of methaqualone, was reported by Peru. Nearly three tons of the substance were seized, and since no such seizures, and no illicit manufacture of methaqualone, have previously been reported by countries in the South American region, the Board is currently determining what circumstances led to the seizure and whether grounds exist to believe that the substance was to be used in illicit drug manufacture.

118. No major seizures were reported during 2001 in Africa or India, where illicit methaqualone manufacture has previously been detected. In contrast, several major cases have been uncovered during 2002. The trafficking routes identified are shown in figure XI.

Figure XI

Trafficking routes and attempted diversions of the precursors used in the illicit manufacture of methaqualone identified through successful action by competent authorities, 2001-2002



119. During that year, the authorities of Mozambique seized a shipment of 10 tons of anthranilic acid from India. The substance had been legally exported from India and was allowed to enter Mozambique, since that country currently does not exercise import controls over precursor chemicals. Inquiries initiated to identify the ultimate end-user determined that the substance was to be re-exported from Mozambique to South Africa and that the importing company in South Africa did not exist. The consignment was therefore seized. Investigations in South Africa identified the trafficker responsible for placing the order, who was subsequently arrested in connection with the discovery, in July 2002, of a major network intending to manufacture methaqualone in South Africa. In that operation, nearly 30 tons of acetic anhydride and 16 tons of anthranilic acid were seized, together with other non-controlled substances and industrial equipment used for synthesis. Some of the anthranilic acid seized was again identified as having originated in India, although how this particular consignment was diverted has not yet been determined.

120. The illicit manufacture of methaqualone has been largely prevented in India since the mid-1990s. In 2002, however, a major laboratory was dismantled and 2.5 tons of methaqualone were seized. In view of the strict controls exercised over both the domestic distribution and exports of acetic anhydride in India, the traffickers involved were using non-controlled substitute chemicals to replace acetic anhydride in the synthesis process. However, the seizure of the 50 kilograms of anthranilic acid at the laboratory site would indicate that the substance was being used. In view of the above seizures of anthranilic acid in Mozambique and South Africa, and taking into consideration the possibility of illicit manufacture taking place within their country, the authorities of India are urged to ensure that appropriate controls are introduced to prevent diversions of this substance from both domestic distribution channels and international trade.

Stopped shipments, diversions and attempted diversions from international trade

121. In addition to the above seizures, the competent authorities of China have been instrumental in preventing the diversion of over 20 tons of anthranilic acid from China to Swaziland. The Chinese authorities requested the assistance of the Board in determining the legitimacy of the shipment and it was possible to determine, on the basis of information supplied by Governments voluntarily to the Board on licit trade, that no previous shipments of this substance had been made to Swaziland. In follow-up inquiries, the authorities in Swaziland were unable to conclusively identify the ultimate consignee and the Chinese authorities stopped the export. The information on licit trade provided by Governments under Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 is continually utilized by the Board in cases such as the above to identify suspicious orders and to initiate further inquiries.

122. Apart from the recent attempt to establish industrial-scale laboratories in South Africa, a smaller diversion attempt was uncovered when an order for 50 kilograms of acetic anhydride was placed with a company in the United Kingdom for delivery to South Africa. While a controlled delivery was planned, the order was cancelled before it could proceed. It is suspected that an employee of one of the companies involved may have warned the traffickers of the attention that law enforcement authorities were paying to the shipment in question.

123. Finally, the competent authorities of the United Arab Emirates stopped an export of 75 kilograms of acetic anhydride and 75 kilograms of anthranilic acid, that was placed by a company in Egypt. While the amounts ordered were not large, the ordering of those two chemicals together was itself a cause for suspicion. In the case in question, it was determined that the Egyptian company placing the order was not authorized to import either substance and the shipment was stopped. Although the order could not conclusively be linked to the illicit manufacture of methaqualone, it is such stopped shipments that need to be followed up and thoroughly investigated by the law enforcement authorities in order to develop intelligence that may later make it possible to identify and dismantle criminal networks.

Notes

[1] *Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).

[2] The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances listed in Table I or II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances" was introduced in the Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, the Board has decided to use it in the present report for the sake of convenience.

[3] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.XI.4), paras. 4, 52-57.

[4] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 ...* .

[5] Those parties are the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Dominica, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mozambique, Niger, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tonga and Zimbabwe.

[6] This information is requested on a voluntary basis in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20, which, inter alia:

"Urges Governments … to inform the Board on a regular basis … of the quantities of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention that they have imported, exported or transshipped, and encourages them to estimate their annual licit needs" (para. 8);

"Requests the Board … to collect information pursuant to paragraph 8 above, and to further develop and strengthen its database in order to assist Governments in preventing diversion of substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention" (para. 9);

"Encourages Governments to consider strengthening, where necessary, the working mechanisms to prevent diversion of substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention, as described in the resolution" (para. 13).

[7] China does, however, monitor all individual exports of *ephedrines*, *acetic anhydride* and *potassium permanganate* and regularly requests the assistance of the Board in verifying the legitimacy of such transactions.

[8] Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand.

[9] Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, France, Hong Kong SAR of China, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

[10] The competent authorities of the following States and territories participate in Operation Purple: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Hong Kong SAR of China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Furthermore, Interpol, UNDCP and the World Customs Organization support Operation Purple in their respective areas of responsibility.

[11] A detailed description of how Operation Purple developed, its activities and the results achieved in the first phase can be seen in the report of the Board for 1999 on the implementation of article 12. The activities undertaken during the initial stages of phase II can also be seen in the report of the Board for 2000. The objectives of the operation, the procedural details and its results can further be found in the report prepared by the Steering Committee on phase I.

[12] Ongoing studies carried out in the United States on samples of cocaine seized around the world indicate that the use of oxidizing agents, such as potassium permanganate, in the extraction and purification process continues to be lower than at any other time, with less than 10 per cent of samples analysed showing a high level of oxidation, as indicated by the presence of unwanted alkaloids usually removed by the oxidizing process. Furthermore, traffickers in Colombia are attempting to manufacture the substances themselves and, during 2002, the Colombian authorities successfully dismantled five such laboratories, bringing the total number dismantled throughout the country since 2000 to 15.

[13] The following Governments are members of the Steering Committee: China, Colombia, Germany, India, Netherlands, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Uzbekistan, along with the European Commission, Interpol, the World Customs Organization and the Board.

[14] The following States and territories are participating in the operation: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Hong Kong SAR of China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Uzbekistan.

[15] Including the following: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, China, Hong Kong SAR of China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Singapore, United Kingdom and United States.

[16] Including the following: Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR of China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

[17] Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

[18] 3,4-MDP-2-P, P-2-P and safrole.

[19] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 64.

[20] The Ukrainian authorities reported that the substance was intended for use in the illicit manufacture of methcathinone.

[21] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 71.

[22] Including seizures of 36 tons by the Islamic Republic of Iran and 1.5 tons by the Russian Federation reported under Operation Topaz during 2001.

[23] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 84.

[24] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.XI.4), para. 94, and *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 83.

[25] Governments throughout the world, supported by Interpol and, in Europe, Europol, have initiated logo index projects, to establish links between tablets and capsules seized through law enforcement actions. Comparisons are made on the basis of the physical appearance, primarily the logo appearing on the tablet, but also including colour and physical dimensions, as well as the active ingredient. This information is used to establish links between tablets and capsules seized to, inter alia, specific manufacturing sites and to the networks involved in their distribution.

[26] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 93.

[27] *ICPO-Interpol Worldwide Intelligence Message (WIM) No. 06/02 of 12 April 2001*.

[28] *Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001* ..., para. 94.

Annex I

Tables

Table 1
Parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention[a]

Notes: The date on which the instrument of ratification or accession was deposited is indicated in parentheses.

	Party to the 1988 Convention		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*	
Africa	Algeria (09.05.1995)	Malawi (12.10.1995)	Angola	Gabon
	Benin (23.05.1997)	Mali (31.10.1995)	Congo	Liberia
	Botswana (13.08.1996)	Mauritania (01.07.1993)	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Namibia
	Burkina Faso (02.06.1992)	Mauritius (06.03.2001)	Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
	Burundi (18.02.1993)	Morocco (28.10.1992)		
	Cameroon (28.10.1991)	Mozambique (08.06.1998)		
	Cape Verde (08.05.1995)	Niger (10.11.1992)		
	Central African Republic (15.10.2001)	Nigeria (01.11.1989)		
	Chad (09.06.1995)	Rwanda (13.05.2002)		
	Comoros (01.03.2000)	Sao Tome and Principe (20.06.1996)		
	Côte d'Ivoire (25.11.1991)	Senegal (27.11.1989)		
	Djibouti (22.02.2001)	Seychelles (27.02.1992)		
	Egypt (15.03.1991)	Sierra Leone (06.06.1994)		
	Eritrea (30.01.2002)	South Africa (14.12.1998)		
	Ethiopia (11.10.1994)	Sudan (19.11.1993)		
	Gambia (23.04.1996)	Swaziland (08.10.1995)		
	Ghana (10.04.1990)	Togo (01.08.1990)		
	Guinea (27.12.1990)	Tunisia (20.09.1990)		

	Party to the 1988 Convention		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*
	Guinea-Bissau (27.10.1995)	Uganda (20.08.1990)	
	Kenya (19.10.1992)	United Republic of Tanzania (17.04.1996)	
	Lesotho (28.03.1995)	Zambia (28.05.1993)	
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (22.07.1996)	Zimbabwe (30.07.1993)	
	Madagascar (12.03.1991)		
Regional total			
53	*45*		*8*

Region	*Party to the 1988 Convention*		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*
Americas	Antigua and Barbuda (05.04.1993)	Haiti (18.09.1995)	
	Argentina (10.06.1993)	Honduras (11.12.1991)	
	Bahamas (30.01.1989)	Jamaica (29.12.1995)	
	Barbados (15.10.1992)	Mexico (11.04.1990)	
	Belize (24.07.1996)	Nicaragua (04.05.1990)	
	Bolivia (20.08.1990)	Panama (13.01.1994)	
	Brazil (17.07.1991)	Paraguay (23.08.1990)	
	Canada (05.07.1990)	Peru (16.01.1992)	
	Chile (13.03.1990)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (19.04.1995)	
	Colombia (10.06.1994)	Saint Lucia (21.08.1995)	
	Costa Rica (08.02.1991)	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17.05.1994)	
	Cuba (12.06.1996)	Suriname (28.10.1992)	
	Dominica (30.06.1993)	Trinidad and Tobago (17.02.1995)	
	Dominican Republic (21.09.1993)	United States of America (20.02.1990)	
	Ecuador (23.03.1990)	Uruguay (10.03.1995)	
	El Salvador (21.05.1993)	Venezuela (16.07.1991)	
	Grenada (10.12.1990)		
	Guatemala (28.02.1991)		
	Guyana (19.03.1993)		
Regional total			
35	*35*		*0*

Region	*Party to the 1988 Convention*		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*	
Asia	Afghanistan (14.02.1992)	Maldives (07.09.2000)	Cambodia	Mongolia
	Armenia (13.09.1993)	Myanmar (11.06.1991)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Timor-Leste
	Azerbaijan (22.09.1993)	Nepal (24.07.1991)	Lao People's Democratic Republic	
	Bahrain (07.02.1990)	Oman (15.03.1991)		
	Bangladesh (11.10.1990)	Pakistan (25.10.1991)		
	Bhutan (27.08.1990)	Philippines (07.06.1996)		
	Brunei Darussalam (12.11.1993)	Qatar (04.05.1990)		
	China (25.10.1989)	Republic of Korea (28.12.1998)		
	Georgia (08.01.1998)	Saudi Arabia (09.01.1992)		
	India (27.03.1990)	Singapore (23.10.1997)		
	Indonesia (23.02.1999)	Sri Lanka (06.06.1991)		
	Iran (Islamic Republic of) (07.12.1992)	Syrian Arab Republic (03.09.1991)		
	Iraq (22.07.1998)	Tajikistan (06.05.1996)		
	Israel (20.03.2002)	Thailand (03.05.2002)		
	Japan (12.06.1992)	Turkey (02.04.1996)		
	Jordan (16.04.1990)	Turkmenistan (21.02.1996)		
	Kazakhstan (29.04.1997)	United Arab Emirates (12.04.1990)		
	Kuwait (03.11.2000)	Uzbekistan (24.08.1995)		
	Kyrgyzstan (07.10.1994)	Viet Nam (04.11.1997)		
	Lebanon (11.03.1996)	Yemen (25.03.1996)		
	Malaysia (11.05.1993)			
Regional total				
46		*41*		*5*

Region	*Party to the 1988 Convention*		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*	
Europe	Albania (27.07.2001)	Lithuania 08.06.1998)	Holy See	Switzerland
	Andorra (23.07.1999)	Luxembourg (29.04.1992)	Liechtenstein	
	Austria (11.07.1997)	Malta (28.02.1996)		
	Belarus (15.10.1990)	Monaco (23.04.1991)		
	Belgium (25.10.1995)	Netherlands (08.09.1993)		
	Bosnia and Herzegovina (01.09.1993)	Norway (14.11.1994)		
	Bulgaria (24.09.1992)	Poland (26.05.1994)		
	Croatia (26.07.1993)	Portugal (03.12.1991)		
	Cyprus (25.05.1990)	Republic of Moldova (15.02.1995)		
	Czech Republic (30.12.1993)	Romania (21.01.1993)		
	Denmark (19.12.1991)	Russian Federation (17.12.1990)		
	European Union[a] (31.12.1990)	San Marino (10.10.2000)		
	Estonia (12.07.2000)	Slovakia (28.05.1993)		
	Finland (15.02.1994)	Slovenia (06.07.1992)		
	France (31.12.1990)	Spain (13.08.1990)		
	Germany (30.11.1993)	Sweden (22.07.1991)		
	Greece (28.01.1992)	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (13.10.1993)		
	Hungary (15.11.1996)	Ukraine (28.08.1991)		
	Iceland (02.09.1997)	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (28.06.1991)		
	Ireland (03.09.1996)			

Region	*Party to the 1988 Convention*		*Non-party to the 1988 Convention*	
	Italy (31.12.1990)	Yugoslavia (03.01.1991)		
	Latvia (25.02.1994)			
Regional total				
45		*42*		*3*
Oceania	Australia (10.11.1992)		Kiribati	Papua New Guinea
			Marshall Islands	Samoa
	Fiji (25.03.1993)		Micronesia (Federated States of)	Solomon Islands
	New Zealand (16.12.1998)			Tuvalu
			Nauru	Vanuatu
	Tonga (29.04.1996)		Palau	
Regional total				
14		*4*		*10*
World total				
193		*167*		*26*

[a] Extent of competence: article 12.

Table 2
Submission of information by Governments pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention (Form D) for the years 1997-2001

Notes: Non-metropolitan territories and special administrative regions are in italics.
A blank signifies that Form D was not received.
X signifies that a completed Form D (or equivalent report) was submitted, including nil returns.
Parties to the 1988 Convention (and the years since they became parties) are shadowed.

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Afghanistan				X	
Albania					
Algeria	X	X	X	X	
Andorra		X	X	X	X
Angola					
Anguilla[a]	X	X	X	X	X
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X	X	X	X
Argentina		X	X	X	X
Armenia					X
Aruba[a]					
Ascension Island	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X
Austria	X	X	X	X	X
Azerbaijan				X	X
Bahamas					
Bahrain	X		X	X	X
Bangladesh					
Barbados	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium	X	X	X	X	X
Belize					
Benin	X	X	X	X	X
Bermuda[a]	X	X	X	X	
Bhutan				X	
Bolivia		X	X	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina					
Botswana	X	X	X	X	X
Brazil	X	X	X		
British Virgin Islands[a]					
Brunei Darussalam	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	X	X	X	X	X
Burkina Faso	X		X		
Burundi					
Cambodia					
Cameroon		X		X	X

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Canada		X	X		X
Cape Verde					X
Cayman Islands[a]	X		X		
Central African Republic	X				X
Chad	X		X		
Chile	X	X	X	X	X
China		X	X	X	
Hong Kong SAR	X	X	X	X	X
Macao SAR	X	X	X	X	X
Christmas Island[a]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]
Cocos (Keeling) Islands[a]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros					
Congo	X		X	X	X
Cook Islands	X	X	X	X	X
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X	X	X	X
Croatia	X		X	X	X
Cuba	X	X	X	X	
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X
Czech Republic	X	X	X	X	X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea		X			X
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X	X	
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti					
Dominica					
Dominican Republic	X		X		
Ecuador	X	X	X	X	X
Egypt	X	X	X	X	
El Salvador		X	X	X	X
Equatorial Guinea					
Eritrea	X	X	X		
Estonia	X	X	X	X	X
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X
Falkland Islands			X	X	
Fjji	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	X	X	X	X	X
France	X	X	X	X	X
French Polynesia[a]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
Gabon					
Gambia					
Georgia	X[d]				
Germany	X	X	X	X	X

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Ghana	X	X	X	X	
Gibraltar					
Greece	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	X		X	X	X
Guatemala	X		X	X	
Guinea					
Guinea-Bissau					
Guyana			X	X	
Haiti					
Honduras			X		
Hungary	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland			X	X	X
India	X	X	X	X	X
Indonesia	X	X	X	X	X
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	X	X	X		
Iraq	X	X		X	X
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
Israel	X	X	X	X	X
Italy	X	X	X	X	X
Jamaica	X	X	X	X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X	X	X	X	X
Kazakhstan	X[d]	X[d]	X[d]	X	X
Kenya	X	X		X	X
Kiribati	X		X	X	X
Kuwait					
Kyrgyzstan	X	X	X	X	X
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia	X	X	X	X	X
Lebanon		X			
Lesotho	X				
Liberia					
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya					
Lithuania	X	X	X	X	X
Luxembourg	X		X	X	X
Madagascar	X				
Malawi	X				
Malaysia	X	X	X	X	X
Maldives	X				
Mali				X	X
Malta		X		X	X
Marshall Islands					
Mauritania				X	

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Mauritius	X	X	X	X	
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X
Micronesia (Federated States of)					
Monaco		X	X	X	X
Mongolia				X	X
Montserrat[a]	X			X	
Morocco	X	X	X		
Mozambique					
Myanmar	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia					
Nauru		X			X
Nepal	X		X		X
Netherlands	X	X	X	X	X
Netherlands Antilles[a]	X	X			
New Caledonia[a]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
New Zealand		X	X	X	
Nicaragua	X	X	X	X	X
Niger					
Nigeria	X	X	X	X	X
Norfolk Island[a]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]
Norway			X	X	
Oman	X	X	X	X	
Pakistan		X	X	X	X
Palau	X	X	X		X
Panama	X		X	X	X
Papua New Guinea					
Paraguay		X	X	X	
Peru	X	X	X	X	X
Philippines	X				
Poland	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X
Qatar					X
Republic of Korea	X		X		
Republic of Moldova		X			
Romania	X	X	X	X	
Russian Federation	X	X	X	X	
Rwanda				X	X
Saint Helena		X	X	X	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X				
Saint Lucia					
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines				X	
Samoa				X	
San Marino					

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Sao Tome and Principe	X		X	X	X
Saudi Arabia	X	X	X		X
Senegal		X	X	X	X
Seychelles	X				
Sierra Leone					
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	X	X	X	X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X
Solomon Islands	X				X
Somalia					
South Africa	X	X	X	X	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan					
Suriname	X	X	X	X	
Swaziland					X
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X
Switzerland	X	X	X	X	X
Syrian Arab Republic	X		X		X
Tajikistan	X[d]	X	X	X	
Thailand	X	X	X	X	X
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia					
Timor-Leste					
Togo				X	X
Tonga					
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X	X	X	
Tristan da Cunha				X	X
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan	X[d]	X[d]	X[d]		
Turks and Caicos Islands[a]			X		X
Tuvalu		X		X	
Uganda			X	X	X
Ukraine		X	X	X	X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X		X
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
United Republic of Tanzania			X	X	X
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay				X	X
Uzbekistan	X	X	X	X	
Vanuatu		X	X		
Venezuela		X	X	X	X
Viet Nam	X	X	X	X	X

Country or territory	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*
Wallis and Futuna Islands[a]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
Yemen					
Yugoslavia					
Zambia	X		X	X	X
Zimbabwe	X				
Total number of Forms D submitted[e]	127	120	135	134	120
Total number of Governments requested to provide information	211	211	211	211	212

[a] Territorial application of the 1988 Convention has been confirmed by the authorities concerned.

[b] Information was provided by Australia.

[c] Information was provided by France.

[d] Information was provided by the Russian Federation.

[e] In addition, the Commission of the European Communities has submitted Form D for the years 1993-2001.

Table 3
Seizures of substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board

Tables 3a and 3b show information on seizures of the substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, furnished to the Board by Governments in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12.

The tables include data on domestic seizures and on seizures effected at the point of entry or exit. They do not include reported seizures of substances where it is known that they were not intended for the illicit manufacture of drugs (for example, seizures effected because of administrative shortcomings, or seizures of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine preparations to be used as stimulants). Stopped shipments are also not included. The information may include data not submitted by Governments on Form D.

Units of measure and conversion factors

Units of measure are indicated for every substance. Fractions of full units are not listed in the table; the figures are, however, rounded.

For several reasons, quantities of individual substances seized are reported to the Board using different units; one country may report seizures of acetic anhydride in litres, another in kilograms.

To enable a proper comparison of collected information, it is important that all data are collated in a standard format. To simplify the necessary standardization process, figures are given in grams or kilograms where the substance is a solid, and in litres where the substance (or its most common form) is a liquid.

Seizures of solids reported to the Board in litres have not been converted into kilograms, and are not included in the table, since the actual quantity of substance in solution is not known.

For seizures of liquids, quantities reported in kilograms have been converted into litres using the following factors:

Substance	*Conversion factor (kilograms to litres)*[a]
Acetic anhydride	0.926
Acetone	1.269
Ethyl ether	1.408
Hydrochloric acid (39.1% solution)	0.833
Isosafrole	0.892
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	0.833
Methyl ethyl ketone	1.242
1-phenyl-2-propanone	0.985
Safrole	0.912
Sulphuric acid (concentrated solution)	0.543
Toluene	1.155

[a] Derived from density, quoted in *The Merck Index* (Rahway, New Jersey, Merck and Co., Inc., 1989).

As an example, to convert 1,000 kilograms of methyl ethyl ketone into litres, multiply by 1.242, i.e. 1,000 x 1.242 = 1,242 litres.

For the conversion of gallons to litres it has been assumed that in Colombia the United States gallon is used, with 3.785 litres to the gallon, and in Myanmar the imperial gallon, with 4.546 litres to the gallon.

In those cases where reported quantities have been converted, the converted figures are listed in the table in italics.

Notes: Territories are in italics.

A dash (–) signifies nil (the report did not include data on seizures of the particular substance in the reporting year).

A degree symbol (°) signifies less than the smallest unit of measurement shown for that substance (for example, less than 1 kilogram).

Discrepancies may occur with the regional total seizure figures and the world total figures because of rounding to whole numbers of the actual quantities seized.

Table 3a
Seizures of substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Africa														
Algeria														
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2 000 000	–	150	–
Côte d'Ivoire														
1997	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	59 132	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	61[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
South Africa														
1997	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	°	–	–	–	3
1998	143	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	3	–	1	–	–	°	–	°	–	–	–	50	–	7
2000	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
2001	8	–	13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4
Zambia														
1997	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total region														
1997	**5**	**0**	°	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3**
1998	**143**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1999	**3**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	°	**0**	°	**0**	**0**	**0**	**50**	**0**	**7**
2000	**0**	**0**	**59 132**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2 000 000**	**0**	**150**	**0**
2001	**8**	**0**	**75**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**4**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Americas														
Central America														
Panama														
1999	598	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	350	–	–
North America														
Canada														
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	[b]	–
Mexico														
1997	–	–	607	–	–	–	–	–	–	47	–	–	7	–
1998	1	–	340	–	–	–	–	–	–	4 979	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	560	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 000	–	63	–
2001	5	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	121	–
United States of America														
1997	23	–	1 103	–	–	–	–	[c]	29	300	–	60 004	8 772	9
1998	20	–	1 778	–	–	[c]	–	[c]	1 049	37	–	7	18 635	67
1999	7	–	425	–	–	84	–	1	450	17	–	8	3 103	2
2000	1	–	370	–	7	–	269	–	40	131	1 091	11	45 065	8
2001	27	1	311	–	45	–	–	14	11	1	–	514	21 987	114
Total subregion														
1997	**23**	**0**	**1 710**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**29**	**347**	**0**	**60 004**	**8 779**	**9**
1998	**21**	**0**	**2 118**	**0**	**0**	**[c]**	**0**	**[c]**	**1 049**	**5 016**	**0**	**7**	**18 635**	**67**
1999	**605**	**0**	**425**	**0**	**0**	**84**	**0**	**1**	**450**	**17**	**0**	**358**	**3 103**	**2**
2000	**1**	**0**	**930**	**0**	**7**	**0**	**269**	**0**	**40**	**131**	**2 091**	**11**	**45 128**	**8**
2001	**32**	**1**	**312**	**0**	**45**	**0**	**0**	**14**	**11**	**1**	**0**	**515**	**22 108**	**114**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
South America														
Argentina														
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2 830	–	–
2000	2 233	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	89	–	–
Bolivia														
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	39	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	82	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	33	–	–
Brazil														
1997	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	856	–	–
1998	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	227	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3 518	–	–
Colombia														
1997	545	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	111 154	–	–
1998	25 882	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	126 636	–	–
1999	9 917	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	71 193	–	–
2000	275	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	70 801	–	–
2001	10 855	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	50 186	–	–
Ecuador														
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	660	–	–
1999	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	397	–	–
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	127	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	349	–	–

Country or territory, by region	Acetic anhydride*	N-acetylanthranilic acid	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Norephedrine	Piperonal	Potassium permanganate*	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Peru														
1997	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	156	–	–
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	113	–	–
1999	19	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	150	–	–
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	345	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	140	–	–
Venezuela														
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	73 510	–	–
2000	840	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	300	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	223	–	–
Total subregion														
1997	**545**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**112 166**	**0**	**0**
1998	**25 887**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**127 448**	**0**	**0**
1999	**9 938**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**151 680**	**0**	**0**
2000	**3 348**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**71 576**	**0**	**0**
2001	**10 855**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**51 020**	**0**	**0**
Asia														
East and South-East Asia														
China														
1998	78 247	–	5 100	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	19 091	–	8 800	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	31 985	–	10 150	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5 000	–	–

Country or territory, by region	Acetic anhydride*	N-acetylanthranilic acid	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Norephedrine	Piperonal	Potassium permanganate*	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Hong Kong SAR of China														
1997	–	–	271	–	–	–	–	2 561	125	–	4 200 000	–	28	°
1998	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4 200 000	40	–	°
2000	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
2001	°	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	197	–	–	–	–	–
Myanmar														
1997	26 469	–	2 420	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	13 940	–	3 819	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	1 620	–	2 670	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	2 429	–	2 670	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	12 318	–	3 922	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Philippines														
1997	–	–	56	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea														
1999	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Thailand														
1997	60	–	38	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	–	–	45	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	404	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	88 000	–	–	–
Total subregion														
1997	**26 529**	**0**	**2 785**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2 561**	**125**	**0**	**4 200 000**	**0**	**28**	**0**
1998	**92 193**	**0**	**8 964**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1999	**21 115**	**0**	**11 470**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**4 200 000**	**40**	**0**	**°**
2000	**34 414**	**0**	**12 820**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5 002**	**0**	**0**
2001	**12 318**	**0**	**3 923**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**197**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
South Asia														
India														
1997	8 311	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	25	–	1 052	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	2 963	–	1 421	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	1 337	–	426	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	8 589	–	930	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
West Asia														
Azerbaijan														
2001	11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kazakhstan														
1998	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	23	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan														
1997	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lebanon														
1998	18	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Pakistan														
1998	10 011	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	422	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	43	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Syrian Arab Republic														
2001	2 639	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Turkey														
1997	6 637	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	17 861	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	29 306	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	33 692	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
2001	47 602	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan														
1997	41 000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	31 803	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	13 946	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan														
1997	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	14 819	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total subregion														
1997	**47 646**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1998	**74 514**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1999	**43 674**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
2000	**33 735**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**0**
2001	**50 275**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
Europe														
Belarus														
1999	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Bulgaria														
1997	3 420	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 460	–	–	–	–	–
1998	2 880	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	100	–
1999	2 233	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	45	–	–	–	–	–
2000	9 891	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	285	–	–	–	–	–
Czech Republic														
1997	–	–	20	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	15	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	15	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	22	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia														
2000	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	°
2001	°	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Hungary														
1998	–	–	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	110	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	60	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia														
1997	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania														
1997	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	°	10	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Poland														
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 321	–	–	–	–	–
Russian Federation														
1997	17 123	–	3 535	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	200	–	–
1998	69	–	14	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	420	–	–
1999	1 971	–	133	–	–	–	11	–	–	–	–	212	–	–
2000	3	–	3 040	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Slovakia														
1997	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5 864	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Slovenia														
2000	9 167	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	9 260	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ukraine														
1998	–	–	24	–	–	–	–	–	48	–	30 000	–	°	–
1999	13	–	28	3	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	8	°	–
2000	110	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	°	°	–	7	°	–
2001	121	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	118	2	–
European Union														
Austria														
1998	–	–	[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region		*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit		*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Belgium															
	1998	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4
	1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	10 000	–	–
	2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	11 492	1 743	–	3 000	–	–	–
	2001	8 671	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland															
	1998	–	–	17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	2001	–	–	[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
France															
	1998	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany															
	1997	7	–	°	–	–	–	–	°	–	–	2	°	°	121
	1998	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4
	1999	1	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	115	–	30	–	°	°
	2000	1	–	5	–	–	–	–	400	°	–	22 490	–	6	–
	2001	1 700	–	–	–	–	–	–	75	–	–	4 600 000	1	–	–
Greece															
	1998	3 748	–	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	2000	111	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 846	–	–	–	–	–
Italy															
	1997	–	–	47	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
	2001	16 298	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Netherlands														
1997	–	–	–	–	–	40	–	1 400	10 200	–	–	–	–	40
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	430	–	–	–	–	3
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	456	600	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	5	–	–	–	–	2 555	5	–	–	–	–	39 724
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10 961	18 238	–	–	–	–	225
Spain														
1997	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	49 332	–	–	–
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	–
1999	3	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	25	–	5
2000	–	–	16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	54	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	150	–	–
Sweden														
1997	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	°	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland														
1997	–	–	10	–	–	18	–	–	13	–	1 000	–	–	200
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	25	–	–	1	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	40	–	–	–	–	–
2001	64 700	–	[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total region														
1997	**20 550**	**0**	**3 614**	**0**	**0**	**58**	**0**	**1 400**	**11 673**	**0**	**50 334**	**200**	**0**	**361**
1998	**6 697**	**0**	**70**	**5**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**503**	**0**	**30 000**	**427**	**100**	**11**
1999	**4 221**	**0**	**188**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**11**	**6 323**	**910**	**0**	**30**	**10 245**	°	**5**
2000	**19 283**	**0**	**3 085**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**14 447**	**4 986**	**0**	**22 490**	**61**	**6**	**39 724**
2001	**100 750**	**0**	**28**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**11 036**	**18 523**	**0**	**4 600 000**	**269**	**2**	**225**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetic anhydride**	*N-acetylanthranilic acid*	*Ephedrine*	*Ergometrine*	*Ergotamine*	*Isosafrole*	*Lysergic acid*	*3,4-MDP-2-P*	*1-phenyl-2-propanone*	*Norephedrine*	*Piperonal*	*Potassium permanganate**	*Pseudoephedrine*	*Safrole*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*grams*	*litres*	*grams*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*grams*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*
Oceania														
Australia														
1997	206	–	25	–	–	3	4	–	9	[b]	–	–	[b]	[b]
1998	–	–	1	–	–	[b]	–	–	12	–	–	–	12	[b]
1999	86	–	1	–	–	–	[b]	[b]	3	–	20 250	2	12	5
2000	7	–	13	–	–	–	8	–	–	–	–	1	111	[b]
2001	3	–	644	–	25	–	71	–	4	15	32	4	79	1
Total region														
1997	**206**	**0**	**25**	**0**	**0**	**3**	**4**	**0**	**9**	[b]	**0**	**0**	[b]	[b]
1998	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	[b]	**0**	**0**	**12**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**12**	[b]
1999	**86**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	[b]	**0**	**3**	**0**	**20 250**	**2**	**12**	**5**
2000	**7**	**0**	**13**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**8**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**111**	[b]
2001	**3**	**0**	**644**	**0**	**25**	**0**	**71**	**0**	**4**	**15**	**32**	**4**	**79**	**1**
World total														
1997	**103 815**	**0**	**8 134**	**0**	**0**	**61**	**4**	**3 961**	**11 836**	**347**	**4 250 334**	**172 370**	**8 808**	**373**
1998	**199 480**	**0**	**12 205**	**5**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1 564**	**5 016**	**30 000**	**127 882**	**18 747**	**78**
1999	**82 605**	**0**	**13 506**	**3**	**1**	**84**	**11**	**6 324**	**1 363**	**17**	**4 220 280**	**162 375**	**3 115**	**19**
2000	**92 125**	**0**	**76 406**	**0**	**7**	**0**	**277**	**14 447**	**5 026**	**132**	**2 024 581**	**76 653**	**45 396**	**39 732**
2001	**182 830**	**1**	**5 912**	**0**	**70**	**0**	**71**	**11 050**	**18 735**	**16**	**4 600 032**	**51 808**	**22 189**	**344**

Notes: * Transferred to Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2001.

[a] For 2001 the following countries have reported seizures of preparations containing ephedrine:

Côte d'Ivoire (626,119 units), Finland (90,000 units), Slovakia (63,292 units), Sweden (30,664 units) and United Kingdom (150,000 units).

[b] The exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

Table 3b
Seizures of substances in Table II of the 1988 Convention as reported to the Board

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Africa									
South Africa									
1997	25	–	25	5	–	–	–	3	70
1998	–	88	–	50	–	–	–	36	20
1999	34	–	5	27	–	–	–	43	2
2000	–	8	–	3	–	–	–	3	–
2001	58	–	2	12	–	2	–	26	–
Total subregion									
1997	**25**	**0**	**25**	**5**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3**	**70**
1998	**0**	**88**	**0**	**50**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**36**	**20**
1999	**34**	**0**	**5**	**27**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**43**	**2**
2000	**0**	**8**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3**	**0**
2001	**58**	**0**	**2**	**12**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**26**	**0**
Americas									
North America									
Canada									
1998	[a]	–	[a]	–	–	[a]	–	–	[a]
Mexico									
1997	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	1 317
1998	400	–	–	[o]	–	1	–	666	[o]
2000	23	–	1	90	–	–	–	16	–
2001	19 202	–	–	876	–	–	–	173	–
United States of America									
1997	4 348	–	633	2 834	140	34	–	667	1 079
1998	7 159	–	1 048	5 463	226	18	[a]	1 948	1 733
1999	7	–	1 670	1 250	25	4	–	1 336	3 230
2000	52 336	11	16 013	4 520	75	1	17	740	3 702
2001	12 838	–	2 002	49 235	125	4	[o]	19 197	4 983
Total subregion									
1997	**4 348**	**0**	**633**	**2 837**	**140**	**34**	**0**	**667**	**2 396**
1998	**7 559**	**0**	**1 048**	**5 463**	**226**	**19**	**0**	**2 614**	**1 733**
1999	**7**	**0**	**1 670**	**1 250**	**25**	**4**	**0**	**1 336**	**3 230**
2000	**52 359**	**11**	**16 014**	**4 610**	**75**	**1**	**17**	**756**	**3 702**
2001	**32 040**	**0**	**2 002**	**50 111**	**125**	**4**	**[o]**	**19 370**	**4 983**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
South America									
Argentina									
1998	264	–	173	1 500	–	–	–	100	–
1999	393 000	–	141 500	207 700	–	–	–	5 000	–
2000	–	–	551	253	1 584	–	–	32	–
2001	424	–	709	141	29 987	–	–	52	–
Bolivia									
1998	5 727	–	3 275	4 974	–	–	–	3 590	–
1999	5 945	–	–	5 001	–	–	–	4 213	–
2001	2 106	–	2 010	922	2 180	–	–	2 698	–
Brazil									
1997	–	–	50	9 832	–	–	–	4 430	–
1998	2	–	609	3	100	–	–	55	838
1999	30 290	–	2 174	6 303	–	–	–	7 920	11 481
Chile									
1997	2	–	°	78	–	–	–	–	–
1998	3 010	–	1	310	–	–	–	2 026	–
1999	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
2000	61	–	–	8	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	18	–
Colombia									
1997	1 244 461	–	320 090	421 664	759 637	–	–	438 687	211 070
1998	1 448 610	–	155 442	358 761	1 025 466	–	–	1 403 255	315 347
1999	1 666 229	–	205 983	143 516	88 402	–	–	286 929	92 982
2000	894 070	–	67 704	62 298	69 209	–	–	198 359	13 306
2001	1 546 651	–	53 989	126 884	10 674	–	–	242	19
Ecuador									
1997	15	–	293	3 305	3 290	–	–	3 642	698
1998	596	–	–	1 935	17 665	–	–	4 399	12 328
1999	327	–	–	710	42 201	–	–	8 249	1
2000	–	–	–	228	7 473	–	–	1 469	–
2001	–	–	–	160	1 975	–	–	296	–
Peru									
1997	*17 306*	–	*54*	*5 014*	*889 893*	–	–	*31 720*	26
1998	57 182	–	1 176	13 876	*274*	–	–	24 468	21
1999	29 892	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	40 657	–	14 613	7 546	–	–	–	21 517	4 743
2001	11 549	2 691	–	–	–	–	–	18 395	8 679

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Suriname									
1998	48 000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Venezuela									
1999	6 600	–	–	–	2 000	–	–	–	–
2000	3 600	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	–	25 580	–	–	–	1 344	2 800
Total subregion									
1997	**1 261 785**	**0**	**320 487**	**439 892**	**1 652 820**	**0**	**0**	**478 479**	**211 794**
1998	**1 563 392**	**0**	**160 676**	**381 359**	**1 043 505**	**0**	**0**	**1 437 894**	**328 534**
1999	**2 132 288**	**0**	**349 657**	**363 230**	**132 603**	**0**	**0**	**312 312**	**104 464**
2000	**938 389**	**0**	**82 868**	**70 332**	**78 266**	**0**	**0**	**221 377**	**18 049**
2001	**1 560 730**	**2 691**	**56 708**	**153 687**	**44 816**	**0**	**0**	**23 045**	**11 498**
Asia									
East and South-East Asia									
China									
1998	–	–	*16 474*	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	18 553	–	*5 407*	–	–	–	–	–	–
Hong Kong SAR of China									
1997	–	–	–	–	–	–	43	–	–
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	°	–	–	–	–	°	–	–
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Macao SAR of China									
1998	°	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Myanmar									
1997	*1 987*	–	*4 505*	*1 296*	–	–	–	*8 701*	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	594	–	–	–
2000	4 319	–	36 400	956	–	–	–	5 828	–
2001	114	1	136	3 870	–	375	–	2 937	–
Republic of Korea									
1999	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Thailand									
1997	160	–	1 280	–	–	–	–	*30*	–
1998	–	–	1	660	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	1 600	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	–	–	1 205	20	–	–	–	–	–
Total subregion									
1997	**2 147**	**0**	**5 785**	**1 296**	**0**	**0**	**43**	**8 731**	**0**
1998	**0**	**0**	**16 475**	**660**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1999	**0**	**°**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**594**	**°**	**0**	**0**
2000	**22 872**	**0**	**43 407**	**956**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5 828**	**0**
2001	**114**	**1**	**1 341**	**3 890**	**0**	**375**	**0**	**2 937**	**0**
West Asia									
Kazakhstan									
2001	–	–	–	265	–	–	–	1 334	–
Turkey									
1997	10	–	–	5	–	–	–	2	–
1998	–	–	130	74	–	–	–	5	–
1999	384	–	14	31	–	–	–	–	–
2000	–	–	–	5	–	–	–	5	25 964
2001	422	–	1 075	–	–	–	–	217	–
Turkmenistan									
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan									
1998	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total subregion									
1997	**10**	**0**	**0**	**5**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**
1998	**2**	**0**	**130**	**74**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5**	**0**
1999	**384**	**0**	**14**	**31**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
2000	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5**	**25 964**
2001	**422**	**0**	**1 075**	**265**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1 551**	**0**

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Europe									
Bulgaria									
1997	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1998	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2000	144	–	2 000	1 000	–	28	–	–	24
Czech Republic									
2001	33	–	4	11	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia									
2000	º	–	74	–	º	–	–	–	–
Romania									
1999	–	–	377	–	–	–	–	–	–
Russian Federation									
1997	156 666	–	114 294	243 588	351 026	445	–	1 262 760	1 964
1998	135 645	–	2	596	283	–	–	10 822	10
1999	417 860	–	6	211 825	4 464	–	–	4 452	709
2000	11 464	–	7 885	58 897	13 036	–	2	24 652	–
Slovakia									
1997	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	4
Ukraine									
1998	13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1999	824	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	21
2000	20	–	–	7	–	–	–	7	48
2001	152	–	4 500	–	–	–	–	–	–
European Union									
Belgium									
1998	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2001	2 000	–	3 200	2 435	–	–	–	25	–
France									
1998	3	–	–	5	–	–	–	1	1

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Germany									
1997	38	–	44	13	º	º	º	4	4
1998	º	–	507	9	–	–	–	9	13
1999	1	–	º	1	130	–	–	–	–
2000	1	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	4
2001	1 445	–	13	7	–	–	–	4	4
Greece									
2000	–	–	550	–	–	–	–	171	–
Italy									
1997	*88 831*	–	–	*1*	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands									
1997	–	–	–	*54*	*34*	–	–	*14*	–
1998	428	–	8	2	–	–	–	7	–
1999	1 420	–	1 275	2 965	–	–	–	100	–
2000	22 680	–	24 135	16 390	20	–	–	160	–
2001	15 600	–	3 800	8 025	–	–	–	1 250	–
Portugal									
2000	38	–	1	–	–	–	–	3	–
Spain									
1997	254	–	3	3	–	–	–	–	5
1998	276	–	101	24	–	–	–	17	12
1999	610	–	300	19	75	–	–	6	–
2000	151	–	203	311	533	–	4	26	–
2001	4 694	–	6 829	151	5 930	–	–	42	365
Sweden									
1997	2	–	–	163	–	9	–	49	1
1998	5	–	1	120	–	–	–	33	215
2001	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland									
1997	–	–	25	20	–	–	–	25	10
1998	135	–	65	203	–	25	–	[a]	5
1999	208	–	3	10	–	–	–	53	5
2001	–	–	–	–	1 250	–	–	–	3 673

Country or territory, by region	*Acetone*	*Anthranilic acid*	*Ethyl ether*	*Hydrochloric acid*	*Methyl ethyl ketone*	*Phenylacetic acid*	*Piperidine*	*Sulphuric acid*	*Toluene*
Unit	*litres*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*	*litres*	*kilograms*	*kilograms*	*litres*	*litres*
Total region									
1997	**245 791**	**0**	**114 366**	**243 843**	**351 060**	**454**	**0**	**1 262 852**	**1 988**
1998	**136 510**	**0**	**683**	**959**	**283**	**25**	**0**	**10 889**	**256**
1999	**420 923**	**0**	**1 960**	**214 820**	**4 669**	**0**	**3**	**4 611**	**735**
2000	**34 498**	**0**	**34 848**	**76 607**	**13 589**	**28**	**6**	**25 019**	**75**
2001	**23 924**	**0**	**18 346**	**10 629**	**7 180**	**0**	**0**	**1 324**	**4 042**
Oceania									
Australia									
1997	187	–	454	329	–	[a]	[a]	114	398
1998	11	–	3	9	–	–	–	8	3
1999	590	–	269	146	3	51	–	38	272
2000	159	–	109	318	–	–	–	149	198
2001	488	–	387	450	16	–	35	412	231
New Zealand									
2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total region									
1997	**187**	**0**	**454**	**329**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**114**	**398**
1998	**11**	**0**	**3**	**9**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**8**	**3**
1999	**590**	**0**	**269**	**146**	**3**	**51**	**0**	**38**	**272**
2000	**159**	**0**	**109**	**318**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**149**	**198**
2001	**488**	**0**	**387**	**450**	**16**	**0**	**35**	**412**	**231**
World total									
1997	**1 514 293**	**0**	**441 750**	**688 207**	**2 004 020**	**488**	**43**	**1 750 848**	**216 646**
1998	**1 707 474**	**88**	**179 015**	**388 574**	**1 044 014**	**44**	**0**	**1 451 446**	**330 546**
1999	**2 554 226**	[a]	**353 575**	**579 505**	**137 300**	**649**	**3**	**318 340**	**108 702**
2000	**1 048 276**	**19**	**177 245**	**152 831**	**91 930**	**29**	**23**	**253 137**	**47 988**
2001	**1 617 776**	**2 692**	**79 861**	**219 044**	**52 137**	**381**	**35**	**48 665**	**20 754**

Notes: [a] The exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

Table 4

Submission of information by Governments on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention for the years 1997-2001

Governments of the countries and territories indicated have provided information on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention on Form D for 1997-2001. That information was requested in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995. Details may be made available on a case-by-case basis, subject to confidentiality of data.

Notes: Non-metropolitan territories and special administrative regions are in italics.

X signifies that relevant information was submitted on Form D.

	1997		*1998*		*1999*		*2000*		*2001*	
Country or territory	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*
Afghanistan							X	X		
Albania										
Algeria			X	X	X	X				
Andorra										
Angola										
Anguilla			X	X	X	X			X	X
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X					X	X		
Argentina			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Armenia									X	X
Aruba										
Ascension Island					X	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Austria							X	X	X	X
Azerbaijan							X	X		
Bahamas										
Bahrain							X	X	X	X
Bangladesh										
Barbados			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium			X		X		X		X	
Belize										
Benin	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bermuda										
Bhutan							X	X		
Bolivia			X				X	X	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina										
Botswana				X						
Brazil					X					
British Virgin Islands										

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
Country or territory	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*
Brunei Darussalam	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burkina Faso										
Burundi										
Cambodia										
Cameroon										
Canada					X					
Cape Verde										
Cayman Islands					X	X				
Central African Republic									X	X
Chad										
Chile	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
China										
Hong Kong SAR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Macao SAR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Christmas Island										
Cocos (Keeling) Islands										
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros										
Congo					X	X	X	X		
Cook Islands	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X								
Croatia										
Cuba							X	X		
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Czech Republic	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea			X	X					X	X
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti										
Dominica										
Dominican Republic	X	X			X	X				
Ecuador	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Egypt										
El Salvador			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Equatorial Guinea										
Eritrea										
Estonia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Falkland Islands					X	X	X	X		
Fjji	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
Country or territory	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*
Finland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
France			X		X		X		X	
French Polynesia									X	
Gabon										
Gambia										
Georgia										
Germany			X		X		X		X	
Ghana										
Gibraltar										
Greece	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada										
Guatemala	X	X			X	X	X	X		
Guinea										
Guinea-Bissau										
Guyana					X	X	X	X		
Haiti										
Honduras					X					
Hungary	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland										
India	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Indonesia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Iraq							X	X		
Ireland			X	X			X	X	X	X
Israel										
Italy	X	X	X		X		X		X	
Jamaica	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kazakhstan			X	X	X	X		X	X	
Kenya	X	X	X	X			X		X	
Kiribati	X	X							X	X
Kuwait										
Kyrgyzstan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X		X		X		X		X	
Latvia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Lebanon			X	X						
Lesotho										
Liberia										
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya										
Lithuania		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Luxembourg					X	X	X		X	X

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
Country or territory	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/or require-ments*
Madagascar										
Malawi	X	X								
Malaysia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Maldives										
Mali							X	X	X	X
Malta			X	X			X	X	X	X
Marshall Islands										
Mauritania										
Mauritius	X	X			X		X	X		
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Micronesia (Federated States of)										
Monaco			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mongolia										
Montserrat										
Morocco	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Mozambique										
Myanmar					X	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia										
Nauru			X	X						
Nepal		X			X	X			X	X
Netherlands			X		X		X		X	
Netherlands Antilles	X	X	X	X						
New Caledonia			X		X	X	X		X	
New Zealand			X		X	X	X	X		
Nicaragua	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Niger										
Nigeria	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norfolk Island										
Norway							X			
Oman	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Pakistan										
Palau										
Panama					X	X	X	X	X	X
Papua New Guinea										
Paraguay							X	X		
Peru			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Philippines	X	X								
Poland	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X			X		X		X	X
Qatar									X	X
Republic of Korea	X	X								
Republic of Moldova			X	X						

Country or territory	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	Trade	Uses and/or require-ments	Trade	Uses and/or require-ments	Trade	Uses and/or require-ments	Trade	Uses and/or require-ments	Trade	Uses and/or require-ments
Romania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Russian Federation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Rwanda									X	X
Saint Helena				X		X				
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	X								
Saint Lucia										
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines							X	X		
Samoa										
San Marino										
Sao Tome and Principe									X	X
Saudi Arabia			X		X	X			X	X
Senegal			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Seychelles	X	X								
Sierra Leone										
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Solomon Islands									X	X
Somalia										
South Africa	X		X		X		X	X	X	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan										
Suriname			X		X	X	X	X		
Swaziland										
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Switzerland	X		X		X		X		X	
Syrian Arab Republic					X				X	X
Tajikistan			X	X	X	X	X	X		
Thailand	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia										
Timor-Leste										
Togo							X			
Tonga										
Trinidad and Tobago	X		X		X		X			
Tristan da Cunha										
Tunisia			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan					X	X				
Turks and Caicos Islands					X	X				
Tuvalu			X	X			X	X		
Uganda							X	X	X	X

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
Country or territory	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*	*Trade*	*Uses and/ or require-ments*
Ukraine			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
United Republic of Tanzania					X	X	X	X	X	X
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay							X	X	X	X
Uzbekistan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Vanuatu										
Venezuela			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Viet Nam	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wallis and Futuna Islands			X	X	X	X				
Yemen										
Yugoslavia										
Zambia					X	X	X	X	X	X
Zimbabwe	X	X								
Total submissions	71	67	90	76	101	87	104	90	93	80
Total number of Governments requested to provide information	211	211	211	211	211	211	211	211	212	212

Table 5

Governments that have requested pre-export notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention

All Governments of exporting countries and territories are reminded that it is an obligation to provide pre-export notifications to Governments that have requested them pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, which provides that:

"... upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country:

(i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee;

(ii) Name of the substance in Table I;

(iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;

(iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;

(v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties."

Governments that have requested pre-export notifications under the above provisions are listed alphabetically, followed by the substance(s) to which the provisions should apply and the date of notification of the request transmitted by the Secretary-General to Governments.

Governments may wish to note the possibility of requesting that a pre-export notification for all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention be also sent.

Notifying Government	*Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies*	*Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General*
Antigua and Barbuda[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	5 May 2000
Argentina	All substances included in Table I[b]	19 November 1999
Australia	Ephedrine, pseudoephedrine	26 June 2000
Belarus[c]	Ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate	
Benin[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	4 February 2000
Bolivia[a]	Acetic anhydride, potassium permanganate, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid	12 November 2001
Brazil[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	15 October 1999 and 15 December 1999
Cayman Islands[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	7 September 1998
China	Acetic anhydride	20 October 2000
Macao SAR[d]	All substances included in Table I[b]	

Notifying Government	*Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies*	*Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General*
Colombia[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	14 October 1998
Costa Rica	All substances included in Table I[b]	27 September 1999
Cyprus	All substances included in Table I[b]	21 December 1999
Czech Republic[a]	All substances included in Table I[b] and methyl ethyl ketone	2 February 2000
Dominican Republic[a, c]	All substances included in Table II	11 September 2002
Ecuador[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	1 August 1996
Ethiopia[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	17 December 1999
European Union	All substances included in Table I[b]	19 May 2000
Haiti[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	20 June 2002
India[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	23 March 2000
Indonesia[a]	All substances included in Table I except lysergic acid, anthranilic acid and phenylacetic acid	18 February 2000
Japan	*N*-acetylanthranilic acid, ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, isosafrole, lysergic acid, 3,4-methylenedioyphenyl-2-propanone, 1-phenyl-2-propanone, piperonal, pseudoephedrine and safrole	17 December 1999
Jordan[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	15 December 1999
Latvia	Ephedrine	27 May 1994
Lebanon[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	14 June 2002
Malaysia[a]	All substances included in Table I,[b] anthranilic acid, ethyl ether, phenylacetic acid and piperidine	21 August 1998
Nigeria[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	28 February 2000
Pakistan[a]	Acetic anhydride, ephedrine, potassium permanganate, pseudoephedrine and acetone	12 November 2001
Paraguay[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	3 February 2000
Peru[a]	Acetic anhydride, ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, lysergic acid, norephedrine, potassium permanganate, pseudoephedrine, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, methyl ethyl ketone, sulphuric acid and toluene	27 September 1999
Philippines[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	16 April 1999
Republic of Moldova[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	29 December 1998
Romania[a]	Acetic anhydride, potassium permanganate and all substances included in Table II[b]	17 November 2000

Notifying Government	*Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies*	*Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General*
Russian Federation[a]	Acetic anhydride, ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, norephedrine, 1-phenyl-2-propanone, potassium permanganate, pseudoephedrine and all substances included in Table II[b]	21 February 2000
Saudi Arabia[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	18 October 1998
Singapore	All substances included in Table I[b]	5 May 2000
South Africa[a]	All substances included in Table I,[b] anthranilic acid	11 August 1999
Sri Lanka	All substances included in Table I[b]	19 November 1999
Tajikistan[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	7 February 2000
Turkey[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	2 November 1995
United Arab Emirates[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	26 September 1995
United States of America	Acetic anhydride, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine	2 June 1995 and 19 January 2001
Venezuela[a]	All substances included in Tables I and II	27 March 2000

Notes: Territories are in italics.

[a] The Secretary-General has informed all Governments of the request of the notifying Government to receive a pre-export notification for substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention as well.

[b] With effect from 8 December 2001, acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate have been transferred from Table II to Table I of the 1988 Convention.

[c] Not yet notified by the Secretary-General as, in a subsequent communication, the Government of Belarus requested the Secretary-General to suspend such notification until a national mechanism to receive and process pre-export notifications is established.

[d] Not yet notified by the Secretary-General. With effect from 20 December 1999, the territory of Macao became the Macao Special Administrative Region of China.

Annex II

Substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and their typical use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

A. List of scheduled substances

Table I	*Table II*
N-acetylanthranilic acid	Acetone
Acetic anhydride	Anthranilic acid
Ephedrine	Ethyl ether
Ergometrine	Hydrochloric acid[a]
Ergotamine	Methyl ethyl ketone
Isosafrole	Phenylacetic acid
Lysergic acid	Piperidine
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	Sulphuric acid[a]
Norephedrine	Toluene
1-phenyl-2-propanone	
Piperonal	
Potassium permanganate	
Pseudoephedrine	
Safrole	
The salts of the substances in this Table whenever the existence of such salts is possible.	The salts of the substances in this Table whenever the existence of such salts is possible.

[a] The salts of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid are specifically excluded from Table II.

B. Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

1. The scheduled substances and their use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances depicted in figures XII to XV below represent classic production and manufacturing methods. The extraction of cocaine from the coca leaf and the purification of coca paste and the crude base products of cocaine and heroin require solvents, acids and bases. A wide range of such chemicals has been used at all stages of drug production.

Figure XII

Illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin

Scheduled substances, and the approximate quantities required, for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of cocaine or heroin hydrochloride



Figure XIII

Illicit manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine

Scheduled substances, and the approximate quantities required, for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of amphetamine sulphate and methamphetamine hydrochloride



Figure XIV

Illicit manufacture of MDMA and related drugs

Scheduled substances, and the approximate quantities required, for the illicit manufacture of 100 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P



Notes: Approximately 250 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDA hydrochloride; 125 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDMA or MDEA (3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine).

[a] Including safrole in the form of sassafras oil.

[b] MDA = 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine.

[c] MDMA = 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine.

Figure XV

Illicit manufacture of LSD, methaqualone and phencyclidine

Scheduled substances, and the approximate quantities required, for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of LSD, and 100 kilograms of methaqualone and phencyclidine



C. Comparative significance of seizures of scheduled substances

2. The figures above outline the typical use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The numbers shown in parentheses in the figures are the approximate quantities of scheduled substances required for illicit drug manufacture. These data may be used to calculate how much drug could be manufactured from a known quantity of seized scheduled substance.

3. To assess the significance of such manufacture in terms of drug doses on the illicit market, the table below gives details of typical street doses of some narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, together with the approximate number of such doses that may be manufactured illicitly from 1 kilogram (or 1 litre) of the relevant scheduled substance.

Table A.II.1
Street doses of drugs manufactured illicitly using scheduled substances

Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance	*Street doses*[a]	*Scheduled substance*	*Approximate number of street doses of drugs manufactured using 1 kilogram (or 1 litre) of scheduled substance*
Amphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Phenylacetic acid (kilograms)	1 000 to 25 000
		1-phenyl-2-propanone (litres)	2 000 to 50 000
		Norephedrine (kilograms)	2 500 to 70 000
Cocaine	100 mg to 200 mg	Potassium permanganate (kilograms)	25 000 to 50 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	250 to 500
Heroin	100 mg to 500 mg	Acetic anhydride (litres)	800 to 4 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	100 to 500
LSD	50 µg to 80 µg	Ergometrine/ergotamine (kilograms)	2 500 000 to 4 000 000
		Lysergic acid (kilograms)	8 500 000 to 13 000 000
Methamphetamine	30 mg to 250 mg	Ephedrine/pseudoephedrine (kilograms)	2 500 to 21 000
Methaqualone	250 mg	Anthranilic acid (kilograms)	4 000
		N-acetylanthranilic acid (kilograms)	3 200

Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance	*Street doses*[a]	*Scheduled substance*	*Approximate number of street doses of drugs manufactured using 1 kilogram (or 1 litre) of scheduled substance*
MDA and analogues	100 mg	Safrole (kilograms)	1 000[b]
		Isosafrole (kilograms)	2 000[b]
		Piperonal (kilograms)	2 000[b]
		3,4-MDP-2-P (litres)	4 000[b]
Phencyclidine	1 mg to 10 mg	Piperidine (kilograms)	100 000 to 1 000 000

[a] Doses may vary depending, inter alia, on the route of administration (by mouth, injection, inhalation etc.) and on the frequency of drug use.

[b] For illicit manufacture of MDA. The numbers of street doses of MDMA or MDEA that could be manufactured are approximately twice the figures given.

4. Using the data given in the figures, and in the above table, it can be seen that, for example, 1 kilogram of ephedrine may be used for the manufacture of approximately 0.7 kilogram of methamphetamine. That quantity of drug is equivalent to a maximum of about 70,000 street doses.

5. Similarly, 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be used to manufacture approximately 0.7 kilogram of LSD. That quantity of drug, however, is equivalent to about 10 million dosage units.

6. Therefore, in terms of the availability of the two drugs on the illicit market, the seizure of 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be considered to have an impact approximately 150 times greater than the seizure of the same quantity of ephedrine (10 million divided by 70,000).

D. Licit uses of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention

7. The following table contains the most common licit uses reported to the Board of the substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. Knowledge of those uses, including the processes and end products in which the substances may be used, is essential to verify the legitimacy of orders or shipments.

Table A.II.2
Licit uses of substances

Substance	*Licit uses*
Acetic anhydride	Acetylating and dehydrating agent in chemical and pharmaceutical industry, for manufacture of cellulose acetate, for textile sizing agents and cold bleaching activators, for polishing metals, and production of brake fluids, dyes and explosives
Acetone	Common solvent in chemical and pharmaceutical industries; used in production of lubricating oils and as intermediary in manufacture of chloroform, and in the manufacture of plastics, paints, varnishes and cosmetics
N-acetylanthranilic acid	Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, plastics and fine chemicals
Anthranilic acid	Chemical intermediate used in the manufacture of dyes, pharmaceuticals and perfumes; also in preparation of bird and insect repellents
Ephedrine	Manufacture of bronchodilators (cough medicines)
Ergometrine	Treatment of migraine and as oxytocic in obstetrics
Ergotamine	Treatment of migraine and as oxytocic in obstetrics
Ethyl ether	Commonly used solvent in chemical laboratories and in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries: mainly used as extractant for fats, oils, waxes and resins; for manufacture of munitions, plastics and perfumes; in medicine as general anaesthetic
Hydrochloric acid	In production of chlorides and hydrochlorides; for neutralization of basic systems; as catalyst and solvent in organic synthesis
Isosafrole	Manufacture of piperonal; to modify oriental perfumes; to strengthen soap perfumes; in small quantities together with methyl salicylate in root beer and sarsaparilla flavours; also used as pesticide
Lysergic acid	In organic synthesis
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	Manufacture of piperonal and other perfume components
Methyl ethyl ketone	Manufacture of coatings solvents, degreasing agents, lacquers, resins and smokeless powders; common solvent
Norephedrine	Manufacture of nasal decongestants and appetite suppressants
Phenylacetic acid	In chemical and pharmaceutical industries to manufacture phenylacetate esters, amphetamine and some derivatives; for synthesis of penicillins; in fragrance applications and cleaning solutions

Substance	*Licit uses*
1-phenyl-2-propanone	In chemical and pharmaceutical industries to manufacture amphetamine, methamphetamine and some derivatives; for synthesis of propylhexedrine
Piperidine	Commonly used solvent and reagent in chemical laboratories and in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries; also used in manufacture of rubber products and plastics
Piperonal	In perfumery; in cherry and vanilla flavours; in organic synthesis and as component for mosquito repellent
Potassium permanganate	Important reagent in analytical and synthetic organic chemistry; bleaching applications, disinfectants, antibacterials and antifungal agents; water purification
Pseudoephedrine	Manufacture of bronchodilators and nasal decongestants
Safrole	In perfumery, e.g. in manufacture of piperonal, denaturing fats in soap manufacture
Sulphuric acid	In production of sulphates; as an acidic oxidizer; a dehydrating and purifying agent; for neutralization of alkaline solutions; as catalyst in organic synthesis; in manufacture of fertilizers, explosives, dyestuffs, paper; as a component of drain and metal cleaners, anti-rust compounds and automobile battery fluids
Toluene	Industrial solvent; manufacture of explosives, dyes, coatings, other organic substances and as gasoline additive

Annex III

Treaty provisions for the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

1. Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961[a] provides as follows:

> "The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

2. Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971,[b] provides as follows:

> "The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

3. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 contains provisions for the following:

(a) General obligation for parties to take measures to prevent diversion of the substances listed in Table I and Table II and to cooperate with each other to that end (paragraph 1);

(b) Mechanism for amending the scope of control (paragraphs 2-7);

(c) Requirement to take appropriate measures to monitor manufacture and distribution, to which end parties may: control persons and enterprises; control establishments and premises under licence; require permits for such operations; and prevent accumulation of substances listed in Tables I and II (paragraph 8);

(d) Obligation to monitor international trade to identify suspicious transactions; to provide for seizures; to notify the authorities of the parties concerned in case of suspicious transactions; to require proper labelling and documentation; and to ensure maintenance of such documents for at least two years (paragraph 9);

(e) Mechanism for advance notice of exports of substances listed in Table I, upon special request (paragraph 10);

(f) Confidentiality of information (paragraph 11);

(g) Reporting by parties to the Board (paragraph 12);

(h) Report of the Board to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (paragraph 13);

(i) Non-applicability of the provisions of article 12 to certain preparations (paragraph 14).

Notes:

[a] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 520, No. 7515.

[b] Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.

The role of the International Narcotics Control Board

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ, established by treaty, for monitoring the implementation of the international drug control treaties. It had predecessors under the former drug control treaties as far back as the time of the League of Nations.

Composition

INCB consists of 13 members who are elected by the Economic and Social Council and who serve in their personal capacity, not as government representatives. Three members with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience are elected from a list of persons nominated by the World Health Organization (WHO) and 10 members are elected from a list of persons nominated by Governments. Members of INCB are persons who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, command general confidence. The Council, in consultation with INCB, makes all arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical independence of the Board in carrying out its functions. INCB has a secretariat that assists it in the exercise of its treaty-related functions. The INCB secretariat is an administrative entity of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), but it reports solely to the Board on matters of substance. INCB closely collaborates with UNDCP in the framework of arrangements approved by the Council in its resolution 1991/48. INCB also cooperates with other international bodies concerned with drug control, including not only the Council and its Commission on Narcotic Drugs, but also the relevant specialized agencies of the United Nations, particularly WHO. It also cooperates with bodies outside the United Nations system, especially the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the Customs Co-operation Council (also called the World Customs Organization).

Functions

The functions of INCB are laid down in the following treaties: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Broadly speaking, INCB deals with the following:

(a) As regards the licit manufacture of, trade in and use of drugs, INCB endeavours, in cooperation with Governments, to ensure that adequate supplies of drugs are available for medical and scientific uses and that the diversion of drugs from licit sources to illicit channels does not occur. INCB also monitors Governments' control over chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and assists them in preventing the diversion of those chemicals into the illicit traffic;

(b) As regards the illicit manufacture of, trafficking in and use of drugs, INCB identifies weaknesses in national and international control systems and contributes to correcting such situations. INCB is also responsible for assessing chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, in order to determine whether they should be placed under international control.

In the discharge of its responsibilities, INCB:

(a) Administers a system of estimates for narcotic drugs and a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances and monitors licit activities involving drugs through a statistical returns system, with a view to assisting Governments in achieving, inter alia, a balance between supply and demand;

(b) Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments to prevent the diversion of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and assesses such substances to determine whether there is a need for changes in the scope of control of Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention;

(c) Analyses information provided by Governments, United Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other competent international organizations, with a view to ensuring that the provisions of the international drug control treaties are adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends remedial measures;

(d) Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to assist them in complying with their obligations under the international drug control treaties and, to that end, recommends, where appropriate, technical or financial assistance to be provided.

INCB is called upon to ask for explanations in the event of apparent violations of the treaties, to propose appropriate remedial measures to Governments that are not fully applying the provisions of the treaties or are encountering difficulties in applying them and, where necessary, to assist Governments in overcoming such difficulties. If, however, INCB notes that the measures necessary to remedy a serious situation have not been taken, it may call the matter to the attention of the parties concerned, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council. As a last resort, the treaties empower INCB to recommend to parties that they stop importing drugs from a defaulting country, exporting drugs to it or both. In all cases, INCB acts in close cooperation with Governments.

INCB assists national administrations in meeting their obligations under the conventions. To that end, it proposes and participates in regional training seminars and programmes for drug control administrators.

Reports

The international drug control treaties require INCB to prepare an annual report on its work. The annual report contains an analysis of the drug control situation worldwide so that Governments are kept aware of existing and potential situations that may endanger the objectives of the international drug control treaties. INCB draws the attention of Governments to gaps and weaknesses in national control and in treaty compliance; it also makes suggestions and recommendations for improvements at both the national and international levels. The annual report is based on information provided by Governments to INCB, United Nations entities and other organizations. It also uses information provided through other international organizations, such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization, as well as regional organizations.

The annual report of INCB is supplemented by detailed technical reports. They contain data on the licit movement of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances required for medical and scientific purposes, together with an analysis of those data by INCB. Those data are required for the proper functioning of the system of control over the licit movement of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including preventing their diversion to illicit channels. Moreover, under the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, INCB reports annually to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on the implementation of that article. That report, which gives an account of the results of the monitoring of precursors and of the chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, is also published as a supplement to the annual report.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى: الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。 请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

CÓMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

United Nations publication
Sales No. E.03.XI.4
ISBN 92-1-148155-4
E/INCB/2002/4

Printed in Austria
V.02-60182–January 2003–1,450